EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4973. March 15, 2010.]

SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. and LOLITA B. RAFOLS ,

complainants, vs . ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR. , respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to

punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them un t to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
— Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 1.

By its Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, the South Cotabato-
Sarangani-General Santos City (SOCSARGEN) Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) resolved to refer to the IBP Board of Governors in Manila, for
appropriate action and investigation, the purported anomaly involving Judge Teodoro
Dizon, Jr. and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. 1 Thus, on March 24, 1998, Atty. Joeffrey L.
Montefrio, the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter President, transmitted the referral to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
The matter involving Judge Dizon, Jr., which was docketed as Administrative
Matter (AM) No. RTJ-98-1426 entitled Manuel C. Rafols and Lolita C. Rafols v. Judge
Teodoro Dizon, Jr., RTC, General Santos City, Branch 37, 2 was resolved in a per curiam
decision promulgated on January 31, 2006, 3 whereby the Court dismissed Judge
Dizon, Jr. from the service, with forfeiture of all bene ts, except accrued leave credits,
and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned and government-controlled
corporations.
In the same per curiam decision, the Court reiterated its resolution of October 21,
1998 for the Of ce of the Bar Con dant (OBC) to conduct an investigation of the
actuations of Atty. Barrios, Jr. (respondent), and to render its report and
recommendation. cdphil

Hence, this decision.

Antecedents
The anomaly denounced by the SOCSARGEN IBP Chapter was narrated in the
joint af davit dated March 3, 1998 of Spouses Manuel C. Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols
(complainants), 4 whose narrative was corroborated by the af davit dated March 11,
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 1998 of Larry Sevilla; 5 the af davit dated March 16, 1998 of Allan Rafols; 6 and the
af davit dated March 16, 1998 of Daisy Rafols, 7 all of which were attached to the letter
of the IBP Chapter President. Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, then Deputy Clerk of Court and
Bar Con dant, referred for appropriate action a copy of the letter and af davits to then
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo.
In turn, then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez led with the
Court an Administrative Matter for Agenda, recommending in relation to Atty. Barrios,
Jr., as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

5. The Of ce of the Bar Con dant be FURNISHED with a copy of the letter-
note and its attachments so that it may conduct its own investigation in the
matter with respect to the actuations of Atty. Ricardo Barrios, Jr. 8

xxx xxx xxx

In the resolution dated October 21, 1998, the Court approved the
recommendations, 9 and directed the Of ce of the Bar Con dant to investigate the
actuations of the respondent, and to render its report and recommendation thereon.
Proceedings of the OBC
Only the respondent appeared during the hearing before the OBC. Denying the
charges against him, he sought the dismissal of the complaint and re-af rmed the
contents of his comment. Despite notice, the complainants did not appear before the
OBC. However, the complainants and the respondent had testi ed during the
administrative hearing involving Judge Dizon, Jr. before Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as the Investigating Justice. Also testifying thereat were the
complainants' witnesses, namely: Allan Rafols, Daisy Rafols and Larry Sevilla.
A. Evidence for the Complainants
The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in General Santos City, wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of
sale. Civil Case No. 6209 was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC, presided by Judge
Dizon, Jr. The complainants were represented by the respondent, paying to him
P15,000.00 as acceptance fee. ADCIca

On December 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., the respondent visited the complainants at
their residence and informed complainant Manuel that the judge handling their case
wanted to talk to him. The respondent and Manuel thus went to the East Royal Hotel's
coffee shop where Judge Dizon, Jr. was already waiting. The respondent introduced
Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their case was pending in his sala. The
judge likewise said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success
up to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver P150,000.00 to him. As he had no
money at that time, Manuel told the judge that he would try to produce the amount. The
judge then stated that he would wait for the money until noon of that day. Thus, Manuel
left the coffee shop together with the respondent, who instructed Manuel to come up
with the money before noon because the judge badly needed it. The two of them went
to a lending institution, accompanied by Allan Rafols, but Manuel was told there that
only P50,000.00 could be released the next day. From the lending institution, they went
to the complainants' shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allan's wife, who offered to withdraw
P20,000.00 from her savings account.

