Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)
Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)
Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)
Sir/Madam,
1. I have the honour to inform you that the ICAO Council, at the seventh meeting of its
212th Session on 10 November 2017, approved the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP), a copy of which
is provided as an Attachment to this letter.
2. The GASeP and its Roadmap provide guidance for the entities responsible at the national
level for the implementation of the Plan. As such, I would request your Administration to share the GASeP and
Roadmap with those entities within your State and to consider organizing your implementation action through
your National Civil Aviation Security Committee or similar coordinating body. You are also encouraged to
establish national roadmaps for GASeP implementation.
3. While acknowledging the ambitious nature of the GASeP, the implementation of the action
items will require a concerted effort from all States, international and regional organizations, and industry,
with the support of the ICAO Secretariat, in accordance with Assembly Resolution A39-18 (Consolidated
statement on continuing policies related to aviation security) and the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2309 on countering terrorist threats to civil aviation.
Fang Liu
Secretary General
Enclosure:
Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)
ATTACHMENT to State letter AS8/1.10-18/6
November 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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(ii)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In September 2016, delegates at the 39th Session of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Assembly agreed that there was a need for the accelerated development of a Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) as
a future aviation security policy and programming framework. The GASeP, which replaces the ICAO Comprehensive
Aviation Security Strategy (ICASS), addresses the needs of States and industry in guiding all aviation security
enhancement efforts through a set of internationally agreed priority actions, tasks and targets.
The GASeP provides the foundation for States, industry, stakeholders and ICAO to work together with the
shared and common goal of enhancing aviation security worldwide and achieving five key priority outcomes, namely:
a) enhance risk awareness and response; b) develop security culture and human capability; c) improve technological
resources and innovation; d) improve oversight and quality assurance; and e) increase cooperation and support.
The Plan calls for action at the global, regional and national levels, as well by industry and all other
stakeholders, in raising the level of implementation of Annex 17 – Security; intensified efforts are also required for ICAO
to enhance its capacity to support States in this regard.
Central to the Plan is a Roadmap that outlines 94 tasks, accompanying 32 actions under 5 key priority
outcomes, which set out objectives until the 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly in 2019. A set of indicators and target
dates also accompanies each individual task. This Roadmap is a “living” document and shall be periodically reviewed
and adjusted as necessary, taking into account new and emerging aviation security threats.
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(iii)
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND
1.1.1. The air transport industry plays a significant role in the global economy. Secure air transport service
enhances connectivity in trade, tourism, political and cultural links between States. Annual international air passenger
traffic is expected to reach 6 billion by 2030 from about 3.3 billion today, while air cargo transported is expected to
increase to 125 million tonnes from 50 million. With air traffic projected to increase significantly in the future, there is a
need for a planning framework at the international, regional and national levels to manage growth in a safe, secure and
efficient manner. Aviation promotes global economic growth, and is a critical enabler for economic progress and
development in many States. Security incidents have an obvious impact on the travelling public, especially when
incidents result in injury and loss of life, but also by affecting confidence in air travel and by disruption to travel and trade.
By ensuring the security of the aviation system, States help to establish public confidence in their aviation system and
provide a strong foundation for trade and tourism globally.
1.1.2. The current threat and risk environment demands that aviation security remain among the highest of
priorities for States and the global international community. This was highlighted by United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolution 2309 (2016) – Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts: Aviation security
adopted in September 2016 (UNSCR 2309), which calls upon ICAO, States and stakeholders to comply with their treaty
obligations and international responsibilities as they relate to aviation security, and by ICAO Assembly Resolution
A39-18 (Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security), in accordance with
international law.
1.2. PURPOSE
1.2.1. The GASeP incorporates the key aspects and themes from UNSCR 2309 (2016) and ICAO Assembly
Resolution A39-18, in particular: the need for effective, risk-based measures that are assessed regularly to reflect the
evolving threat picture; ensuring that measures are effectively implemented on the ground on a sustainable basis;
resource allocation and the promotion of a culture of security; and establishing effective national oversight of aviation
security systems.
