LAZARO VENIEGAS, Petitioner, v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

Aniano A. Albon for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of six (6) counts of malversation and six (6) counts of
falsification. In this petition, he assailed the decision as violative of due process and the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. He alleged that he was convicted without evidence of his guilt;
that having been convicted of malversation he should not be convicted of falsification; that he was
made to answer several times for a single offense; and that for the twelve (12) convictions he would be
made to serve ninety two (92) years of imprisonment. Petitioner further claimed that P. D. No. 1606
creating the Sandiganbayan is an ex-post facto legislation.

The Supreme Court held that petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of due process of law is belied by
the decision of the Sandiganbayan which states and analyzes the evidence against him, and which
shows that the misappropriations could have been committed without resort to falsifications, and that
the falsifications and misappropriations were committed by him separately; that the maximum duration
of his sentence is that mandated by the provisions of Article 70, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code; and
that in the case of Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan. G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, it has been resolved that P.D. No.
1606 is not an ex-post facto legislation.

Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; DUE PROCESS

OF LAW; CLAIM OF DEPRIVATION THEREOF BELIED BY ASSAILED DECISION IN CASE
AT BAR. — The claim of the petitioner that he was deprived of due process of law for having been
convicted without evidence of guilt is belied by the decision of the Sandiganbayan which states and
analyzes the evidence against him. Further on due process, petitioner claims that having been convicted
of malversation, he should not have been convicted anymore of falsification. But as the Sandiganbayan
states in its decision, the public funds were already in petitioner’s possession and he could have
misappropriated them without having to resort to falsification but which he did anyway. His other
claim that he was made to answer several times for a single offense is baseless for the
misappropriations and falsifications were committed by him separately.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; NINETY TWO (92)
YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER IN CASE AT BAR SUBJECT TO
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 70, PARAGRAPH 4, REVISED PENAL CODE. — The claim that the
decision imposed cruel and unusual punishment because for the twelve (12) convictions petitioner
would be made to serve ninety two (92) years of imprisonment which is "shocking to the moral sense . .
. an offense to the Constitution" is non-sense. The provisions of Art. 70, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code mandates that "the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than threefold
the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him, and no other
penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the
same maximum period."

RESOLUTION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Petitioner in seeking to set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting him of six (6) counts of
malversation and six (6) counts of falsification assails the decision as violative of due process and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. He also contends that P.D. No. 1606, which created
the Sandiganbayan, is an ex-post facto legislation.

The petition must fail on all counts.

It is to be noted that it is the decision, not the statute, which petitioner assails as having violated the due
process and the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Constitution. He claims that he was
deprived of due process of law for having been convicted without evidence of his guilt. This is belied
by the decision of the Sandiganbayan which states and analyzes the evidence against him. Further on
due process, petitioner claims that having been convicted of malversation, he should not have been
convicted anymore of falsification. But as the Sandiganbayan states in its decision, the public funds
were already in petitioner’s possession and he could have misappropriated them without having to
resort to falsification but which he did anyway. His other claim that he was made to answer several
times for a single offense is baseless for the misappropriations and falsifications were committed by
him separately. Lastly, it is claimed that the decision imposed cruel and unusual punishment because
for the twelve (12) convictions, he would be made to serve ninety two (92) years of imprisonment
which is "shocking to the moral sense . . . an offense to the constitution." This is nonsense. Obviously,
petitioner’s counsel has forgotten the provisions of Art. 70, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
mandates: chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

"Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict’s
sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum
total of those imposed equals the same maximum period." cralaw virtua1aw library

