ASAD, Talal. Anthropology and The Analysis of Ideology. 1979
ASAD, Talal. Anthropology and The Analysis of Ideology. 1979
ASAD, Talal. Anthropology and The Analysis of Ideology. 1979
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ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF
IDEOLOGY*
TALAL ASAD
ofHull
University
I
In the early seventieswhen the questionof anthropologyand colonialism
was firstbeingpubliclyarguedout in thiscountry,therewas an understandable
reactionon the part of many Britishanthropologists againstthe exaggerated
role attributed,in some of the crudercriticisms,to anthropologyas colonial
ideology. In the excitementof indignantresponseit was oftenforgottenthat
the really interestingquestions concerned the ideological conditions of
anthropology,and the implicationsof theseconditionsfor its discourse,and
not the very occasionallydirectbut on the whole insignificantpracticalrole
thatBritishanthropologists hadplayedin supportofBritishimperialstructures.
Insteadofenquiringintotheeffects ofideologicalconditionson anthropological
discoursethe argumentoftendegeneratedinto assertionsabout the personal
motivesor politicsof its producers.However, I do not want to addressthis
problemdirectlyhere,but insteadto beginwitha generalpuzzle: themodesty
of anthropologistsregardingthe ideological role of their discoursesin the
determinationof colonial structuresdoes not seem to be matched by a
correspondingscepticismregardingthe role of ideology generallyin the
determinationof social structureswhich are the objects of their discourse.
* Malinowski Lecturefor 1979, given at the London School of Economics on 6 March.
Man (N.S.) 14, 607-27.
6o8 TALAL ASAD
II
Questionsconcerningconceptsand society,classification and socialstructure,
rules and social behaviour have always been of central concern to social
anthropology.In recentyearsa freshimpetushas been given to suchquestions
derivingfromthe studyof language.This new impetushas occasionallybeen
representedas a radical break,a New Anthropology,and linesof battlehave
been drawn on what are alleged to be mattersof profoundimportanceforthe
theory and method of social anthropology.However, it is very doubtful
whetherthefreshdevelopmentsrepresent a totallynew departure,or whether
thelinesofbattledefinepositionswhichare as different as theyhave sometimes
been claimed to be.
In fact,many of the basic assumptionsand concernsof more recentwriters
influencedby the studyof language can be tracedback to Malinowski, not
only of those writerswho have been happy to acknowledge the connexion,
but also of many who have not. Malinowski's critics,rangingfromlinguists
such as J.R. Firth(I957) and Langendoen (I968) to the publicistsfora New
Anthropologylike Ardener (I97i), Henson (I974) and Crick (I976), have
largelyseen in Malinowski a failedlanguage-theorist. One is oftengiven to
understand that despite his commendable emphasis on the importanceof
learning native for
languages fieldwork, Malinowski had no realunderstanding
of advanced language theory.He is dismissedby anthropologistslike Sahlins
or noted brieflyby linguistslike Lyons
(I976) for his crass utilitarianism,
(I968) as someone who contributedthat quaint but not entirelyvalueless
notion,'phatic communion',to semantictheory.That Malinowski'stextson
language also containan anthropologicaltheoryof culture(which is not,by
the way, to be confusedwith his theoryof basic and derivedneeds),has gone
generallyunnoticed.Not only in his explicitlylinguistictexts,such as 'The
problem of meaningin primitivelanguages'and Volume 2 of Coralgardens,
but also in some of his otherwritingssuch as his famousessayon myth,there
is presenta notion of cultureas an a prioritotalityof authenticmeaningsto
TALAL ASAD 609
... natureas it existsin itselfis only the raw materialprovided by the hand of God, waiting
to be given meaningfulshape and contentby the mind of man. It is as the block of marble to
the finishedstatue;and of course the geniusof thesculptor-in thesame way as the technical
developmentof culture-consists of exploitingthe lines of defractionwithinthe materialto
his own ends. That marbleis refractory;thereare certainthingsone cannotdo with it-such
are the factsof natureand the action of selection.But it is the sculptorwho decides whether
the statueis to be an equestrianknightcontemplatinghis victories[.. .] or a seated Moses
contemplatingthe sins of his people. And if it be objected thatit is the compositionof the
marble which compels the formof the statue,it should not be forgottenthatthisblock of
marble was chosen fromamong all possibleones because thesculptorsaw withinit the latent
image of his own project(I 976: 2 I0).
