Republic of the Philippines March 14, 2012

Supreme Court x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manila ----------x

THIRD DIVISION DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, G.R. No. 166216
NESTOR BODINO,
Assailed in this petition is the July 31, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court
NOEL ETABAG, DANILO DELA FUENTE,
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43763 and its November 26, 2004
BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO Present:
Resolution[2]reversing and setting aside the February 19, 1993 Decision[3] of
GUZMAN,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City (RTC), in Civil Case No.
ALAN JASMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
37487 entitled Rogelio Aberca, et al. v. Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al. for sum
ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, PERALTA, of money and damages.
ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, ABAD,
JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MENDOZA, and The Facts
MARCO PALO, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
ROLANDO SALUTIN BENJAMIN SEGUNDO,
The factual and procedural antecedents were succinctly recited by the CA as
ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN, and
follows:
REBECCA TULALIAN,
Petitioners,
On 25 January 1983, several suspected
subversives who were arrested and detained by the
- versus - military filed a complaint for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Gen.
Fabian Ver, then AFP Chief of Staff, and the following
subordinate officers: Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Gerardo
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, Lantoria, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Guillermo
COL. FIDEL SINGSON, Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo
COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1Lt. Pedro Tango, 1Lt.
ROLANDO ABADILLA, Romeo Ricardo, 1Lt. Raul Bacalso, M/Sgt. Bienvenido
COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, Balaba and John Does. The case was docketed as Civil
LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. Case No. 37487 and assigned to Branch 95.
RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO, In their complaint, the plaintiff-appellees
1LT. PEDRO TANGO, alleged that they were arrested and detained by Task
1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, Force Makabansa, a composite group of various
1LT. RAUL BACALSO, intelligence units of the AFP, on the strength of
M/SGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA defective search warrants; that while under detention
and JOHN DOES, and investigation, they were subjected to physical and
Respondents. Promulgated: psychological harm, torture and other brutalities to
extort from them confessions and other information
that would incriminate them; and that by reason On April 15, 1988, the Supreme Court rendered
thereof, they suffered actual and moral damages. a decision annulling and setting aside the assailed
orders and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
Defendants-appellants, through their counsel,
the then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza, filed a However, trial could not proceed immediately
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) since because on June 11, 1988, the record of the case was
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was then destroyed when fire razed the City Hall of Quezon City.
suspended, the trial court cannot inquire into the It was only on October 9, 1989 when plaintiffs-
circumstances surrounding plaintiffs-appellees arrests; appellees sought a reconstitution of the record of the
(2) the defendants-appellants are immune from case. The record shows that the petition for
liability for the reason that they were then performing reconstitution was set for hearing on October 27, 1989.
their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no However, there is nothing in the record to show that
cause of action. defendants-appellants or their counsel were notified.
For lack of an opposition, the petition for
In an order dated November 8, 1983, the trial reconstitution was granted in an order dated March 12,
court granted defendants-appellants motion to dismiss 1990.
and ordered the case dismissed.
On August 15, 1990, plaintiffs-appellees filed a
Plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion to reconsider motion praying that defendants-appellants be required
and set aside the order of dismissal. In an order to file their answer. However, the record as
dated May 11, 1984, the trial court declared the order reconstituted did not show who are the lawyers of the
of November 8, 1983 final. defendants-appellants considering that Estelito
Mendoza, who had represented them in his capacity as
Plaintiffs-appellees again filed a motion for Solicitor General, was no longer holding that position.
reconsideration of the order dated May 11, 1984. In an Furthermore, defendants-appellants were also no
order dated September 21, 1984, the trial court denied longer occupying the positions they held at the time the
the motion for reconsideration. complaint was filed. Thus, in an order dated August 17,
1990, plaintiffs-appellees were directed to report to the
On March 15, 1985, plaintiffs-appellees went to trial court the addresses and whereabouts of
the Supreme Court on a petition for review on defendants-appellants so that they could be properly
certiorari, seeking to annul and set aside the orders of notified.