As to the claim that P.D. No. 1606 is ex-post facto legislation, Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
50581-50617, says it is not so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano by the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case Nos. T-20 and T-21, for the killing of
Godofredo Pascual and Mariano Buenaflor.
The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:
On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of
Camarines Sur, between the hours of four and five o'clock in the afternoon, after the
accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim Godofredo Pascua with a
bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol "palas" which is a sharp bladed and pointed
instrument about two feet long including the black handle, tapering to the end, about one
and one-half inches in width, (Exhibit "C") while the latter was walking alone along the
barrio street almost infront of the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo
Pascua, sustained two mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously, described by
Dr. Constancio A. Tan, Municipal Health Officer, of Sagñay Camarines Sur, in his
Autopsy Report (Exhibit "A", pp. 5, Record Crim. Case No. T-21) as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB - three (3) inches long at left side, three (3) inches
below left axilla, a little bit posteriorly, cutting the skin, subcutaneous
tissues, muscles one (1) rib, pleura of left lung, pericardium, penetrating
the ventricles of the heart, Media stinum, the right lung and exit to the
right chest. One inch opening.
2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm
CAUSE OF DEATH - Wound No. 1 causing instant death due to severe
hemorrhage.
After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused proceeded to the
seashore of the barrio, and on finding Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence
of his house, in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head
stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after the
victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he
lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave him a final thrust of the bolo
at the left side of the chest above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a
little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back, of one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit
B) causing instant death. The victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which
were specifically described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "B" dated
February 17, 1970, as follows:
NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:
1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest above the
nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an
exit at the back of one (1) inch opening. Penetrating the skin,
subcutaneous tissues, pericardium the auricles of the heart, the left lung
towards the right side of back.
2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep three-
fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the sternum.
3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long one and
one-half (1-1/2) inches deep.
4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches long.
5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting skin and
bone of anterior side.
6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.
7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at the back near
spinal column.
8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head cutting skin
and bone.
CAUSE OF DEATH — Wound number one (1) causing instant death due to severe
hemorrhage from the heart." Out of the eight (8) wounds, two (2) are mortal wounds,
namely wound Number one (1) and wound Number Three (3), (Exhibit "B") (t.s.n., pp.
18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two victims Godofredo Pascua and Mariano
Buenaflor, together with the accused are neighbors, residing at the same street of Barrio
Nato, Sagñay, Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31, Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody
 incident was not preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the victims and the
accused (t.s.n. p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).
Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the two victims
had a misunderstanding with the accused while fishing along Sagnay River. During this
occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo Pascua to tow his fishing boat
with the motor boat owned by Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused by both.
This refusal greatly offended and embittered the accused against the victims. From this
time on, the accused begrudged the two, and entertained personal resentment against
them. And although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the game table with
Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems to be
merely artificial than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom he openly
detested. He consistently refused to associate since then with the two victim especially,
Mariano Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts were made by Amado Payago, a
neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were refused.
Instead, defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge Mariano Buenaflor to a
fight and announce his evil intention to kill them. (t.s.n., pp. 50-53, session November
22, 1971.)
Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or "palas" belongs to the accused.
That after killing the two victims, he returned to his house, where he subsequently
surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, Erasmo Valencia, upon demand
by laid peace officers for him to surrender. When brought to the Police headquarters of
the town for investigation he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden by
him under the table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was
dispatched, and recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to he
Chief of Police was still stained with human blood from the base of the handle to the
point of the blade. And when asked as to who was he owner of said bolo, the accused
admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano
Buenaflor. however, when he was asked to sign a statement, he refused. 1
For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano was charged, under
two (2) separate informations, with the crime of murder attended by evident premeditation and
treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly.
The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-defense. He denied
killing Godofredo Pascua. He also denied holding a grudge against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano
Buenaflor and belittled the fist fight he had with Mariano Buenaflor. He said that while they were
drinking, they had a heated discussion, and because they were drunk, it resulted in a fist fight, which
they had soon forgotten. 2
His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970, he was fishing in the open
sea. He went ashore at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning and was met by Mariano Buenaflor who,
upon seeing that he had a big catch, demanded a percentage. for the fishery commission. When he
refused to give what was asked, Buenaflor remarked that he was hard-headed. He went home, taking
his things along with him. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep and awoke at about 3:30 o'clock in
the afternoon. 3 He ate his dinner 4 and prepared to go out to sea again. While he was standing in the yard of
his house, Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua, Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas Carable, Abelardo
Bolaye, Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were drinking at the store of Socorro Buates, went to him and
Godofredo Pascua, without any provocation whatsoever, boxed him. He recounted what happened next: "I
defend myself but inspite of that I was hit on my upper arm. Then after that I was again boxed by Mariano
Buenaflor and I was hit on my lower jaw. (Witness pointing to the bolo marked Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab
that bolo from him."

