Impact of The Recent Reforms On Indian Arbitration Law: Rohit Moonka
Impact of The Recent Reforms On Indian Arbitration Law: Rohit Moonka
Impact of The Recent Reforms On Indian Arbitration Law: Rohit Moonka
ROHIT MOONKA,
Institute of Law, Nirma University (Ahmedabad, India)
SILKY MUKHERJEE,
Institute of Law, Nirma University (Ahmedabad, India)
DOI: 10.21684/2412-2343-2017-4-1-58-71
In order to give effect to the UNICITRAL Model Law on Arbitration and due to radical
change in its economy as the result of the 1991 New Economic Policy (NEP) India enacted
the 1996 Arbitration & Conciliation Act. This Act provides a pragmatic legal basis for
resolution of commercial disputes outside the court procedures. It circumscribes the
older laws and consolidates multiple legal norms dealing with arbitration. However,
the experiences in application of this Act for the last 20 years suggest that it needs to
be amended as it contains serious drawbacks primarily due to poor legal technique
which necessitated excessive judicial interventions and judicial overreach having led to
resentment among those willing to resort to alternative dispute resolution under this
Act while keeping the seat of Arbitration in India. Several attempts were made by the
successive governments aiming at amending the 1996 Act. Yet all those attempts failed.
Finally the present Union Government under the leadership of the Prime Minister Mr.
Narendra Modi was able to bring in sweeping changes in existing arbitration law. These
changes were carried out with the commitment of the Government in doing business in
India through the Ordinance route and proper legislative procedures which finally led
to the amendments having come into force on January 1, 2016. This paper attempts to
analyse the key changes brought through the 2015 Amendment Act and their impact on
the application of arbitration law in India. Moreover, the authors overview the prospects
of India to acquire the preferred position in International Commercial Arbitration in the
future as envisioned by the present Modi Government.
Recommended citation: Rohit Moonka & Silky Mukherjee, Impact of the Recent
Reforms on Indian Arbitration Law, 4(1) BRICS Law Journal 58–71 (2017).
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Applying Provisions of Part I for a Foreign Seated Arbitration
2. Court References to Arbitration and Widening the Meaning
of Arbitration Agreements
3. Interim Injunction
4. Appointment of Arbitrators
5. Time Limit for Arbitral Award
6. Fast Track Arbitration
7. Imposition of Costs
8. Limiting the Scope of Setting Arbitral Award Aside
9. Issues Requiring Further Determination
9.1. Emergency Arbitrators
9.2. Arbitrability of Disputes Involving Fraud
Conclusion
Introduction
The 1996 Arbitration & Conciliation Act (hereinafter “the 1996 Act”) was first
promulgated by way of issuing an Ordinance as a step in urgent economic reforms
necessitated by new economic policy. 20 years later another ordinance was
introduced, i.e., the 2015 Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, which
amended the 1996 Act in order to bring it in line with international standards. For the
last few years, arbitration has become an optimal choice for resolution of commercial
disputes. However, over the last two decades the process of arbitration in particular
in ad hoc domestic disputes becomes more alike the adversarial proceedings in
India. Accompanied by high costs due to insufficient amount of trained and qualified
arbitrators this dispute resolution process caused a growing sense of annoyance
among its users. Due to these and other problems in application of the 1996 Act, the
amendments were discussed by public authorities which are necessary in order to
fill in its gaps and minimize the opportunities for its misinterpretation. Reports and
suggestions where given by many bodies aimed at amending the 1996 Act. However,
those suggestions could not sustain the pressing needs of modern practice. Two
attempts were made to amend the 1996 Act in 2001 and in 2010, both unsuccessful
and having not led to the Act being amended.
BRICS LAW JOURNAL Volume IV (2017) Issue 1 60
However, through the Ordinance the present Government took a robust step
towards reinstating confidence of individuals and firms in investors and business
community which is significant for optimizing the procedures of business
transactions. The Ordinance included proposals of the Law Commission Report
No. 246, released in the year 2015, which is a pre-cursor to this Ordinance1 and
subsequent Amendment Act. The Amendment Act also introduces unique provisions
which have not so far been mentioned in leading arbitration statutes. Some of these
provisions provide for extraordinary measures and other peculiar issues with ad
hoc domestic arbitration including, e.g., the time limit for completing arbitration
and arbitrators fees. The Amendment Act mandates that every arbitration held
in India must result in an award within 12 months of the arbitral tribunal being
constituted, with parties having the right to give an extension to it by another
6 months through mutual consent. Otherwise the mandate of tribunal terminates
unless the court extends it imposing such conditions as it considers appropriate.