the trial court dated November 8, 1983, May 11,
1984 and September 21, 1984. The case was docketed Instead of complying with the order of August
as G.R. No. 69866. 17, 1990, plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion to declare
defendants-appellants in default. The trial court
While the case was pending in the Supreme deferred resolution of this motion and instead, it issued
Court, the so-called EDSA revolution took place. As a an order on September 10, 1990 directing that a copy of
result, the defendants-appellants lost their official the order dated August 17, 1990 be furnished to new
positions and were no longer in their respective office Solicitor General Francisco Chavez to enable him to
addresses as appearing in the record. Also, in the take action pursuant to Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules
meantime, the case was re-raffled to Branch 107. of Court, and to former Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza to enable him to give notice as to whether he
[would] continue to represent the defendants- therefore, to consider the defendants-appellants in
appellants in his private capacity. As it said in its order, default would be tantamount to lack of due process xxx.
the trial court took this action in view of the change in
government and corresponding change in the For failure of the plaintiffs-appellees to comply
addresses and circumstances of the defendants- with the orders dated August 17, 1990 and December
appellants who may not even be aware of the decision 27, 1990, the trial court dismissed the case without
of the Supreme Court in case G.R. No. L-69866 and of prejudice in its order dated March 7, 1991.
the reconstitution of records in this case xxx. Subsequently, however, in an order dated June 4, 1991,
the trial court set aside the order of dismissal and
On October 1, 1990, former Solicitor General reinstated the case. It also approved plaintiffs-
Mendoza filed a manifestation informing the trial court appellees request to serve the notice to file answer or
that his appearance as defendants-appellants counsel responsive pleading by publication.
terminated when he ceased to be Solicitor General and
that he was not representing them in his private In a compliance dated September 12, 1991,
capacity. On his part, Solicitor General Chavez finally plaintiffs-appellees informed the trial court that the
filed on December 11, 1990 a notice of withdrawal of following notice was published in the Tagalog
appearance, citing Urbano v. Go, where the Supreme newspaper BALITA in its issues of August 29,
Court said that the Office of the Solicitor General 1991 and September 5, 1991:
(OSG) is not authorized to represent a public official at
any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for xxxx
damages arising from a felony. The record does not
show that defendants-appellants were furnished a copy
of this notice of withdrawal or that they gave their No answer was filed by defendants-appellants
conformity thereto. within the period stated in the notice. On motion of
plaintiffs-appellees, the trial court in its order
In an order dated December 27, 1990, the trial dated December 5, 1991 declared defendants-
court denied plaintiffs-appellees motion to declare appellants in default and directed plaintiffs-appellees
defendants-appellants in default, emphatically pointing to present their evidence ex-parte.[4]
out that defendants-appellants were not duly notified
of the decision of the Supreme Court. In the same Ruling of the RTC
order, the trial court directed plaintiffs-appellees to
comply with the order of August 17, 1990 within ten On February 19, 1993, the RTC handed down a decision in favor of
(10) days from notice, with a warning that the case the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
[would] be archived and eventually dismissed if
plaintiffs-appellees failed to furnish to the court the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
addresses of defendants-appellants. Plaintiffs-appellees ordering the following defendants:
moved to reconsider the order dated December 27,
1990 but in an order dated February 1, 1991, the trial 1) Maj. General Fabian Ver
court denied the motion, stating that without actual 2) Col. Fidel Singson
3) Col. Rolando Abadilla
notice of the judgment of the Supreme Court xxx the 4) Col. Gerardo Lantoria
defendants-appellants herein would not be aware that 5) Col. Galileo Kintanar
they should file a responsive pleading and that, 6) Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7) Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo
 8) 1Lt. Pedro Tango The Omnibus Motion of Col. Singson, Lt. Col. Lacson and Col.
9) M/Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba Abadilla; the Motion for Reconsideration of Col. Gerardo Lantoria; and the
Petition for Relief from Judgment of Maj. Aguinaldo were denied by the
to pay jointly and severally to EACH of the following RTC.[6] Aggrieved, the said respondents elevated their case to the CA.
plaintiffs:
Maj. Aguinaldo argued that he was deliberately deprived of the
a) Rodolfo Benosa opportunity to be heard and put up his defense, while Col. Singson, Lt. Col.
b) Manuel Mario Guzman Lacson and Col. Abadilla presented the following assignment of errors:
c) Joseph Olayer
d) Marco Palo I
e) Rolando Salutin
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE OFFICE
the amounts of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) TO WITHDRAW AS
temperate or moderate damages; ONE HUNDRED FIFTY COUNSEL WITHOUT THE REQUIRED NOTICE TO,
THOUSAND PESOS (₱150,000.00) as moral damages; and AND/OR CONSENT/CONFORMITY OF APPELLANTS.