"When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was able to take hold of his
hands and I was able to grab the bolo. After I have taken the bolo from Godofredo Pascua, all I know is
that he fell on the ground and the rest of the group except Mariano Buenaflor run away after seeing that
Godofredo Pascua fell already on the ground. Mariano Buenaflor approached me having also a bolo
then immediately when we meet each other I boloed him and when he has wounded he run away and
when he was running away I run after him. After I have boloed Mariano Buenaflor he run away so I
run after him because I know that he has a gun and if he reach home he will get that gun and he might
shoot me." 5 Mariano Buenaflor was hit on the head.
The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused, saying:
Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to its regret cannot give
credence to the testimony and story of the accused, and his lone witness, Nemesio
Camano, who is his first cousin. The claim of self-defense does not find support in the
evidence presented. The claim, that a group of eight (8) men headed by Godofredo
Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor ganged up on him by boxing him one after another while
others were throwing stones at him; that he was attacked by Godofredo Pascua with a
bolo which he succeeded in wresting from him; that he did not know Godofredo Pascua
was killed; that he killed said Mariano Buenaflor after a bolo duel, are mere fictions of a
desperate man without evidentiary support. His testimony on these points, and that of his
cousin Nemesio Camano are simply incredible not only because they are inherently
improbable in themselves, but also because of their clear inconsistencies on
contradictions against each other. For, conceding in gratia argumenti that he was really
ganged up by eight (8) persons, some boxing him while others throwing stones at him,
and two of whom were armed with a bolo, and that he was all alone fighting them and
yet he did not suffer any physical injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With
eight (8) persons to contend with, two armed with bolos, it is simply unbelievable that he
should come out of the melee unscathed.
The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully each and every piece of
evidence presented by the defense and has relaxed all technical rules of evidence in
favor of the accused in search for evidentiary support of his claim of self-defense in
vain. Conscious of the enormity of the offense and the bitterness attached to an adverse
 decision, the Court has earnestly searched in vain for facts upon which to lay the basis at
least of a finding of reasonable doubt in favor of the accused at least just to avoid the
ugly and unpleasant task of signing an adverse court decision. But, the falsity of their
concocted story is so apparent and self-evident to need further elucidation. This is
demonstrated by the record. They simply cannot stand, as basis of belief. Moreover, the
Court feels very much intrigued by the fact that notwithstanding that many people
witnessed the incidents, having occurred in broad daylight, and that the accused had
more sufficient time to look for witnesses among his friends, relatives, and neighbors in
the barrio, during the long period that this case has been pending trial since February 17,
1970, that he could not get any witness to testify in his favor, other than his lone witness,
Nemesio Camano, whose testimony, coming as it is from a very close relative is
naturally very vulnerable to grave doubt and suspicion for coming from a biased source.
Could this mean lack of public sympathy because the horrible act was in truth committed
by the accused? Is this a sign of public condemnation? Be it as it may, this unpleasant
circumstance has no bearing or influence in the painful decision of this case. What
impelled and compelled this Court in making this painful decision, much to his dislike,
are the bare and incontrovertible facts of the case born out by the evidence presented
indicating beyond per adventure of doubt the stark reality which shows that there exist
that moral certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who
are to act upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-24339, June 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1321) For the
bitter conclusions herein reached, is based on the compelling and irresistible facts born
out by the evidence of record found after sleepless night of study that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged committed with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, and
intoxication with no mitigating circumstance. The accused and his only witness,
Nemesio Camano changed their declarations not only once, twice, or thrice, but many
times, placing the Court in quandary and confused what theory or testimony is to be
believed and considered among the mess of contradictory, inconsistent, and
diametrically opposed statements. Considering the manner and tenor they were given, -
the accused and his only witness changing stand in every turn, leaves no room for doubt
than that said testimonies are merely concocted and fabricated as a desperate attempt to
salvage a hopeless case. 6
In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and the cause of their
deaths are not disputed. Counsel de oficio merely claims that the accused is guilty of homicide only in
each case, and not murder, as charged; and prays for the modification of the judgment and the
consequent reduction of the penalty imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano.
(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts of the accused, as testified to
by the prosecution witnesses, are all indicative of E, "spur-of-the-moment" decision and action.
The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully
Planned by the offender, when he prepared beforehand the means which he deemed suitable for
carrying it into execution, and when he had sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. 7 It has also been held that evident premeditation
requires proof of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to
allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. 8 In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the
killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the plan to kill
Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time had elapsed before the plan was carried out. The trial court
merely concluded that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was premeditated because "the accused has been
nursing the evil design to kill both the victims since three years prior to the occurrence of the incident on
February 18, 1970, when both of them refused the request of the accused to have his boat towed by the motor
boat belonging to Mariano Buenaflor while fishing along Sañgay River," and "from that time on, to the fatal
killings, said accused refused consistently to join his neighbors in their drinking spree where both the victims
especially Mariano Buenaflor were present;" "in fact, no less than ten attempts made by witness Amado Payago
inviting the accused to be reconciled with the victims were rejected;" and that "on the contrary, it has been
established that whenever the accused was drunk, he announces his intention to kill the victims, and as a matter
of fact he challenged several times Mariano Buenaflor to a fight."