1.2.2. The global nature of aviation means that States are dependent on the effectiveness of each other’s
aviation security systems to provide a common secure aviation environment. Despite enhancements to the security
system, terrorists continue to view civil aviation as an attractive target and continue to exploit real or perceived
vulnerabilities in the international civil aviation system, with the aim of causing substantial loss of life, economic damage
and disruption to connectivity and trade between States.
1.2.3. The GASeP provides guidance for priority setting at the international, regional and State levels, creates a
framework within which ICAO, States and stakeholders can work together to meet shared objectives, supports ICAO’s
No Country Left Behind initiative to address common challenges, and guides efforts to jointly further enhance aviation
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security.
1.2.4. Target-based planning complements international conventions and resolutions, as well as the framework of
Annexes and guidance material by establishing security priorities with tangible and measurable outcomes.
1.3.1. ICAO uses information from the following sources to assess the risk facing international civil aviation:
ICAO Acts of Unlawful Interference Database; risk assessments carried out by the Aviation Security Panel’s Working
Group on Threat and Risk (refer to the ICAO Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement); and analysis of audit
findings by the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP). These same sources, also used in identifying priorities in
the GASeP, indicate that air transport is challenged by a number of security risks, as evidenced by the following:
a) sixty-nine acts of unlawful interference were recorded between 2011 and 2016. Twenty-one out of 69
incidents had fatalities (a total of 884 deaths). Facility attacks represented the highest number with 24
incidents (or 32 per cent), followed by unlawful seizure with 18 incidents (or 26 per cent), sabotage
with 15 incidents (or 22 per cent) and other acts with 12 incidents (or 17 per cent);
b) as the weapon of choice in attempts to attack civil aviation and airport infrastructure, improvised
explosive devices (or IEDs) and person-borne IEDs continue to pose a significant threat. Screening
regimes play a critical role to deter and detect threat items in the aviation security system but can be
undermined by ineffective implementation in practice;
c) attacks on the landside areas of airports have highlighted a growing threat to locations where
members of the public and passengers circulate with minimal restrictions and congregate at
predictable times. ICAO assesses landside threats to be credible and real; and
d) USAP data confirms critical improvements are urgently needed in the implementation of Annex 17, to
address the following gaps: inadequate access control measures to Security Restricted Areas (SRAs);
deficiencies in the implementation of airport personnel identification and vehicle pass systems; lack of
airport-level human and technical resources for aviation security; ineffective screening and security
controls of non-passengers granted access to the SRA.
1.3.2. The above challenges establish a need for more aviation security awareness, deploying more appropriate
resources, stronger political will, improved security culture, and increased quality control and oversight, amongst others.
1.3.3. As terrorists find innovative ways to target the system, States must continue to address the risks identified
above, while also attending to complex issues such as cybersecurity, remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), and risks
arising from conflict zones.
1.4.1 Without question, enhancing aviation security globally will bring financial and other economic benefits. The
economic and financial cost to States, airports, airlines, and stakeholders of terror attacks and security breaches can be
very significant, and the loss of human lives cannot be measured. On the financial and economic side, some recent
Chapter 1. Introduction 1-3
attacks have caused losses as high as US $4.47 billion as a result of close to two weeks suspension of airport and
1
airline operations, repair to infrastructure, and other losses suffered from terror attacks. The terror attacks of
11 September 2001, where terrorists hijacked four civil aircraft to commit the attacks, led to total estimated losses of
2
around US $2 trillion. Other repercussions may also be suffered as a result of poor aviation security standards and
measures, including the loss of public and investor confidence, and effects on tourism, trade and connectivity.
1.4.2 The GASeP therefore aims to foster amongst ICAO, States, industry, and stakeholders a greater
commitment to enhancing global aviation security. With all stakeholders fulfilling their responsibilities set out in the
Roadmap, the sustained level of secure and safe civil aviation operations will prevent stakeholders from suffering human,
economic, financial and other losses. A strengthened global aviation system will provide a conducive environment for
global economic growth and development that will benefit all States.
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OBJECTIVE
2.1.1. The objective of establishing the GASeP is to help ICAO, States and stakeholders enhance the
effectiveness of global aviation security. The GASeP therefore seeks to unite the international aviation security
community and inspire action in this direction, taking into account that the threats and risks faced by the civil aviation
community continue to evolve. It is also intended to achieve the shared and common goal of enhancing aviation security
worldwide and to help States come together to fulfil the commitments set out in UNSCR 2309 (2016) and relevant ICAO
Assembly Resolutions.
2.1.2. The overarching principles that support the GASeP’s objective are:
• No Country Left Behind. To ensure that the implementation of security SARPs are urgently
undertaken globally so that all States have access to the significant socio-economic benefits of safe,
secure and reliable air transport.
• Effective implementation and compliance. Appropriate measures that are applied to ensure
consistent outcomes, coupled with a robust security quality control and oversight system.
• Sustainability. Utilizing measures that are proportionate and realistic in the long term, duly
coordinated with entities from other sectors (e.g. aviation safety, air navigation, facilitation).
• Cooperation and information sharing. Strengthen cooperation and sharing of information between
and amongst States and stakeholders. To ensure that the principles of cooperation defined in bilateral
and/or multilateral air services agreements, recognition of equivalent security measures, and focus on
security outcomes continue to be the basis for international cooperation.
• Security culture and human capacity development. Establish a strong and robust security culture
and develop human capital, skill and competency.
• Innovation. Encourage States and stakeholders to devise, establish and share new and innovative
ways to implement security policies and measures.
• Identifying, understanding and managing risk. Enhance understanding of aviation security risks,
and take appropriate and effective action.
2.2. APPLICATION
2.2.1. Continued improvement in States’ effective implementation of Annex 17 is paramount to assure the
security and regularity of air transport. The GASeP applies to ICAO, its Member States and stakeholders to guide
effective implementation and compliance efforts, promote accountability for these security responsibilities, and enhance
the effectiveness of global aviation security.
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2.2.2. The Roadmap in Appendix A contains many tasks for States to implement and it is acknowledged that
States have limited resources with which to operate. When implementing these tasks, States should consider where
their greatest areas of risk are and prioritize the tasks listed in Appendix A accordingly. Information to assist with this
prioritization can be obtained from the ICAO Global Risk Context Statement, USAP audit results and feedback from
other States that conduct last port of departure assessments.
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Chapter 3
PRIORITY OUTCOMES
In order to make rapid progress on its core objective of enhancing the effectiveness of global aviation security, and
improving the practical and sustainable implementation of preventive aviation security measures, the GASeP identifies
five key priority outcomes where ICAO, States and stakeholders should focus their urgent attention, resources and
efforts. These priorities derive from the main challenges that may face member states in delivering this objective. They
are:
a) Enhance risk awareness and response. Understanding risk is essential for policies and measures
that are effective, proportionate and sustainable. Undertaking risk assessments will help to identify
gaps and vulnerabilities, which can then be urgently addressed in the most practical way possible, and
with optimal use of resources.
b) Develop security culture and human capability. The promotion of effective security culture is
critical to achieve good security outcomes. A strong security culture must be developed from the top
management across and within every organization. The existence of a well-trained, motivated and
professional work force is a critical prerequisite for effective aviation security.
c) Improve technological resources and foster innovation. Promoting and applying better
technological solutions and innovative techniques can provide the tools for enhancing security
effectiveness while ensuring operational efficiency.
d) Improve oversight and quality assurance. Effective quality control and oversight processes
globally, nationally, and locally are critical in delivering sustained effective aviation security.
e) Increase cooperation and support. Increasing collaboration between and within States will enable
the key security objectives to be achieved more quickly and efficiently.
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Chapter 4
PRIORITY ACTIONS
In order to deliver the five priority outcomes, consistent with the overarching principles, the following priority actions
should form the basis for the GASeP. Some require action at the global level (which may include delivery by ICAO
1
through its Secretariat and/or expert groups ); while some call on action from States and industry at national and local
levels.
1.1 Keep global threat picture under regular review and enhance dissemination of threat and risk advice.
1.3 Review relevant ICAO Annex 17 provisions and guidance for highest risk areas.
1.4 Up-to-date framework established in each State for conducting national and local risk assessments.
1.5 Ensure effective internal mechanisms for communicating information/assessments to those who
need it.
1.7 Review personnel security measures taking into account risk advice and guidance on insider threat.
1. Including but not limited to the Aviation Security Panel and its Working Groups, which comprise: Working Group on Threat and
Risk (WGTR), Working Group on Guidance Material (WGGM), Working Group on Air Cargo Security (WGACS), Working Group on
Training (WGT), Working Group on Innovation (WGIAS) Working Group on Annex 17 (WGA17), Secretariat Study Group (SSG)
on the Universal Security Audit Programme.
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2.5 Revise ICAO training material and guidance, focusing on core aviation security skills/needs.
3.6 Develop and improve the efficiency of certification processes and operational use of security
equipment, including human factors.
3.7 Consider and evaluate the use of passenger information to inform and assist aviation security.
4.1 Develop regional USAP-CMA targets on the levels of effective implementation of security measures.
4.2 Coordinate efforts between States, stakeholders and ICAO on audits and peer review.
4.3 Develop and implement rectification plans at national and local levels to address gaps and
vulnerabilities identified.
4.4 Enhance USAP-CMA to provide reliable information regarding the effective implementation of aviation
security measures.
5.1 Contribute resources to ICAO, States and stakeholders for auditing/peer review.
5.4 Ensure all national entities concerned are actively involved in implementation of measures.
5.5 Identify and utilize new funding sources (e.g. UN, World Bank, States, industry, etc) in addition to
existing funding sources.
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Chapter 5
5.1. IMPLEMENTATION
The GASeP is applicable to all ICAO Member States, industry and stakeholders. Each entity is encouraged to adopt the
recommended priorities and targets contained in the GASeP based on the Roadmap, which outlines priority outcomes,
priority actions, and associated tasks, and indicators and target dates, to help ICAO, States and stakeholders focus and
work towards implementing effective measures and actions to achieve the Objective of Enhancing Global Aviation
Security.
Different data sources are used to measure and monitor the performance of States. Data analysis is conducted through
USAP audits and validation missions, and reports by the Regional Offices, including reports of existing Regional AVSEC
Groups to ICAO Headquarters. The ICAO Secretariat will conduct a review of the GASeP as and when appropriate in
coordination with the AVSEC Panel, on the progress of ICAO and Member States moving towards achieving the targets.
ICAO will also undertake status updates of the targets and the intended deadlines, as outlined in the GASeP. These will
include identifying areas where States may need assistance to meet the targets through aviation security training and
capacity building assistance, and other relevant efforts, and update the Roadmap where necessary, amend or adjust
any of the implementing actions where practical, and add actions to address new and emerging threats as they arise
and as needed..
All aviation stakeholders need to be involved in the effort to continually improve aviation security. The GASeP provides a
common frame of reference for all stakeholders and identifies the roles played by ICAO, States and industry. In addition
to the development of SARPs, ICAO supports the implementation of the GASeP by providing resources, implementation
tools and assistance via different programmes and initiatives, such as the No Country Left Behind initiative.
5.4.1. ICAO will have an important global leadership and monitoring role in the implementation and coordination
of the GASeP. This includes:
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5.4.2. States and industry also have important roles to undertake towards the implementation and effectiveness
of the GASeP, recognizing the coordinating role States have on tasks attributed to industry. It is important that States
and other stakeholders demonstrate year-on-year improvement in the implementation of operational standards. The
overall cumulative improvements to aviation security globally will enhance the security, safety, facilitation and operations
of the international civil aviation system.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
6.1. CONCLUSION
The GASeP will bring together ICAO, States, industry, and other stakeholders in a holistic and coordinated effort to
address current and emerging global aviation security challenges. Security is a critical pillar for the growth and
sustainability of the global aviation industry. It is envisaged that the GASeP will serve as an important document to assist
all stakeholders to strengthen international collaboration in aviation security, including the areas of harmonizing security
principles, approaches and measures; information sharing; innovation and better use of security technology, and in
aviation security training and capacity development. The GASeP will also move ICAO, States, industry and all
stakeholders towards fulfilling the intent and direction of UNSCR 2309 (2016), and towards enhancing the level of global
aviation security for the benefit of all States, as well as contributing to the wider benefit of strengthening economic
growth and development across the world.
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APPENDIX A
Priority 1.1 Keep global threat picture under regular review and enhance dissemination of threat and risk advice.
Actions 1.2 Improve training on risk assessment.
(PAs) 1.3 Review relevant ICAO Annex 17 provisions and guidance for highest risk areas.
1.4 Up-to-date framework established in each State for conducting national and local risk assessments.
1.5 Ensure effective internal mechanisms for communicating information/assessments to those who need it.
1.6 Review current screening arrangements in light of national risk assessment.
1.7 Review personnel security measures taking into account risk advice and guidance on insider threat.
1.8 Ensure holistic aviation perspective and appropriate impact assessments.
Actions
Global PA 1.A Identify and address cybersecurity Compliance with relevant Annex 17 On-going
1.1 threats to civil aviation’s critical provisions.
infrastructure, data and information and
communication technology systems through ICAO survey/questionnaire.
collaboration using horizontal, cross-cutting
and functional approaches to achieve an
acceptable and commensurate cyber
resilience capability on a global level. It
should involve air navigation,
communication, surveillance, aircraft
operations and airworthiness and other
relevant disciplines to ensure the safety and
security of civil aviation operations in full
alignment with ICAO’s Global Air Navigation
Plan (GANP) and Global Aviation Safety
Plan (GASP).
1.B Monitor and address emerging and Compliance with relevant Annex 17 On-going
evolving risks, such as cyber security, provisions.
remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS),
and risks arising from conflict zones. ICAO survey/questionnaire.
PA 1.C When considering aviation security Coordinated provisions at ICAO level (e.g. On-going
App A-1
App A-2 Appendix A. Global Aviation Security Plan roadmap
1.8 risks and measures, ensure appropriate cross-references on horizontal topics such as
holistic consideration of the aviation sector. cyber security)
Where relevant, early and appropriate
coordination with aviation safety, air Appropriate documentation of impact
navigation and facilitation experts to take assessment.
place at global and national levels.
Effective coordination channels established
and implemented.
States and 1.D States’ authorities work together with Definition of responsibilities in NCASP and
Industry industry to most appropriately and Airports’ Security Programs
effectively allocate responsibilities for the
delivery of measures to counter the threat Attendance of responsible parties at Airport
from landside attacks. Security Committees
PA
On-going
1.1
Evidence of implementation of measures as
defined in Airport Security Program
Industry PA 1.H Enhance and promote global Establishment of appropriate forums; usage 2018
1.5 platforms for sharing of security information levels.
with, from and between industry.
ICAO PA 1.I Develop strategy for increasing States’ ICAO survey/questionnaire. 2018
1.1 awareness of and access to the ICAO
Global Risk Context Statement (RCS),
including through Regional offices and
organizing regular seminars.
1.J Encourage use of the ICAO Aviation Substantial increase in use of PoC Network; 2018
Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network to conduct annual test on the PoC Network
Appendix A. Global Aviation Security Plan roadmap App A-3
share information.
1.K Assess the effectiveness and usability, Improvements to PoC system incorporated 2019
in consultation with States, of the PoC
system in its existing state in order to
identify what is working well and any areas
for potential improvement including
information security matters
PA 1.L Establish team of volunteer experts Number of volunteers and from across As
1.2 available to provide risk management various regions. necessary
training. but no less
than one
workshop
yearly
1.M Deliver revised workshop on risk Conduct the workshop to train participants on 1 workshop
management in every region. risk management in each region; obtain yearly
feedback on courses and areas for
improvement
1.N Identify key staff for States in greatest Key AVSEC personnel from State authorities, Five
need of risk assessment training and including the Appropriate Authority, and key activities
conduct outreach activities to promote industry agencies (e.g. airlines, airports, etc) globally per
awareness and understanding of risk to undergo risk assessment training. year
assessment among key staff.
ICAO PA 1.O Identify key Standards for detecting AVSECP/29 report to Council. 2018
1.3 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) carried
by passengers and non-passengers having
access to SRAs, and conduct review of their
adequacy and levels of effective
implementation.
PA 1.R Identify priority States in each region Overall level of effective implementation of Priority
1.4 in need of assistance risk management and Annex 17 Standard 3.1.3. States
offer support. identified in
early 2017
PA 1.V ICAO to issue State letter on insider Level of responses to State letter. 2018
1.7 threat.
Actions
Global PA 2.A Review or develop training material to • Increased awareness and incident 2018
2.1 teach security culture and its principles. reporting
2.D Develop and enhance joint training New and updated AVSEC programs
programmes. developed and delivered.
PA 2.G Increase management oversight and Measured through National Civil Aviation On-going
2.2 leading by example. Security Quality Control Programme (NQCP).
ICAO PA 2.O Define, revise and enhance guidance Materials reviewed. 2019
2.1 on Security Culture as required.
2.Q Identify optimum model and delivery Table produced within relevant training
plan for new global professional material.
qualifications.
Actions
States PA 3.A Develop a package on conducting Number of States conducting operational trials On-going
3.2 operational trials of innovative techniques. and sharing information on such trials.
PA 3.D Establish detailed threat item Greater information sharing between States On-going
3.4 identification for each type of security equipment information, requirements and
equipment. specifications.
States and PA 3.I States and industry to conduct ICAO survey/questionnaire. On-going
industry 3.5 outreach activities to promote the use of
appropriate technology, including human
factors considerations.
ICAO PA 3.N Improve and update AVSECPaedia. • Number of States signing up to On-going
3.1 AVSECPaedia.
3.O Promote use of AVSECPaedia
through State letter, communications and • Number of States signing up to edit
incentives. AVSECPaedia.
Priority 4.1 Develop regional USAP-CMA targets on the levels of effective implementation of security measures.
Action (PA) 4.2 Coordinate efforts between States, stakeholders and ICAO on audits and peer review.
4.3 Develop and implement rectification plans at national and local levels to address gaps and vulnerabilities
identified.
4.4 Enhance USAP-CMA to provide reliable information regarding the effective implementation of aviation security
measures.
4.5 Enhance training and guidance on quality assurance.
Actions
Global PA 4.A Each region to develop USAP-CMA targets Targets and results to be reviewed every 2018
4.1 on effective implementation of security measures triennium during the Assembly.
on the ground, including regions where the
USAP-CMA is conducted through other
established cooperative arrangements.
PA 4.B Develop processes and procedures to Development of mechanism for the 2018
4.2 conduct quality control (QC) and coordinate sharing of QC information between
efforts between stakeholders within a State and government agencies and industry on
with other States on auditing and peer review peer review audit activities.
activities. This could include tools, models and
QC training.
PAs 4.C Develop best practices on conducting Development of mechanism for the 2019
4.2 quality control and coordinate efforts between sharing of QC information between
& States, stakeholders on auditing and peer review government agencies and industry on
4.5 activities. This could include tools, models and peer review audit activities.
QC training.
States PA 4.D States to establish a framework to work Enhancements and amendments to 2018
4.3 with other States and industry to rectify gaps and national oversight systems as evidenced
implement immediate response measures. by results from ICAO and State’s
surveys/questionnaires.
4.E Analyse national quality control data to Development and implementation of 2018
identify implementation issues that are systemic corrective action plans.
and require attention at a foundational level.
Industry PA 4.F Industry partners to work with States to Consideration of the IATA Operational 2019
4.3 assist with the development of action plans and Safety Audit (IOSA) and IATA Safety
identify possible channels of assistance, training Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO)
or knowledge transfer. results by States.
ICAO PA 4.G Update of the Aviation Security Oversight Update completed 2018-2019
4.3 Manual ICAO Doc 10047 to possibly include
new procedures for state oversight and effective
preventive measures aimed at preventing
noncompliance with mandatory aviation security
requirements based on a consolidation of best
practices
App A-10 Appendix A. Global Aviation Security Plan roadmap
ICAO PA 4.H Restructure the reporting of USAP-CMA New format for the annual reporting of 2018
4.4 results to provide a more meaningful USAP-CMA results.
understanding of the level of implementation
across the range of areas audited.
4.I Study and consider how to effect the limited Review of the level of disclosure of 2018
disclosure of USAP-CMA results in an USAP-CMA results, tabled to Council in
appropriate manner. 2018 and to Assembly at 2019.
4.J Review and revise the USAP-CMA. Review USAP-CMA objectives, 2018-2019
methodology and Protocol Questions
and analyse USAP data to make
recommendations.
4.K Consider how to make more efficient use of Consider the deployment of trained and 2018
scarce resources and manpower in USAP-CMA. competent regional aviation security
officers to conduct USAP-CMA ground
audits to maximize the limited resources
within the Secretariat for more effective
and efficient use of resources.
4.L Analyse national quality control data to Monitor and review States’ corrective On-going
identify implementation issues that are systemic action plans and implementation.
and require attention at a foundational level.
PA 4.M Develop, review and revise guidelines and Review USAP-CMA report with State’s 2018-2019
4.5 guidance materials to help States to regularly Appropriate Authority following an -audit
assess the effectiveness of their national to identify gaps in QC where audit results
programmes. show the need for assistance.
Priority 5.1 Contribute resources to ICAO, States and stakeholders for auditing/peer review.
Actions 5.2 Provide increased assistance (where possible) for capacity development.
(PA) 5.3 Commitment to enhance effective implementation by recipient States.
5.4 Ensure all national entities concerned are actively involved in implementation of measures.
5.5 Identify and utilize new funding sources (e.g. UN, World Bank, States, industry, etc).
5.6 Enhance ICAO’s capability and effectiveness in delivering assistance.
Actions
Global 5.A Support and encourage all stakeholders to Needs, priorities and funding sources 2018
(PAs 5.1 conduct peer review, transfer knowledge, or share identified.
to 5.6) knowledge on security processes, procedures and
technologies.
5.B Provide funding for assistance activities carried Develop peer-to-peer reviews, workshops and 2018
out by States/industry. training.
States 5.C Publicize UNSC Resolution 2309 (2016) and ICAO survey/questionnaire Ongoing
(PAs 5.1 GASeP’s objectives/Roadmap to local entities
to 5.6) involved in AVSEC
5.D States that have resources to provide Model/template accountability framework 2018
assistance commit to the following: regarding roles and responsibilities of donor
recipients of assistance programmes.
– long-term engagement;
Industry 5.F Enhance capacity to provide peer to peer Industry associations develop peer-to-peer 2018
(PAs 5.1, knowledge transfer, review and audits. reviews, workshops, seminars and training
and 5.2) events.
ICAO 5.G Ensure that the ICAO strategy for promoting Mapping of donor capabilities. 2018 / 2019
(PAs 5.2, and facilitating targeted assistance includes
5.4, 5.5 and establishment of an information and coordination Develop needs assessment manual.
5.6) mechanism (e.g. Clearing House) to promote more
effective and efficient capacity building and includes Risk-based priority-setting framework and
elements such as: specific tools.
5.I Develop new ICAO strategy for promoting and New strategy approved by ICAO leadership. 2019
facilitating targeted capacity development linked to
appropriate conditions, commitment and assessment
tools.
5.J Explore opportunities for increased short-term Report on a strategy for potential short-term 2018
subject-matter expert (SME) deployments to ICAO in deployment of SMEs.
order to close the SME gaps.
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