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 On their way to the bank, Manuel, Allan and Ditas dropped off the respondent at
the hotel for the latter to assure Judge Dizon, Jr. that the money was forthcoming.
Afterwards, Ditas and Manuel withdrew P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 from their
respective bank accounts, and went back to the hotel with the cash. There, they saw the
judge and his driver, who beckoned to them to go towards the judge's Nissan pick-up
then parked along the highway in front of the hotel. Manuel alighted from his car and
approached the judge. Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who told
Manuel after asking about the amount that it was not enough. Thereafter, Manuel
entered the hotel's coffee shop and informed the respondent that he had already
handed the money to the judge.
On December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent again visited the
complainants. He was on board the judge's Nissan pick-up driven by the judge's driver.
The respondent relayed to the complainants the message that the judge needed the
balance of P100,000.00 in order to complete the construction of his new house in time
for the reception of his daughter's wedding. However, the complainants managed to
raise only P80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that same day.
On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called up the complainants' residence and
instructed their son to request his parents to return his call, leaving his cell phone
number. When Manuel returned the call the next day, the judge instructed Manuel to see
him in his of ce. During their meeting in his chambers, the judge demanded the balance
of P30,000.00. Manuel clari ed to the judge that his balance was only P20,000.00 due
to the previous amount given being already P80,000.00. The judge informed him that
the amount that the respondent handed was short. Saying that he badly needed the
money, the judge insisted on P30,000.00, and even suggested that the complainants
should borrow in order to raise that amount.
On January 22, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. called the complainants to inquire whether
the P30,000.00 was ready for pick up. After Manuel replied that he was ready with the
amount, the judge asked him to wait for 20 minutes. The judge and his driver later
arrived on board his Nissan pick-up. Upon instructions of the judge's driver, the
complainants followed the Nissan pick-up until somewhere inside the Doña Soledad
Estate, Espina, General Santos City. There, the judge alighted and approached the
complainants and shook their hands. At that point, Manuel handed P30,000.00 to the
judge. The judge then told Manuel that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the
perpetuation of the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made should still
testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in order for the complainants to win. The
judge persuaded the complainants to give money also to that judge; otherwise, they
should not blame him for the outcome of the case. ETCcSa

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they feared
that the judge would be biased against them unless they gave in to his demands. But
when they ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about their case, they
consulted Larry Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated to Sevilla all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case. They agreed that the details should be released to
the media. The expose was published in the Newsmaker, a local newspaper.
Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made several attempts to
appease the complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion of the
money, but the complainants declined the offers.
According to the complainants, the respondent demanded P25,000.00 as his
expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City to
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 be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, the respondent requested the
complainants to borrow P60,000.00 from the bank because he wanted to redeem his
foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to give P11,000.00 to his nephew who
was due to leave for work abroad.
B. Evidence for the Respondent
In his veri ed comment dated March 22, 2006, 1 0 the respondent con rmed that
the complainants engaged him as their counsel in Civil Case No. 6209. His version
follows.
On December 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel to Judge Dizon, Jr.
inside the East Royal Hotel's coffee shop. The respondent stayed at a distance,
because he did not want to hear their conversation. Later, Manuel approached the
respondent and gave him P2,000.00. When the respondent asked what the money was
for, Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of the former's introducing the latter to
the judge. The respondent stated that Manuel did not mention what transpired between
the latter and the judge; and that the judge did not tell him (respondent) what transpired
in that conversation.
Two days later, the respondent again visited the complainants at their house in
General Santos City on board the judge's Nissan pick-up driven by the judge's driver, in
order to receive the P80,000.00 from the complainants. The amount was being
borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. Later on, the judge told the respondent
to keep P30,000.00 as a token of their friendship. After Manuel handed the P80,000.00,
the respondent and the judge's driver headed towards Davao City, where, according to
the judge's instruction, they redeemed the judge's wristwatch for P15,000.00 from a
pawnshop. The driver brought the remaining amount of P35,000.00 to the judge in his
home.
On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited the respondent at the latter's house
to ask him to execute an af davit. Declining the request at rst, the respondent relented
only because the judge became physically weak in his presence and was on the verge
of collapsing. Nonetheless, the respondent refused to notarize the document. IDcHCS

