Kuhn Baltics INT Final WEB
Kuhn Baltics INT Final WEB
Kuhn Baltics INT Final WEB
KÜHN
PREVENTING
ESCALATION
in the BALTICS
A N ATO
P LAY BO O K
“The risk of serious military escalation between NATO and Russia is higher than ever
before since the end of the Cold War. In a time marked by the erosion of trust and in-
creasing tensions between Moscow and the West, Ulrich Kühn’s report offers sensible,
well-measured and timely recommendations that can help to avoid both contributing to a
dangerous arms race and underestimating the threat emanating from Russia. His call for a
comprehensive NATO strategy that includes deterrence and assurance, but also resilience
and risk-reduction measures should be mandatory reading for policymakers worried
about our sleepwalking into a serious confrontation over the Baltics.”
“The Baltic states are now on the front line of the developing tension between NATO and
the Russian Federation. In this disturbing study, Ulrich Kühn demonstrates how Russian
actions directed against these states that fall short of armed force might nonetheless
escalate into dangerous situations involving force. He urges prudent measures to identify
and reduce these risks.”
—Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London
PREVENTING
ESCALATION
in the BALTICS
A NATO PLAYBOOK
Ulrich Kühn
© 2018 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are
the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permis-
sion in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Please direct inquiries to:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................................ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....................................................................................................................xi
SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................. 7
NOTES..............................................................................................................................................73
ULRICH KÜHN is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
and a senior research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
(VCDNP)/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, based in Vienna, Austria.
Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program,
and a fellow with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of
Hamburg (IFSH). He holds a PhD (summa cum laude) in political sciences from Hamburg
University, an MA in Peace Research and Security Policy from Hamburg University, and a
Magister Artium in medieval and newer history as well as German literature from the
Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms University Bonn. His current research focuses on NATO-
Russian relations, transatlantic security, nuclear and conventional deterrence and arms
control, and the proceedings of the OSCE.
Kühn worked for the German Federal Foreign Office and was awarded United Nations Fellow
on Disarmament in 2011. He is the founder and a permanent member of the trilateral Deep
Cuts Commission and an alumnus of the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius.
His articles and commentary have appeared in Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Washington Quarterly, and War on the Rocks.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
THE AUTHOR wishes to thank James Acton in the first place for his always insightful
comments and continuous efforts to improve the quality of this report. In no order of the
significance of their contributions, this report also benefited from the help of William
Alberque, Samuel Brase, Samuel Charap, Toby Dalton, Ryan DeVries, Dave Johnson,
Martin Zapfe, the anonymous Baltic and Polish officials and experts who were interviewed,
and Carnegie’s whole Nuclear Policy Program team. This research was conducted at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, between September
2016 and September 2017.
Carnegie gratefully acknowledges the support of the Stanton Foundation that made the
writing of this report possible.
ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS
EU European Union
INCSEA Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas
xi
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
AMID THE ROLLOUT of the February 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, security ana-
lysts have understandably focused much attention on its implications for the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, intra-alliance ties with key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners,
and Washington’s icy relations with Moscow. But nuclear deterrence only partially ad-
dresses NATO members’ shared concerns about Russian behavior, especially in light of
Moscow’s growing propensity to undermine the alliance with nonkinetic operations and
other tactics that nuclear warheads cannot easily deter.
1
THE CHALLENGE RUSSIA POSES
To keep the West out of the non-NATO former Soviet republics, Moscow has developed
new-generation warfare, a coercive strategy that combines traditional conventional and
nuclear military capabilities with nonkinetic operations such as cyberattacks, propaganda,
and disinformation.
NATO members have different views of Russia’s intentions toward the alliance and how
to respond. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, some allies fear that Moscow could use mili-
tary force against NATO, particularly the Baltic states. They urge the alliance to do more,
militarily, to deter Russia and to reassure its easternmost members. They fear that NATO’s
current response—including, most importantly, the deployment of a trip wire force of four
multinational battalions, the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), to the three Baltic states
and Poland—might not be enough to deter deliberate Russian escalation. Others are rather
skeptical that Moscow presents an immediate military threat and caution against unneces-
sarily raising tensions further. Instead of deploying additional forces, they want NATO to
focus on increasing the resilience of member states against Russian nonkinetic operations
and to engage in a serious security dialogue with Russia, reducing the risks of inadvertent
and accidental escalation.
Both approaches could create the risk of miscalculation and, perhaps, escalation. If NATO
underestimates the threat Russia poses, the alliance may give Moscow reason to test its re-
solve—perhaps even by using military force. Conversely, if NATO overestimates the threat
emanating from Russia, its well-intentioned defensive measures may lead to a security di-
lemma that precipitates an arms race and ultimately undermines alliance unity.
•• Were Russia to threaten military escalation in a crisis, NATO would feel significant pres-
sure to reinforce forward-deployed troops as a defensive precaution. However, if NATO
failed to clearly and persuasively communicate to Russia its defensive intent, Moscow
might misread the deployment as the opening of a NATO offensive, perhaps responding
by escalating to (what the Kremlin would see as) the preventive use of military force.
•• Even more concerning, were Russia to use force against the alliance by taking a small
portion of land in, for instance, eastern Latvia, EFP forces, which are based far from
the Russian border, might arrive too late to engage in combat (especially given that
NATO’s decisionmaking process could be quite slow). Consequently, Russia might
hope to get away with a military fait accompli.
•• NATO’s combined conventional military power and any subsequent efforts to retake
the Baltics through massive force deployments, once initiated, would put the onus on
Moscow. Out of fear of losing a conventional conflict with NATO, Russia might esca-
late further, perhaps even to nuclear use.
•• NATO allies have disagreed about the politics of nuclear sharing, the idea of having non-
nuclear NATO members take part in nuclear planning and some members providing
national aircraft to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons in the event of their use. In addition,
allies disagree about the appropriate readiness levels for those dual-capable aircraft in
Europe and about whether NATO exercises should involve nuclear elements. This some-
what ambiguous stance toward nuclear deterrence might lead Russia (perhaps wrongly)
to doubt NATO’s resolve in a crisis, increasing the risk of escalation.
•• Conversely, NATO might not view Russian nuclear threats as credible, especially early
in a crisis when they might appear to be disproportionate. In this case, NATO misread-
ing Russian resolve might cause escalation.
Nonkinetic Operations
Moscow’s efforts to influence Russian minorities in the three Baltic states could lead
to a crisis in which neither NATO nor Russia would be able to manage subsequent
escalation.
•• For many years, Russia has staged a subversive disinformation campaign in the Baltics,
aimed at influencing Russian minorities. If protests by these minorities were to oc-
cur—whether deliberately fomented by Moscow or not—NATO and Russia might
•• NATO must clarify the roles of the EFP and reinforcement forces in the event of ex-
ternally instigated domestic unrest in the Baltics or if NATO forces are deliberately
targeted by protesters.
•• The alliance must make sure that it can move forces if reinforcement becomes necessary.
It should consider enhancing the defenses of its vital logistics and transportation nodes
in Western Europe and adapting its logistics in Eastern Europe.
•• To bolster deterrence and assurance, NATO heads of state and government should
convey clearer public and private messages of political resolve, while avoiding changes
to NATO’s current nuclear posture.
Resilience
•• NATO must encourage civilian resilience measures to deny Russia the ability to escalate
through nonkinetic operations, perhaps by making resilience-building expenditures
count toward NATO members’ 2 percent goal for defense spending.
•• Allies must counter Russian propaganda and disinformation targeted at Russian mi-
norities in the Baltic states. The alliance should consider a joint NATO/EU fund for
financing Russian-language media outlets, journalists, and social media accounts.
•• NATO members should closely monitor the state of integration and representation of
the Russian minorities in the Baltic states, perhaps through a reporting mechanism.
Risk Reduction
•• NATO must continue to engage Russia to seek to prevent incidents and reestablish
crisis communication channels. Allies should encourage Poland and the Baltic states to
conclude individual incident prevention mechanisms with Moscow.
•• Member states should start internal preparations for confidence-building and security-
building measures and an arms control process with Russia, seeking transparency as
well as reciprocal reductions and/or limitations on heavy conventional equipment in
the wider Baltics region.
•• If Russia initially refuses to cooperate on arms control, allies could explore the pos-
sibility of threatening additional NATO force deployments unless Moscow engages on
conventional arms control and the INF Treaty.
7
multinational battalions to the three Baltic states and Poland to deter eventual Russian ag-
gression.3 Meanwhile, Moscow strongly denies any malign intentions toward NATO, and
instead points to the alliance as a threat to its own national security.4
Conversely, it is also possible that NATO may be underestimating the Russian military
threat. Russia’s strategy of conflict, as stipulated in its doctrine of new-generation warfare,7
appears to be comprehensive, involving everything from propaganda to potential nuclear
use. Failing to identify a sound response that addresses the threat in its totality could be
dangerous. For example, NATO’s defensive measures, by being too limited, could lead
Moscow to deliberately test allies’ resolve, perhaps even by military means.
Some NATO members argue that the alliance is still not doing enough to credibly deter
Russia.8 The geography and the military balance in the region present real challenges to
NATO in defending Baltic allies. Russia has a much larger force presence than NATO
in the region and, by using land routes, can quickly reinforce equipment and personnel.
NATO, by contrast, would have to fly or ship in reinforcements—a much slower process.
Additionally, Moscow continues to hold large-scale military exercises based on aggressive
scenarios against neighboring states such as Poland, close to NATO’s borders. The latest
one—Zapad 2017—peaked in September
2017. Such exercises, some of Russia’s
Some NATO members neighbors fear, could be used as a cover for
argue that the alliance is a limited military attack against them.9
still not doing enough to The conventional challenge in Europe is
credibly deter Russia. compounded by Russia’s increasingly ag-
gressive behavior in the nuclear realm. On
various occasions since 2014, the United
States has publicly accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty by developing and, more recently, deploying a ground-launched cruise missile
(although Washington has not indicated whether it believes these missiles are designed to
accommodate nuclear or nonnuclear warheads or both).10 Furthermore, Russia frequently
All these developments create political (as well as military) problems for NATO. They lead
to pressure on NATO to review its own deterrence and defense posture, including its nucle-
ar component, and, perhaps, to formulate more muscular responses. But such a debate—al-
ready tentatively taking place at NATO Headquarters—risks eroding unity among NATO
allies, which have a wide range of different preferences in the nuclear realm. This erosion
of unity could undermine deterrence. A military alliance at odds over its own deterrence
and defense posture could be perceived as weak by Russia, making it a potential target for
military blackmail and coercion.
Preserving NATO’s unity is, therefore, a key task for the alliance, even more so since Russia’s
doctrine of new-generation warfare is challenging NATO militarily and politically in many
other respects. All three Baltic states, for instance, are subject to relentless Russian attacks
through propaganda, disinformation, and outright hate speech that have become more
virulent since 2014.12 These states are home to significant ethnic Russian minorities that
receive Russian state-sponsored media almost exclusively. This propaganda deepens exist-
ing divides, which date back to the Soviet
occupation, between the different popula-
tions groups in the Baltics.13 Perhaps Russia Preserving NATO’s unity is a
does not seek to stoke protests or outright key task for the alliance, even
unrest among minority groups. But even
if it does not, Moscow’s negative influence
more so since Russia’s doctrine
nonetheless increases the risk of a domestic of new-generation warfare is
crisis in one of the three states, in the wake challenging NATO militarily and
of which there could be growing domestic politically in many other respects.
pressure on the Kremlin for Russia to come
to the aid of Russians living abroad.
Even if Moscow is not planning for deliberate aggression against NATO, accidental escala-
tion is another potential risk. Russia has stepped up military brinkmanship vis-à-vis NATO
member states since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.14 In 2016 alone, Russian military
aircraft violated Estonian airspace five times and often came extremely close to allied air-
craft.15 These actions could result in an accident, potentially killing NATO and Russian
service personnel. In the wake of such an accident, tensions could rapidly mount, especially
given domestic pressure to retaliate. NATO and Russia might find themselves unable to
control the subsequent escalation.