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱150,000.00)
as exemplary damages. Likewise, they are ordered to pay II
jointly and severally the sum of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS to the plaintiffs counsel. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE
ORDER OF DEFAULT AND/OR THE JUDGMENT BY
The claims of the rest of the plaintiffs are denied and thereby DEFAULT AND GRANTING NEW TRIAL.
dismissed. Likewise, the case against the following
defendants: Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1Lt. Romeo Ricardo and III
1Lt. Raul Bacalso is DISMISSED, and the said defendants are
exonerated from any liability.[5] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
OSGS MISTAKES AND NEGLIGENCE ARE BINDING ON
Subsequently, respondents Col. Fidel Singson (Col. Singson), Lt. THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Col. Panfilo M. Lacson (Lt. Col. Lacson), and Col. Rolando Abadilla (Col.
IV
Abadilla) filed their Omnibus Motion praying as follows: 1) that the order of
default dated December 5, 1991 be reversed and set aside; 2) that the THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
decision dated February 19, 1993 be reversed and set aside; 3) that the entire DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SINGSON, ABADILLA AND
proceedings be declared null and void; and 4) that they be given fifteen (15) LACSON LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED DAMAGES
days from notice to file answer to the complaint and present their evidence. SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (SIC).[7]
Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria (Col. Lantoria) filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Ruling of the CA
On his part, respondent Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo (Maj.
Aguinaldo) failed to file a timely notice of appeal so he filed a Petition for On July 31, 2003, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the
Relief from Judgment praying that the RTC set aside its decision and proceed RTC decision and ordering the case remanded to the RTC for further
to try the case based on the following grounds: 1) the decision was rendered proceedings. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:
without the benefit of notice in gross violation of his right to due process; 2)
the reconstitution of the records of the case and further proceedings taken WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated February 19,
thereon were effected through fraud; and 3) his failure to move for a new 1993 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the record
trial or to appeal was due to mistake or excusable negligence. be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with the foregoing disquisition.
 issuance of the order dated December 5, 1991 declaring them
SO ORDERED.[8] in default notwithstanding the defective service by
publication of the courts notice requiring them to file such
The CA ruled, among others, that the RTC committed four (4) errors in answer or responsive pleading.[9]
declaring the respondents in default and proceeding to hear the case. The
RTC committed its first error when it abandoned the proper modes of service Not satisfied, the petitioners come to this Court praying for the reversal and
of notices, orders, resolutions or judgments as the petitioners failed to setting aside of the CA decision anchored on the following arguments:
comply with its order dated August 17, 1990, directing them to report the
addresses and whereabouts of the respondents so that they could be properly I
notified. IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS RULINGS
DECLARING DEFENDANTS IN DEFAULT AND
The second error was the failure of the RTC to avail of substituted service ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO PRESENT THEIR EVIDENCE
after failing to effect personal service or service by mail. It perpetrated EX-PARTE; AND IN NULLIFYING THE TRIAL COURTS
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT, THE COURT A QUO ACTED
its third error when it authorized service by publication after dismissing the
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND SO FAR
case for failure of the petitioners to furnish the current addresses of the DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
respondents. The CA reasoned out that there was nothing in the rules which PROCEEDINGS AS TO WARRANT THE EXERCISE BY
would authorize publication of a notice of hearing to file answer and for what THIS COURT OF ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION.[10]
was authorized to be published were summons and final orders and
judgments. The fourth error was committed when the respondents were II
declared in default because they were not duly notified and, therefore, were
denied due process. IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL TO
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND PETITION FOR RELIEF
The CA stated that since the RTC failed to notify the respondents of the
FROM JUDGMENT, THE COURT A QUO ACTED
proceedings undertaken, the latter were denied the chance to actively CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND SO
participate therein. It explained as follows: FAR DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO WARRANT THE
Instead of observing the above precepts by according EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS POWER OF
defendants-appellants every opportunity to ventilate their SUPERVISION.[11]
side of the controversy, the trial court failed not only to
notify them of the proceedings undertaken relative to the The Petitioners Position
resolution of the case but the chance as well to actively
participate therein. It bears stressing that defendants-
appellants were not informed of the reinstatement of the The petitioners claim that the RTC did not err in declaring the respondents in
case against them when the High Tribunal set aside the default and in allowing them to present evidence ex- parte; that the
orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1984, September 21, respondents were represented by the OSG from 1983 up to December 11,
1984 and November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint 1990 when the latter withdrew its appearance from the case; that after the
instituted by plaintiffs-appellees. Likewise, defendants- respondents had appeared, thru the OSG, by filing a motion to dismiss, the
appellants were not apprised of the reconstitution of the petitioners were under no obligation to track down the respondents addresses
records of the case which were destroyed by the fire that since the Rules of Court provide that once a litigant is represented by