In that af davit dated January 27, 1998, 1 1 the respondent denied that Judge
Dizon, Jr. asked money from the complainants; and stated that he did not see the
complainants handing the money to the judge. He admitted that he was the one who
had requested the judge to personally collect his unpaid attorney's fees from the
complainants with respect to their previous and terminated case; and that the judge did
not ask money from the complainants in exchange for a favorable decision in their
case.
On January 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the complainants' residence,
but was surprised to nd complainant Lolita crying aloud. She informed him that the
judge was again asking an additional P30,000.00 although they had given him
P30,000.00 only the week before. She divulged that the judge had told her that their
case would surely lose because: (a) they had engaged a counsel who was mahinang
klase; (b) the judge hearing Civil Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who had
testi ed in Civil Case No. 6029 had not been presented; and (c) they would have to
spend at least P10,000.00 for said judge's accommodations in General Santos City. 1 2
On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to the house of the respondent, but
the latter was not home. The judge left a note addressed to the complainants, and
instructed the respondent's secretary to deliver the note to the complainants along with
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 a gift (imported table clock). 1 3 According to the respondent, the complainants
consistently refused to accept the gift several times; it was later stolen from his house
in Cebu City.
On February 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and gift to the
complainants, but the latter refused to receive it, telling him that they were no longer
interested to continue with the case. At the same time, the complainants assured him
that they bore no personal grudge against him, because they had a problem only with
Judge Dizon, Jr.
On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National Bureau of
Investigation Regional Of ce, Region XI, and the Philippine National Police Regional
Office, Region XI, both in Davao City, to request the investigation of the matter. 1 4
On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid Judge Dizon, Jr. a visit upon the latter's
request. In that meeting, the respondent told the judge about the refusal of the
complainants to accept the judge's gift and about their decision not to continue with
the case. 1 5
On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note to the respondent to inform him that
the judge had raised the amount that he had borrowed from the complainants. 1 6 The
judge requested the respondent to tell the complainants that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was
going to return whatever he had borrowed from them. However, the complainants
informed the respondent that he should tell the judge that they were no longer
interested in getting back the money.
The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP Regional Of ces in Davao
City of his request for assistance after Manuel mentioned to him that he (Manuel) knew
of many armed men ready at any time to help him in his problem with the judge. ECAaTS

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 15, 2008, 1 7 the OBC opined that
the administrative case against the respondent could not be dismissed on the ground
of failure to prosecute due to the complainants' failure to appear in the scheduled
hearing despite due notice.
Based on the facts already established and identi ed, as rendered in the decision
dated January 21, 2006 in Manuel Rafols and Lolita B. Rafols v. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon,
1 8 the OBC rejected the respondent's denial of any knowledge of the transaction
between his clients and the judge.
The OBC recommended:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, Jr. be SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years with a stern warning that a repetition
of similar act in the future will be dealt more severely."

Ruling of the Court

We approve and adopt the report and recommendations of the OBC, which we
nd to be fully and competently supported by the evidence adduced by the
complainants and their witnesses, but we impose the supreme penalty of disbarment,
which we believe is the proper penalty.
I

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 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disbarment and suspension
of attorneys, provides:
Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
of ce as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such of ce, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers constitute malpractice.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on

the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the
complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants
the imposition of the harsh penalty. 1 9 As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is
proved. An attorney is further presumed as an of cer of the Court to have performed
his duties in accordance with his oath. 2 0 cDHAES

Here, the complainants successfully overcame the respondent's presumed

innocence and the presumed regularity in the performance of his duties as an attorney
of the complainants. The evidence against him was substantial, and was not
contradicted.
To begin with, the respondent's denial of knowledge of the transaction between
the complainants and Judge Dizon, Jr. was not only implausible, but also
unsubstantiated. It was the respondent himself who had introduced the complainants
to the judge. His act of introducing the complainants to the judge strongly implied that
the respondent was aware of the illegal purpose of the judge in wanting to talk with the
respondent's clients. Thus, we unquali edly accept the aptness of the following
evaluation made in the OBC's Report and Recommendation, viz.:
. . . Being the Of cer of the Court, he must have known that meeting litigants
outside the court is something beyond the bounds of the rule and that it can never
be justi ed by any reason. He must have known the purpose of Judge Dizon in
requesting him to meet the complainants-litigants outside the chamber of Judge
Dizon. By his overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and
complainants-litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel, it is crystal
clear that he must have allowed himself and consented to Judge Dizon's desire to
ask money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable decision of their case
which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon. 2 1