So far, NATO has responded with an incremental approach, focused on collective defense,
crisis management, and cooperative security. At its 2014 summit in Wales, NATO empha-
Indeed, NATO’s deterrence and defense approach still contains loopholes that must be
closed. But deterrence alone is ill-equipped to manage the nonkinetic or accidental escala-
tion risks that Russia’s doctrine of new-generation warfare pose. NATO needs a compre-
hensive, threefold strategy that addresses these risks and takes into account the views of
allies in the wider Baltic region.18 As NATO seeks to formulate an effective response to
Russia’s policies and actions, the alliance is facing three major tasks: (1) how to calibrate its
deterrence measures to prevent deliberate Russian escalation and to assure its easternmost
members; (2) how to maintain alliance unity in light of the differing threat perceptions—
particularly toward Russia—and defense priorities of the members states; and (3) how to
prevent possible inadvertent or accidental escalation with Russia. If left unattended, these
challenges will further increase the already high risk of escalation in the Baltic region. The
focus should be on what NATO can do now to reduce the risk of escalation in the future,
rather than on the separate (albeit important) question of how NATO should try to manage
escalation should a crisis occur.
To this end, NATO should close dangerous loopholes in its current deterrence and
assurance approach, so as to deter Russian aggression against NATO and prevent Moscow
from using deliberate escalation to coerce the alliance. The alliance should also double
down on efforts to enhance resilience—that is, increasing the ability of member states to
absorb shocks, such as sudden electricity outages or large-scale cyberattacks on corporate
networks. NATO must make its societies—in particular its easternmost allies and Russian
minorities living there—more immune to Russian destabilization efforts. Finally, by engag-
ing Moscow in talks on risk-reduction measures, NATO should seek to diminish the po-
tential for accidental escalation, especially given the spike in dangerous military encounters.
Over the longer term, it is also possible that consultations with Russia could lead to more
far-reaching arms control talks about conventional forces in the region.19
Finding the right balance between deterrence and assurance, resilience, and risk reduction
will be no easy feat, but could pay dividends if done well. NATO will probably have to make
trade-offs. For instance, further emphasizing military responses—perhaps by additional
force deployments—could help to solidify assurance of the Baltic states and Poland. At the
RUSSIA SEES ITSELF as a status quo power and views NATO, and the United States
above all, as a challenger to the status quo.20 For Moscow, preserving the status quo means
retaining and exerting its influence in the former Soviet republics other than the three Baltic
states.21 The more Moscow sees a real prospect of former Soviet republics like Ukraine,
Georgia, Belarus, or Moldova drifting westward, the harder it seeks to crackdown on those
states and the more determined it becomes in its efforts to weaken, divide, and keep the
West busy.
These efforts reflect security concerns and a common history as well as close economic,
cultural, religious, and societal ties.22 No less important, Moscow’s desire for regional pre-
ponderance helps fulfill a national narrative of Russia’s return as a great power.23 Another
crucial reason lies in Russian historical experiences of being attacked by continental powers,
including Germany and France. These experiences make it seem prudent for Russia to have
some degree of influence over its western periphery.24 Last but not least, Moscow sees itself
as a security patron of Russian citizens, “wherever they may be,” in the words of former
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, including those in the former Soviet republics.25
It is no exaggeration to assert that losing the ability to influence the former Soviet republics
would be seen throughout Russia as no less than a humiliating national catastrophe. Any
serious attempt by other powers to pry the former Soviet republics away from Moscow, or
to even encourage their independence, has, therefore, met with strong Russian resistance.
13
Toward that end, the eastward enlargements of NATO and the European Union (EU),
which are often seen by Russia’s leadership as equally concerning,26 are perceived as both
harbingers that Russia may one day lose her sphere of influence and as a potential military
security threat. Seen from Moscow, NATO has dangerously been moving ever closer to
Russia’s sphere of influence, step by step.27
This struggle is all the harder to sustain because, as Russia’s leadership is all too aware, the
United States and the West in general have greater economic and military resources at their
disposal and provide a more attractive model to the former Soviet republics, particularly in
the economic realm.28
Russia’s approach to the former Soviet republics and its relationship with NATO should
not be conflated. Yet, they interact with one another. While Russia keeps the former Soviet
republics from drifting westward, at the same time, it is doing everything it can below the
level of open military hostilities to prevent NATO from even thinking about offering mem-
bership to those countries.
In doing so, Russia has three advantages vis-à-vis NATO. First, because of its authoritarian
rule, Russia’s leadership faces much less domestic pressure to justify its strategy. As a result,
internal decisionmaking on issues such as the use of military force or military procurement is
much swifter and less publicly controversial than in most NATO states. Second, Russia has
no real allies but rather client states with limited room for independent political maneuver.
NATO, by contrast, has to take into ac-
count the diverse views of its member states,
To further its interests, which, again, slows down decisionmaking.
Russia’s leadership has Third, open liberal societies, including most
developed a strategy toward NATO states, are inherently more suscep-
tible to influence campaigns than semi-
the former Soviet republics closed, authoritarian systems.
to keep Western institutions
NATO’s weaknesses have been recognized
out, the Russians in, and the in Moscow, and the Kremlin tries to exploit
former Soviet republics down. them to its advantage. According to the
chief of the General Staff of the Armed
The situation in the post-Soviet space with its economically vulnerable and often demo-
cratically dysfunctional states is somewhat reversed. Against those states, Russia’s relative
economic and military dominance allows it to exert economic pressure or, if necessary, to
employ military force. By actively creating, manipulating, or prolonging secessionist con-
flicts in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Moldova, Moscow prevents those states from fully
joining NATO and the EU at some point in the future.
NEW-GENERATION WARFARE
Western analysts often refer to the model of hybrid warfare to describe Russian tactics.31
This description is not correct and might even be misleading.32 Hybrid warfare originally
referred, in Western theoretical analyses, to a tactical approach by inferior insurgents in the
Middle East to try to not lose a conflict against a superior opponent (such as Hezbollah’s
struggle against Israel).
Moscow attributes the initial development of these tactics and operations almost exclusively
to the West and sees the events of the Arab Spring as a prime example of a Western strategy
that begins with stirring political unrest, is followed by foreign military support of insur-
gents, and—finally—ends with intervention. However, Russian actions in Ukraine and
elsewhere provide strong evidence that Moscow emulated these tactics and developed this
integrated NGW doctrine with the post-Soviet space and, to a much lesser degree, NATO
member states in mind.
•• NONKINETIC TOOLS: As part of its NGW concept, Moscow employs various nonmili-
tary means, including standard diplomacy; economic pressure; financial and/or rhetorical
support of political groups or parties that are friendly to Russia and hostile to the EU and
NATO; propaganda and disinformation campaigns; overt criminal activities by paid mer-
Western analysts have struggled to specify how exactly Russia would employ its nuclear
arms. Some experts continue to focus on the concept of escalate-to-deescalate.46 Generally
speaking, under this doctrine, Russia—facing NATO’s conventionally stronger, combined
forces (or perhaps those of China)—would employ nuclear weapons first, in a limited fash-
ion, perhaps on its geographical periphery. The purpose would be to convince a hypotheti-
cal attacker that further nuclear escalation
would be imminent if that attacker were to
Western analysts have choose not to back down. At the end of the
struggled to specify how 1990s, when the Russian military was in
exactly Russia would employ aplayed moribund state, some Russian strategists
with exactly that idea.47
its nuclear arms.
Despite its recent military modernization,
Russia is still facing two conventionally su-
perior powers along its borders—NATO and China—and Moscow continues to maintain
up to an estimated 2,000 tactical nuclear arms (an unclear number of which is expected to
be stored in depots west of the Ural Mountains).48 These facts lend certain credence to the
assumption that Russia relies on this doctrine to this day.49 Further evidence comes from
Russia’s use, in exercises, of a simulated strike with a single nuclear weapon at the end of
a conventional conflict. Interestingly, in many such exercises, the strike is conducted with
a strategic nuclear weapon—that is, with a missile that could reach the United States.50
This fact has led some experts to question certain aspects or even the very existence of the
escalate-to-deescalate doctrine.51 After all, in the event of a war between Russia and NATO,
In fact, Russian exercises do not preclude the possibility that Moscow plans for limited
regional escalation using tactical nuclear weapons. Rather, the exercises suggest that Russia
is also prepared to escalate in a limited fashion at the strategic level. Western analysts even
assume that Russian escalation to the nuclear level in general could happen rather quickly
in a conflict with NATO.52
The key question is what political and military purposes Russia intends for the escalate-to-
deescalate doctrine to serve, if the doctrine does in fact exist. There are two possible inter-
pretations, neither of which is conclusive given the lack of clear evidence. The more benign
interpretation sees Russia—after being attacked first—escalating an unfavorable conven-
tional battle to the nuclear level in order to, in effect, deescalate the overall standoff. Russia’s
inherently defensive goals in this scenario would be to deter further aggression or terminate
the conflict with an acceptable outcome. The more malign view assumes that Russia would
seize territory through conventional means and threaten, simultaneously or afterward, to
escalate to the nuclear level in the event of a counterattack. Here, the inherently offensive
goal would be to terminate such a conflict before Russia’s opponent(s) could regain ground.
In both scenarios, escalation to nuclear use would presumably only make sense against
adversaries that Moscow believes it could deter from responding in kind with nuclear weap-
ons. Some Russian analysts strongly deny either of these interpretations and instead argue
that no Russian concept of intra-war deterrence has ever made it to the operational military
levels. They claim that, especially if Russia were attacked by the United States and NATO,
the Russian military would probably be quick to escalate to all-out nuclear war.53
In fact, it is not impossible that all of these interpretations contain some grain of truth. As
Russian expert A. Pechatnov has put it, “at the present time the Russian Federation uses a
concept based on the ideas of Mutual Assured Destruction and limited nuclear war” (itali-
cized by the author).54 In spite of all this speculation, Moscow has not responded by clarify-
ing whether the escalate-to-deescalate doctrine exists and, if it does, what purpose it serves.
Nevertheless, from a military point of view, the utility of the SSC-8 for Russia is somewhat
questionable. Russia can already target all of Europe with its sea- and air-launched dual-ca-
pable missiles.61 Perhaps, Russian military leaders do not trust those delivery platforms in a
second-strike scenario and believe that they would lose them early on in a war with NATO.
Another possibility is that the SSC-8 is intended to put pressure on NATO members to
formulate a political and military response, thereby exposing alliance members’ divergent
views on nuclear weapons. Intentionally or inadvertently, the INF crisis risks further dam-
aging what remains of the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control process, most notably the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limiting strategic arms, which is set
to expire in 2021.62
Taken together, Russian nontransparency and noncompliance with nuclear arms control
agreements helps Moscow acquire prohibited capabilities and obscure its capabilities at the
same time. It thus contributes to the ambiguities Western experts encounter in analyzing
Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
RHETORICAL NUCLEAR THREATS AND SIGNALING: Since the outbreak of the Ukraine
crisis, Russian actors have repeatedly issued nuclear threats, often targeted against NATO
Russia frequently has augmented such threats with acts of nuclear signaling—meaning non-
routine and perhaps offensive military actions that involve nuclear forces. In recent years,
for example, Russia has regularly sent nuclear-capable long-range bombers close to NATO
territory, although always strictly within international airspace. Russian nuclear signaling
often occurs in conjunction with important political events, such as Russia’s occupation of
Crimea, NATO’s 2017 defense ministers meeting in Brussels, or even on July 4, the United
States’ Independence Day.66 This timing indicates that the relevant actions are not simply
practice maneuvers but are intended to convey a threat.