The court can also penalize arbitrators by ordering reduction of their fees at the
time of granting such extension. It is also the right of the court to change one or
all the arbitrators at the time of granting extension. Moreover, the Amendment
Act introduces other significant changes which cause a significant departure from
the law having existed before, or clarify controversies, or confirm the rules which
had evolved through judicial interpretations. This paper analyses the key changes
brought by the Ordinance which had passed through the Parliament route, received
the assent of the President of India on December 31, 2015, and been promulgated
in the Official Gazette on January 1, 2016.
After the case of Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc.2 (BALCO Judgement) which puts a complete bar on Indian courts to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign seated arbitrations. According to this judgment, on the
basis of Sec. 2(2) of the 1996 Act, all the provisions under the Part I of the Act would
apply when the arbitration is seated in India, and Indian courts cannot invoke any
provisions under Part I of the Act with respect of foreign seated arbitration. Due
to this practical difficulties were arising, especially with regard to granting interim
injunction in a foreign seated arbitration by Indian courts.
1
By virtue of Art. 123 of the Constitution of India, the President of India is empowered at any time,
except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, if he is satisfied that circumstances exist which
render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinance as the
circumstances appear to him to require. Further, Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have
same force and effect as an Act of Parliament.
2
(2012) 9 SCC 552.
ROHIT MOONKA, SILKY MUKHERJEE 61
To overcome this situation, a provision was included in Sec. 2(2) which grants to
Indian courts jurisdiction in the context of seeking interim injunction in a foreign
seated Arbitration, as well as assistance in collecting evidence in a foreign seated
arbitration or making appeal for court orders.3 However, this provision applies only if
the parties express an agreement to use it. Noteworthy is the fact that the expression
“only” has not been included in the mentioned Sec. 2(2) of the 1996 Act. The lack
of the word “only” in the text of the Act was the primary cause for disagreements
between the parties in the case of Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA.4 That case
led to the BALCO Judgement5 where the Supreme Court of India held that the
expression “only” in Art. 1(2) of the UNICITRAL Model Law had been used in view of
the exceptions impressed upon in the said Article through the proviso. Since the said
provision was lacking in the Act, the word “only” was not required in such a situation.
Yet since the provision had been added it appears unjustified that the word “only”
remains omitted and leading to unnecessary complications.
3
“Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (a)
of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international commercial
arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made
in such place is enforceable and recognised under the provisions of Part II of this Act.”
4
(2002) 4 SCC 105.
5
Supra note 2.
6
Sec. 8(1): “A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an
arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through
or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of
the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court,
refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”
BRICS LAW JOURNAL Volume IV (2017) Issue 1 62
the said agreement or certified copy is retained by the other party to that agreement,
the applying party shall file such application alongside with a copy of the arbitration
agreement and a petition to the court to call upon the other party to present the
original arbitration agreement or its duly certified copy to the Court.
The amended Sec. 8 provides that the court can deny a reference to arbitration if it
finds that no prima facie valid arbitration agreement exists. This power is different from
the one stipulated by Sec. 11 and only prescribing examination of existence of the
agreement. Considering applications under Sec. 11 of this Act does not presuppose
delving into the issues of validity of such agreement. Different requirements set
forth by Secs. 8 and 11 of the Act open avenues for nuanced judicial interpretation.
In case of denial of reference under Sec. 8 a judicial appeal is possible under Sec. 37
of the Act. If the court does not refer the parties to arbitration, the arbitral tribunal
can still exercise kompetenz-kompetenz under Sec. 16. Such legal ambiguity runs the
risk of undermining the kompetenz-kompetenz rule under Sec. 16 by taking away
the power of the arbitral tribunal.
3. Interim Injunction
7
(1999) 2 SCC 479.
8
(2004) 3 SCC 155.
9
“Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim
measure of protection under sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period
of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine.”
