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376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

*
G.R. No. 137621. February 6, 2002.

HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION,

petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY,
BULACAN, respondent.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Procedural Rules and

Technicalities; It is error on the part of the Court of Appeals to
dismiss an appeal on the ground that it was formally deficient
where it is clear from the records that such party exerted due
diligence to get copies of its appealed resolutions certified but
failed to do so on account of a typhoon, a fortuitous event.—We
find that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s
appeal on the ground that it was formally deficient. It is clear
from the records that the petitioner exerted due diligence to get
the copies of its appealed Resolutions certified by the Department
of Justice, but failed to do so on account of typhoon “Loleng.”
Under the circumstances, respondent appellate court should have
tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the
fortuitous event considering that litigation is not a game of
technicalities.

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

377

VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 377

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of Hagonoy,

Bulacan

Same; Local Governments; Municipal Corporations; Tax

Ordinances; An appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure
should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days
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from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the
effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended.—The
aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or
revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice
within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even
during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall
not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28
took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in
December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the
ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly
dismissed it for being time-barred.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The timeframe fixed by law for
parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is
not a “mere technicality” that can be easily brushed aside—the
periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory.—At this point, it is apropos to state that the
timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies
before competent courts is not a “mere technicality” that can be
easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the
Local Government Code are mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a
revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix
and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood,
collection of revenues by the government is of paramount
importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and
provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived
from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the
validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable
length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an
aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax
ordinances.
Local Governments; Ordinances; Public Hearings; Public
hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow interested
parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance, but
these views are not binding on the legislative bodies—parties who
participate in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed
ordinance should not expect that their views would be patronized
by their lawmakers.—Petitioner cannot gripe that there was
practically no public hearing conducted as its objections to the
proposed measure were not considered by the Sangguniang
Bayan. To be sure, public hearings are conducted by legislative
bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a
proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding
on the legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the
same. Sanggunian members are elected by the people to make
laws that will promote the general interest of their

378

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378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of Hagonoy,

Bulacan

constituents. They are mandated to use their discretion and best

judgment in serving the people. Parties who participate in public
hearings to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not
expect that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
Same; Same; Section 6c.04 of the 1993 Municipal Revenue
Code and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limiting the
percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not
rentals.—Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the
petition must fail. Section 6c.04 of the 1993 Municipal Revenue
Code and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limiting the
percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not
rentals. Neither can it be said that the rates were not uniformly
imposed or that the public markets included in the Ordinance
were unreasonably determined or classified. To be sure, the
Ordinance covered the three (3) concrete public markets: the two-
storey Bagong Palengke, the burnt but reconstructed Lumang
Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke with wet
market. However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon
was excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a
makeshift, dilapidated place, with no doors or protection for
security, intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their
goods along the sidewalk.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.
     Joselito H.J. Reyes for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural.

Substantive laws, insofar as their provisions are
unambiguous, are rigorously applied to resolve legal issues
on the merits. In contrast, courts generally frown upon an
uncompromising application of procedural laws so as not to
subvert substantial justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally
uncommon for courts to decide cases based on a rigid
application of the so-called technical rules of procedure as
these rules exist for the orderly administration of justice.
Interestingly, the case at bar singularly illustrates both

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instances, i.e., when procedural rules are unbendingly

applied and when their rigid application may be relaxed.
379

VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 379

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

1
This is a petition for review of the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, dated February 15, 1999, dismissing the appeal
of petitioner Hagonoy Market Vendor Association from the
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice for being formally
deficient.
The facts: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Hagonoy,
2
Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg.
28, which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors
in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon
approval. The
3
subject ordinance was posted from November
4-25, 1996.
In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioner’s
members were personally given copies of the approved
Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in
January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioner’s
President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance.
Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the
ordinance.
Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the
ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the
ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law.
Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner’s appeal, made
over a year later, was already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30)
days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1,
1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local4
Government Code. Citing the case of Tañada vs. Tuvera,
the Secretary of Justice held that the date of effectivity of
the subject ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval
in October 1996, after the required publication or posting
has been 5complied with, pursuant to Section 3 of said
ordinance.

_______________

1 Per Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Justices Conrado M.

Vasquez, Jr. and Teodoro P. Regino; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

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2 Annex “E,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 35-36; The ordinance was signed by
Councilor Felix V. Ople, Tagapangulo ng Sanggunian and Dr. Maria
Garcia Santos as Pangulo Punong Bayan.
3 Per Certification of Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos;
Rollo, at p. 49.
4 146 SCRA 448, 452-454 (1986).
5 Resolution, dated February 25, 1998; Rollo, pp. 27-29.