In doing so, Moscow’s ultimate goal is to expose the various contradictory views on nu-
clear deterrence within the alliance and undermine its unity. Indeed, this purpose, and the
aforementioned second one, illustrate that Russia’s nuclear doctrine contains a subversive
element aimed at undermining Western institutions. Taken together, the different missions
The threat of nuclear escalation is central to Moscow’s NGW doctrine precisely because
Russia constantly employs this tool not only at the high end of the proverbial ladder of nu-
clear escalation, but also on the ladder’s lower rungs and in the background of conflict. For
instance, if Russia wanted to initiate low-level violence against NATO—by, for example,
sending disguised special forces across the border of a Baltic state—the supporting threat of
nuclear escalation could be a potential enabler, intended to deter NATO from responding
strongly. In such a scenario, NATO would have to contemplate the possibility of Moscow
escalating to nuclear use. Whether NATO would perceive such a threat as credible is an
open question, but it might affect and perhaps slow down NATO’s response.69 Apart from
being employed to support specific operations, Russian nuclear threats also have served as
a kind of constant background noise to intimidate and distract NATO for at least the last
few years. In this way, such threats are intended to help enable any possible low-level action
that Russia might want to initiate.
SINCE THE END of the Cold War, NATO has taken a threefold approach of collective
defense, enlargement, and cooperative security to respond to the dramatic changes Europe
has undergone since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. How to prioritize these different ele-
ments has been and still is disputed among the alliance’s twenty-nine members, all of which
have their own, sometimes divergent, interests. At the heart of the alliance, however, lies the
collective defense commitment to assist each other in the event of an armed attack.
For the past twenty years, as NATO has mostly pursued an open door policy toward Central
and Eastern Europe, the alliance has grown by integrating former members of the Warsaw
Pact, nonmembers who were previously friendly with the Soviet Union, and three former
Soviet republics (the three Baltic states). The principles underlying enlargement are that
new member states must choose freely to join NATO, that they fulfill a number of political
and military criteria (such as having settled any ethnic or external territorial disputes, as well
as being able to contribute militarily and financially to collective defense), and that their
accession strengthens the alliance.70 In addition, NATO has fostered close cooperative ties
with all other former Soviet republics and continues to champion their political indepen-
dence. At the same time, NATO has engaged Russia to try to alleviate Moscow’s concerns
about NATO enlargement and to pursue cooperation in areas of common security interest,
such as mutual military risk reduction and counterterrorism. NATO insists that it does not
seek conflict with Russia.71
23
NATO members have sometimes disagreed about which elements of this approach to pri-
oritize; at times, fractures between different national positions have become very visible.
For example, at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, the United States and some other allies
pushed for Georgia and Ukraine to become members, directly challenging a core Russian
interest. But France and Germany blocked this proposed accession, partly because they
were concerned about Russia’s likely negative reaction and partly because they questioned
the fitness of these states to join NATO and their potential to strengthen the alliance.72
Russia’s occupation of Crimea and subsequent deterioration in relations with NATO has
again pushed the task of collective defense to the fore.73 At its 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO
allies underscored that Moscow is now considered to be a “challenge [to] the Alliance” and
“a source of regional instability.”74 To meet this challenge, NATO agreed first and foremost
to assure its easternmost allies and to enhance its means of deterring and defending against
Russia. But allies also recognized the need to increase the resilience of all members and to
seek dialogue with Russia.
GENERAL UNCERTAINTY
For NATO, the Russian challenge presents multiple uncertainties, which exacerbate the
potential for disagreement. For starters, NATO members have different views of Moscow’s
intentions in the post-Soviet space and toward the alliance. Some officials from certain
members—including the three Baltic states, Poland, and the United States—have repeat-
edly claimed that the Kremlin is “revanchist,” in the sense that it purportedly wants to
redraw the map of Europe.75 They argue that Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, and in
Georgia back in 2008, demonstrate Moscow’s willingness to use force in the former Soviet
republics. They fear that Moscow could even use military force against the alliance, particu-
larly the Baltic states. At a minimum, they see Russia as a challenger of the status quo—a
view diametrically opposed to Moscow’s
view of itself.
For NATO, the Russian
In addition, the states that see Russia as
challenge presents multiple
revanchist are mindful of Russian domes-
uncertainties, which tic politics and how these forces interact
exacerbate the potential with the tensions with NATO. According
for disagreement. to a popular—and probably correct—
theory, Putin, confronted with an ailing
Russian economy, to some extent may
need the friction with NATO, and particularly with Washington, to hold on to power.76
According to this theory, Putin’s efforts to foster nationalistic support to divert attention
from Russia’s deep-seated domestic problems could even force him to militarily test the
alliance one day.
countries where NATO troops Sites where new Russian St. Petersburg
have recently been stationed divisions are stationed
Number of troops Combat tanks Warplanes
830 ,000 3,000 1,900
ESTONIA
Moscow
LATVIA
DENMARK Baltic
Fleet LITHUANIA
BRITAIN
Russian exclave of BELARUS
Kaliningrad
Main line of defense former
for NATO during the East Germany POLAND
Cold War
GERMANY UKRAINE
CZECH REP. Eastern Ukraine
Occupied by Rostov
SLOVAKIA pro-Russian
FRANCE MOLDOVA separatists South Ossetia
since 2014 Military conflict between Russia
HUNGARY and Georgia in August 2008
SLOVENIA ROMANIA
Crimea
CROATIA Annexed by Russia GEORGIA
ITALY Black in March 2014
PORTUGAL Sea
SPAIN
Fleet
BULGARIA
NATO Member States
ALBANIA
TURKEY
GREECE
Recognizing these weaknesses, the NATO allies agreed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit to
deploy four multinational battalions—a so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)—to
the three Baltic states and Poland. NATO also agreed to increase the intensity and scope
of its exercises in the region to deter Russian aggression and assure its eastern members.
Separately, the United States has sent additional forces and military equipment under a U.S.
national program known as the European Deterrence Initiative. (See Box 1 for a description
of the forces deployed under the EFP and the European Deterrence Initiative.)
In the event of a conflict, NATO’s Graduated Response Plan (known as Eagle Defender) would
come into play; this plan contains its own detailed rules of engagement. In any case, even
in the event of a conflict, SACEUR can only move forces in a very limited fashion—and not
beyond borders without a North Atlantic Council executive directive. Under the European
Deterrence Initiative, the United States deployed a range of forces including an armored
brigade combat team (of about 3,500 personnel) that continuously rotates through NATO’s
easternmost member states. This deployment also includes a combat aviation brigade (of
about 2,200 personnel), headquartered in Germany; a combat sustainment support battalion
(of about 750 personnel), based in Poland with a logistics hub in Romania; and a support
team in Lithuania. These steps have increased the overall number of U.S. combat brigades in
Europe to three, while also pre-positioning stocks of military equipment for a fourth brigade.
The grim logic of this arrangement is that once the trip wire is pulled, NATO would be
forced to retake the Baltic states if it were to not accept (temporary) defeat at Russia’s
hands. In the event of a crisis or combat, the EFP could, according to current plans, receive
two waves of reinforcements. The first to arrive would be NATO’s Very High Readiness
Joint Task Force (VJTF)—also known as the Spearhead Force—which consists of, at most,
13,000 personnel. The Spearhead is the most rapidly deployable part of the Enhanced
NATO Response Force (eNRF) the rest of which would follow later. At most, the complete
eNRF consists of 40,000 personnel (including the Spearhead).86
Assembling, moving, and deploying those forces would take time. NATO estimates that it
would take less than seven days to deploy the Spearhead.87 Little is known publicly about
the readiness of the rest of the eNRF.88 Some experts believe that “between 30 and 45 days”
would be needed “from notice to movement”—a timeline that does not include actual
deployment.89 How long it would take European allies to muster additional credible forces
for a potential third wave, given the atrophied state of some European allies’ forces, is even
less clear.90 One study concluded that even British, French, or German forces would have a
hard time providing a combat-ready heavy brigade at short notice.91
Of course, in the event of a crisis, it would be possible for individual NATO states, most
notably the United States, to bypass NATO’s political command structure and intervene
independently ahead of a NATO decision.92 However, doing so would come at the political
price of rendering NATO’s collective decisionmaking in the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
obsolete. Moreover, given the current U.S. administration’s ambiguous commitment to
Article V, Washington’s willingness to intervene independently is questionable. In any case,
all military crisis planning ultimately depends on NATO allies politically agreeing to use
force to counter a potential Russian attack. While the decision to enter war with Russia
would certainly not be an easy one, it would require a unanimous vote by the twenty-nine
members of the NAC.93
Particularly the latter represents a serious problem for NATO. The flow of NATO’s rein-
forcements—by air, sea, and land routes—could be disrupted by Russia’s substantial mod-
ern anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which are centered in the Kaliningrad
exclave and around Saint Petersburg. These capabilities include conventional and dual-
capable guided missiles, anti-ship weapons, air defense systems, and several layers of mod-
ern radar.96 If accusations that Russia has violated the INF Treaty are correct, then Moscow
might well also possess dual-capable intermediate-range missiles that could be used to target
key transport nodes and pre-positioned equipment deep in Western Europe.
Taken together, the current EFP configuration has loopholes that might provide Russia with
the opportunity for a military fait accompli, effectively taking a small part of Latvia. This
increases the risk of deliberate escalation. Without the EFP directly involved in early combat,
NATO members might find it hard to agree on immediate military counteractions. If Russia
were to only threaten a conventional attack, the risk of inadvertent escalation might increase
once NATO decides to deploy additional forces to the Baltics. Russia might simply misread
NATO’s defensive move as offensive. Last but not least, in any crisis or open conflict with
Russia, NATO would face serious but not insurmountable obstacles reinforcing its troops.
Some Western analysts have criticized NATO’s deterrence and assurance measures for not
doing enough to meaningfully mitigate the risk of deliberate Russian escalation. They wor-
ry that NATO’s current policy may still leave Moscow tempted to test the alliance with
its superior conventional forces unless NATO follows up with a strategy for overcoming
Russian A2/AD capabilities and enabling swift reinforcement.97 Others have argued for the
additional deployment of large-scale, mainly U.S. troops to the region to help bypass the
reinforcement problem.98 According to war games conducted by the RAND Corporation,
NATO would probably need seven heavily armed brigades (of about 35,000 personnel)
permanently deployed in the region to prevent a Russian fait accompli and an additional
nine to fourteen maneuver brigades (of up to about 70,000 personnel) as reinforcements to
drive Russian forces back.99
Officials from the region have echoed some of these concerns. Baltic officials, in particular,
argue in private conversations for additional deployments—particularly of U.S. forces—to
their countries, though on a much more limited scale than proposed in the RAND study.
They express an expectation that current deterrence and assurance measures are only the
starting point for a larger effort aimed at modernizing and streamlining NATO’s overall
command structure, and they maintain that the next steps must include efforts to perma-
nently secure reinforcement routes, to have reinforcement personnel ready at all times, and
to provide indigenous Baltic forces with advanced equipment, such as air defense systems,
needed to win time in any war with Russia.100
These views are at odds with those of other NATO allies who have warned the alliance
of unnecessarily increasing tensions with Russia by going beyond current deployments.