The incident referred to, however, does not establish the tune when the appellant decided to commit the
crime. If ever, the aforementioned incident merely established the motive for the killing of the two
victims. 9
The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor to a fight whenever he was drunk and
announces his intention to kill the latter does not reveal a persistence of a criminal design since there is
no showing that in between the utterances of the threats and the consummation of the crime, the
appellant made plans or sought the deceased to accomplish the killing.
As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor and
of the marked persistence to accomplish that plan, the trial court's conclusion cannot be sustained.
(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the commission of the crime.
The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked
Godofredo Pascua from behind, a method which has ensured the accomplishment of the criminal act
without any risk to the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may put up. His testimony
reads, as follows:
Q At that time and date while you were in front of your house did you
notice whether there is anything unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you relate before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please relate it?
 A I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a bolo and run
after Godofredo Pascua and immediately stabbed him.
Q How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by
Filomeno Camano?
A More or less 12 to 15 meters.
Q What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by Filomeno
Camano?
A He was walking to his house.
Q In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano at the
time that Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo Pascua?
A From behind sir.
Q After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano what
happened to Godofredo Pascua?
A He fell down and keep on turning.
Q What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after Godofredo Pascua
fell down?

A He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano Buenaflor. 10

His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased
Godofredo Pascua. The autopsy report, 11 showed that the point of entry of the stab wound inflicted upon
Pascua was three (3) inches long and three (3) inches below the left armpit, a little bit posteriorly or toward the
hinder end of the body; and the point of exit was the right chest, one (1) inch Iateral to the right nipple with a one
(1) inch opening. If the deceased was stabbed while he was facing his assailant, as claimed by counsel for the
accused, the entrance wound would have been in the front part of the body, and its exit wound, if any, would be
at the back. The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding that the deceased Godofredo Pascua
was assaulted from behind.

With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that he was attacked while in a kneeling
position, with his arms on top of the gate of the fence surrounding his hut and his head was "stooping
down." 12 He was hacked on the head, causing him to fall to the ground, and then successively hacked and
stabbed without respite, as he lay on the ground, until he died. The attack was also sudden, unexpected, and
lethal, such as to disable and incapacitate the victim from putting up any defense.

(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
which the lower court appreciated in fixing the penalty, is absorbed in treachery.
This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled that abuse of superiority is absorbed in
treachery. 13
(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of intoxication was erroneously appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance. Counsel argues thusly:
As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted that there
was no proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing other than the
bare testimony of Payago that from his house he allegedly saw the accused drinking in
his house which is about 30 meters away. The prosecution did not present any police
report or doctor's certification that accused was found to be intoxicated at the time of the
killing. Moreover, it was not shown by competent evidence that accused purposedly
became drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense.
If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance
because it affected accused's mental facilities such that it diminished his capacity to
know the injustice of his acts and to comprehend fully the consequences of his acts. 14
There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual
nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or
intentional. 15 To be mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. 16 A habitual drunkard is one given to
intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary
that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power
making its victim a potential evildoer. 17

The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to excessive use of intoxicating
drinks although he used to get drunk every now and then. The testimony of Amado Payago to this
effect, reads as follows:
Q But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno Camano are
already in good terms because they even go on drinking spree, is it not?
A Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan against
Godofredo Pascua.
Q And how did you come to know about this plan?
A He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is drunk.
Q During the three years that the incident where Camano's boat was not
towed, could you remember how many times more or less did you hear
him speak about his plan before the stabbing incident?
A Whenever he is drunk.
Q Can you not remember more or less how many times have you heard
him?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q About five times?
 FISCAL CLEDERA:
Already answered.
A Whenever he is drunk.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?
A I cannot estimate, sir.
Q What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that there had been
an altercation between him and Filomeno Camano prior to the incident, is
it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was this altercation about?
A It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his boat was
refused by Godofredo Pascua because that boat used by Godofredo
Pascua is owned by Mariano Buenaflor.
Q How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic) this
Buenaflor?
A Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano Buenaflor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink liquor
immediately prior to the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A In his house.
Q When you saw him where were you?
A I was also in my house because I can just see his house from our
window.
Q About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno Camano so
that you can see from your house?
A More or less 30 meters.
Q With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?
 A Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons (who) are
arriving far from our house.
Q According to your personal knowledge do you know whether or not the
accused was drunk when this incident happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q But the truth is that, you still affirm that you don't know of any incident
immediately prior that has precipitated this stabbing incident between the
accused and the victim
A None, sir.
ATTY. TRIA:
Q How about you, did you now drink that time?

No, sir. 18
The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that the said appellant was in a
state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the alternative circumstance of
intoxication should be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the cases at bar,
citing Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the Constitution which provides that: "Excessive fines shag not be imposed,
nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted."
The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. In the case of
Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 19 the Court said:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-Parte Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that "punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution." It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano guilty of Murder in each
of the two cases. The offense being attended by the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without
any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by
law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.
WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the appellant, as above indicated,
the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED in all other respects. With costs
against the said appellant.
SO ORDERED.