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380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner

appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner did not assail
the finding of the Secretary of Justice that their appeal was
filed beyond the reglementary period. Instead, it urged that
the Secretary of Justice should have overlooked this “mere
technicality” and ruled on its petition on the merits.
Unfortunately, its petition for review was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals for being formally deficient as it was not
accompanied by certified true copies 6
of the assailed
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
Undaunted,7 the petitioner moved for reconsideration but
it was denied.
Hence, this appeal, where petitioner contends that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

RESPECT, ERRED IN ITS STRICT, RIGID AND TECHNICAL
ADHERENCE TO SECTION 6, RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF COURT AND THIS, IN EFFECT, FRUSTRATED THE
VALID LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER THAT
ORDINANCE (KAUTUSAN) NO. 28 WAS NOT VALIDLY
ENACTED, IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, TANTAMOUNT TO AN ILLEGAL
EXACTION IF ENFORCED RETROACTIVELY FROM THE
DATE OF ITS APPROVAL ON OCTOBER 1, 1996.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE

RESPECT, ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION NOTWITHSTANDING PETITIONER’S
EXPLANATION THAT ITS FAILURE TO SECURE THE
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WAS DUE TO THE
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INTERVENTION OF AN ACT OF GOD—TYPHOON “LOLENG,”

AND THAT THE ACTUAL COPIES RECEIVED BY THE
PETITIONER MAY BE CONSIDERED AS SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES.

_______________

6 Resolution, dated December 17, 1998; Rollo, pp. 22-23.

7 Resolution, dated February 15, 1999; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

381

VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 381

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

III

PETITIONER WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IF

ORDINANCE/KAUTUSAN NO. 28 BE NOT DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AND IS ALLOWED TO BE ENFORCED
(RETROACTIVELY FROM OCTOBER 1, 1996), CONTRARY TO
THE GENERAL RULE, ARTICLE 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
THAT NO LAW SHALL HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT.

The first and second assigned errors impugn the dismissal

by the Court of Appeals of its petition for review for
petitioner’s failure to attach certified true copies of the
assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The
petitioner insists that it had good reasons for its failure to
comply with the rule and the Court of Appeals erred in
refusing to accept its explanation.
We agree.
In its8 Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals, the petitioner satisfactorily explained the
circumstances relative to its failure to attach to its appeal
certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice, thus:

“x x x (D)uring the preparation of the petition on October 21,

1998, it was raining very hard due to (t)yphoon “Loleng.” When
the petition was completed, copy was served on the Department of
Justice at about (sic) past 4:00 p.m. of October 21, 1998, with (the)
instruction to have the Resolutions of the Department of Justice
be stamped as “certified true copies. However, due to bad weather,
the person in charge (at the Department of Justice) was no longer
available to certify to (sic) the Resolutions.
“The following day, October 22, 1998, was declared a non-
working holiday because of (t)yphoon “Loleng.” Thus, petitioner
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was again unable to have the Resolutions of the Department of

Justice stamped “certified true copies.” In the morning of October
23, 1998, due to time constraint(s), herein counsel served a copy
by personal service on (r)espondent’s lawyer at (sic) Malolos,
Bulacan, despite the flooded roads and heavy rains. However, as
the herein counsel went back to Manila, (official business in)
government offices were suspended in the afternoon and the
personnel of the Department of Justice tasked with issuing or
stamping “certified true copies” of their Resolutions were no
longer available.

_______________

8 Rollo, pp. 11-12.

382

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

“To avoid being time-barred in the filing of the (p)etition, the

same was filed with the Court of Appeals “as is.”

We find that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing

petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was formally
deficient. It is clear from the records that the petitioner
exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed
Resolutions certified by the Department of Justice, but
failed to do so on account of typhoon “Loleng.” Under the
circumstances, respondent appellate court should have
tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view
of the fortuitous event9 considering that litigation is not a
game of technicalities.
Nonetheless, we hold that the petition should be
dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Secretary
of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is
Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which
provides:

“SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax

Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings.
—The procedure for the approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of
this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for
the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further,
That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within

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thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of

Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall
not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance
and accrual and payment of the tax, fee or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary
of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings.

The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax

ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the
Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity
of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the
effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be

_______________

9 Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA

187 (1997).