Germany and France, in particular, seem to believe that the EFP is sufficient and that fur-
ther military deployments are not an urgent matter.101 Conscious of cost considerations,
they point to allies’ combined military and economic superiority and see the Russian con-
ventional edge in the Baltics as only one side of the equation. After all, on the other hand,
NATO states currently have 3.2 million personnel in their collective militaries, compared
to 830,000 active Russian servicemen; moreover, the United States maintains, by far, the
world’s largest and most powerful armed forces. In the words of the former head of Poland’s
National Security Bureau, Army General Stanisław Koziej, “NATO is the most powerful
military alliance in the world and has the largest military potential at its disposal, the deter-
rence power of which discourages any potential adversary from confrontation.”102 The allies
that take this position receive support from NATO’s Southern European members, who
would instead like to see greater attention focused on North Africa and the Middle East to
counter threats such as mass migration and international terrorism.103
Further arguments against a more muscular NATO policy in Eastern Europe include rec-
ognition of Russia’s legitimate interest in securing Kaliningrad (which might be hard for
While recognizing Moscow’s aggressive policies over the last few years, proponents of arms
control want to see an ongoing NATO commitment to hold on to the last remaining ves-
tiges of the cooperative security regime with Russia. They fear that going beyond NATO’s
current deterrence and assurance measures in the Baltic states and Poland could overload
the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, in which NATO pledged not to permanently
station additional “substantial combat forces” on the territories of those states.110 NATO
reiterated this pledge at the Warsaw Summit.111
For the time being, NATO seems focused on maintaining the delicate balance of assuring its
easternmost allies, considering calls for caution, and signaling resolve as well as non-offensive
intentions to Russia. The size of the EFP, in particular, is a concession to NATO’s more cau-
tious allies to maintain alliance unity and to signal restraint toward Russia. At the same time,
as a result of this concession, NATO has accepted the military and political hardship that
would come with retaking the Baltics in the event of a potential Russian attack.
This consensus is, however, not necessarily set in stone. Any significant and permanent
buildup of Russian forces close to Baltic territories, which has not occurred so far, or an-
other Russian intervention in the post-Soviet space—in Belarus, for example—would
strengthen arguments in favor of more NATO boots on the ground. Meanwhile, the longer
But words are only one part of the equation. The other is that NATO has put much less
emphasis on its nuclear deterrent in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The alliance has
forward-deployed an estimated 150 U.S. B-61 gravity bombs in Belgium, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Turkey.113 The gravity bombs deployed in Turkey are not operational
as long as nuclear-capable aircraft are not stationed at the İncirlik Air Base. As noted be-
fore, Russia has an estimated 2,000 tactical nuclear arms, many of which are assumed to
be stored in depots in the western (European) part of the country, and Moscow regularly
conducts exercises to simulate the transition from conventional to nuclear warfare. That
said, even though Russia now relies heavily on the threat of nuclear use, and even though
NATO has reduced its reliance on nuclear arms, the alliance still threatens nuclear use to
try and deter a Russian attack against the Baltics.114
There are, nonetheless, a range of views within NATO on its nuclear posture. To begin
with, nuclear weapons are generally very unpopular in all of the five NATO states that host
U.S. B-61 bombs; politicians in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have regularly re-
sponded to this domestic sentiment by seeking to remove these U.S. weapons.115 Moreover,
some alliance members do not see an immediate need to take steps to bolster NATO’s
nuclear posture in the wake of Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea. As a result, in recent
In fact, like Russia’s nuclear years, member states have shied away from
doctrine, NATO’s current an open debate about NATO’s nuclear de-
terrent, and NATO’s nuclear policy has
nuclear policy contains quite not been updated.
an element of ambiguity as
In fact, like Russia’s nuclear doctrine,
well. Would NATO be ready
NATO’s current nuclear policy contains
to use nuclear weapons in quite an element of ambiguity as well.
a conflict with Russia? Would NATO be ready to use nuclear
weapons in a conflict with Russia? The
The intra-alliance debate over nuclear weapons is similar to the one over conventional
forces. Critics who worry that NATO is doing too little perceive Russia as having more,
and more readily available, capabilities, as well as, perhaps, greater resolve to escalate to
nuclear use. They worry that NATO’s resolve to use nuclear weapons is undermined by
powerful domestic opposition to nuclear arms in key member states and by the fact that
NATO’s combined conventional forces are still superior to Russia’s (which is to say there
might be no actual need for NATO to use its nuclear weapons).116 Some allies also criticize
NATO for not making meaningful attempts to explain to their publics why nuclear arms
continue to matter.117 The result of this lack of public discussion, they claim, is that NATO’s
forward-deployed nuclear weapons are typically kept in such a way that they are weeks
away from being ready to use.118 As a result, critics charge NATO with being unprepared
for nuclear use.
Other points of criticism abound as well. For instance, NATO exercises do not practice the
transition from conventional to nuclear warfare, as Russian exercises do. Another issue is that
a minority of experts also views NATO’s numerical nuclear inferiority in Europe as prob-
lematic and is concerned that the existing imbalance will be further tipped in Russia’s favor if
Moscow really is producing and deploying weapons in violation of the INF Treaty.119 Polish
experts, in particular, have expressed additional concerns about the possibility of Russia
secretly moving nuclear warheads for short-range missiles into Kaliningrad.120 Especially in
light of Moscow’s alleged doctrine of escalate-to-deescalate, these critics believe that NATO
would be left without an appropriate response if Russia were to escalate to nuclear use or
even if it just threatened nuclear use following an attack on NATO territory.121 As a result,
they worry that NATO’s nuclear deterrent might not be sufficiently credible to prevent
deliberate Russian escalation.
Against this backdrop, the new 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) argues that to
“credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks . . . the President must have
a range of limited and graduated options, including a variety of delivery systems and explo-
sive yields.”122 Such capabilities, the drafters of the NPR argue, would “pose insurmountable
difficulties to any Russian strategy of aggression against the United States, its allies, or part-
ners and ensure the credible prospect of unacceptably dire costs to the Russian leadership
if it were to choose aggression.”123 In concrete terms, the NPR recommends new sea-based
nuclear options, including low-yield nuclear warheads, designed to introduce additional
Those who oppose efforts to strengthen NATO’s nuclear profile make a strong case that
doing so would risk serious disunity because of the strong public opposition to nuclear
weapons in many European NATO states. In response to the criticism that NATO lacks
the capabilities necessary for deterrence, they point out that NATO is already tailoring its
deterrent capability. In particular, the U.S. B-61s have a so-called dial-a-yield functionality
that reportedly permits them to produce a yield as low as 0.3 kilotons or as high as 170
kilotons.125
Moreover, prior to the new NPR, Washington was already in the process of enhancing
NATO’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Starting in 2022, Washington will field a modern-
ized version of the B-61 with improved accuracy and (again) adjustable yields.126 In addi-
tion, the new U.S. administration is proceeding with plans to acquire between 1,000 and
1,100 new air-launched nuclear-armed cruise missiles that, in the event of a crisis, could be
deployed to Europe along with the necessary U.S. aircraft.127 Washington has also begun to
reinsert a nuclear presence into some NATO exercises since the annexation of Crimea—in-
cluding two exercises in the Baltic region—with the participation of nuclear-capable U.S.
B-52 bombers.128
The diverse range of Russia’s nonkinetic toolbox makes it challenging for NATO states to
identify one single action, such as Russian sponsorship of anti-government groups, as suf-
ficiently serious to demand a strong response and, then, for member states to decide what
that strong response should be. Nevertheless, this form of low-level attacks in nonmilitary
domains and by non-attributable or low-visibility actions can further exacerbate general
tensions between NATO and Russia and could potentially create the conditions for a crisis.
This problem is particularly apparent in the three Baltic states.
Moscow’s disruptive propaganda and disinformation campaigns targeting the three Baltic
states have been in operation for more than a decade.132 All three of these states are home
to ethnic Russian minorities, which constituted 25 percent of Estonia’s population, 26.9
percent of Latvia’s, and about 5.8 percent of Lithuania’s in 2011 respectively.133 Most of
these groups are fairly well integrated, and problems generally do not arise in daily life. But
they continue to value their Russian roots, language, and family or business ties. Moreover,
their relationship to the Baltic majorities is often fraught because of mutual historical griev-
ances about the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states and the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Almost all of these Baltic Russian minorities receive their daily information entirely through
Russian state-sponsored media, which incorrectly describes the three countries as “failing
states” with huge economic and political problems that are unfit to serve as proper homes
for the Russians living there, not least because their Baltic majorities purportedly have stark
anti-Russian feelings.134
The danger of nonkinetic Russian operations in the information space stems from their de-
liberate as well as inadvertent effects and the difficulty of defending against them. The delib-
erate effect is to prevent reconciliation efforts between the many ethnic groups populating
the Baltic states and to present authorities with manifold internal problems, such as fighting
a constant uphill battle against hardening mutual prejudices. But the inadvertent effects
could go much further, since the constant seeping of propaganda and disinformation into
the collective consciousness of Russian minorities could at some point lead to a domestic
crisis, perhaps sparked by a totally mundane event, such as local rivalries between different
groups of youth turning into violent protests. In the wake of such an incident, the Kremlin
could face mounting domestic pressure to intervene if Russian minorities were involved.
The big challenge for NATO is that deterring these operations with classical military means
is almost impossible, particularly since Russia relies on a wide range of nonkinetic opera-
tions across multiple nonmilitary domains—such as cyberattacks, criminal activities like
fostering corruption, and intelligence operations aimed at probing border security mea-
sures.137 Responding with conventional—let alone nuclear—deterrence threats is not cred-
ible because such traditional military defense measures are highly disproportionate. A re-
lated risk is that because Russian nonkinetic operations can fly under the radar, NATO
members might pay too much attention to nuclear or conventional escalation scenarios and
fail to give adequate attention to Russian nonkinetic operations.
Like deterrence, resilience is preventive, but the latter operates without making a threat.
In the words of Patrick Turner, NATO’s assistant secretary general for operations, “we can
only confront today’s security challenges effectively if we strengthen our civil preparedness
alongside our military preparedness.”140 But although NATO’s resilience efforts include
securing critical civilian infrastructure, such as electrical grids and power stations, against
cyberattacks or sabotage as well as defending against cyber intrusions that might hurt local
economies, the alliance’s primary concern still centers around preventing the disruption of
military deployments to ensure effective deterrence and defense.141
What remains open to debate is how to tailor resilience measures in the Baltics to reduce
the vulnerability of Russian minorities against Russian propaganda and disinformation. So
far, allies have viewed resilience as a primarily national responsibility that NATO can sup-
port by, for instance, cooperating with the European Union.142 Some allies are concerned
that concentrating too much on resilience might run the risk of losing sight of NATO’s
traditional core missions of deterrence and defense.143 A report authorized by the Latvian
National Defense Academy exemplifies such sentiment, concluding that “Russia’s influence
in Latvia is limited.”144 Some experts, meanwhile, view Russian nonkinetic operations as
a mere repetition of “Soviet-style” propaganda that has already been shown to fail.145 Still
others argue that in an increasingly interconnected world, it would be extremely difficult
to comprehensively defend against the NGW’s inherently boundless approach, and so they
advocate good governance and appropriate minority rights.146
All in all, even though NATO’s approach to resilience is much less controversial within the
alliance than its deterrence and assurance policies, the alliance shies away from playing a
larger role in seeking to foster civilian resilience in the three Baltic states, including efforts to
address the potential vulnerability of the Russian minorities there. To be clear, the alliance
could be tested in the future. For example, EFP forces could become a high-priority target
of Russian nonkinetic operations, such as protests in front of military barracks, sabotage, or
terrorist activities. Such operations could be aimed at undermining public acceptance of the
EFP, both in the countries that provide the forces and in their host countries.147
Having said that, so far none of the allies in the Baltics have experienced any concerted or
sustained large-scale, nonkinetic, Russian attack across multiple domains that could seri-
ously test the effectiveness of existing national resilience measures. In the absence of such
In the past few years, Moscow has repeatedly violated the national airspaces of countries
in Northern Europe, such as the Baltic states, as well as those of non-NATO members
like Finland and Sweden.148 In response, national or NATO aircraft usually approach the
offending Russian jets and drive or escort them back. The immediate tactical aim of the
Russian pilots conducting such maneuvers is to test the readiness of national air defenses.