LUDOVICO AJENO, complainant,

vs.
HON. SANCHO Y. INSERTO, Judge of Court of First Instance of Iloilo, City of Iloilo,
respondent.

MARTIN, J.:
In a verified complaint dated October 25, 1975, complainant Ludovico Ajeno of Barotac, Nuevo, Iloilo,
charged Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance, Iloilo City for ignorance of the law,
particularly Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 1 and Article
IV, Section 13 of the 1973 Constitution 2 by sentencing complainant "to suffer an imprisonment of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, to Idemnify Solomon Banagua, Jr. in the sum of P200.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of the suit." 3 Complainant claims that the
indemnity of Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos is a civil liability and to order his imprisonment for
non-payment thereof is in violation of the constitutional provision that "no person shall be
imprisoned for debt." 4 He thus prays this Court to remove respondent Judge from office "for
incompetence and for lack of the highest degree of intellectual responsibility and integrity
required of him by the nature of his office. ... " 5
In his comment to the charge of complainant, respondent Judge admitted his error in imposing upon the
complainant the subsidary imprisonment of forty (40) days in case of insolvency, to pay the indemnity
of P200.00 to Solomon Banagua, Jr. and alleged among others that he realized his oversight when the
case was appealed to the Court of Appeals; that it was never his intention to oppress anyone, much less
the complainant; that at the time he committed the mistake he was relying on the doctrine that what the
Constitution prohibits is imprisonment for debt arising exclusively from action ex contractu and does
not include damages arising from action ex delictu, fines, penalties imposed in criminal proceedings,
citing the case of People vs. Cara, 41 Phil. 828. 6
The main issue in this case is whether the respondent Judge can be administratively held liable for his
error in imposing upon complainant the subsidiary imprisonment of forty (40) days in case of his
insolvency to pay the indemnity of P200.00 to the offended party in the criminal case filed against him.
A well established doctrine that has gained foothold in our jurisdiction is that a judge must be wholly
free to render a just decision in the application of the correct law t to the facts of a given case. 7 This is
based on the legal truism embodied in the Canons of Judicial Ethics that precisely "courts exist to
promote justice, and thus to serve the public interest. Their administration should be speedy and
careful. Every judge should at all times be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of the
court, so far as he can, to make it useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid
unconsciously falling in to the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the
courts for the litigants." 8 Of course this Court is aware of its policy of not disciplining judges for
inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment committed by them 9 yet it
is highly imperative that judges should be conversant with the law including its latest amendments
which they are to apply to the facts and the evidence adduced during the trial, so as to forestall any
harm, injury or prejudice to the litigants.
In the present case, there is hardly any dispute that respondent Judge has violated Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, which provides, among others, that if the
principal penalty imposed be prision correcional six (6) years, or one (1) day to six (6) months (arresto
mayor) and a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third (1/3) of the sentence nor
more than one (1) year at the amended rate of one (1) day for each eight (P8.00) pesos fine. In the
criminal case filed against him, complainant "was sentenced to four (4) months imprisonment and to
indemnify the victim Solomon Banagua, Jr. in the sum of P200.00 for alleged medical expenses. It is
clear here that the sum of P200.00 was intended to answer for the indemnity to the offended party.
Therefore non-payment there of can not subject the accused to subsidiary imprisonment because under
the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465, it is only for non-payment of the fine that the
accused may be required to serve subsidiary imprisonment.
But it is erroneous on the part of the complaint to claim that the error committed by the respondent
Judge was in violation of the constitutional provision that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt,"
because the debt contemplated in the constitutional provision refers only to a contractual obligation or
an obligation to pay money arising from a contract and not to an obligation arising from a crime. The
obligation of the complainant to pay the sum of P200.00 to Solomon Banagua, Jr. does not arise from a
contract but from a crime and is therefore beyond the scope of the constitutional provision mentioned.
If at all, the error of the respondent Judge is his failure to observe the amendatory law, Republic Act
No. 5465, in imposing the penalty to complainant. It was through his own negligence that he imposed
forty (40) days of subsidiary imprisonment to complainant in case of non-payment of the P200.00
indemnity to the offended party. He was negligent when he failed to exercise the care that the
circumstances justly demanded. He failed to use that diligence which is expected of judges like him to
determine whether the provision of law he is enforcing is still applicable, whether it has been amended
or not, or whether there are recent doctrines of the Supreme Court pertinent to the case. Had respondent
Judge been more careful and cautious in this regard, he would have spared the complainant from the
trouble and expense of prosecuting his case in the appellate court to correct the error.
But what really mitigates respondent Judge's offense is the frank admission of his error and his honest
disclaimer of bad faith in its commission. Thus he said in his comment:
... It was never my intention to oppress anyone, much less the complainant. As a matter
of fact the complainant was charged with frustrated murder but I convicted him of less
serious physical injuries only, in accordance with the evidence presented. ... Had counsel
for the herein complainant filed a motion for reconsideration or called my attention in
any manner, I could have rectified my error right then and there. The Rules of Court
provides the remedy of appeal to rectify possible errors committed by judges in inferior
courts. This remedy was availed of by complainant.
That respondent Judge was really acting in good faith when he committed the aforementioned error is
depicted by his full support to the doctrine that the prohibition in the Constitution that "no person shall
be imprisoned for debt" protects only debt arising from contracts or action ex contractu but not an
obligation arising from crimes or action ex delictu, citing the case of People vs. Cara, 41 Phil. 828,
which doctrine has so far not been changed by this Court. Respondent Judge is correct in relying on
said doctrine, but he failed to realize that if subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed now in case of
insolvency of the accused to pay the indemnity, it is not because its imposition would constitute
imprisonment for non-payment of a debt but because of the new amendment introduced to Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act No. 5465, imposing subsidiary imprisonment only in case of
non-payment of the fine, In the case of In re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212, this Court previously ruled that
"For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules." To hold therefore liable the respondent Judge administratively for
ignorance of the law there must be reliable evidence to show that the judicial acts complained of was
ill-motivated, corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules. None of these has been presented in this case. On the contrary the
preponderance of evidence shows that the act of the respondent Judge was an honest error of judgment;
it was not inspired by any ill-motive to oppress the complainant; and that it was the first violation of the
norm of judicial conduct by the respondent Judge during the 36 years that he is in the service of the
government.
This notwithstanding, the Canons of Judicial Ethics would not allow that such conduct pass without
any word of admonition to the erring respondent Judge. When he accepted his position he owed it to
the dignity of the court, to the legal profession and to the public, to know the very law. he is supposed
to apply to a given controversy. Even in the remaining years of his stay in the judiciary he should keep
abreast with the changes in the law and with the latest decisions and precedents. Although a judge is
nearing retirement he should not relax in his study of the law and court decisions. Service in the
judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end. In this respect
respondent Judge has failed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respondent Judge is hereby admonished to be more cautious in
the application of the law to cases submitted to him for decision with a warning that a repetition of the
same will be severely dealt with.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of
the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12
August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against
private respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas
Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City,
searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring,
devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government,
and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1 owned by the private respondent. These electric devices
and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric
meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had
caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. 3

