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FLO,S P,~

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PERSONAL

SIR KEVIN TEBBIT KCB CMG

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON
SW1A 2EU

Telephone: 020-7218 2193


Fax 02G-7218 3048
e-mail; pus-pa@mod .gsi .gov.uk

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRET

DlPt1Sl12J3 (278)
4 July 2003
N4 aCQ,GJ. ......f, n-. .k L . .., .t r.
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ANDREW GILLIGAN AND THE SINGLE SOURCE

An official in the MOD has volunteered that he had a discussion with Andrew
Gilligan on 22 May, one week before Gilligan's allegation about the interference in the
production of the September dossier and the '45 minute story/ . He is an FCO official
seconded to the MOD's Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, with a long history of
authorised dealing with the press in the course of his duties, though not in this case .

He was interviewed today by his line manager and my Personnel Director for two
hours . The official claims that he met Gilligan to discuss Gilligan's experiences in
Baghdad because he believed it would be helpful to him in his own role as a BW expert
with long scientific/academic association with the Iraqi weapons programme, past
experience as a UN Inspector and an expectation that he would be returning to Iraq to
debrief Iraqis associated with their WMD programme shortly. It would appear, from what
he has told us, that their discussion touched on some of the issues subsequently referred
to by Gilligan in the press in a number of ways :

- In response to a question from Gilligan about the failure of Iraq to use WMD
and the inability to find them, he said that conditions early in the war were not
favourable and that there were command and control problems subsequently, and
that the small arsenal of WMD remaining would be difficult to find without human
information ;

- on the issue of the 45 minutes, raised by Gilligan, he said that he did not
know to what it refers (not having access to the intelligence report) ;

- asked why it should be in the dossier, he said that he replied "probably for
impact" ;

PERSONAL C  ~~`~oO IO
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- on the role of Alistair Campbell, he said he was unable to comment (not


being involved in the process) .

My immediate reaction was that this must be the "single source' to whom Gilligan
referred to in his testimony to the FAC as the origin of the story that the Government
exaggerated intelligence contained in the September dossier. Certainly, his comments to
Gilligan could have been incorporated into Gilligan's 29 May story. However, closer
examination, following today's interview suggests that this would not necessarily be a
reliable conclusion . A significant element of the information that Gilligan attributes to this
source in his FAC testimony would not have been known to this individual : he was not, for
example, involved in, or claims to have been involved in, the intelligence component of the
dossier or the process of the dossier's compilation . There are also discrepancies, over the
circumstances of the meeting, the length of their relationship, and, indeed, about the
nature of the individual : Gilligan claims that this source was a senior official in charge of
drawing up the dossier. This official - although an acknowledged expert on Iraqi WMD-
" patently was not so involved ; nor does he subscribe to views attributed to Gilligan's
source.

So, there are three possibilities :

(a) that Gilligan has embellished this official's meeting with him, but that he is
the 'single anonymous source';

(b) that Gilligan's source is someone else ;

(c) that no one 'source' exists and is in fact a hotchpotch of comments from
numerous individuals and articles.

In the case of (a), we would have the strongest possible reason for publicly
correcting the misrepresentation made by Gilligan in the interests of factual accuracy.
However, we do not have sufficient evidence to reach such a conclusion with any degree
" of safety . The official himself is adamant that he is not the single source. Were we to
accuse Gilligan and the BBC of misrepresenting the official's remarks, it would be easy for
Gilligan to claim that his source was someone else and that the Government was pursuing
a vendetta .

For these reasons, I do not recommend that we use what the official has told us to
seek to correct the public record further.

I do, however, believe it necessary to have defensive material available should the
story leak. Of this there must be a possibility . The official himself says he came forward,
not because he considered that he was the source of Gilligan's information, but because a
contact in RUSI suggested that Gilligan's evidence to the FAC looked as if it drew on the
sort of comments he might make about Iraq's CW and BW capability. In general, there
must, therefore, be some speculation already. Contingent lines have, therefore, been
prepared by officials here. These are enclosed .

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I should add that the official has clearly breached the MOD's rules about
unauthorised contact with the media. There is no reason to suspect a breach of the OSA
or compromise of security information, but discipline is being reinforced .

I am copying this letter to Andrew Tumbull, David Manning (No .10), Michael Jay
(FCO), Eliza Manningham-Buller (Security Services) and John Scariett (JIC) .

Sir David Omand KCB


Security & Intelligence Co-ordinator &
Permanent Secretary
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS

PERSONAL I
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PRESS STATEMENT

An individual working in the MOD has volunteered that he met with Andrew Gilligan on 22

May to discuss Iraq in general. This was one week before Gilligan's story claiming that the

Iraq dossier was "sexed up". The account of the meeting given by this official does not

match the account given by Gilligan of his "single source".

" This was an unauthorised contact which is being deaft with appropriately by line

management.

There is no reason to suspect that a breach of security is involved .