Close military encounters involving Russian forces also happen in international airspace
and over international waters. In these environments as well, Russian pilots have exhibited
risky behavior, by getting very close to surveillance planes or ships, for instance. Especially
early on in the Ukraine crisis, there were even cases in which civilian aircraft were en-
dangered.149 Ultimately, the strategic goal behind these dangerous tactics is to intimidate
Russia’s neighbors and remind them that Moscow is a capable military power.
Preventing accidental escalation calls, first and foremost, for responsible behavior. But ab-
sent the political willingness to show such behavior, improved communication can help.
Before an accidental crisis, good communication can help prevent one from occurring in
the first place. During an accidental crisis, reliable communication channels can help the
parties involved deescalate the situation and perhaps contain the immediate political fall-
out. In addition, commonly agreed-upon rules of the road, such as a mutual expectation to
switch on aircraft transponders at all times, perhaps embodied in bilateral and multilateral
CSBMs, could help mitigate the risks of accidental escalation.
NATO allies have sought to pursue talks with Russia on risk-reduction measures and gen-
eral responsible airmanship, but these efforts have stalled as the two sides have not been able
to agree on the best way forward.152 NATO has suggested that Russia first change its behav-
ior, after which the two sides could institute a political process for updating risk-reduction
procedures under Chapter III of the Vienna Document, an agreement on CSBMs under
the auspices of the multinational Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). Because NATO suspended practical cooperation with Russia in 2014 in reaction
to the annexation of Crimea, alliance members would prefer the OSCE as a forum, so as to
avoid a dedicated military-to-military dialogue with Moscow. Contrary to this preference,
Moscow has started to demand direct and exclusive consultations with NATO. Further
complicating matters, the Ukraine crisis has interrupted continuous NATO-Russian mili-
tary-to-military channels of communication at the working level.
39
problem is that in the wider Baltic region, neither Poland nor the three Baltic states have
INCSEA arrangements with Russia.156
Even though the number of incidents has gone down in recent months, NATO is aware
that current conditions still create the risk of accidental escalation. Officially, risk-reduction
efforts are considered a priority for NATO—under the headline of general engagement with
Russia—as stated in the 2016 Warsaw Summit declaration.157 However, there seems to be
disagreement within the alliance about the terms of engagement with Moscow and the na-
ture of potential deliverables. These disagreements and a general lack of Russian cooperation
create the risk of putting off efforts to address the problem of accidental escalation.
THREE ESCALATION SCENARIOS
To this end, below are three possible escalation scenarios that can help analysts better un-
derstand the potential implications of NATO’s current policies as well as what NATO could
do today to make future escalation less likely. All three scenarios involve nuclear threats
(though two of them stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapons use). The value of this
scenario-based approach is that it can highlight escalation risks that are not obvious or that
Western analysts have not yet discussed in detail. For example, this approach highlights
the escalation risks linked to NATO’s current deterrence policy, which might necessitate
the quick reinforcement of NATO personnel in the Baltics in the event of a crisis. If such a
move were not properly communicated to Moscow, Russia could inadvertently misinterpret
NATO’s actions as the start of a military offensive and consequently choose to escalate the
crisis militarily.
Accordingly, the aim is not to describe each and every escalatory step in great detail but to
provide enough information to identify lessons that are more generally applicable. Clearly,
41
many other escalation scenarios, besides those described here, can be imagined, and ana-
lyzing them could well lead to other important insights. Indeed, one complication of the
real world not considered here is the possibility of multiple escalation pathways occurring
simultaneously. By side-stepping this possibility, this analysis tends to understate the escala-
tion risks and the challenges the alliance would face in seeking to manage them.
STAGE ONE: The year 2018 sees the return of large-scale protests to major Russian cit-
ies. Suddenly, Vladimir Putin’s hold on power no longer seems a given. Only two weeks
after the first protests, the Russian General Staff announces a large military exercise in
Russia’s Western Military District, close to the border of Latvia.
IMPLICATIONS: This combination of events would put NATO on notice about the inter-
nal developments in Russia and the announced military exercise, and these events would
raise serious concerns that Russia’s leadership might be planning to create an international
crisis to divert attention from a domestic crisis.
At the same time, however, strong voices within NATO would almost certainly caution
against overreacting to these events. They could argue that if NATO were to react militar-
ily—by, for example, deciding to send temporary reinforcements, even perhaps only one
additional battalion—to alleviate the concerns of Baltic nations, doing so would risk giving
the Kremlin reason to up the ante. Indeed, deploying EFP forces in the region to the border
area or even just raising their state of alert might be perceived by Russia as an aggressive
move. Given these trade-offs, it is quite likely that NATO would react in a rather reserved
way, which would give Russia an important advantage in terms of mobilizing its forces.
STAGE TWO: Sudden protests by the Russian minority community in Latvia’s east-
ernmost Latgale region spiral out of control with several fatalities. While NATO ambas-
sadors are gathering for an emergency meeting, Putin warns NATO “not to interfere in
the internal affairs of Latvia” and assures his domestic audience that “Russia will not idly
stand by as Russians are being slaughtered abroad.”
STAGE THREE: Russian forces cross the border into Latvia and occupy the Latgale
region. President Putin makes a press announcement that “Russia’s humanitarian in-
tervention stops here and now.” NATO defense ministers meet and issue an ultimatum,
demanding full Russian withdrawal.
IMPLICATIONS: At this point, debates within NATO about the severity of the Russian
threat would be overtaken by events. NATO would be presented with a military fait ac-
compli. While this situation already would be very challenging to handle, it might be fur-
ther complicated if Russian forces met only minimal resistance from Latvian forces and
perhaps none at all from the EFP. (Given the distance between their base in Riga and the
Latgale region, there would be a serious risk that they would not arrive quickly enough to
resist Russian forces.) In this case, regional EFP commanders—who, in the case of Latvia,
come from six different contributing nations—might be confronted with a choice between
engaging immediately in a futile fight that they would be certain to lose or holding back
to await further instructions from NATO Headquarters. Worse still, some commanders
might even receive orders from their own national commands, bypassing the NATO chain
of command and possibly complicating a collective response.
Regardless of exactly how the fight was playing out in the theater, the NAC would, at this
stage, have to determine whether or not to invoke Article V and whether or not to go to war
with Russia in an environment where the scope of the Russian campaign would still look
rather limited (as no allied forces from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or the United
States would be involved yet). Even if Article V were triggered, certain allies might still ad-
vocate for a diplomatic solution. A possible compromise might see allies starting immediate
preparations for military reinforcement in parallel with heightened crisis diplomacy.
STAGE FOUR: NATO is ready to deploy the Spearhead Force from Ramstein, Germany,
and starts preparations for assembling the rest of the eNRF. Simultaneously, the United
States starts flying in additional personnel and equipment to Western Europe and
Poland. Putin claims that “NATO is provoking an unnecessary war.” In many European
capitals tens of thousands take to the streets, urging Russia and NATO to “end the
mutual violence.”
IMPLICATIONS: NATO, having started its military preparations, would face another tough
choice. While the Spearhead would be ready in less than a week, assembling the rest of the
eNRF would take longer (in all likelihood, a couple of weeks). A decision would have to
be made whether to deploy the Spearhead right away, and risk losing it almost immediately
in the theater, or to wait for assembling the full manpower of the eNRF. If NATO were to
wait, the louder the voices of opposition to any military response could grow. Indeed, large-
scale protests in Western Europe, perhaps fueled by subversive Russian propaganda, would
very likely further affect and complicate NATO’s political decisionmaking.161
In this situation, some allies might opt out of a military response, while others—the United
Kingdom and the United States, most likely—could bypass NATO’s slow mobilization
process and move forward with their own deployment plans. This contingency—in which
some allies hesitate to engage and others push forward—could effectively paralyze the alli-
ance as a collective decisionmaking entity.
In any case, NATO might well have to deal, at some point, with further Russian efforts
to escalate the conflict by targeting critical NATO transportation nodes with precision-
guided conventional strikes so as to prevent or at least complicate NATO preparations for
retaliation.162 From a Russian perspective, waiting for NATO to muster a force of perhaps
100,000 personnel—which is what would be required to be credible enough to fight a
regional war with Russia with the aim of retaking and securing the Baltics or perhaps even
extending combat operations into Russian territory—would hardly be an option.163
STAGE FIVE: NATO receives intelligence reports that Russia is readying some of its
tactical nuclear weapons stored in western Russia. Putin warns that “the two sides are
on the brink of a nuclear armageddon.”
IMPLICATIONS: Assuming that NATO had decided on a concrete deployment plan by this
point, NATO leaders would have to decide whether to move forward given the possibility
of Russia escalating to actual nuclear use. That decision would almost certainly cause serious
frictions within the alliance and could further delay a military response. If NATO leaders
weathered those quarrels and pressed on, NATO might then immediately be confronted
with a second serious dilemma, stemming from NATO’s long-standing internal disputes
about its nuclear deterrent.
Over the years, Russia might have arrived at the conclusion that NATO would not use
nuclear weapons—even in response to Russian nuclear use—in a limited regional sce-
nario. As a result, Moscow might feel tempted to escalate to nuclear use in the hope of
stopping NATO in its tracks before it could deploy forces. In this case, all of NATO’s pos-
sible nuclear countermeasures—rhetorical nuclear threats; so-called slow nuclear signals in
the form of readying NATO’s forward-deployed nuclear forces (which would take a few
weeks); or so-called fast signals, such as U.S. B-52 deployments to Western Europe (which
could be executed within hours)—could be misperceived in Moscow as mere bluffs. The
interplay between Russia doubting NATO’s resolve and NATO having difficulties mak-
ing its nuclear threats credible would create a number of pathways for escalation through
misperception.
STAGE SIX: U.S. satellites detect a small-yield nuclear explosion over a remote area in
the North Sea.
IMPLICATIONS: At this point, NATO would face the dire situation of Russia having esca-
lated to actual nuclear use in the form of a single demonstration strike over international
waters. The Russian strike would most likely not eradicate the dilemmas NATO would
be facing already at Stage Five, when Russia was only threatening nuclear use, but instead
make those dilemmas more pressing. In concrete terms, NATO members would now have
to decide whether to move forward with the alliance’s deployment plans, stop in its tracks
(obviously intimidated by Russian nuclear use), or perhaps respond with nuclear use. The
latter option—nuclear use by the allies—in particular would most likely be highly contested
within NATO. Given that the Russian demonstration strike would not have been directed
against NATO territory, the risk of further nuclear escalation if NATO were to reciprocate,
rapidly mounting domestic pressures in Western Europe to “avoid a nuclear holocaust,” and
NATO’s (though comparably slow) ability to muster a significant conventional force, the
alliance’s members might decide against nuclear use. At the same time, that might only help
to reinforce the Russian (mis)perception that NATO really tends to shy away from nuclear
use in a crisis. NATO would therefore be hard-pressed to show serious nuclear signals below
the level of actual use, such as U.S. B-52 deployments to Western Europe.
In turn, Russia, having just escalated to nuclear use, would face a no less dire situation,
given that Moscow might feel that it had played its final card in an escalatory game aimed
at preventing NATO from deploying forces to the Baltics. If NATO were to continue
with its mobilization and deployment plans, Russia would have little choice other than to
escalate the conflict further into NATO territory—perhaps by aiming conventional strikes
at NATO’s western transportation nodes or perhaps by conducting additional nuclear
strikes—or back down. Either way, Moscow would have to fear that its escalation strategy
would solidify NATO’s assertiveness rather than undermine its cohesion.
Key Takeaways
•• It is not clear what role NATO forces, particularly the EFP, could or should play in an
internal crisis scenario in one of the Baltic states coupled with a Russian buildup in very
close proximity to Baltic borders.
•• NATO’s process of preparing for a military response would be very slow because rela-
tively few NATO forces are rapidly deployable. This would give Russia additional time
and opportunities to affect NATO decisionmaking in its favor. Moreover, deploying
only a few forces, such as the Spearhead Force, would be very undesirable because of
the risk that they would be destroyed rather quickly in combat.