On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of
Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of
1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging
from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30)
days, or both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This information reads as follows:
 The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of
Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S.
1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said
ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful
and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or
decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at
Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized installations of electric
wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas was
damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY
TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering
the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the
City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine
currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he
filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already
prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony
which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the
information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in
February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this
time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the
Revised Penal Code. This information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of
theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of
February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current
valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND
SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice
 of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government
of Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash,
dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded
by the accused in the motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses
Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10
Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government of
Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of
illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the
accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city government of
Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged
illegal connections which were done at one instance on a particular date between
November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from
November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud the
City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or
permit from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices, etc."
(Emphasis supplied), it was meant to include the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in
effect, defrauded the city government. The information could not have meant that from
November 1974 to 21 February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he
had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly
happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 which had allegedly resulted in
defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and
parentheses in the original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the petitioner was denied by the
respondent Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court by the
Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The
petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for
unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of
an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. Only two elements are needed to constitute an
offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority therefor
had been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District
Engineer. The petitioner urges that the relevant terms of the City Ordinance — which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) x x x
(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their connection with the
Electrical System shall be done either by the employee of the system duly authorized by
its Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter duly authorized by the District
Engineer. Applicants for electrical service permitting the works of installation or
connection with the system to be undertaken by the persons not duly authorized therefor
shall be considered guilty of violation of the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical installations
on residences or buildings be done by persons duly authorized or adept in the matter, to
avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is primarily a regulatory
measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is already
covered by the Revised Penal Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument continues, is the installing
of electric wiring and devices without authority from the proper officials of the city government. To
constitute an offense under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of
the offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different
essential elements. These elements are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things. 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be effected even without
illegal or unauthorized installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following means:
 1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the actual electrical
consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the rotation of the same. 7
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the
same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not
an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is clear both from the express
terms of the constitutional provision involved — which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973
Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of
the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets
forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11