A-,~ s).i4 auq~ u;A 11+.k Y v,~

PERSONAL
uffllCf' K -crx" .rv,n 1"
SIR KEVIN TEBBIT KCB CMG Wo- t16-e Vlan Mt% Ful
IJJAW.11~~ ~s~W~'~`+"+~ MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 4hV01 .
OLD WAR OFFICE BUILOING'yy HI TEHALL LO NDON ,
SW1A 2E ~U
[c :
TdeW,a,r-
Fax
020-7218 2193
02o-7218 3048
"

~ W,UL4 `~ vis-va@mo&g9 .gov-uk

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

-=-II7PU~Tf213C2- ~~
4 July 2003

" ~'"/

ANDREW GILLIGAN AND THE SINGLE SOURCE

An official in the MOD has volunteered that he had a discussion with Andrew
Gilligan on 22 May, one week before Gilligari s allegation about the interference in the
production of the September dossier and the '45 minute story'. He is an FCO official `
seconded to the MOD's Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, with a ng history of '
authorised dealing with'the press in the course of his duties, though not in this case.

He was interviewed today by his line manager and my Personnel Director for two
hours. The official claims that he met Giiligan to discuss Gilligan's experiences in
Baghdad because he believed it would be helpful to him in his own role as a BW expert
with long scientficlacademic association with the Iraql weapons programme, past
experience as a UN Inspector and an expectation that he would be returning to Iraq to
- debrief Iraqis associated with their WMD programme shortly. It would appear, from what
' he has told us, that their discussion touched on some of the issues subsequently referred
to by Gilligan in the press in a number of ways:

- In response to a question from Gilligan about the failure of Iraq to use WMD
_ and the inability to find them, he said that conditions early in the war were not
-fa-vourable anii-tat-there merre-cbmmarid--arizi"CoMlprabiems subsequentty;-and
that the small arsenal of WMD remaining would be difficult to find without human
information ;.

- on the issue of the 45 minutes, raised by Gilligan, he said that he did not
know to what it refers (not having access to the intelligence report);

- asked why d should be in the dossier, he said that he replied Oprobably for
impact" ;

PERSONAL
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PERSONAL

- on the role bfAliStair Campbell, he said he was unable to comment (not


being involved in the process~

My immediate reaction was that this must be the 'single source' to whom Gilligan
referred to in his testimony to the FAC as the origin of the story that the Goveinment
exaggerated intelligence contained in the September dossier. Certainly, his comments to
Gilfigan could have been incorporated into Gil6gan's 29 May story. However, closer
examination, following todays interview suggests that this would not necessarily be a
reliable conclusion . A significant element of the information that Giiligan attributes to this
source in his FAC testimony would not have been known to this individual : he was not, for
exam Re, anvotvedan. or_claimstahave been involved in, the intellic7ence componen t of the
dossier or the process ofthe dossiers compilation . There are also discrepancies, over the
circumstances of the meeting, the length of their relationship, and, indeed, about the
nature of the individual : Gilligan clairns that this source was a senior official in charge of
drawing up the:dossier. This official - although an acknowledged expert on Iraqi WMD -
" patently was ni3t so involved ; nor does he subscribe to views attributed to Gilligan's
source .

So, there are three possibilities:

(a) that Gilligan has embellished this official's meeting with him, but that he is
the 'single anonymous source! ;

(b) that Gilligan's source is someone else;

(c) that no one 'source' exists and is in fact a hotchpotch of comments from
numerous individuals and articles. -

In the case of (a), we would have the strongest possible reason for publicly
correcting the misrepresentation made by Gilligan in the interests of factual accuracy.
However, we do not have sufficient evidence to reach such a conclusion wrth any degree
of safety. The official himself is adamant that he is not the single source. Were we to
accuse Gilligan and the BBC of misrepresenting the official's remarks, it would be easy for
" Gilligan to claim that his source was someone else and that the Government was pursuing
a vendetta .

For these reasons, I do not recommend that we use what the official has told us to
seek to correct the public record further.

1 do, however, believe it necessary to have defensive material available should the
story leak. Of this there must be a possibility. The official himself says he came forward,
not because he considered that he was the source of Gilligan's information, but because a
contact in RUSI suggested that Gilligan's evidence to the FAC looked as if it drew on the
sort of comments he might make about Iraq's CW and BW capability. In general, there
must, therefore, be some speculation already. Contingent lines have, therefore, been
prepared by officials here. These are enclosed. .

PERSONAL
RE.'!S'fRIiCTED- STAFF
RESTRICTED - STA -~ -
- PERSONAL

I should add that the official1fas clearly breached the MOD's rules about
unauthorised contact with the media. There is no reason to suspect a breach of the OSA
or compromise of security information, but discipline is being reinforced .

1 am copying this letter to Andrew TumbuA, David Manning (No . 10). Michael Jay
(FCO), EI'iza Manningham-Buller (Security Services) and John Scarlett (JIC).

-CM"

Sir David Ornand KCB


Security & Intelligence Co-ordinator &
Permanent Secretary
Cabinet Office
70.1Nhitehaq
London SW1A 2AS

MRSQFIAL .
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