•• NATO’s ambiguous stance toward its own nuclear deterrent might lead Moscow to
doubt NATO’s resolve, opening up potential pathways to escalation by misperception.
•• The necessity of retaking the Baltics through massive force deployments, once initiated
by NATO, would put the onus on Russia to escalate further, perhaps even to nuclear use.
STAGE ONE: On May 9, commemorations of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi
Germany lead to isolated ethnic clashes in Riga, resulting in two fatalities. Fueled by
social media rumors, crowds of angry ethnic Russians take to the streets the next day.
IMPLICATIONS: Given the attention that NATO policymakers are already paying to
Russia’s influence campaign toward and potential manipulation of the Russian minorities
in the Baltics,165 this scenario would ring alarm bells in Brussels. While there is not much
NATO leaders could do at that stage, they might urge Latvian authorities, in bilateral com-
munications, to diffuse tensions and keep a lower profile to avoid further escalating the
protests. At the same time, NATO as well as Latvian authorities might have difficulties as-
sessing whether Moscow was behind the protests or whether they were really spontaneous.
STAGE TWO: The protests grow in the following days. While there is no official re-
action from the highest echelons of the Kremlin, Russian ultra-nationalist groups start
their own protests in Moscow, demanding that Putin “come to the help of our brothers
and sisters.”
IMPLICATIONS: For NATO, the surge in protests coupled with the clamor in Russia
would increase the urgency of the situation. On the one hand, the mere existence of con-
tinued protests would underscore the risk that the Latvian authorities might lose control
of the situation. Some NATO members might argue for deploying the EFP battlegroup
to “show presence” at the Latvian-Russian border. Latvian authorities might order exactly
that but could face resistance from EFP commanders who may receive contradictory na-
tional orders.
On the other hand, NATO might well struggle to interpret the mixed signals from Moscow
and debate whether Moscow was creating the pretext for a crisis with NATO or whether
the Kremlin was in danger of losing control of the situation.166 In the latter case, NATO
would probably be well advised to offer Moscow some sort of off-ramp to defuse tensions.
Some allies might therefore urge NATO to pursue immediate backchannel diplomacy with
Moscow, while others might instead argue for lower-level military preparations than EFP
deployments.
STAGE THREE: NATO deploys the EFP battlegroup to patrol Latvia’s border with
Russia. The following day, the Russian military starts large-scale military readiness drills
in the Western Military District.
IMPLICATIONS: NATO’s deployment of military forces would be far from the protesters
and with a clear defensive aim. However, Russia’s readiness drills could cause some head-
aches at NATO Headquarters. Some allies might interpret the Russian move as a mere
reaction to NATO’s response, providing another argument for trying to deescalate tensions
and avoid any further NATO military action. By contrast, other allies might read Moscow’s
actions as part of a larger Russian plan to intimidate NATO or perhaps prepare to inter-
vene. Assuming the second reading of events were to prevail within NATO, allies would
presumably decide to start preparations for assembling and deploying the Spearhead Force.
But doing so without simultaneously readying the additional forces of the eNRF would cre-
ate the risk of losing the Spearhead if Russia were to really attack Latvia. At the same time,
readying all forces of the eNRF could be misinterpreted in Moscow as preparations for an
offensive against Russia.
IMPLICATIONS: NATO, confronted again with a Russian decision to up the ante and
still in the dark about Russian intentions, would face a tough choice. Declining to send
the Spearhead might deescalate the situation, but Russia might instead interpret that as
a sign of weakness that would perhaps invite Russian escalation. By contrast, sending the
Spearhead could underscore NATO’s resolve—perhaps deescalating the standoff—but do-
ing so could also increase the pressure on Russia to escalate before NATO reinforcements
arrived. Indeed, if NATO members were to decide to deploy the Spearhead, they would
also have to make an almost immediate decision about preparing the rest of the eNRF for
deployment, given its low level of readiness.
STAGE FIVE: NATO issues a statement that “the deployment of the Spearhead will
continue without delay.” Only a few hours later, the Russian Ministry of Defense an-
nounces a nationwide emergency drill of its nuclear forces.
IMPLICATIONS: This strong Russian nuclear signal could create different escalation path-
ways, depending on NATO’s reaction. If Moscow’s signal was intended to prevent allied
reinforcement out of fear that NATO was staging a larger campaign against Russia, NATO’s
decision to halt deployment of the Spearhead could well deescalate tensions. Conversely,
if Moscow’s signal was intended to prevent allied reinforcement as a test of allies’ resolve,
NATO’s compliance could trigger a Russian military intervention. But whatever Russia’s
real intentions, if it were to fail to achieve its goal of deterring NATO from deploying the
Spearhead, Moscow might feel compelled to raise the stakes further.
One important aspect of this scenario is the possibility that NATO might interpret the
Russian signal as not credible, given that NATO would not yet have sent reinforcements
to the Baltics, let alone inflicted military fatalities on Russia. But that interpretation might
well be incorrect; the early use of a serious nuclear threat would be perfectly consistent with
the Russian strategy of conflict.167
In any case, a possible NATO response-in-kind to Russia’s nuclear threat might be drills
with U.S. and British (and perhaps French) nuclear forces. However, and given domes-
tic public pressure, that would be a decision fraught with political disagreements within
NATO about how and under what circumstances to flex alliance members’ nuclear muscle.
A slower response, perhaps intended to break the rapid escalation cycle, could be to start
raising the alert levels of NATO’s forward-deployed nuclear forces.
•• NATO might find it challenging to identify when a crisis needs a military response and
what response that might be—that is to say, not starting to escalate too early or waiting
too long.
•• NATO’s reliance on reinforcement in the event of a crisis would create incentives for
deliberate Russian escalation early in a crisis designed to gain an advantage before the
Spearhead arrived. This also would create room for misperceptions—such as Russian
fears that NATO would stage a major campaign against Russia—once NATO actually
considered deployments and started preparations to assemble all forces of the eNRF.
•• NATO might not assess early Russian nuclear threats as credible, given their apparently
disproportionate nature; misreading Russian resolve in this way would perhaps create
the possibility for escalation.
To be sure, during and after the Cold War, incidents like the 2015 downing of a Russian
fighter jet by Turkey (a NATO member) were successfully managed even though they took
place amid heightened tensions. It would be unwarranted, however, to conclude that acci-
dental escalation is impossible, particularly in light of the high number of incidents taking
place over the Baltic region.
STAGE ONE: A Russian fighter jet accidentally crashes into a U.S. guided-missile de-
stroyer operating in the Baltic Sea, killing forty-two crew members. The Kremlin claims
that the Russian jet crashed because it was shot down by the U.S. vessel. An emergency
meeting of the NATO-Russia Council cannot take place since Russia refuses to partici-
pate. Bilateral crisis communication channels between Russia and the United States
(such as the U.S.-Russia hotline) remain silent.
Especially if general tensions between Washington and Moscow were already high prior to
the incident, the U.S. administration would immediately come under enormous domes-
tic pressure “to do something,” even though clarifying events might take time. Domestic
pressure could, therefore, clash with the necessity of having enough time to properly ex-
amine events. While NATO allies in Brussels might unsuccessfully seek direct talks with
the Russian personnel at NATO Headquarters to ease tensions and shed light on the event,
Washington would probably decide to go it alone already by that point.
STAGE TWO: The U.S. president accuses Russia of “belligerent behavior” and an-
nounces efforts “to deny Moscow any further misconduct in the Baltic Sea.” That night,
two additional U.S. destroyers and an aircraft carrier are dispatched to the Baltic Sea.
IMPLICATIONS: U.S. decisionmakers would be unlikely to want to wait for the uncertain
and probably slow process of forming a NATO position and acting collectively. For its al-
lies, Washington’s unilateral decision to increase its naval footprint in the Baltic Sea would
create a twofold problem. On the one hand, not having been consulted by Washington
would damage their political credibility in the eyes of Russia and undermine their efforts to
establish a communication channel with Moscow. On the other hand, not supporting the
U.S. move would risk further undermining alliance unity.
STAGE THREE: The Kremlin announces that it would view the U.S. vessels’ presence
as “an open provocation that cannot go unanswered.” The next day Russia mobilizes its
conventional forces in the Western Military District.
IMPLICATIONS: For NATO, the spat between Washington and some of its allies might
make it much more difficult to reach consensus about Russia’s intentions. Some allies might
argue behind closed doors that the Russian reaction was somewhat understandable, given
that the U.S. naval deployments would carry significant fire power that Russia must con-
sider, and given that Washington would not have told even its closest allies how long it in-
tended to keep the vessels in the Baltic Sea. Others might argue that Moscow was using the
crisis as a pretext to create exactly the kind of military fait accompli that NATO planners
had long warned about. Whatever the outcome of this debate, given the heightened ten-
sions between Russia and the United States, the lack of a NATO reaction to Russia’s move
might be as risky as preparations to send in the Spearhead Force.
IMPLICATIONS: Allies would now face a difficult choice. Akin to the two scenarios above,
the Russian nuclear threats would again raise tensions. This time, however, the Russian
nuclear signals might drive an even bigger wedge between allies. Not only might allies reach
different conclusions about the severity of the Russian nuclear threat, but the specific men-
tion of the “strategic level” could cause certain allies to publicly question the U.S. decision
to send in its navy. Other allies might argue that their response was exactly what Russia
sought—splitting the alliance to render it politically obsolete.
STAGE FIVE: The U.S. naval convoy is now only one day away from entering the
Skagerrak, the strait between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden that separates the North
Sea from the Baltic Sea. The Russian General Staff issues a “final warning” urging
Washington “to turn back or incur massive costs.” Washington sends a number of long-
range bombers to the United Kingdom.
IMPLICATIONS: Assuming that these events were to take place against rapidly mounting
protests in Western Europe, it is not far-fetched to assume that some allies would now
publicly blame both Russia and the United States for “unnecessarily racing toward a war,”
while others might accuse those allies of “stabbing NATO in the back.” The problem for
Washington and Moscow at this point would be the potentially extreme political difficul-
ties of agreeing and implementing some kind of face-saving solution to deescalate the crisis.
And even if both sides were able to agree on a solution, NATO would be left with significant
political damage due to its inability to remain united in its response to the initial incident.
Key Takeaways
•• European NATO members might prefer to deal with such a military incident as an alli-
ance, whereas Washington would probably prefer not to. As a result, NATO might end
up severely weakened by a lot of infighting.
•• Domestic politics might play a big role in tackling an accidental crisis, and diverging
domestic preferences (pressure in the United States to escalate versus peace protests in
Western Europe) might greatly complicate a unified NATO response.
•• Escalation might unfold more rapidly than efforts to clarify what occurred and to de-
escalate the crisis.
55
Deterrence by Denial
If NATO wants to deny Russia the ability to successfully attack one or more Baltic states,
it has little choice but to deploy forces on a much larger scale than it currently does. Such
forces could be deployed gradually to avoid giving Russia a casus belli and to make such de-
ployments more palatable to skeptical NATO members. The 2017 RAND study proposed
deployments of around 35,000 personnel, with an additional reinforcement capability of
up to about 70,000 personnel;169 this would certainly prevent a Russian military fait ac-
compli and force Moscow to fight a bloody and drawn-out conventional war, should it at-
tack. These deployments would also, perhaps, eliminate most of the difficulties—and some
of the resulting escalation pathways—that
stem from the alliance’s current need to re-
If NATO wants to deny Russia inforce troops rapidly and on a large scale
the ability to successfully attack in a crisis. In addition, these troop deploy-
ments would raise the costs to Moscow of
one or more Baltic states, it has deliberately forcing a military crisis with
little choice but to deploy forces NATO.
on a much larger scale than it
While such measures might mitigate the
currently does. short-term risk of deliberate Russian esca-
lation, they would create a number of se-
vere political trade-offs. First, a deterrence-
by-denial approach would risk overstretching the delicate political consensus among NATO
members about conventional deterrence and assurance. A number of member states, per-
haps led by Germany and France, would not support such a policy and would seek to
block it. Even more importantly, perhaps, not even the Baltic states are supportive of such
a maximalist approach. While many Baltic officials and experts would like to see greater
U.S. military engagement in the region, some of them are highly skeptical of the assump-
tions underlying the RAND war games and think that they are too pessimistic about Baltic
defenses. While they would like to see a strong, unified allied response to the growing threat
from Russia, they also recognize the need to avoid unnecessarily escalating general tensions
with Russia.170 Also, against the background of often contentious debates within NATO
about financial and military burden sharing, it would not be clear at all who would provide
the necessary funds and forces for such a large military footprint. Neither the United States
nor most other allies currently seem to be both willing and capable.