ROHIT MOONKA, SILKY MUKHERJEE 63
In order to reduce court interventions and to restrict the courts’ power to grant
interim injunction after the constitution of arbitral tribunal, sub-clause 3 of Sec. 9 was
introduced providing that “once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the court
shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the court finds that
circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17
efficacious.” Through this provision the opportunities for the courts to deal with such
applications are not excluded during the arbitration proceedings. However, the courts
can grant injunctions only in exception circumstances. To give effect to this provision,
the powers of arbitral tribunals has been equated with the powers of the court in
giving interim injunction during the arbitration proceeding or at any time after making
the arbitral award but before it is enforced, in accordance with Sec. 36 by inserting
sub-clause 1 to Sec. 17 of the 2015 Amendment Act.10 Furthermore, the interim order
passed by arbitral tribunals is enforced in the same manner as an order of the court,
i.e., through insertion of sub-clause 3 to Sec. 17 of the Amendment Act.11
This change is a positive development as it reduces court interventions with
regard to granting interim injunctions, particularly during arbitration proceedings
and after the delivery of award but before it is enforced. Since arbitral tribunal is
the best instance to deal with the matter and it would be most appropriate that
this power is exercised solely by the tribunals. Yet before the said amendments the
arbitral tribunals did not have powers as courts to grant interim injunctions, the
orders of tribunals were lacking legal force and the parties should have addressed
the courts for interim injunctions. Since the amendments came into force the
tribunals’ power in line with the powers of courts is no more dependent on the
choice of the parties but is a non-derogable provision. It will, therefore, minimize
10
“17. (1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral
award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to the arbitral tribunal –
(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of
arbitral proceedings; or
(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:
(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the
arbitration agreement;
(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;
(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of
the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the
aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or
authorising any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which
may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;
(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;
(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the arbitral tribunal to be just and
convenient, and the arbitral tribunal shall have the same power for making orders, as the court has
for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.”
11
“Subject to any orders passed in an appeal under section 37, any order issued by the arbitral tribunal
under this section shall be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner as if it were an order of the Court.”
BRICS LAW JOURNAL Volume IV (2017) Issue 1 64
4. Appointment of Arbitrators
The second case, i.e., the Patel Engineering case provided that hat the Chief Justice
can delegate his/her power under Sec. 11 of the 1996 Act only to another judge of that
court but not to any other person or institution considered to have judicial powers
as judicial power can only be delegated to judicial authority. However, the 2015
Amendment Act took this aspect into account and specified in a new sub-sec. (6B)
that “[T]he designation of any person or institution by the Supreme Court or, as the
case may be, the High Court, for the purposes of this section shall not be regarded
as a delegation of judicial power by the Supreme Court or the High Court.”
Thus, one of the main problems revealed under application of the said Sec. 11
is whether the function of the Chief Justice under this Section is an administrative
function or a judicial function. The 2015 Amendment Act has ultimately solved
this issue by replacing the “Chief Justice” with the “Supreme Court or High Court”.
The provision incorporated in sub-sec. (8) of this Sec. 11 required a prospective
arbitrator to submit a declaration following Sec. 12 of the Act.16 This provision ensures
that a prospective arbitrator who due to his/her schedule may not be able to carry
out an expedite arbitral proceedings will not be appointed. Another important
addition was included in sub-sec. (14) of Sec. 11 stipulating that the High Court
can formulate rules for the purpose of determining the fees of the arbitrators.17
This provision which could possibly incorporate a fixed fee for ad-hoc arbitrations
is unique for Indian legislation as matters relating to arbitrators’ fees is not usually
covered by any statutes in other states.
Moreover, new Fifth Schedule and Seventh Schedule were added in the 2015
Amendment Act. The Fifth Schedule touches upon the issue of independence
and impartially of the arbitrators and lists the grounds justifying doubts in their
independence or impartiality. Another list of grounds is stipulated by the Seventh
Schedule and entails relationships between arbitrators and the parties or the counsel
making an arbitrator ineligible for appointment. These two schedules listing grounds
for challenging arbitrators are influenced by the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest
in International Arbitration. The 2015 Amendment Act also prohibits parties to agree
in advance and appoint an arbitrator who had previously been an employee of
either of the parties. These provisions ensure independence and impartiality of
arbitrators to be appointed and the equal opportunities for parties to have a say in
the appointment process regarding their arbitrators.
16
“The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court or the person or institution designated
by such Court, before appointing an arbitrator, shall seek a disclosure in writing from the prospective
arbitrator in terms of sub-section (1) of section 12, and have due regard to –
(a) any qualifications required for the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and
(b) the contents of the disclosure and other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of
an independent and impartial arbitrator.”
17
“For the purpose of determination of the fees of the arbitral tribunal and the manner of its payment
to the arbitral tribunal, the High Court may frame such rules as may be necessary, after taking into
consideration the rates specified in the Fourth Schedule.”
BRICS LAW JOURNAL Volume IV (2017) Issue 1 66
An entirely new Sec. 29A was introduced in the 2015 Amendment Act which
stipulates a time limit for rendering an award in every arbitration process in India. The
default time limit for making such and award should be provided within a period of
12 months starting from the date when the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference.