razed the City Hall of Quezon City. In the same manner, they counsel, all notices, motions and pleadings must be sent to him as counsel of
were not notified of the withdrawal of the OSG as their
record; that it is a matter of record that the OSG was furnished copies of all
official counsel of record, much less was their consent
thereto sought. Finally and most significantly, defendants- court orders and the petitioners pleadings for the period it remained as the
appellants were precluded the chance to file their respective respondents counsel of record or from 1983 until the OSG withdrew on
answer or responsive pleadings to the complaint with the December 11, 1990; that as counsel of record, the OSG was duty-bound to
file the respondents answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice that The respondents counter that the CA did not commit a reversible error in
it was reinstated by this Court and the case was remanded to the RTC for reversing and setting aside the default judgment rendered by the RTC; that
further proceedings; and that despite having received copies of this Courts the petitioners failed to address four (4) errors committed by the RTC cited
decision in G.R. No. 69866 on or about April 20, 1988 and despite having by the CA; that the respondents were deprived of the opportunity to file their
been duly notified of the finality of said decision by means of this Courts answer or responsive pleadings to the complaint when the RTC issued a
Entry of Judgment, the OSG did not file any answer or seek an extension of default order against them after a defective service of notice to file answer by
time to do so. publication; that the petitioners invocation of the jurisprudence that a
defaulting party has the burden of showing that he has a meritorious defense
The petitioners further argue that as early as May 1988, when this does not apply in this case; and that what should apply is the settled rule that
Courts decision became final and executory and the respondents received once a denial or deprivation of due process is determined, the RTC is ousted
notice thereof through their counsel of record, it was incumbent upon them to of its jurisdiction to proceed and its judgment is null and void.
have answered the complaint within the period provided by the Rules of
Court; that the RTC was not hasty in declaring the respondents in default for
they were given several chances to file their answers even after their period
to do so had already lapsed; that it was the respondents failure to exercise
ordinary prudence in monitoring the progress of this case that placed the The Courts Ruling
petitioners in a difficult situation; that the respondents in this case cannot
seize control of the proceedings or cause them to be suspended indefinitely The basic question is whether the constitutional right to procedural
by the simple expedient of not filing their answers or by feigning ignorance due process was properly observed or was unacceptably violated in this case
of the status of the proceedings; that the rule on service of summons by when the respondents were declared in default for failing to file their answer
means of publication applies to service of summons by publication, not to within the prescribed period and when the petitioners were allowed to present
notices to file answer by publication; that while service of summons by their evidence ex-parte.
publication entails acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it
was already obtained over the respondents in this case by their voluntary Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that:
appearance through counsel and their act of filing a motion to dismiss on
substantive grounds; that substituted service was an exercise in futility No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
because the respondents were no longer holding the positions they were property without due process of law nor shall any
holding at the time the petition was filed and, therefore, could not be reached person be denied the equal protection of the law.
at the addresses indicated on the complaint; that the only remaining option
was to notify the respondents by publication; that the RTC did not err in
holding that the respondents failed to establish the fraud, accident, mistake Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns,
and/or excusable negligence that would warrant the grant of a new trial, or which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It
the setting aside of the judgment and/or petition for relief from judgment; contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered
that the negligence of the OSG is binding on the respondents in the same affecting one's person or property.[12]
manner that its initial success in securing the dismissal of the case was
binding on them; and that it would be highly unfair to allow the respondents, Moreover, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5) of Article VIII
who reaped the benefits of the initial dismissal of the case and never of the 1987 Constitution,[13] the Court adopted and promulgated the following
complained then about the OSG, to suddenly complain that they were not rules concerning, among others, the protection and enforcement of
bound by their counsels handling or mishandling of the case. constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts:

The Respondents Position

 The Rules of Court has been laid down to insure the orderly conduct
Rule 13 of litigation and to protect the substantive rights of all party litigants. It is for
SEC. 5. Modes of service.Service of pleadings, this reason that the basic rules on the modes of service provided under Rule
motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers 13 of the Rules of Court have been made mandatory and, hence, should be
shall be made either personally or by mail. strictly followed. In Marcelino Domingo v. Court of Appeals, [14] the Court
wrote:
SEC. 6. Personal service.Service of the papers
may be made by delivering personally a copy to the Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:
party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with
his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.
person is found in his office, or his office is not known, Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.
the hours of eight in the morning and six in the Except with respect to papers emanating from the
evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by
with a person of sufficient age and discretion then a written explanation why the service or filing was not
residing therein. done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause
to consider the paper as not filed.