There is, however, also a potentially positive synergetic effect here. If large-scale NATO de-
ployments precluded a deliberate Russian conventional military attack, there would be no
reason for Moscow to employ escalate-to-deescalate in an offensive fashion.
Second, a more modest approach would be for NATO to address some of its existing mili-
tary shortcomings—by increasing the chance that the trip wire were triggered and would
result in a timely political decision by NATO to respond—with the goal of strengthening
the credibility of NATO’s deterrence approach and thus preventing deliberate Russian es-
calation. For instance, if NATO wants to make sure that the EFP is involved in combat as
early as possible in the event of a Russian attack, it could rethink the geographical location
of EFP bases or add an additional small element of forward-deployed forces that would
continuously patrol and monitor the borders with Russia. That way, NATO would limit
Russia’s ability to send small disguised units over the border. NATO could also consider
Another necessary adjustment, if not already under way, would be to forge a clear political
understanding within NATO of its role pertaining to possible domestic protests that Russia
may foment in the three Baltic states. In a similar vein, NATO should seek to avoid any
overlapping or even conflicting chains of command for the EFP and consider the additional
option of devising harmonized rules of engagement before its Graduated Response Plan
comes into play.
Beyond the EFP, NATO should seek greater clarity internally about what military or per-
haps even political events would trigger deployment of the Spearhead Force and the eNRF.
This process should result in streamlined political and military decisionmaking in the event
of a crisis. NATO has already started to rehearse its crisis decisionmaking,171 but that is not
the same as streamlining necessary processes. Perhaps allies should determine, in advance,
which general contingencies will trigger reinforcement so that, in times of crisis, the North
Atlantic Council can act swiftly.
None of those options would be entirely uncontroversial within the alliance. They would,
however, almost certainly be much less contentious than adopting a deterrence-by-denial
approach and would help strengthen assurance of the alliance’s eastern members. It is also
less likely that Russia would (mis)perceive such measures as escalatory.
Alliance unity will be much harder to maintain when it comes to NATO’s nuclear de-
terrent, given the aforementioned ambiguities in NATO’s current approach for political
reasons. One way to convince Russia of NATO’s resolve and readiness would be, perhaps,
to tighten the link between NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces by integrating both
elements in exercises—as NATO did during the Cold War. Another option would be to
increase the readiness levels of nuclear forces in Europe (none of which could currently be
made ready for use in less than a few weeks). An even more provocative step would be for
NATO to extend its sharing arrangements to select eastern members, such as Poland, by
allowing them to certify national aircraft for nuclear weapon delivery, and/or by deploying
B-61 gravity bombs to their territories.
Given these risks, NATO alternatively could seek to enhance the overall security of its
members in other ways, while hoping to avoid a costly and potentially destabilizing nuclear
arms race with Russia and without undermining alliance unity in the traditionally contro-
versial field of nuclear deterrence and assurance.173 This alternative option would involve
relying more heavily on U.S. bombers for signaling and exercises. Indeed, NATO allies
are already moving in this direction. In conjunction with NATO’s 2017 Baltic Operations
(BALTOPS) and Saber Strike exercises, for example, the U.S. Air Force sent B-52 and
B-2 nuclear-capable bombers to the United Kingdom.174 While increased reliance on U.S.
bombers allows NATO to avoid the toxic debate about its forward-deployed nuclear deter-
rent, this choice comes with the downside of increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation.
In the event of a nuclear crisis with Russia, Moscow could misread bomber deployments
as preparations for a strategic strike against Russian territory and, in response, opt for early
nuclear use. NATO could therefore consider communicating alert levels to Russia in the
event of a (nuclear) crisis.
Given these trade-offs, the alliance could further strengthen the credibility of its nuclear de-
terrent posture—not by adding (new) capabilities or missions—but by conveying a clearer
message of political resolve. This approach would require an inclusive political process,
backed by all allies. Public as well as private messages from individual NATO heads of state
and government should convey the unified message to the Kremlin that NATO is willing
to defend its members with all means necessary. High-level political and military leaders
from NATO members should also appear regularly in the Baltic states to publicly stress that
NATO is able to inflict unacceptable damage on any opponent in the event of an attack on
one of its members.
As for NATO’s response to alleged Russian INF Treaty violations, the alliance could opt
to deploy its own ground-launched, medium- or intermediate-range cruise missiles if
Washington were willing to produce and provide them and if European allies agreed to host
them. In so doing, NATO could impose significant costs on Moscow, which despite its ef-
forts to enhance its precision-strike capabilities, seemed mindful, at least in the past, of the
likely economic and security consequences of a new arms race.175
RESILIENCE
Unlike the threats Russia poses in the military realm, Moscow’s intimidating NATO al-
lies through nonkinetic operations across various civilian domains cannot be countered by
traditional military means. Instead of deterrence and defense, civilian resilience measures
are better tools for dealing with most of Russia’s NGW tactics. In particular, increasing the
resilience of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states to Russian propaganda should become a
key feature of NATO policy. The example of Ukraine, though very different compared to
the three Baltic states, shows that existing ethnopolitical tensions can serve as a gateway for
Russian intervention.
A more effective approach would be to reduce the initial risk of domestic unrest as much as
possible. Resilience measures could be an important way to help make minorities more im-
mune to nonkinetic Russian operations, such as propaganda and disinformation. However,
But NATO has several options as its disposal to broaden its resilience portfolio. To begin
with, NATO could provide technical assistance funds to the Baltic states to help them build
Russian-language media outlets from the ground up. This assistance should cover capacity
building, program development, public relations, and branding. To be comprehensive, these
efforts should include traditional media outlets—such as newspapers, television, and radio—
as well as social media and internet resources. The aim would be to provide a counternarrative
to Russian propaganda and help audiences distinguish between facts and fake news.
While such efforts to build resilience would be much cheaper than most military options,
any positive effects would only be seen in the coming decades. At the same time, allies might
struggle to reach a consensus on whether NATO, a military alliance, is really the right orga-
nization for a soft power approach, not least because such efforts would run the risk of be-
ing seen as NATO-sponsored propaganda. Since NATO already cooperates with the EU on
resilience,179 Brussels would, perhaps, be better placed to lead such efforts.
Another option for NATO could be to closely monitor the state of integration, rights, and
treatment of Russian minorities in the Baltics, and to intervene, perhaps through a special
civilian monitoring and advisory mission, in cases of concern. Such a watchdog institu-
tion could help signal to Russia that NATO is taking the issue seriously. NATO does not
currently play a role on minority rights within member states and is wary about infringing
on members’ sovereignty. It could, therefore, be quite difficult to reach a consensus about
allowing NATO to intervene directly in the domestic policies of its member states. Allies
with a poor track record in terms of democratic institutions and the rule of law, including
Turkey or Hungary (and, to a lesser extent, Poland), might even view this as a dangerous
But NATO is an alliance of shared values, and the integration and fair treatment of Russian
minorities in the Baltic states is too important a matter to leave unattended. If allies found
NATO monitoring to be unacceptable, they could opt for self-reporting. Obviously, self-
reporting by the Baltic states would have its weaknesses, but such an approach could be
accompanied by behind-the-scenes pressure from other allies to ensure reports were mean-
ingful. Another option would be to task the OSCE, which is also concerned with human
rights, with an enhanced monitoring role. The problem there, however, is that Russia has a
veto in that organization.
Increasing the resilience of NATO members against Russian meddling should not stop with
the Baltic states. As Russian attempts to interfere in the elections of France, the Netherlands,
and the United States have all shown, strengthening the cyber defenses of governmental
agencies as well as political parties is a first necessary step to prevent the deliberate leaking
of confidential information. NATO should make national resilience measures in the cyber
realm count toward the alliance’s 2 percent defense spending target.
One final area where NATO could enhance the resilience of its own populations pertains to
public acceptance of deterrence in general and nuclear deterrence specifically. While polls
show that approval rates for NATO are on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic,183 parts of
Western European societies remain quite skeptical of NATO’s deterrence and defense poli-
cies vis-à-vis Russia.184 Open disagreement with official policies is one of the most precious
achievements of democratic societies. But it bears the risk of being exploited as envisaged
in the Russian NGW playbook. NATO allies could do a better job at explaining to their
RISK REDUCTION
Neither deterrence and assurance nor enhanced resilience is applicable to preventing ac-
cidental escalation. For this task, NATO’s goal of achieving security cooperatively with
Moscow comes into play. Jointly reducing various risks that stem from limited transparency
and potential military incidents calls for agreed-upon rules and good communications in
crisis situations. Beyond such immediate risk-reduction measures, more ambitious CSBMs
and arms control measures would be more challenging to attain. Some, such as modern-
izing the OSCE’s Vienna Document, might be achievable even in the current environment.
Others—such as limitations on conventional weaponry—would be tougher sells. Much
will depend on NATO’s ability to reach a robust consensus on these matters.
There are three chief ways NATO could seek to reduce the most pressing risks of acci-
dental escalation. First, NATO should aim to re-establish military-to-military crisis com-
munications channels with the Russian General Staff at the working level. NATO holds
some sporadic meetings of the NATO-Russia Council, which is a useful tool for general
political dialogue, but might not be sufficient in the event of a crisis because the council
does not provide the necessary military-to-military communications channels. Second, ini-
tial talks about avoiding accidental escalation should aim at commonly agreed-upon and
adhered-to rules for preventing accidents in the busy civilian and military airspace over the
Baltic Sea. More ambitiously, Washington
and Moscow should make continuous
use of the readily available bilateral U.S.- There are three chief ways
Russian Agreement on the Prevention of NATO could seek to reduce
Dangerous Military Activities. In addition,
NATO should encourage Poland and the the most pressing risks of
three Baltic states to seek to conclude in- accidental escalation.
dividual agreements with Russia similar
to the Agreement on the Prevention of
Incidents On and Over the High Seas. Third, reconvening NATO-Russian talks about
military strategy and nuclear doctrine, which had been ongoing prior to Russia’s annexation
of Crimea, could help dispel misperceptions and thus avoid inadvertent escalation. Such
Those short-term options are unlikely to spark much contention within NATO because
they would not undermine deterrence, assurance, or alliance unity. However, implementing
them in the current political environment would be difficult because Russia reaps benefits
from appearing unpredictable. Going beyond these initial measures to address the risk of
accidental escalation and engaging Russia on more far-reaching CSBMs and arms control
measures would be even more difficult.
On this front, NATO should start to put more intellectual effort into identifying what spe-
cific measures would increase allies’ security. First, allies’ concerns about large-scale Russian
exercises close to NATO territory highlight a lack of transparency and predictability that
could be mitigated by mutually agreed-upon CSBMs, such as an updated version of the
OSCE’s Vienna Document addressing snap exercises, as well as large ones broken down into
multiple components. Second, mitigating the risks that stem from the numerical imbalance
in regional conventional forces should be possible if the two sides can devise limitations on
heavy conventional weaponry. The worst-case scenario for NATO would be a Russian at-
tack against one of the alliance’s militarily weak eastern members. For such an attack to be
successful, Russia would have to use its tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, and helicopters.