Secondly, the respondent's insistence that he did not see the complainants' act
of handing the money to the judge is unbelievable. In his comment, the respondent even
admitted having himself received the P80,000.00 from the complainants, and having
kept P30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the instruction of the judge as a token of
the friendship between him and the judge. 2 2 The admission proved that the respondent
had known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the complainants,
and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to the judge.
Thirdly, his attempt to explain that the complainants had given the money to the
judge as a loan, far from softening our strong impression of the respondent's liability,
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 con rmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the transaction. Being the
complainants' attorney in the civil case being heard before the judge, the respondent
could not but know that for the judge to borrow money from his clients was highly
irregular and outrightly unethical. If he was innocent of wrongdoing, as he claimed, he
should have desisted from having any part in the transaction. Yet, he did not, which
rendered his explanation unbelievable. Compounding the unworthiness of his
explanation was his admission of having retained P30,000.00 of the "borrowed" money
upon the judge's instruction.
And, lastly, the OBC has pointed out that the respondent's act of requesting the
NBI Regional Of ce in Davao City to investigate was an afterthought on his part. We
agree with the OBC, for the respondent obviously acted in order to anticipate the
complainants' moves against him and the judge. To be sure, the respondent sensed
that the complainants would not simply forgive and forget the mulcting they had
suffered at the hands of the judge and their own attorney from the time that the
complainants assured him that they were no longer interested to get back their money
despite their being very angry at the judge's greed.HScCEa

Overall, the respondent' denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the
uncontradicted evidence showing that he had not only personally arranged the meeting
between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants
the judge's illegal reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted
as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. This need derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and
self-serving character, weightless in law and insuf cient to overcome the testimony of
credible witnesses on affirmative matters. 2 3
II
The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions. 2 4 The
attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain not
only legal pro ciency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing in order that the people's faith and con dence in the legal system are
ensured. 2 5 Thus, he must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with
the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times. 2 6 Any violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justi es the imposition on the attorney of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 2 7
Speci cally, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct. 2 8 Corollary to this injunction is
the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal
Profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. 2 9
The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law
Profession, which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any
personal advantage that con icted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of
his clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to "delay no man for money or
malice" and to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good delity as well to the courts as to my clients" that he made
when he took the Lawyer's Oath. 3 0 He also disobeyed the explicit command to him as
an attorney "to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval." 3 1 He conveniently ignored that the
relation between him and his clients was highly duciary in nature and of a very delicate,
exacting, and confidential character. 3 2
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 Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and de nite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and
not mere error of judgment." 3 3 Any gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional
or private capacity shows him un t to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral
character is an essential quali cation for the admission of an attorney and for the
continuance of such privilege. 3 4
The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were
conspirators against the former's own clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to
serve with utmost delity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this
administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty.
The disbarment of the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the
dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr. DISEaC

WHEREFORE , Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is disbarred.

This decision shall be entered in the records of Atty. Barrios, Jr. as a member of
the Philippine Bar.
Copies of the decision shall be furnished to the Bar Con dant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for record purposes; and to the Court Administrator, for
circulation to all courts nationwide.
SO ORDERED .
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 4-5.

2. Formerly OCA IPI No. 98-579-RTJ.
3. A.M. No. RTJ-98-1426, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 92.
4. Rollo, pp. 6-9.
5. Id., pp. 10-11.
6. Id., p. 12.
7. Id., p. 13.
8. Id., p. 86.
9. Id., p. 87.
10. Id., pp. 185-195.
11. Id., p. 199.
12. Id., p. 197.

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 13. Id., p. 202.
14. Id., pp. 204-206.
15. Id., p. 203.
16. Id.
17. Id., pp. 241-249.
18. Supra at note 3.
19. Arma v. Montevilla, A.C. No. 4829, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 1.
20. Id.
21. Rollo, pp. 247-248.
22. Id., p. 189.
23. Rafols, Jr. v. Dizon, A.M. RTJ-98-1426, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 92; Orfila v.
Arellano, A.M. Nos. P-06-2110 and P-03-1692, February 23, 2006, 482 SCRA 280; Mabini
v. Raga, A.M. No. P-06-2150, June 21, 2006, 491 SCRA 525; Re: (1) Lost Checks Issued to
the Late Roderick Roy P. Melliza, Former Clerk II, MCTC, Zaragga, Iloilo and (2) Dropping
from the Rolls of Ms. Esther T. Andres; A.M. No. 2005-26-SC, November 22, 2006; 507
SCRA 478.
24. Dumadag v. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 513.
25. Cham v. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA l.
26. Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
27. Cham v. Paita-Moya, supra at note 25.
28. Rule 1.01, which states:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

29. Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility.

30. In the Lawyer's Oath, the attorney declares that:
. . . I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
31. Rule 138, Section 20 (e), Rules of Court.

32. Barnachea v. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 1.
33. Whitson v. Atienza, A.C. No. 5535, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 10.
34. Id.

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