SEC. 7. Service by mail.Service by registered
mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office,
Section 11 is mandatory. In Solar Team
in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or
Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, the Court held
his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his
that:
residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and
with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail
Pursuant x x x to Section 11 of Rule 13, service
to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no
and filing of pleadings and other papers must,
registry service is available in the locality of either the
whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made
sender or the addressee, service may be done by
through other modes, the party concerned must
ordinary mail.
provide a written explanation as to why the service or
filing was not done personally. x x x
SEC. 8. Substituted service.If service of
pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and
Personal service and filing are preferred for
other papers cannot be made under the two preceding
obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action
sections, the office and place of residence of the party
or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and
or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by
conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to
delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of
be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
failure of both personal service and service by mail. The
considering the inefficiency of postal service. Likewise,
service is complete at the time of such delivery.
personal service will do away with the practice of some
lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the
following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing
The above rules, thus, prescribe the modes of service of pleadings,
pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard,
motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers, namely: (1) personal
thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare,
service; (2) service by mail; and (3) substituted service, in case service
for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or
cannot be effected either personally or by mail.
(2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the
registered parcel containing the pleading of or other
paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, In the case at bench, the respondents were completely deprived of
not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in due process when they were declared in default based on a defective mode of
the disposition of such pleading or other papers. service service of notice to file answer by publication. The rules on service of
pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers were not
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of strictly followed in declaring the respondents in default. The Court agrees
this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring with the CA that the RTC committed procedural lapses in declaring the
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of respondents in default and in allowing the petitioners to present evidence ex-
Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a parte.
pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were resorted to and no written A review of the records discloses that after the Court rendered its
explanation was made as to why personal service was April 15, 1988 Decision in G.R. No. 69866, annulling the RTC orders dated
not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion November 8, 1983, May 11, 1984 and September 21, 1984 and ordering the
must, necessarily, consider the practicability of remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, the RTC issued an
personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the order[15] dated August 17, 1990 directing the petitioners to report the
clause "whenever practicable." addresses and whereabouts of the respondents so that they would be properly
notified of the proceedings. This directive was issued by the RTC
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that considering that the respondents counsel of record, the OSG, could no longer
under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil represent them and because the respondents were no longer holding official
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general government positions because of a change in government brought about by
rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This order was likewise made in response to the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or motion[16] filed by the petitioners praying that the respondents be required to
filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of file their answer.
time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is Instead of complying with the RTCs directive to report the
not practicable may resort to other modes be had, respondents addresses and whereabouts, the petitioners filed a
which must then be accompanied by a written motion[17] dated September 4, 1990 to declare the respondents in default. On
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not December 27, 1990, the RTC denied the petitioners default motion because
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility the respondents were not duly notified of the April 15, 1988 Decision of this
of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the Court and the OSG no longer wanted to represent them. The RTC likewise
importance of the subject matter of the case or the ordered the petitioners to comply with its August 17, 1990Order, otherwise,
issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the the case would be archived and eventually dismissed. On February 1, 1991,
pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section the RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and on March 7,
11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow 1991, it issued an order dismissing the case without prejudice.
circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997
Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of Surprisingly, on June 4, 1991, the RTC issued an order[18] setting
justice. aside its March 7, 1991 Order and reinstating the case. It directed the
petitioners, among others, to cause the publication of a notice on the
xxxx respondents to file answer or responsive pleading. After the petitioners
complied with the publication requirements, the RTC issued the order
x x x [F]or the guidance of the Bench and dated December 5, 1991 declaring the respondents in default and directing
Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is
the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.
mandated. [Emphasis supplied]
 To stress, the only modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices,
As correctly observed by the CA, the RTCs August 17, 1990 Order orders, judgments and other papers allowed by the rules are personal service,
was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on the respondents by service by mail and substituted service if either personal service or service by
personal service and/or by mail. These proper and preferred modes of mail cannot be made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules
service, however, were never resorted to because the OSG abandoned them of Court. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to file answer by
when the petitioners failed to comply with the August 17, 1990 RTC order publication is mentioned, much less recognized.
requiring them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents.