Here enter upon the reference means that from the day when the arbitrator(s) receive
their letter of appointment in writing.18 Parties may extend this period by consent
for another period not exceeding 6 months.19 If the award is not made within the
prescribed time period of 12 months or within the mutually acceptable period, the
mandate of the arbitrator(s) terminates unless the time period has been extended
by the court on the basis of either an application by the party or due to a sufficient
cause and on such terms and conditions which may be imposed by the court prior
to or after the expiry of the period specified.20 However, these rules are fortified by
a provision, according to which if the court while granting the extension finds that
proceeding delayed for reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, it may order
a reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) not exceeding 5 percent for each month of such
delay. However, the extension of period referred to in sub-sec. (4) may be granted
upon an application of the parties and only due to sufficient cause and on such
terms and conditions that may be imposed by the court. Under this Section the
court can impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties.21 However, such
a carrot and stick approach may not be conducive in every matter and can lead to
unnecessary litigation before the courts which are already overburdened with other
cases and may not be in a position to deliver judgment within the sixty days’ time
frame as prescribed under this Section.
18
“29A. (1) The award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the arbitral tribunal
enters upon the reference.
Explanation. – For the purpose of this sub-section, an arbitral tribunal shall be deemed to have entered
upon the reference on the date on which the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be, have
received notice, in writing, of their appointment.”
19
“29A. (3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award
for a further period not exceeding six months.”
20
“29A. (4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period
specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has,
either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period.”
21
Sub-sec. (8) to Sec. 29A.
ROHIT MOONKA, SILKY MUKHERJEE 67
of appointment of the arbitral tribunal. Its Sec. 29B22 offers an option for expedite
arbitration process. Pursuant to Sec. 29B(1), parties can agree to have their dispute
resolved by in a fast track procedure which, according to Sec. 29B(4), requires the
award to be made within 6 months starting from the date when the arbitral tribunal
enters upon the reference. However, it is left to the parties to claim for such fast track
arbitration. This provision could have more significant meaning if would also have
provided for mandatory reference of cases involving smaller claim to such fast track
arbitrator for speedier justice.
7. Imposition of Costs
The cost regime where “costs follow the event” which is practised internationally
has been introduced in the 2015 Act in a new Sec. 31A. As follows from the explanation
to this Sec. 31A(1), the costs are not limited to legal fees but also include travel
expenses, witness expenses, and so on.23 The imposition of costs also extends to
every litigation arising from arbitration which had been addressed to by virtue of
22
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the parties to an arbitration agreement, may,
at any stage either before or at the time of appointment of the arbitral tribunal, agree in writing to
have their dispute resolved by fast track procedure specified in sub-section (3).
(2) The parties to the arbitration agreement, while agreeing for resolution of dispute by fast track
procedure, may agree that the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator who shall be chosen
by the parties.
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall follow the following procedure while conducting arbitration proceedings
under sub-section (1):
(a) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute on the basis of written pleadings, documents and
submissions filed by the parties without any oral hearing;
(b) The arbitral tribunal shall have power to call for any further information or clarification from the
parties in addition to the pleadings and documents filed by them;
(c) An oral hearing may be held only, if, all the parties make a request or if the arbitral tribunal
considers it necessary to have oral hearing for clarifying certain issues;
(d) The arbitral tribunal may dispense with any technical formalities, if an oral hearing is held, and
adopt such procedure as deemed appropriate for expeditious disposal of the case.
(4) The award under this section shall be made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral
tribunal enters upon the reference.
(5) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (4), the provisions of sub-
sections (3) to (9) of section 29A shall apply to the proceedings.
(6) The fees payable to the arbitrator and the manner of payment of the fees shall be such as may be
agreed between the arbitrator and the parties.”
23
“Explanation. – For the purpose of this sub-section, “costs” means reasonable costs relating to –
(i) the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, Courts and witnesses;
(ii) legal fees and expenses;
(iii) any administration fees of the institution supervising the arbitration; and
(iv) any other expenses incurred in connection with the arbitral or Court proceedings and the arbitral
award.”
BRICS LAW JOURNAL Volume IV (2017) Issue 1 68
The new amendments primarily seek to clarify the meaning of public policy
under Sec. 34 of the 2015 Act regarding the scope of review that courts should enter
in, which remained a matter of concern for the last few years. Particularity after the
decision in ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd.24 and ONGC v. Western Geco25, the explanation to
Sec. 34(2)(b) clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India only
if, firstly, making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was
in violation of Sec. 75 or Sec. 81; or, secondly, it contradicts the fundamental policy
of Indian law; or, thirdly, it contradicts the most basic concepts morality or justice.