In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal Court of
Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance
No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City of Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an automobile — "recklessly and without
reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street." Three
months later, Yap was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court, this
time with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The information charged him with
violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587)
committed by driving and operating an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result
thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information
upon the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. This motion was
denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meantime, another municipal judge had acquitted Yap in
Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo to set aside the order of the respondent municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo
having reversed the respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist from continuing with
Criminal Case No. 16443, the respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on
appeal. In affirming the decision appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy was available to petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving — with which
Diaz stood charged in the court of first instance — is a violation of the Revised Penal
Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law (Act No. 3992, as
amended by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of
the same law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless
driving are punishable under different provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence —
from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or Constitutional
Law — they constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under certain conditions,
one offense may include the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the
plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz case.
(Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (Emphasis in the
original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include, the crime charged in
the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other
case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.

The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in
case No. 16443, petitioner could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be convicted
of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he has already been acquitted. The
information in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place
therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and
operated "recklessly and without reasonable caution" an automobile described in said
information. Upon the other hand, the information in case No. 16443, similarly states
that, on the same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of
speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as amended
 by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned
in the second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be
convicted in case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged
in case No. 16054, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining the theory of
petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the
identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the
acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same
acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections
of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the
second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction
or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition,
different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense
having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the
other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935
Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of
extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not
otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements
of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions
of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated
liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance,
by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the
two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having
taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments
(a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from
the same act or sets of acts — that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The
additional technical element of serious physical injuries related to the physical consequences of the
operation of the automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the body of the
offended party. Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the accused operated the
automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused throughout
that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to
February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation
of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization
from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present
from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the
unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute
literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes
the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of
an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):

While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it
seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for
several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may
give use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to
imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by
simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the
crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by
force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin.
(88 Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and
sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or
statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of
the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an
acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an
order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case.
It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by
stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an
Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he
should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to
hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this
case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both
before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of
criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as we noted earlier, 16
accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric current through the installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical
connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power.
However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having
been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed
17) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition
of judgment conformably with such evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related
civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as
indicated above. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City,
respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his
petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a second
information against him, although a first information charging the same offense had been
previously dismissed, over petitioners vigorous opposition.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, [2]
Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an
unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he
was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel
of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information
against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No.
11542, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control one (1) .38
Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions, which he
carried outside of his residence without having the necessary authority and permit to carry the
same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] (Emphasis petitioners.)
The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the
Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the
fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and
not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the
Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of
Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal
cases involving crimes committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to Branch
56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file
a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that thru inadvertence and oversight,
the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing
that the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga[4] and that the Provincial Prosecutor had
filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two separate informations
for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the
motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April
3, 1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground
that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had
been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner
raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double
jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner could not have been convicted
under the first information as the same was defective. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR
OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE FIRST
INFORMATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID
NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED
WAS NOT VALID.
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that (n)o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense x x x. Pursuant to this provision, Section 7 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that (w)hen an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, x x x.
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense
or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.[5]
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove
the existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction
(b) Valid complaint or information
(c) Arraignment
(c) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[6]
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded not
guilty therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his
opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the first two
requisites have been met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for
jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals
and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance of Criminal
Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:
The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). In
all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof
took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in
Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56.[7]
It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it
must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction.
Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated
January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve
are hereby defined as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
PAMPANGA
xxxxxxxxx
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and
the municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S.
Airbase.
xxxxxxxxx
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.
Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City
RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is the
doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial
court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed
in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.
1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
xxxxxxxxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the
conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take
oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An
information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
another.[8] It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone
authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. [9]
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor
in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof.[10] As correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may
be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned.
But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of
uniform decisions,[11] questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner)
and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the
information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.[12]
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no
authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to
petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads
guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. [13]
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the
investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all
too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of
its officials and employees.[14] To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free,
deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance
between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal,
should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals[15] has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an
amendment, an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition
against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the
simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information
meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the
instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double
jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
and GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Hugo Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan for petitioner.
Juanito M. Romano for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J:
The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against
respondent accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed. The complaint filed with the
Batangas court which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and which
pended for twelve years (the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years) and which
was eventually dismissed by said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the proof
adduced before it properly interrupted and tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge failed, in
ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases
by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof. The case is ordered
remanded for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this case has already been pending for
fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The undisputed factual background of
the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., thus:
1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of
Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-respondent
Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...
2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his arrest,
posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter arraigned and
he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits. However, on
September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his bail bond was forfeited
and the case against him archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas.
3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was re-
arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.
4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent
Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas court
did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime
was committed in Manila.
 5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated
November 5, 1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial
jurisdiction over the crime charged ...
6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case
against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation was
conducted. On July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...
7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss
criminal Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.
8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to
which the accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.
9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided
over by the Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No.
22397 on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The prosecution
moved for the reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the lower court by
order of January 7, 1976. ...
10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses provides:
interposed an appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On
March 3, 1976, this honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976 requiring
the Solicitor General to file the petition for review within fifteen days from receipt
thereof ...