III
That thecentralobjectof anthropologicaldiscourseis primarilyconstituted
in termsof human meaningshas very recentlybeen reaffirmed by Maurice
Bloch in his I977 paper'The pastand thepresentin thepresent'.
In thispaperBloch is concernedto specifyreasonsfortheperennialdifficulty
that anthropologistshave had in formulatingan adequate theoryof social
change.Bloch pointsout thatthe conceptof social structurein anthropology
refersessentiallyto an integratedtotalityof social classifications
and meanings,
a system of social rules and roles which can, in one widely accepted
anthropologicalsenseoftheterm,be called ritual.Now ifthisconceptof social
structureis linked to the doctrineof the social origin of concepts(the social
determination ofcognition)itbecomesimpossibleto specifyhow socialchange
can occur. This is because,so Bloch argues,a systemof meaningfulcategories,
ofsharedconceptsthatmakescommunicationpossible(a systemwhichis none
otherthansocial structure)cannotexplain thecreationof new concepts.5
Bloch believes thatthe Marxist theoryof determininginfrastructure and
determinedsuperstructure is no answerto theproblemeither,because:
the infrastructureis seen as externalto the conceptsof the actors.[And] forit to be a source
of criticismof the social order it means thatpeople mustapprehendit in termsavailable to
them and which are differentfrom and incompatible with those of the dominant social
theory. This means terms not determinedby it. Otherwise the infrastructure, however
contradictoryto the dominantsocial theory,is never transformed into action and just carries
on in itsown sweet way, totallyirrelevantto the processesof history(I977: 28 i).
IV
Some years afterPoliticalsystemsof highlandBurmawas firstpublished,
Gellner(i958) wrote a paperdrawingattentionto thebook as:
perhapsthe most lucid statementof a certainkind of Idealism that I know, and teachersof
philosophycould profitablyuse a selectionof his statementsas a means of explainingto their
studentswhat such Idealism is about (I958: 202).
Leach in effectsees otherFunctionalistsas holding a kind of Platonism.Only the staticis
properlyknowable, it is merely approximated by the empiricallyreal. [...] Leach's own
variantto thisis a kind of Hegelianism: realitychangesbecause it is in conflict,the conflictis
a conflictof embodied ideas,and the change and conflictare knowable by means of concepts
thatare themselvesin conflictin a parallelway (I958: I93).
V
But perhapsthisargumentcan be made morestronglyifwe turnto Douglas
in her most recent,transactionalist
mood-I referof course to the booklet
Cultural
entitled bias.
TALAL ASAD 6I7
VI
Perhapsthisis the place to considervery brieflysome popular misunder-
standingsof Marx's famousformulationabout the relationof ideologyto the
materialconditionsof existence.In thiswhole area too many different kinds
of question are often confounded,by defendersand critics alike of that
formulationin anthropology.Let me try,however sketchily,to sortsome of
themout.
Take firstideology as systematic formsof sociallyconstitutedknowledge.
The Marxian propositionthatthereare specificmaterialconditionsforthe
existenceof specificideologiesin thissensedoes not necessarilyimplythatthe
ideologiesare simplyeffectsor reflections of thoseconditions.Thus if we say
thatthedomainsofsystematic discoursewithinwhich specificknowledgesare
produced, testedand communicated,are dependent on specificinstitutional
conditionsand relations,thisdoes not requireany commitmentto the view
that the knowledges reflectthose institutionalconditions-that there is an
isomorphic relation between the structureof knowledge and that of
institutionalconditions.If we say thatgiven social conditionssustain,and at
certainstagesbecome obstaclesto thedevelopmentofscholarlyunderstanding,
thisdoes not imply thatthe conceptof objectiveknowledgesis nothingbut
illusion.If we say thatparticularmodes of systematicdiscoursecan be and are
used forfurthering particularclassinterests,
thisdoes not imply thatall such
modes of discourseare essentiallynothingbut an 'expression'of the positions
thatare supposedto definethoseinterests. So much may be familiarenough
and acceptableto manyof you.