Moreover, an explanation specifies that in order to avoid any doubt, the test as to
whether there is a contradiction with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall
not entail a review on the merits of the dispute. Awards in arbitrations exclusively
between Indian parties can be challenged on the ground of patent illegality but
only if it is “on the face of the award” and without entering into a merits review and
without re-appreciation of evidence.26 A time limit has also been fixed to dispose-
off the application filed under sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 34 of the 2015 Amendment Act27
to minimize the delay in the disposal of such applications.
Having removed many ambiguities, the 2015 Amendment Act still left several areas
of concern unaddressed. Some of these major issued of concern are discussed below
as the authors consider them urgent and requiring to be officially addressed.
24
AIR 2003 SC 2629.
25
(2014) 9 SCC 263.
26
Sub-section (2A) to Sec. 34: “An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated
by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciation of evidence.”
27
“An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of
one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.”
ROHIT MOONKA, SILKY MUKHERJEE 69
approaching the court for urgent interim relief before constitution of arbitral
tribunal is a common practice, however approaching court is not considered as
the best practice in a dispute involving arbitration as the primary reason to refer
the dispute to arbitration is to avoid the rigours of the court system. Institution
across the Globe introduce provisions for appointment of emergency arbitrators.
For instance, under the 2013 Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC)
Rules a party may seek emergency relief prior to the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal. Such an application, if accepted by the parties, has to be decided in
a time-bound manner by the HKIAC, following their rules. The same rule applies
to cases involving other prominent institution arbitrations including the London
Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce and the
Singapore International Arbitration Centre. However, the 2015 Amendment Act is
less elaborate with respect to addressing the issue of interim measures despite the
fact that it reiterates a seminal objective of “minimal intervention of the courts in
the arbitration.” Needless to mention that if the Indian arbitration law fails to provide
opportunity for utilizing emergency arbitrators the parties have no other option
than addressing their disputes to the courts of law for immediate relief which does
not meet the objective of the 2015 Act.
The Law Commission of India in its 246th Report which had acted as the precursor
to this 2015 Amendment Act recommended amending this Act so that to provide
statutory recognition for the concept of emergency arbitrators.28 This amendment
was intended to be introduced in Part I of the Act defining an arbitral tribunal as a sole
arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators. The change that the Law Commission of India
had put forward suggested broadening the definition of “arbitral tribunal” so that
it would include provisions for appointment of emergency arbitrator or arbitrators
under any institutional rules only. At the same time such a recommendation was
not extending to ad hoc arbitration by the Law Commission of India. However, since
this suggestion was not incorporated in the 2015 Amendment Act it still should be
considered, at least by legal scholars.
28
Law Commission of India, Report No. 246 – Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(2014), at 37 (Mar. 10, 2017), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report246.pdf.
BRICS LAW JOURNAL Volume IV (2017) Issue 1 70
Conclusion
The Ordinance Act and now the Amendment Act mark a change in legal thinking
and legal practice. Such changes are significant steps towards optimizing arbitration
procedure and arbitration jurisprudence as legal amendments gave many lacunas
of the principal 1996 Act away nullifying judicial decisions that impeded proper
application of arbitration rules in India. However, a note of caution is attached to these
developments, i.e., the amendments require too short time frame for application of
various rules in the arbitration process which are difficult to comply with in practice
and running the risk of ending in unavoidable judicial dispute resolution. At the
same time, clear-cut provisions encouraging institutional arbitration in India are still
lacking while the said amendments repeat the details which are otherwise practised
by the parties or institutions. Moreover, the experience of few other legislation in
29
(2010) 1 SCC 72.
30
(2014) 6 SCC 677.
31
AIR 2016 SC 4675.
ROHIT MOONKA, SILKY MUKHERJEE 71
India (on other subjects) having time-line have not succeed in the past. It is doubtful
that the time limits as prescribed by the 2015 Amendment Act would be followed
by the courts of law in India which are already overburdened with pending cases
and lacking adequate infrastructure as well as the necessary amount of judges. Yet
apparently, much still depends on the approach of the courts of law dealing with
matters subjected to arbitration in meeting the objectives of the 2015 Amendment
Act. A next round of amendments can possibly consider this concern after analysing
the effects of the recent changes.
References