Nevertheless, there was still another less preferred but proper mode of Furthermore, the Court would like to point out that service by
service available substituted service - which is service made by delivering the publication only applies to service of summons stated under Rule 14 of the
copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons in civil cases are:
service by mail. Unfortunately, this substitute mode of service was not (1) personal service;[19] (2) substituted service;[20] and (3) service by
resorted to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and service by publication.[21] Similarly, service by publication can apply to judgments, final
mail. Instead, the RTC authorized an unrecognized mode of service under the orders and resolutions as provided under Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Rules, which was service of notice to file answer by publication. Court, as follows:

Considering the fact that the OSG could no longer represent the SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or
respondents, the RTC should have been more patient in notifying the resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions
respondents through personal service and/or service by mail. It should not shall be served either personally or by registered mail.
have simply abandoned the preferred modes of service when the petitioners When a party summoned by publication has failed to
failed to comply with its August 17, 1990order with the correct addresses of appear in the action, judgments, final orders or
the respondents. More so, it should not have skipped the substituted service resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by
prescribed under the Rules and authorized a service of notice on the publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
respondents to file answer by publication. [Emphasis supplied]
As correctly ruled by the CA:
In view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, the RTC
should have instead directed the petitioners to exert diligent efforts to notify Its third error was when it authorized service by
the respondents either personally or by registered mail. In case the preferred publication after initially dismissing the case for failure
modes were impractical, the Court should have required the petitioners to at of plaintiffs-appellees to furnish the current address of
least report in writing why efforts exerted towards personal service or service defendants-appellants. There is, however, nothing in
by mail failed. In other words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of the Rules that authorizes publication of a notice of
personal service or service by mail to the respondents should have been hearing to file answer. What is authorized to be
shown first. The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the publication of a published are: (1) summons, and (2) final orders and
notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural judgments.
defect equivalent to lack of due process. The RTC cannot just abandon the
basic requirement of personal service and/or service by mail.
Xxx xxx xxx

At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the The above-quoted provision cannot be used to
respondents was practicable under the circumstances considering that they justify the trial courts action in authorizing service by
were well-known persons who used to occupy high government positions. publication. Firstly, what was published was not a final
order or judgment but a simple order or notice to file
 answer. Secondly, even granting that the notice to file
answer can be served by publication, it is explicit in the Next, the court records got burned during the June 11, 1988 fire that
Rule that publication is allowed only if the defendant- hit the Quezon City Hall where the records were kept. On March 12, 1990,
appellant was summoned by publication. The record is the RTC granted the petitioners petition for reconstitution. Again, the records
clear that defendants-appellants were not summoned do not show that the RTC initiated extra efforts to notify the respondents
by publication. about the reconstitution proceedings. The entire records of this case tend to
show that the respondents were completely out of the picture until after the
On this point, the petitioners argue that the publication was a valid promulgation of the RTC decision.
and justified procedure because following the ruling of the RTC, it was an
extra step to safeguard the interest of the defendants done pursuant to the On countless occasions, the Court ruled that, generally, judgments by
inherent power of the courts to control its proceedings to make them default are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to
comfortable to law and justice. The petitioners further argue that the public policy. An example here would be the case of Regalado P. Samartino
defendants in a civil case cannot seize control of the proceedings or cause v. Leonor B. Raon,[22]where the Court stated:
them to be suspended indefinitely by the simple expedient of not filing their
answers or by feigning ignorance of the proceedings. All these could have The trial court should not have been too rash in
been avoided had the defendants not been so inexplicably complacent and declaring petitioner in default, considering it had actual
utterly lacking in ordinary prudence. notice of valid reasons that prevented him from
answering. Well-settled is the rule that courts should
The Court is not convinced. be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default
judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it
As already discussed above, the basic rules on modes of service of clearly appears that the reopening of the case is
pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers are intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default
mandatory in nature and, therefore, must be strictly observed. The Court is should be the exception rather than the rule, to be
not unaware of the inherent power of courts to control its proceedings. allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the
Nonetheless, the exercise of such inherent power must not violate basic court defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.