620 TALAL ASAD
VII
One consequenceof what I have been sayingof course is thatthe vulgar-
Marxistview of ideologyas a coherentsystemof falsebeliefswhich maintains
622 TALAL ASAD
VIII
Let me try to statein a few words the generalposition which underlies
much of what I have been tryingto say (a dangerousthingto do, but even so,
probablynecessary).It is an old position,but one which bearsre-stating given
the presentself-consciousness about ideology and about meaning.However
muchwe might,as professional talkersand writers,wishto affirm theprofound
importanceof systematicdiscourse,it is difficult to avoid the obvious,but by
no means trivial,conclusion that political and economic conditionshave
developed and changed in ways that are rarelyin accord with systematic
discourse.Or let me put it anotherway: it is surelyneitherthepower ofsocial
criticismnor the relativestrengthof competingsocial ideologieswithinthe
societiesstudied by social anthropologists(in Asia, in Africa and in Latin
America) which explains why and how they have become basically
transformed, but the historicalforcesof world industrialcapitalismand the
way thesehave impingedupon particularpoliticaland economic conditions.
Of coursepoliticalargumentscan be important(and especiallyiftheyhelp to
mobilisepowerfulsocial movements)butperhapsneverin theway,nor to the
extent,thatwe flatterourselvestheyare important.Given thatthisis so, the
main troublewith much colonial anthropology-and with much contempo-
rary anthropologytoo-has been not its ideological servicein the cause of
imperialism,but itsideological conceptionof social structureand of culture.
NOTES
thought.Simply,ifall conceptsandcategoriesaredetermined
bythesocialsystem a fresh look
is impossiblesinceall cognitionis alreadymouldedto fitwhat is to be criticised'(Bloch
I977: 28I).
wheremanis in mostdirectcontactwithnaturethatwe
6 'It is in contexts finduniversal
concepts,[andso] itissomething in theworldbeyondsocietywhichconstrains atleastsomeof
ourcognitivecategories' (Bloch I977: 285).
7 Bourdillonis also surelyrightin criticisingBloch'sviewson 'formal'language-views
whicharedevelopedat lengthin hisIntroduction to Politicallanguageandoratoryin traditional
Buthe couldhavegonemuchfurther
society. in hiscriticism.(See below,mynote2 I.)
8 'Roughlyspeaking, Leachbelievesthatlanguage,systems of propositions
[sic],describea
it in somefairlyliteralsense,in otherwordshe believesin what
realityin virtueof reflecting
mightbecalledtheparallelism theory ofmeaning. Thisiswhatwe needknowofhisphilosophy.
As a matterofanthropology, he believesthatritualreflectsthesocietyin whichit occursin a
similarway' (Gellner I 9 5 8: I 89).
9 Gellner's assertion thatLeachbelievesina parallelist theory ofmeaningisclearlywrongfor
thefollowingreasons.(i) In thefirst placeLeach'sown discourse claimsto present a cultural
grammar, nota system ofpropositions whichreflects Reality'in somefairly literalsense'.As we
shallseelater,thisgrammar is presentedas authentic,in thesensethatitis simplyre-presented
in his text.This culturalgrammaris intendedto helpus understand theheterogeneous and
changingsocialconditionsof theKachinHills Area,in theway thata grammarbook of a
foreign languagehelpsusunderstand theprocessesofspeechandwriting inthatlanguage.(2) As
forLeach'sanalysisofthediscourse oftheKachinsthemselves, he arguesthattheirmyths, for
example,mustbe seenas 'a languagein whichto maintain controversy' (pp. 85-97),andsince
in hisview thetruthor untruth of whatis uttered in thislanguage'is quiteirrelevant' to an
understanding ofitsmeaning, to seehowsucha conception
itisdifficult oflanguagecanbe said
to be foundedon a parallelist theoryofmeaning.(3) Furthermore, whenLeachdefines 'ritual'
as thataspectofalmostanybehaviourwhich'servesto expresstheindividual's statusas a social
personin thestructural system in whichhe findshimself forthetimebeing'(pp. i o-i i), he is
asserting notthatritual'reflects butthatitssignifying
society', function ofsociety.
is constitutive
(4) Finally, thereareplacesin thetextwhereLeachseemsat first sightto invokeparallelism in
his elucidationof the meaningof ritual-as in his analysisof ceremonies of sacrifice(e.g;
pp. I 72-82). Leach'sargument hereisthatsuchceremonies havea mnemonic function byvirtue
of thefactthattheyrepresent to theparticipants whattheiridealsocialstructure shouldbe.