The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite the
provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that the offense charged has not
prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the offense
charged, and in holding that the case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the case at bar."

The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.

I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.— The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information and shall commence to run again when the proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him. ...
The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for and
instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds (minus his
commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be the complainant,
who promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period the criminal
complaint against respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas. The prescriptive
period was thereupon interrupted.
After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964
and evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial was resumed. When the Batangas
court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint "for lack of
jurisdiction" since the evidence (of both prosecution and accused) showed that all elements of the crime
were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein terminated without conviction or
acquittal of respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive period (which was interrupted during
the pendency of the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run again.

When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case
against respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a preliminary
investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been consumed.
Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the information
on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy, because he was not
acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could neither convict him because it
was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.
But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no
interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court because
"(T)he proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a competent
court. If they are void from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction of the offense
charged, it is as if no proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or order of arrest as
well as the bail given by the accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect. Inevitably, there can be
no jumping bail to speak of and there are no proceedings to be interrupted."
This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal
cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof." 4
It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal
complaint filed with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in the Municipality of
Batangas, province of Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a competent
court, (including the arrest warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the accused's jumping
of bail), until the same court issued its November. 1974 order dismissing the Case and declaring itself
without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence presented to it by both prosecution and the
accused.
It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12-year
pendency of the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which respondent accused
had jumped bail and evaded re-arrest).
II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and
disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5
In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar that the
true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the municipal court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case on the merits)
should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows:

Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines
of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes
has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with
the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the prescriptive
term: (People vs. Olarte, L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs.
Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590.) Another series
of decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have
been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs.
Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and
Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration has arrived at
the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decision holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits.
Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed
to investigate the case, its actuation already represents the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 7
Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter
alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes expenses to the State, but exposes
public justice to peril, for it weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration of
memory if not to anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt and
that statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of grace, but
checks imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure for criminal
trials the best evidence that can be obtained. 8
But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his
misconception that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in Batangas contrary
to what has already been held hereinabove that the express allegations of the complaint that the offense
was committed in Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful jurisdiction until its dismissal order
twelve years later for lack of jurisdiction as a result of the proof presented before it during the tiral (and
in not taking into account that the delay was not at all due to the State but to respondent accused
himself who jumped bail and escaped tile law for nine [9] years and who apparently has made no effort
all this time to make good the amount the to complainant or any part thereof).
Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and
shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10, 1974 while respondent accused
was testifying on the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October 14, 1974
which granted by the Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had already been
pending for almost 15 years, all the evidence already taken by the Batangas court as recorded in the
minutes and transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the Manila court which
is hereby ordered to receive only the remaining evidence of the respondent accused and such rebuttal
evidence as the parties may have and thereafter resolve the case with the utmost dispatch.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are
hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever presides Branch XIII of the
Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the
Batangas city court in Criminal Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line
with the directives in the preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is
further ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from
promulgation of this decision. In view of the many years that the criminal case has been pending, this
decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant,

vs.
AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo and T. M.
Dilig for plaintiff and appellant.
Rolando de la Cuesta for defendant and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:
That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one,
Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted
by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove
mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in
self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.
Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the
court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed therefrom.
This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No
appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the appeal was
certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law (Sec. 17,
Republic Act 296). And on August 5, 1966, We ordered it docketed herein.1äwphï1.ñët
The sole assignment of error is:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.
Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with
respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the
court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng
Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish
mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be
taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should have
been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the case, in the
order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Order of trial. — The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in the
following order:
(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support of the
charges.
 (b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.
(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue
in question.
(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the case is submitted
to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the attorney for the defense
must follow, and the fiscal may conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral
or written, or partly written, but only the written arguments, or such portions of the same as may
be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in
procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: "The People of
the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The
present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies even if the accused fails
to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956;
People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that
the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851;
People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the accused had first
entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove
mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the
court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a
quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing
plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the appeal herein.1
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the
prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In
doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its
action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no
acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v.
Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already gave
credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way doubting
the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further
proceedings under another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court a quo
for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial with
presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter, No costs. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court.