Enabling technologies such as cruise missiles, command and control assets, and air defense
systemsare crucial for such operations, but they cannot seize and hold enemy territory. This
reality points to the continued utility of an arms control arrangement limiting states’ ability
to move boots on the ground.
As the Cold War ended, NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed to the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which reduced and limited five specified types of conven-
tional military land and air equipment in designated geographical zones. In 2007, Moscow
suspended the CFE Treaty in reaction to NATO making the ratification of an Adapted CFE
Treaty conditional on Russia’s withdrawing remaining weapons and personnel from seces-
sionist regions in Georgia and Moldova.185 Even though the treaty is de facto still in place,
without Russia’s participation it has lost much of its utility. Still, particularly in today’s tense
environment, a CFE-type arrangement could increase security on NATO’s eastern flank.
Since many of the current military tensions emanate from the Baltic Sea, perhaps a naval
arms control component could be added, though addressing rapid naval military move-
ments could prove difficult.
NATO should be mindful, too, of the critics of a conventional arms control approach.
Critics from the Baltics, in particular, voice concerns that regional limitations on conven-
tional forces, even if reciprocal, would solidify the notion of an alliance with different zones
Back in the late 1970s, NATO used a similar strategy to respond to the Soviet missile build-
up. While threatening to reciprocate Soviet actions with its own missile buildup, NATO
made a concrete offer of dialogue and arms control. A few years later, and after NATO had
put its threat to the test, Moscow finally came to the table. The resulting U.S.-Soviet INF
Treaty eliminated all those intermediate-range missiles that NATO and the Soviets found
most threatening. In a similar fashion, any potential additional NATO force deployments
to the Baltics should include an offer of dialogue to Moscow with the aim of forging a new
regional and reciprocal conventional arms control mechanism. Such a mechanism, if suc-
cessfully concluded and implemented, could make additional deployments redundant.
Finally, allies could try to use the ongoing INF crisis in a similar way. If Russia does not
return to compliance with the INF Treaty, U.S. military deployments become increasingly
likely within the next few years.187 Washington and its allies could use the pending threat
of these deployments as an opening bid for broader talks with Russia about European
security and arms control. If arms control talks were to result in a satisfactory outcome,
NATO could renounce its arms buildup. To be successful, such an approach would have to
be carefully timed, have broad support within the alliance, and be carefully communicated
to Russia.
WITH ITS DECISIONS from the Wales and Warsaw summits, NATO has made some
progress on addressing the risks of escalation, partially as a result of allies’ ability to success-
fully integrate and balance the divergent views of more cautious and more hawkish mem-
bers. Nonetheless, NATO has more homework to do. The risk of deliberate, inadvertent, or
accidental escalation is still high in the Baltic region.
Russia’s strategy of new-generation warfare makes it necessary for NATO to develop a com-
prehensive strategy. That means going beyond nuclear and conventional deterrence and as-
surance. If NATO wants to address the risks that stem from Russia’s nonkinetic operations
and from accidental escalation, its strategy has to thoroughly integrate and enhance the
elements of resilience and risk reduction.
NATO should not respond with steps that could exacerbate escalation risks, such as station-
ing additional large-scale conventional forces in Eastern Europe or adding new nuclear ca-
pabilities or missions, which both would risk alliance unity (although such restraint should
be contingent on Russian behavior).
One unpleasant reality is that a comprehensive strategy requires prioritizing certain goals
at the expense of others. The following recommendations constitute a starting point for
articulating a viable way to balance these goals, which are sometimes in tension.
67
BOLSTERING DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE
•• Improve NATO’s trip wire approach but avoid additional large-scale deployments.
It is possible, if unlikely, that a limited Russian land grab in the Baltics might not activate
NATO’s trip wire conventional forces (the EFP). In particular, the EFP might arrive too
late to prevent a fait accompli. It is also possible that the first EFP forces to the scene
might not include personnel from any of NATO’s most significant military powers.
To correct these problems, NATO could ask Washington to consider deploying an ad-
ditional small-scale rotational U.S. Army battalion (of about 1,000 personnel), split
equally among the three Baltic EFP deployments. Equipped with observation drones,
U.S. forces could continuously patrol and monitor the borders with Russia. NATO
should also make sure that the EFP does not suffer from competing chains of command
before and during a crisis by, for instance, harmonizing the relevant rules of engagement
before NATO’s Graduated Response Plan comes into play. Deploying additional large-
scale contingents of NATO forces to the region would not be politically feasible for
the alliance. Moreover, such deployments might increase the risk of deliberate Russian
escalation if Moscow misinterpreted NATO’s moves as offensive.
•• Clarify the roles of the EFP and reinforcement forces in the event of externally in-
stigated domestic unrest in the Baltics. In general, NATO forces have no role in the
internal security of its member states. However, if Moscow instigated domestic unrest
involving Russian minorities in the Baltics, the role of the EFP and perhaps NATO’s
reinforcement forces is much less clear and should be clarified. NATO should also con-
sider how to react if forces were to be deliberately targeted by protesters.
•• Increase the pressure on Russia on INF but avoid a tit-for-tat response. Russia’s
alleged INF Treaty violations represent a serious problem for the United States and
particularly for its European NATO allies. However, if Washington responds by try-
ing to deploy its own ground-launched cruise missiles, which would mean abrogating
the treaty, this decision would meet strong opposition in most of Western Europe and
carry enormous risk of undermining NATO. Instead, allies should explore alternative
options, such as limited forward deployment of conventional cruise missiles on U.S.
bombers and ships in Western Europe, supported by the deployment of cruise missile
defenses at NATO’s vital logistics and transportation nodes. In parallel, all allies should
engage Moscow head-on for a diplomatic solution. More broadly, allies should seek to
increase the diplomatic pressure by making states in Asia voice their growing discom-
fort over Russia’s alleged violation.
ENHANCING RESILIENCE
•• Deny Russia the ability to escalate through nonkinetic means. Russia’s ability to es-
calate tensions with NATO through nonkinetic operations (propaganda, cyberattacks,
or criminal operations) cannot be countered with military means. NATO must, there-
fore, increase efforts to support its members and work closely with the EU to build up
civilian resilience—that is, societies’ ability to deal with and absorb shocks. One way to
further incentivize allies’ national efforts to improve resilience could be to make these
expenditures as well as resilience assistance to NATO’s eastern members count toward
NATO’s 2 percent goal for defense spending. Allies should continue to educate their
publics about Russian efforts to meddle with their domestic politics. In so doing, allies
should avoid the mistake of portraying the Kremlin as some kind of “superman” that
could bring down Western societies.
•• Keep a close watch on the state of integration and representation of the Russian
minorities in the Baltic states. The better these minorities are integrated, the less le-
verage the Kremlin has to influence their perceptions. NATO should therefore support
integration efforts and encourage regular self-reporting by the Baltic states about mi-
norities’ state of integration and representation. While NATO is wary about infringing
on members’ national sovereignty, the alliance is built on shared values, and the integra-
tion and representation of those Russian minorities is too important to be ignored. If
allies found such a reporting mechanism to be too politically controversial, they could
increase cooperation with the EU and encourage it to report regularly about the situa-
tion on the ground.
1. NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” press release, Warsaw, Poland, July 8–9, 2016,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.
2. This report does not directly consider the security of neighboring non-NATO members—
namely, Belarus, Finland, and Sweden.
3. For instance, the Polish Strategic Defense Review, initiated in 2016, concludes that “the scale
of threats resulting from the Russian aggressive policy had not been adequately assessed in the
past.” Poland was thus, according to the authors, facing “the necessity of adequately preparing
Poland to defend its own territory.” Polish Ministry of National Defense, The Concept of Defense
of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense, 2017), 6, http://www.mon
.gov.pl/d/pliki/rozne/2017/05/KORP_DRUK_v03_mn2.pdf.
4. According to a speech by Vladimir Putin: “Russia has no intention of attacking anyone. This
is all quite absurd. . . . It is unthinkable, foolish and completely unrealistic. Europe alone has
300 million people. All of the NATO members together with the USA have a total population
of 600 million, probably. But Russia has only 146 million. It is simply absurd to even conceive
such thoughts.” Kremlin, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” October 27,
2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151.
5. Rishi Iyengar, “Russia Announces New Military Divisions to Counter NATO Deployments in
Eastern Europe,” Time, May 4, 2016, http://time.com/4318941/russia-nato-military-divisions-
retaliation/.
6. For a good overview of the different arguments within NATO, see Jens Ringsmose and Sten
Rynning, “Now for the Hard Part: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to Russia,” Survival 59, no. 3
(June-July 2017): 129–146.
73
7. New-generation warfare (NGW) is basically a boundless military strategy that includes
and targets all military and civilian realms with the goal of coercing the opponent into
accepting changes to the status quo (see chapter 2). When referring to NGW, it is probably
more appropriate to speak of a “corpus of ideas” than of a full-fledged military doctrine. See
Dmitry Adamsky, Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy (Paris: French
Institute of International Relations, 2015), 22, http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/pp54adamsky.pdf. Other Western scholars use the term Gerasimov Doctrine—a reference
to the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of Russia, Valery Gerasimov. See Mark
Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” Moscow’s Shadows (blog),
July 6, 2014, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-
and-russian-non-linear-war/. Again, others have referred to a strategy of “full-spectrum
conflict.” See Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal
After Ukraine,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 28, no. 1 (2015): 1–22. Still others describe it
as “strategic deterrence.” See Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival
58, no. 4 (August-September 2016): 7–26; Dave Johnson, Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Approach
to Conflict (Paris: Foundation for Strategic Research, 2016), https://www.frstrategie
.org/web/documents/publications/recherches-et-documents/2016/201606.pdf. The term
strategic deterrence should not be confused with the more narrow strategic nuclear deterrence
relationship between Russia and the United States.
8. Andrius Sytas, “Baltics Need Anti-Aircraft Protection Against Russia, Lithuania Says,” Reuters,
July 20, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-baltics-patriot/baltics-need-anti-aircraft-
protection-against-russia-lithuania-says-idUSKBN1A51VC.
9. See Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Military Drills Near NATO Border Raise
Fears of Aggression,” New York Times, July 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/
world/europe/russia-military-exercise-zapad-west.html.
10. See the testimony of General Paul Selva, as quoted in a New York Times article. Michael R.
Gordon, “Russia Has Deployed Missile Barred by Treaty, U.S. General Tells Congress,” New
York Times, March 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/us/politics/russia-inf-
missile-treaty.html. For a good backgrounder on the INF Treaty, see Amy F. Woolf, Russian
Compliance With the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues
for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
nuke/R43832.pdf.
11. “Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles at Denmark Ships if It Joins NATO Shield,”
Reuters, March 22, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-russia-
idUSKBN0MI0ML20150322.
12. See Ieva Bērziņa (ed.), The Possibility of Societal Destabilization in Latvia: Potential National
Security Threats (Riga: National Defense Academy of Latvia, 2016), http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/
media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/WP%2004-2016-eng.ashx.
13. For a good overview of the state of inclusion and potential vulnerabilities of Russian minorities
in Latvia, see Žaneta Ozoliņa (ed.), Societal Security. Inclusion-Exclusion Dilemma: A Portrait of
the Russian-Speaking Community in Latvia (Riga: Zinātne Publishers, 2016), http://www
.szf.lu.lv/fileadmin/user_upload/szf_faili/Petnieciba/sppi/demokratija/Societal_Security_
iekslapas_20160418.pdf.
14. European Leadership Network, List of Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West,
March 2014 – March 2015 (London: European Leadership Network, 2015), http://www
.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/03/11/4264a5a6/ELN%20Russia%20-%20
West%20Full%20List%20of%20Incidents.pdf.