However,notethatwhatissaidto be themeaninghereisnot'society'or 'socialreality insome
fairlyliteralsense'-but ideasin themindsof theparticipants. In otherwords,whatLeachis
proposing is notthatthemeaningofritualisto be foundinthewaytheIdeaitembodiesreflects
Reality(whichwouldbe rather likethephilosophical theory Gellneralludesto) butin theway
theceremonial evokescertainideasinthemindsoftheparticipants-and thatisnota parallelist
theoryofmeaningat all,noris itnecessarily linkedto an idealistphilosophy.
10Cf. Walter Benjamin'sseminalessay'The work of art in the age of mechanical
reproduction' in Benjamin(I970).
11 MarvinHarris(I969) was notmistaken in hisreadingwhenhe praisedthatbook forits
materialist method-Gellner's judgements aboutitsidealismnotwithstanding.
12 An a-historical approachto theconceptofmodeofproduction hasbeencharacteristic of
theworkofFrenchanthropologists likeGodelier, andofEnglishsociologists whofollowthem.
Anthropologists and sociologists who have beenstrongly influenced by thisworkare often
quite unawareof the strongresemblances betweentheirwork and old-fashioned British
functional anthropology.
13 Semioticians in France,who have addressedthemselves to the taskof formulating a
Marxisttheoryof ideology,havesometimes takenup whatseemsto be a contrary position.
Thus Veronwrites:'One mustunderstand thatsemioticactivityis inevitably embodiedin
everyformofsocialorganisation-regardless ofwhether theorderconcerned isdescribed asthe,
"economic", the"political",the"cultural", the"ritual",etc.,i.e.whenitistreated independently
of its signifying aspect.Withoutthissemioticactivity,no formof social organisation is
conceivable'(I978: I4). Veronisofcoursequiterighttostress theseriousdifficultieswhichthe
Marxistmodel of economicbase and ideologicalsuperstructure engenders foran adequate
understanding of ideology,but it is not at all certainthathis insistence on the ubiquityof
semioticactivity constitutesa resolution ofthesedifficulties-even thoughhe goeson to warn
thereaderthat'This is notto saythatthissemioticactivity running through societyis capable
ofbeingdescribed in itsentiretyintermsofa simpleprinciple ofinternal coherence-quitethe
contrary'. Forin placeofthedistinction betweenthediscursive andthenon-discursive aspects
ofsociallife,whichthenotionof basis/superstructure was intended, howeverunsatisfactorily,
626 TALAL ASAD
to articulate, he proposesa heterogeneity ofdiscursive principles (distinctive 'grammars'), i.e.
contradictory principles ofdiscourse whichin industrial capitalist societies aresituated on the
level of class conflict.There is alwaysa dangerin tendenciesrepresented by thisarticle
(interesting andingenious thoughitis) thatin theendevenMarxistswillbe leftwithnothing
but 'real discourse',and 'real people' who producethatdiscourse, whilehistorical political
economiesare bracketedon one side as beingno more than'abstractions' or 'theoretical
concepts'.
14 Voloshinov's Marxismandthephilosophy oflanguage, firstpublished fifty yearsago,is still
one of the mostfruitful discussions of thisproblem,and althoughit leavesmanydifficult
questionsunanswered, it revealsa sensitivityto thecomplexsocialfoundations of discourse
whichsurpasses muchofwhatis written on thissubjecttoday.
15 See Austin(I962), who firstcoinedtheterm'performative' and thenabandonedthe
concept.In hisinteresting recentstudyofAustin, Graham(I977) hasforcefully arguedthatthe
conceptofperformative, properly defined, shouldbe retained, andfortheveryreasonthatled
to the latter'sgivingit up-namely, the impossibility of establishing, throughit, a sharp
separation betweenactingin theworldandmerelyconceiving ofitin a particular way.
16 I referto theattempt thatbegan-with Searle'Whatis a speechact?' (I965)-reprinted in
Giglioli (1972). See Coulthard(977), chapter2, for some of the problemsinvolvedin
identifying and classifying performatives (or illocutionary acts) in English.As for other
languages, M. K. Fosterwrites(inBaumanandSherzer[I974: 468]) thatPhilipRavenhill who,
morethananyoneelse,has exploredthestrengths and weaknesses of thisnotionforcross-
culturalcomparison, has'effectively arguedagainstan uncritical application of performative
analysis, basedon English,to otherlanguages(andcultures).' The workof Ravenhillwhichis
citedbyFosteris a mimeographed paperwhichI have,unfortunately, notbeenableto secure.