383

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Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28

took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only
in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of
the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice
correctly dismissed it for being time-barred. At this point, it
is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for
parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent
courts is not a “mere technicality” that can be easily
brushed aside. The periods stated in Section
10
187 of the
Local Government Code are mandatory. Ordinance No. 28
is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of
Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals.
Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the
government is of paramount importance. The funds for the
operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to
its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and
collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue
measures
11
is not left uncertain for a considerable length of
time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an
aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures
and tax ordinances.
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In a last ditch effort to justify its failure to file a timely

appeal with the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner
contends that its period to appeal should be counted not
from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from
the time its members were personally given copies of the
approved ordinance in November 1997. It insists that it
was unaware of the approval and effectivity of the subject
ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first, no public
hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the
ordinance and, second, the approved ordinance was not
posted.
We do not agree.
Petitioner’s bold assertion that there was no public
hearing conducted prior to the passage of Kautusan Blg. 28
is belied by its own evidence. In petitioner’s two (2)
communications with the Secretary

_______________

10 Reyes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 320 SCRA 486 (1999), citing
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 edition, p. 266.
11 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1998).

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384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

12
of Justice, it enumerated the various objections raised by
its members before the passage of the ordinance in several
meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. These
show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the
proposed increase and in fact participated in the public
hearings therefor. The respondent municipality likewise
submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings
conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan’s Committee on
Appropriations and Market on February 6, July 15 and
August 1319, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall
rentals.
Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no
public hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed
measure were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan.
To be sure, public hearings are conducted by legislative
bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views
on a proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are
not binding on the legislative body and it is not compelled
by law to adopt the same. Sanggunian members are elected
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by the people to make laws that will promote the general

interest of their constituents. They are mandated to use
their discretion and best judgment in serving the people.
Parties who participate in public hearings to give their
opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect that
their views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the
Local Government Code provides:

“Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue

Measures. Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true
copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or
revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3)
consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided,
however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there
are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in
at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.”
(emphasis supplied)

_______________

12 Pagtutol sa Kautusan Blg. 28, C.A. Rollo, p. 18; Paghahabol, CA

Rollo, pp. 29-30.
13 Rollo, pp. 82-95.

385

VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 385

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

The records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s

negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not
posted as required by law. In contrast, the respondent
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows that the
procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance was
complied with. Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was enacted by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy on October 1, 1996.
Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos
approved the Ordinance on October 7, 1996. After its
approval, copies of the Ordinance were given to the
Municipal Treasurer on the same day. On November 9,
1996, the Ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the period
from November 4 - 25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz.:
in front of the municipal building, at the bulletin board of
the Sta. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of the
14
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14
Office of the Market Master in the public market. Posting
was validly made in lieu of publication as there was no
newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of
Hagonoy. This fact was known to and admitted by
petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s ambiguous and unsupported
claim that it was only “sometime in November 1997” that
the Provincial Board approved Municipal Ordinance No. 28
and so15
the posting could not have been made in November
1996 was sufficiently disproved by the positive evidence of
respondent municipality. Given the foregoing
circumstances, petitioner cannot validly claim lack of
knowledge of the approved ordinance. The filing of its
appeal a year after the effectivity of the subject ordinance
is fatal to its cause.
Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the
petition must fail. Section 6c.04 of the 1993 Municipal
Revenue Code and Section 191 of the Local Government
Code limiting the percentage of increase that can be
imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it be
said that the rates were not uniformly imposed or that the
public markets included in the Ordinance were
unreasonably determined or classified. To be sure, the
Ordinance covered the three

_______________

14 Certification of Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos; Rollo,

p. 49; Affidavits of municipal employee Ruperto dela Cruz and Municipal
Councilor Cruz; Rollo, pp. 99-100.
15 See Reply; Rollo, at p. 54.

386

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hagonoy Market Vendor Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan

(3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong

Palengke, the burnt but reconstructed Lumang Palengke
and the more recent Lumang Palengke with wet market.
However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon
was excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a
makeshift, dilapidated place, with no doors or protection
for security, intended for transient16
peddlers who used to
sell their goods along the sidewalk.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo and

Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—Section 187 of the Local Government Code

authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he
is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. (Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 [1994])
Public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an
appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other specific
statutory authority, i.e., Section 84 of PD 1445. (City of
Quezon vs. Lexber Incorporated, 354 SCRA 493 [2001])

——o0o——

_______________

16 As shown in pictures attached to respondent’s Memorandum; Rollo,

pp. 117-118.

387

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