procedures. More importantly, it must not disregard ones basic constitutional
right to procedural due process. Suits should as much as possible be decided on
the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we
have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting
This was precisely the reason for the RTCs denial of the petitioners aside orders of default as default judgments are
defaultmotion in its August 17, 1990 Order, and for the eventual dismissal of frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they
the case in its December 27, 1990 Order. may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to
the defendant and the possibility of such serious
It must be noted that as the RTC orders stated, the respondents were consequences necessitates a careful examination of the
not notified of the April 15, 1988 Decision of this Court, which ordered the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set
re-opening and remanding of this case to the RTC. They were neither aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed
notified of the reconstitution proceedings that took place pertaining to the to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well
burned records of the case. The RTC further stated that the respondents were recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its
no longer holding their official government positions and that they were no operation, or except a particular case from its
longer represented by the OSG on account of the change in government. In operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to
other words, the respondents had no counsel of record and no notice of frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We
subsequent proceedings. In short, due process was absent. are not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency
of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered
 judgment against petitioners. However, being the court that the OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a
of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. The records
liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to do not show any proof that the respondents were furnished a copy of this
petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued notice of withdrawal or whether or not they gave their conformity thereto.
by the trial court and the consequent default judgment;
otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are Contrary to the petitioners position, while it is true that Sol. Gen.
not afforded an opportunity to prove their claims. Chavez filed a notice of withdrawal only on December 11, 1990, the
respondents were in effect no longer represented by counsel as early as April
Finally, the Court finds unacceptable the petitioners contention that 15, 1988 when the Courts decision was rendered, or much earlier, right after
1) the respondents were well represented by counsel from 1983 up to the 1986 EDSA Revolution due to the change in government. The Court
December 1990 and that the respondents were properly notified of the entire cannot subscribe to the petitioners argument that there was negligence or
proceedings through their counsel; 2) the respondents counsel was negligent mistake on the part of the OSG considering that Sol. Gen. Mendoza ceased to
for failing to file an answer within the prescribed period; and 3) the hold office due to the EDSA Revolution while Sol. Gen. Chavez withdrew
negligence of the OSG binds the respondents. his representation because of the prohibition in Urbano v. Chavez. Definitely,
Sol. Gen. Mendozas cessation from holding office and Sol. Gen. Chavezs
The petitioners do not deny the fact that on May 15, 1985, they filed withdrawal of representation in the unique scenario of this case are not
a petition for certiorari before this Court questioning the RTC orders granting equivalent to professional delinquency or ignorance, incompetency or
the respondents motion to dismiss and denying their motion for inexperience or negligence and dereliction of duty. Hence, there is no
reconsideration. They do not question the fact that while their petition was negligence of counsel in this case. After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the
pending in this Court, the 1986 EDSA Revolution took place which resulted respondents were practically left without counsel.
in the removal of the respondents from their respective high government
offices and the replacement of then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza (Sol. As a final point, this Court commiserates with the petitioners plight
Gen. Mendoza). There is likewise no dispute that subsequently, on April 15, and cry for justice. They should not be denied redress of their grievances.
1988, this Court rendered its decision annulling the subject RTC orders and The Court, however, finds Itself unable to grant their plea because the
remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The case was then re- fundamental law clearly provides that no person shall be deprived of life,
raffled to another branch. liberty and property without due process of law.

Clearly from the above circumstances, there was no longer any WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
lawyer-client relationship between the OSG and the respondents at the time
the decision of the Court dated April 15, 1988 was promulgated because, SO ORDERED.
admittedly, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the respondents were no longer
occupying their respective government positions and Sol. Gen. Mendoza,
who represented them, was no longer the Solicitor General.

In fact, in compliance with the RTCs order dated September 10,

1990,[23]former Solicitor General Mendoza submitted a manifestation[24] that
his legal representation for the respondents was deemed terminated when he JOSE
ceased to be the Solicitor General and that he was not representing the CATRAL MENDOZA
respondents in his private capacity. For his part, on December 11, 1990, the Associate Justice
incumbent Solicitor General at that time, Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez (Sol. Gen. Chavez), filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance for the
respondents citing the case of Urbano v. Chavez,[25] where the Court ruled
WE CONCUR: