Intro To Law Cases Finals
Intro To Law Cases Finals
Intro To Law Cases Finals
August 1, 2007
Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for
grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra
first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiance Irene Moje introduced respondent to
him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read I
love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall. He also noticed that Irene habitually went home
very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan,
Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April
22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her and the
Object 1
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of
his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No.
71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together
with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.
Held: Lawyers oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning
he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be
convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of
Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, Any husband who shall keep a mistress in
a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that Marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer
has sworn to uphold. Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361 ENTITLED
"PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO C. BARROZO"
FORMER ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR JOSELITO C. BARROZO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C. Barrozo (respondent) is
taken up by this Court motu proprio by virtue of its power to discipline members of the bar under
Section 11 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Factual Antecedent
Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambasa Blg. 222 which were assigned to respondent as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City,
Pangasinan. According to Valeriano, respondent told her that he would resolve the cases in her favor in
exchange for 20,000.00. hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to report the
matter. The Regional State Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), who, after being told of respondents demand, immediately planned an entrapment operation.
During the operation conducted of February 15, 2005, respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI
agents receiving the amount of 20,000.00 from Valeriano.
As a result, a case for direct bribery3 under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code was
filed against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. The case, however, was later
on indorsed to the Sandiganbayan as respondent was occupying a position with a salary grade 27 or
higher.
After finding the existence of all the elements4 of the crime, the Sandiganbayan, in a Decision5 dated
March 17, 2011, found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery and sentence him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prison
correctional maximum, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prison mayor
medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of 60,000.00. in addition, it imposed upon him the penalty of
special temporary disqualification.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 (MR) but was denied in a Resolution7 dated
September 28, 2011.
Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari8 before this Court but was denied in a
Resolution9 dated December 14, 2011 on the ground that the Petition failed to sufficiently show that
the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in its challenged issuances as to warrant the exercise
of the Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Respondent thrice move for reconsideration.10 the
first two MRs were denied,11 while the third one was ordered expunged from the records.12
Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment13 was issued stating that the Courts Resolution of denial had
already become final and executor on August 16, 2012.
In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter14 dated in August 14, 2013
from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating that its client in Hong Kong received a letter from the
Philippines signed by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for long service payment from the employers
of domestic helper Anita G. Calub who passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and
discovering that said person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it
if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law.
Prompted by Wat & Co.s letter, the OBC inquired from the Department of Justice (DOJ) whether
respondent is still connected thereat.15 in reply, the DOJ informed OBC that respondent had already
resigned from his position effective May 3, 2005.16
On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was indeed convicted of
direct bribery by final judgment and that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment.
In view of the foregoing and considering that respondents conviction is a ground for disbarment from
the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Court through a Resolution17
dated December 11, 2013 required respondent to comment on why he should not be
suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.
In his Comment18 respondent identified the issue in this case as whether he can engage in the practice
of law despite his conviction. He then argued that he did not engage in the practice of law as his act of
signing the claim letter does not constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any
monetary consideration, but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no
payment involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between him and the claimants. This
therefore negates practice of the law on his part.
Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up with its February 20,
2015 Report and Recommendation19 recommending the disbarment of respondent.
Our Ruling
The court adopts the OBCs recommendation.
It must first be clarified that the issue in this case is not what respondent essentially argued about in his
Comment, i.e., whether his act of signing the claim letter constitutes practice of law. As aptly stated by
the OBC in its recommendation and viewed from proper perspective the real issue here is whether
respondent should be suspended or disbarred by reason of his conviction of the crime of direct bribery.
Hence, the Court finds respondents comment to be totally without merit as he veered away, whether
wittingly or unwittingly, from the crux of the controversy in this case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment
of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondents
conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a
crime that involves moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been
"done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [it must involve] an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."20
In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa,21 the Court already had the occasion to answer the same question posed in
this case, viz:
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a will disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority [to do so]. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Xxxx
[T]he crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,22 we
ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a
promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties
which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also the fact that the offender takes advantage of
his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary o the accepted rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.23
Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a ground for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney.
The Court is mindful that a lawyers conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not
automatically call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment since it may, in its
discretion, choose to impose the less severe penalty of suspension. As held, the determination of
whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.24 here, however, the circumstances surrounding the case constrain the Court
to impose the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the OBC.
It must be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime respondent was an assistant public
Prosecutor of the City of Dagupan. His act therefore of extorting money from a party to a case handled
by him does not only violate the requirement that cases must be decided based on the merits of the
parties respective evidence but also lessens the peoples confidence in the rule of law. Indeed
Respondents conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.1wphi1 Lawyers in public office are expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard
of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice,25
Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath as a government
official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his qualification as a lawyer, respondent
must be disbarred from his office as an attorney.
As a final note, it is well to state that:
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable lawyers in whom
courts and [the public at large] may repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and
vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to rid [the]
profession of odious members.26
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is herby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of the Decision be attached to his personal records
and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
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NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
BACK
SERVICES OFFERED:
In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such
calling cards.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro
Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should
not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangans clients, Atty.
Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in
the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law office. Through Labianos
actions, Atty. Tolentinos law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more favorable
result.
Labianos calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance legal
actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to
the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the
lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may
take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided
fidelity to the clients cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states w/ financial assistance, was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal
actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and direct
hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate, for all the
infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme Court for one year.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral
character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on
6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment,
filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan,
Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76
of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law
studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable
future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife
(Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he
declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from
taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in
filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral
character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and
"abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said
"Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was
"legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and
declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar
examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was
"single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my
status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He
further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
"Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's
Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and
communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed
Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for
Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me
assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the
affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to
his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended
me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his
wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with
the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter
addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating,
among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be
yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually
void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum
cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the
solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were
not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything
more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-
pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go
to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear
on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who
has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to
disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the
reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of
the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
(5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because
they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he
honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the
recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed
to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making
inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite
suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's
lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was
"single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be
made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had
been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only
because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage
to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit.
Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the
requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code
have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in
Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph
1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings
before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p.
21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to
admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid.,
pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to
such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1),
in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab
initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as
to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it
was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant.
However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage
is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with
Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take
the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had
become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant
in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well
as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them
(Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his
actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as
an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so
aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show
that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO,
Respondent, Promulgated:
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been
transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of
Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of
the records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully,
Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals?
You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true
copy? Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the
Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be
representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified
me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been
frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me.
Complainant replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said
requirement.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on
25 September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also
moved that the case be submitted for resolution.[11] Respondent later
on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance
was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he
was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was
rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public
apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on
the next hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that
respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she
accepted.[13]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of
record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would
have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to
procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals
furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or
certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its
records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not
being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either
the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will
on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
SO ORDERED.
Attorney; aiding illegal practice of law. It has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of
the Bar misrepresented herself as respondents collaborating counsel. There was also sufficient
evidence to prove that respondent allowed Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and give
legal assistance to respondents client. This is in violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that [a] lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to
the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.
Holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of
a law office for the general practice of law. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Busmente.
A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.
Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of July 22, 1966, to file an answer. Thereafter, on
August 17, 1966, he did so, alleging as the truth of the matter that the aforesaid Affidavit of
Adjudication and Transfer was introduced in evidence only to prove the fact of such transfer of the
property in question to his client, respondent having "no hand in the making of said affidavit nor of the
petition, both of which were prepared in Pasay City." 4
On September 1, 1966, the matter was referred by us to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. Such investigation was had wherein both complainant and respondent were duly
heard. The issue in the opinion of the then Solicitor General, the Honorable Antonio Barredo, now a
member of this Court, as set forth in his report of March 18, 1968, is whether respondent "consented in
violation of his oath, to the doing of any falsehood in court."
It was admitted in said report: "If respondent had anything to do with the preparation of the Petition or
of the Affidavit of Adjudication, his participation does not appear from the evidence presented in this
case. The Petition was subscribed and sworn to in Pasay City before one Atty. A. Mendoza, while the
Affidavit was subscribed under oath in Pasay before Notary Public Ernesto V. Ventura. The foregoing
documents were posted from Pasay to the Clerk of Court, Sorsogon...." 5
It was likewise noted that respondent testified as to his being "not "very meticulous about the petition"
because there was neither private nor government opposition thereto; that if he had intended to deceive
the court by virtue of the documents, he could have told his client to answer his questions at the
cadastral hearing to conform to the controverted paragraph in the Affidavit of Adjudication concerning
the statement reproduced from the tax declaration that the decedent left no legitimate ascendants or
descendants or any other heirs except the affiant...." 6
There is this admission in the aforesaid report. Thus: "As the evidence stands, there is no apparent
causal link between the falsehood and the fact that respondent is the lawyer handling the cadastral case
at the Sorsogon end." 7 Nonetheless, while recognizing the absence of evidence that such falsehood in
the Affidavit of Adjudication could be traced to respondent, the report would hold him liable for
discretionary action as the circumstance that various estates are involved "certainly warranted a greater
exercise of diligence on respondent's part." 8
Moreover, as likewise stated therein, the fact "that he did not even bother to read the entirety of the
affidavit runs counter to respondent's inescapable duty to clear up doubts and inconsistencies." 9 For he
could have been aware of the family litigations between his client and complainant which are rooted in
successional rights...." 10 If only for the above fact then, as stated in the report, "he should precisely
have taken the bother to read the entirety of the Affidavit of Adjudication when the cadastral case was
heard on January 17, 1966...." 11
From which, in the light of the above, it was the conclusion of the then Solicitor General Antonio
Barredo, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Frine Zaballero: "If he did not, he cannot be relieved
from the consequences of his acts as a lawyer, and disclaim responsibility therefor. To allow respondent
relief from his duty is to ignore what is obvious from the nature of the litigations in which he entered
his appearance.... Actually, respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that he did not properly
inform himself of the evidence he was going to present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to
proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to confusion and
the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for Relief...." 12
It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the violation of his oath against
respondent be instituted. Such complaint was filed by the two above officials on March 18, 1968.
Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, [having] caused confusion and
prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence therein containing a false statement
inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of the family litigations between his client and
complainant herein, which are rooted in successional rights [and that] respondent's failure to discharge
his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath of office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised
Rules of Court." 13
Respondent in his answer, dated May 16, 1968, raised no issue as to the facts. He would allege in
justification however "that while it is true that the ... respondent was the counsel who appeared for the
petitioner in Cadastral Case No. 2, LRC Cadastral Record No. 869 of Sorsogon Cadastre, yet he had
nothing to do with the making of the petition and the annexes thereto attached; for the same were made
in Pasay City and that when (he) accepted to represent the petitioner in the Cadastral Case mentioned
above, there was no opposition from anybody ... not even from the Bureau of Lands nor from the
Honorable Solicitor General, making, therefore, the hearing therein a mere formality. Such being the
case, the [respondent] presented the petitioner's case on January 17, 1966, without meticulously going
over the documents, and the alleged Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was presented to show the
fact of transfer of the land described therein from the affiant to her son. The stenographic notes in that
proceeding will bear this matter out. [Respondent's] failure to notice the existence of an incorrect
statement in the said affidavit was a mere oversight. It was not [wilful], for he has not consented to the
doing of the falsity therein made, since the same was prepared by petitioner's lawyer in Pasay City; nor
did [respondent] willingly do falsehood in the hearing mentioned above; ..." 14
There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then Solicitor General
Barredo that there was nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by respondent in thus introducing in
evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned out to be false, in the preparation of
which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deception obviously cannot be
sustained.1awphil.t
Would that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The answer must be in the
negative. As was correctly pointed out in the complaint, his failure to exercise greater care did result in
the "confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit." Under the circumstances, it would be to err on,
the side of undue leniency if he would be held blameless. He had incurred liability. His fidelity to his
oath as attorney was less than entire.
Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, the way he
conducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time and
time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that
while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise
held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned.
Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case, betrays
inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter instituted
against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that he has not consented to the doing
of the falsity.
A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every
lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if courts cannot rely on the
submission as well as the representations made by lawyers, insofar as the presentation of evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this case, even without any
intent on the part of a member of the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable event did occur, he must
not be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an
offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with. The Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, through any of the district judges, is hereby directed to administer in public the reprimand
thus imposed on respondent Pedro B. Carranza. The complainant, Eduardo J. Berenguer, must be duly
informed of the date when such reprimand is to be administered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo,. J., took no part.
petitioner Nicasio I. Alcantara and his family, hereafter the Alcantaras, including one for
estafa against petitioner in the Makati Prosecutors Office docketed as I.S. No. 97-39547.
In essence, respondent Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out of 3,000,000
It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa
that respondent Ponce, shortly after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit,[4] submitted to the
It was prefaced with the quotation For every extraordinary fortune there is a great crime
The newsletter then went on to discuss SEC Case No. 2507 which, in the sur-
rejoinder affidavit, respondent Ponce described as being the forefather of all the cases he
had filed against the Alcantaras. In SEC Case No. 2507 which the Securities and
Exchange Commission en banc decided against him, Ponce accused the Alcantaras of
Ponce with the Makati Prosecutors Office[6] in connection with the aforesaid newsletter.
He claimed that: (1) the statements therein were defamatory; (2) respondent had
circulated it in the Makati Prosecutors Office and (3) the newsletter could not be
considered an annex to the sur-rejoinder because respondent had not attached it to the
On March 17, 1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued a resolution[7] finding probable cause for
libel and recommending the filing of an information[8] in court. Thereafter, the case was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled to Judge Tranquil Salvador of
Branch 63.
However, respondent Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice, who reversed the City Prosecutor in a resolution dated February 28, 2000.[9]
This reversal was based on the finding that the newsletter was a privileged
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61543. In a decision dated August 29, 2002, the CA found
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside the latters
resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal case.[12] After unsuccessfully
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 157105. However, we denied respondent Ponces
motion for extension for time to file his petition[13] as well as his subsequent motions
for reconsideration.
In the meantime, however, before CA-G.R. SP No. 61543 was decided, the Office
of the Makati City Prosecutor, in deference to the resolution of the Justice Secretary,
filed a motion to withdraw information, which the trial court granted on September 28,
2001.[14] The trial court ruled that the absence of the essential element of publicity
precluded the commission of the crime of libel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of
the withdrawal but the trial court denied the motion in an order dated March 21, 2002.
[15]
On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71189. In this case, the CA rendered the assailed decision.
The principal question for our consideration is whether or not the CA, in its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189, gravely erred in finding that Judge Salvador had not
committed grave abuse of discretion for granting the withdrawal of the information for
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,[16] has the
following elements:
(1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
(3) malice;
(4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person
and
(5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.
The factual antecedents are undisputed. The only issue is whether or not the
from libel.
It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the
presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the
inquiry. The lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of
relevancy.
In this case, a reading of the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, contrary to petitioners submission, instantly
shows that there was sufficient reference to the newsletter which justified the Justice Secretary and
respondent Judge in holding that private respondent actually intended the said article to be included as
an annex attached to said pleading and that the same was merely omitted and belatedly submitted to
Prosecutor Bautista during the preliminary investigation. Such sufficient reference is shown by the fact
that the newsletter is about SEC Case No. 2507 the very same case being discussed by private
respondent in pages 8 to 12 of his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit and hence, petitioners claim that Annex F
mentioned together with Annex E, both articles showing the devious maneuvering of petitioner in the
said case, refers to another article. And even if the supposed Exhibit F could refer also to that article So
The Public May Know, such circumstance will not exclude the subject newsletter as an intended annex
to the said pleading as in fact private respondent explicitly mentioned articles without stating that there
were only two (2) particular articles being referred or which of those articles caused to be published by
his counsel.
As the Justice Secretary opined and which position the respondent Judge adopted, the newsletter
containing the defamatory statement is relevant and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa then
under preliminary investigation. The crime of estafa involves deceit, dishonesty and other fraudulent
acts. The inclusion in the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of the newsletter discussing the alleged corporate
grabbing by petitioner will tend to support private respondents case of estafa against petitioner insofar
as such alleged corporate grabbing will highlight or manifest petitioners propensity for dishonest
dealing or fraudulent machinations. There is therefore no doubt that the subject newsletter is relevant
and pertinent to the criminal complaint for estafa, and hence the same comes within the protective
cloak of absolutely privileged communications as to exempt private respondent from liability for libel
or damages.
In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a
liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. Thus, in People vs. Aquino, our Supreme
Court has emphasized that it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally construed
to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity. The doctrine of
privileged communication has a practical purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone
other than the person to whom it has been written. There is publication if the material is communicated
to a third person. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for a
mans reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself.
Our Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her
official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to
perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount
to publication. Applying this rule by analogy to the present case, private respondents submission of the
newsletter intended as an annex to his Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit in I.S. No. 97-39547 to Prosecutor
Bautista who was then conducting the preliminary investigation in said case, does not amount to
publication for the reason that the sending of such material was made specifically for the purpose of
including the same as evidence in the preliminary investigation. That such submission was belatedly
made does not take out the material from the absolutely privileged communication rule. Prosecutor
Bautista had a legal duty to perform with respect to the subject communication, which is to consider the
same along with the other evidence submitted by private respondent as complainant in I.S. no. 97-
39547, in determining the existence of probable cause for the commission of the crime of estafa and
that petitioner as accused-defendant therein should be tried for such offense. Under the circumstances
and in the lawful exercise of private respondents right to present evidence in support of his accusations
against petitioner in the criminal complaint for estafa, We fail to see how such submission of
documentary evidence omitted from the annexes to the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit, could amount to
publication that would give rise to private respondents liability for a libel charge especially when there
is no proof of the alleged circulation of copies of the subject newsletter except to the City Prosecutors
Office of Makati wherein I.S. No. 97-39547 was then in the preliminary investigation stage. Petitioners
feeble argument that Prosecutor Bautista remains a third person because the subject newsletter was
never included or formally offered as evidence, hardly convinces Us to hold that there was actual
publication for purpose of finding a prima facie case for libel against the private respondent. He must
be reminded that the case for estafa was still at the preliminary investigation stage and there is no
requirement of a formal offer of such documentary evidence or supporting documents to establish
probable cause (citations omitted).[17]
Since the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation, it was vested
with a privileged character. While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the
or other proceedings preparatory to the actual trial, the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas[18]
It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the actual
participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official
nature have been given absolute privilege. Of particular interest are proceedings leading up to
prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for crime xxx [A] written charge or information filed with the
prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded. Furthermore, the
information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a prosecution is
protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for defamation.
(Emphasis ours)
While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its abuse can
lead to great hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this account will give
rise to even greater hardships. The doctrine itself rests on public policy which looks to
The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged communication
must hurdle is the test of relevancy. Under this test, a matter alleged in the course of the
proceedings need not be in every case material to the issues presented but should be
legitimately related to the issues or be so pertinent to the controversy that it may become
Here, the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal complaint
against petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts involving greed and deceit, and were
disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint. Liberally applying the
privileged communication doctrine, these statements were still relevant to the complaint
under investigation because, like the averments therein, they also involved petitioners
2002 decision and November 21, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Promulgated:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Complaint filed by complainants Eliza V. Venterez , Genaro de Vera,
Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon de Vera against
respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross
Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981 entitled,
Sps. Daniel and Lolita Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al., for Declaration of
Ownership with Damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Respondent represented the complainants, who were defendants in said
case, until a Decision thereon was rendered by the MTC on 25 February 2004. The MTC
ruled against the complainants. Respondent received a copy of the said Decision on 3
March 2004.
Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for
Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. The 15-
day period within which to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration of the MTC
Decision expired on 18 March 2004. Complainant Elisa V. Venterez was constrained to
contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed on
19 March 2004. It must be stressed that the said motion was signed by complainant Elisa
V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer did not enter his appearance.
On 23 March 2004, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied[1] by the MTC.
Respondent was not furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a Certification[2]
issued by Clerk of Court II Zenaida C. de Vera. On 31 March 2004, a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution[3] was filed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 981 but
respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any comment on the said motion
despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted[4] by the MTC on 23 April
2004. On 28 April 2004, a Writ of Execution[5] was issued and on 26 April 2004, an
Entry of Judgment[6] was made in the said case.
Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his
Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.
Feeling aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant
administrative complaint against him.[7]
In his Answer,[8] respondent denied the claim of complainants that soon after the
Decision was rendered by the MTC, they (complainants) directed him to file an appeal
or a motion for reconsideration thereof. For his defense, respondent averred that
Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the complainants, Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed
him that he [was] withdrawing the case from the respondent because he already engaged
another lawyer to take over the case, so respondent gave the records of the case to him.
Respondent explained that after Salvador Ramirez withdrew the case from the
respondent, and engaged another lawyer, the respondent turned over the records of the
case to him and the respondent ceased as the counsel of the complainants. Respondent
further alleged that the said Motion for Reconsideration was already prepared by another
lawyer. He denied being furnished a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration allegedly
prepared and filed by another lawyer engaged by complainant Elisa V. Venterez and that
he was served with a copy of the denial of the said Motion by the MTC. Respondent also
clarified that the last day of the 15-day period for the perfection of the appeal is 19
March 2004 since a copy of the decision was served on the respondent on 4 March 2004.
Finally, respondent argued that when the respondent was served a copy of the Motion for
Writ of Execution, he immediately notified Salvador Ramirez about said Motion but
Salvador Ramirez came to see the respondent only on 3 May 2005, when the respondent
asked him to sign a Notice of Retirement of Counsel signed by Salvador Ramirez which
respondent immediately filed in court.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross
negligence, Atty. Rodrigo Cosme is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.[11]
The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling
complainants case, as would warrant disciplinary action.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client,
but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.[12] Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and
executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services
without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.[13]
Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client.[14] This means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.[15]
The Decision in Civil Case No. 981 was rendered by the MTC of Calasaio, Pangasinan,
on 25 February 2004. Respondent admitted[16] that he was served a copy of the said
Decision on 4 March 2004. After having received a copy of the MTC Decision,
respondent did not bother to file a Motion for Reconsideration or a notice of appeal with
the proper courts. Thus, complainants were compelled to engage the services of a new
counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the MTC who did not, however, enter
his appearance as new counsel. It bears stressing that during this time, respondent had
not yet filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No.
981. Respondent only formally withdrew as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No.
981 when he filed with the MTC his Notice[17] of Retirement as Counsel on 5 May
2004, on the ground that "he was also retired as Counsel for the [complainants] two days
after he received copy of the decision rendered in this case when SALVADOR
RAMIREZ, a representative of the [complainants], withdrew all the records of the case
from [respondent] to be given to his new counsel.
We cannot accept respondents defense that he had already withdrawn from the case two
days after his receipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly communicated this
withdrawal to Salvador Ramirez, son of one of the herein complainants, Inocencia
Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the part of respondent to wash his hands of any
liability for failing to pursue any of the available remedies to complainants from the
adverse MTC Decision.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause.[18] The right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted.[19] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that
an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.[20] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.[21] A
lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the
client's written consent or from a good cause.[22]
What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are identified
under Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.
The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither can the
circumstances of this case be considered analogous to the grounds thus explicitly
enumerated. Contrary to respondents contention, his professional relations as a lawyer
with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case to his
clients. Respondents defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that Salvador
Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to
withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to terminate the latters
services.
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he,
however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer
has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court.[24]
Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record
who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his
clients require.[25] He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his
clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not
terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.
The facts of the case show that respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer
pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a 3-month
suspension from the practice of law is a just penalty under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.