17 Such an assumption is perhapsevidentin thefollowingremarks by theeditorsof that
valuablecollection, Explorations intheethnography ofspeaking: '. . . theethnography ofspeaking
fillsthegapintheanthropological recordcreatedbytheneglectbyanthropological linguistsof
thesocialuseoflanguageandbythelackofinterest ofethnographers in patterns andfunctions
ofspeaking.The importance oftheethnography ofspeakingto anthropology cutsfardeeper
thanthis,however,fora careful focuson speaking as aninstrument fortheconductofsociallife
bringsto theforetheemergent natureofsocialstructures,notrigidly determined bytheinstitutional
structure ofthesociety, butrather largely createdin performance by thestrategic andgoal-directed
manipulation ofresourcesfor speaking'(Bauman& SherzerI974: 8, myemphasis). Thisnotion
thatit is thelevelofindividualtransaction andcommunication whichgenerates thehistorical
structure of societiesis also proposedby Kapferer (1976: I 5-I6)-and it is one of thethings
againstwhichI am arguing.In thiscontext,it may be worthstressing thatthedistinction
betweentheconditions ofthepoliticaleconomyandthoseofdiscourse doesnotparallelbutcuts
acrosstheanthropological distinction between juralandstatistical norms.
18 ForexampleGeertz(1973: 208-9).
19 Thus in his more recent work, Roland Barthes has abandoned his early attemptsat
establishinga universalscienceof semiotics.Compare Barthes(I967) with Barthes(I974).
20 It is no accident thatMarxdid notputforward a generaltheoryofideology.Contrary to
theassumption thathe did notfindthetimeto developsucha theorybeforehe died,it can be
arguedthatthereis no placeforitinhisanalysis ofthecapitalist modeofproduction, andin his
commitment to theclassstruggle.
21 Authoritative discourseshouldnot be confusedwith'formalised language',whichM.
Blochhaswritten aboutin hisIntroduction to Political
language andoratory intraditional
society.
Bloch(I975: I2) seesformalised speechas 'a kindofpower'whichis employedbytraditional
leadersto coercefollowers('the extremeformalisation of languagewithitsaccompanying
exerciseofpoweris characteristic oftraditional authority situations as definedbyWeber'),and
contrasts itwitheveryday speechwhich,beingflexible, allowsfordisagreement andopposition.
It is notveryclearwhetherBloch'sargument is logicalor psychological, and in eithercaseit
seemsuntenable. Is it thatcertaincrucialthingscannotbe saidin 'formalised speechacts'even
ifonewantstosaythem?Inthatcase,whatprevents thespeaker fromresorting toanother style?
Or is it perhapsthatspeakers are lulledintoacceptingthingsas theyare whentheyemploy
'formalised language'?In thatcase,whatgivestheinitiator an immunity whichtherespondent
lacks?The difficulty withthiskindofargument residesin theveryvaguenotionof'formalised
language'whichmightincludeanything fromsymboliclogic throughlegal disputation to
authoritative discourse. Strictly
speaking, authoritative discourse is nota kindofsocialpower,
of one will over another, buta discoursewhichbindseveryego who recognises himselfor
herself init-regardlessofwhichistheinitiator andwhichtherespondent. (SeeArendt[I958],
fora provocative discussion oftheconceptofauthority in classicalGreekandRomansociety.)
TALAL ASAD 627
22 I referheretotheinfluential paperentitled asprinted
'Conceptsandsociety', inEmmetand
Maclntyre (I970).
23 Woulditmakeanydifference to Gellner'sargument 'luck'or'socialand
ifwe substituted
politicalskills'forbaraka?In otherwords,is theallegedlydelusorycharacter of theconcept
barakareally'essential fortheworkingofthesocialsystem'?
24 In a slightly different context,but one stillappositeto the presentproblem,Foucault
delusionisa function
observes:'.. . religious ofculture:religion
ofthesecularization maybe the
objectofdelusional beliefinsofar as thecultureofa groupno longerpermits theassimilationof
religiousor mystical beliefsinthepresent content ofexperience'(FoucaultI976: 8 i).
2 See forexampleKedourie(I966).
26 See forexampleHacking
(I975).
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