Niklas Törneke-Learning RFT - An Introduction To Relational Frame Theory and Its Clinical Application-Context Press (2010)
Niklas Törneke-Learning RFT - An Introduction To Relational Frame Theory and Its Clinical Application-Context Press (2010)
Niklas Törneke-Learning RFT - An Introduction To Relational Frame Theory and Its Clinical Application-Context Press (2010)
95 PSYCHOLOGY
LE ARNING RFT
to Relational Frame Theory
Learning
Relational frame theory, or RFT, is the little-understood behavioral theory be-
hind a recent development in modern psychology: the shift from the cognitive
paradigm underpinning cognitive behavioral therapy to a new understanding of
language and cognition. Learning RFT presents a basic yet comprehensive intro-
duction to this fascinating theory, which forms the basis of acceptance and com-
mitment therapy. The book also offers practical guidance for directly applying
RFT
RFT in clinical work.
In the book, author Niklas Trneke presents the building blocks of RFT: language
as a particular kind of relating, derived stimulus relations, and transformation of
stimulus functions. He then shows how these concepts are essential to understand-
ing acceptance and commitment therapy and other therapeutic models. Learning
RFT shows how to use experiential exercises and metaphors in psychological treat-
ment and explains how they can help your clients. This book belongs on the book-
shelves of psychologists, psychotherapists, students, and others seeking to deepen
their understanding of psychological treatment from a behavioral perspective.
There is no better place to start learning about RFT than this excellent
book. Trneke teaches the principles of RFT simply and elegantly . . . I
wish a book like this had existed when I first learned about RFT.
Russ Harris, author of The Happiness Trap and ACT Made Simple An Introduction to
NIKLAS TRNEKE, MD, is a psychiatrist and licensed psychotherapist in private practice in
Relational Frame Theory
and Its Clinical Application
Kalmar, Sweden. Together with Jonas Ramner, Ph.D., he has previously authored The ABCs
of Human Behavior.
Since RFT first appeared in the experimental literature, it has been hailed
as a breakthrough in our scientific understanding of language and cognition
with direct and important implications for clinical psychological practice. Yet,
descriptions of RFT, written largely for technical audiences, have been, at best,
curiously baffling, and at worst, maddeningly incomprehensible. In this book,
Trneke has solved the puzzle of RFT! He summarizes the history of RFT, its
key features, and its clinical implications with language that is user-friendly
and easily understandable. I believe this book will make a huge difference
for clinicians who wish to understand RFT and its implications for clinical
practice. It also may be a useful learning tool for researchers and RFT experts
themselves who wish to learn and see a beautiful example of how RFT can be
presented clearly and comprehensively.
Jonathan Kanter, associate professor at the University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and director of its Depression
Treatment Specialty Clinic
For years, clinicians have asked me for recommendations about what they
should read to learn RFT. There was really no good advice I could give except
be persistent. Finally, I have a better answer. If you want to understand
relational frame theory, this is the place to start. Trnekes RFT primer is both
masterful and accessible.
Kelly G. Wilson, Ph.D., associate professor of psychology
at the University of Mississippi, coauthor of Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy and author of Mindfulness for Two
At times, while reading Trnekes book, I have felt as though I were in
the middle of a thriller about the psychopathological behaviors of humans.
Clues to unraveling the mystery embedded in complex concepts like
arbitrarily applicable relational responding have alerted me, as the reader,
to what is coming up next. Our ability for relational framing and for
rule-governed behavior may at first glance seem fabulousa gift from the
godsbut darkness lurks around the corner. Our ability to problem-solve is
the villain. This book helps me make sense of it all.
Maria Midbe, M.Sc., candidate in psychology at
Stockholm University in Stockholm, Sweden
NIKLAS TRNEKE, MD
CONTEXT PRESS
An Imprint of New Harbinger Publications, Inc.
Publishers Note
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to
the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged
in rendering psychological, financial, legal, or other professional services. If expert assistance or
counseling is needed, the services of a competent professional should be sought.
Acquired by Catharine Sutker; Cover design by Amy Shoup; Edited by Jasmine Star
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
PART 1
Background
CHAPTER 1
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles. . . . . 9
CHAPTER 2
Thinking and Human Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CHAPTER 3
Is the Power of Thinking a Clinically Relevant Issue?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
PART 2
Relational Learning
CHAPTER 4
Derived Relational Responding as the Fundamental Element in
Human Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Learning RFT
CHAPTER 5
Analogies, Metaphors, and Our Experience of Self. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
CHAPTER 6
Relational Framing and Rule-Governed Behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
CHAPTER 7
The Dark Side of Human Languaging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
PART 3
Clinical Implications
CHAPTER 8
Learning Theory and Psychological Therapies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
CHAPTER 9
General Guidelines for Clinical Behavior Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
CHAPTER 10
Altering the Context with a Focus on Consequences. . . . . . . . . . . . . .193
CHAPTER 11
Altering the Context with a Focus on Antecedents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
Afterword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261
vi
x
cognition. Its purpose was intensely pragmatic. Among other objectives, the
book aimed to stimulate both basic and applied research on human language
and cognition, and to provide a set of functional analytic terms that would
facilitate communication among researchers and practitioners. It appears to
have been relatively successful in achieving the first goal, but the latter objec-
tive, I believe, requires another book: the one you are currently reading.
Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Account of Human Language
and Cognition is intensely academic, full of jargon, and littered with highly
abstract concepts. Learning RTF contains many of those concepts and some
of the jargon, but it presents the material in a very accessible manner and,
critically, does complete justice to the subject matter.
The first section of Learning RFT starts with a succinct but well-worked
introduction to the philosophical and conceptual underpinnings of behav-
ior analysis, an understanding of which is essential in grappling with what is
to follow. The topics of thinking and human language are then introduced,
and the traditional Skinnerian perspective on these topics is explained and
contrasted with that of traditional cognitive therapy. In this examination it is
proposed that neither approach has fully dealt with the role of thinking and
language, at least in the clinical domain. The first section of the book will
serve as a strong motivator for the reader, and particularly the clinician, to
delve into the next and perhaps most challenging section.
In the second part of Learning RFT, the theory itself is presented, but in
a highly accessible way. The chapters in this section strike a perfect balance
between providing an appropriate level of technical detail and keeping the
writing lively, light, and a pleasure to read. Furthermore, although the earlier
chapters in this section focus necessarily on the more abstract features of
RFT, the writing progresses rapidly and with relative ease to issues that will
be of more interest to the practicing clinician, dealing with topics such as
self and perspective taking. The final chapter in this section, The Dark Side
of Human Languaging, will be particularly relevant to clinicians in that it
explains how RFT means that human language and cognition may be the
source of much human suffering.
The third and final section of the book focuses on the clinical implica-
tions of RFT. The section begins with traditional behavior therapy and how
it relates to other therapeutic approaches, then it explains how RFT makes a
unique contribution to our understanding of psychotherapy itself. The reader
is now prepared for the final chapters of the book, which work systematically
through the application of modern behavior analysis to clinical psychology.
This material provides a powerful review of clinical behavior analysis and
in particular explains how RFT supplements and extends the traditional
behavior therapeutic approach. It is only in this final part of the book that
xi
Learning RFT
the intensely pragmatic nature of RFT is fully revealed. This highly abstract
and arcane theory allows the practitioner to conceptualize human language
and thought as composed of behavioral units that may be subjected to func-
tional analyses and behavioral intervention strategies. In short, Learning RFT
clearly illustrates in a very powerful way how RFT can contribute toward the
conceptualization and treatment of human suffering. In truth, this is a book
I would love to have written.
Dermot Barnes-Holmes
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
xii
Foreword to the Swedish
Edition
Is there a need for a book devoted to relational frame theory? Can we learn
anything about language by endorsing the principles of learning? Honestly, is
it not the case that cognitive psychologists do a much better job at explain-
ing how we think? My answers to the first two questions are affirmative, and
Learning RFT is an important contribution, giving a thorough description of
how a behaviorist framework can help us understand cognition and language.
While some readers might not find this topic attractive at first sight, perhaps
because they have a clinical focus, my conviction is that this book can be
helpful for clinicians as well as researchers and that the principles described
are put forward in a reader-friendly manner, facilitating comprehension of the
sometimes difficult-to-grasp concepts in relational frame theory.
I received my training as a clinical psychologist in the mid-1980s, and
most of the textbooks I read stated that behaviorism was dead and that the
cognitive revolution had taken over after the dark years under the rule of
B. F. Skinner. However, not all my teachers shared that opinion, and at the
department of psychology in Uppsala, Sweden, I got the basics of applied
behavior analysis and developed an interest in behaviorism. I guess I can say
I acquired what might best be called a behaviorist framework, which influ-
enced my clinical work and research, by that time focused on hearing loss in
the elderly. In my work I found operant psychology very useful and ended up
with a thesis entitled Hearing as Behavior. However, I was also painfully aware
of the fairly low status of operant psychology in mainstream psychology, and
while I found the work by Skinner useful, I could not fully appreciate his
book Verbal Behavior. On the other hand, the work by Steven Hayes and his
Learning RFT
xiv
something is likely to be true. With RFT, we now have more tools to explain
the verbal behavior we confront in our clinical work.
You may wonder about the third question I raised: Is it not true that cog-
nitive psychologists are doing a better job at explaining cognition? Learning
RFT is excellent in this respect, as the author does not ignore the substantial
literature on the cognitive psychology of language; rather, he relates it to RFT.
For me, and most likely for many other psychologists, this makes it easier to
understand RFT and take it seriously as a major contribution to psychology.
So heres the answer to my last question: To date, cognitive psychology is, if
not the best, at least the most productive when it comes to language and cog-
nition. But RFT need not be seen as in opposition to the rest of psychology,
and it can provide us with important clues to further our understanding of
language and cognition. It is possible that a behaviorist renaissance is on the
horizon. Niklas Trnekes book is one of the building blocks in that venture.
Gerhard Andersson, Ph.D., professor of clinical psychology in the
Department of Behavioral Sciences and Learning at Linkping
University, in Linkping, Sweden
xv
Acknowledgments
In 1998 I went to an international conference in Ireland and for the first time
heard two people speak who, more than any others, are behind the ideas and
the research this book is based on: Steven Hayes and Dermot Barnes-Holmes.
From that time, both of them have generously answered my questions and
helped me become familiar with an outlook and research tradition that, up
until then, had been essentially unknown to me. Many thanks to both!
The person who first told me I should write a book like this is Kelly
Wilson. He is also the person I have mainly learned ACT from in practice. I
owe him warm thanks, as well.
A fourth person who has meant a lot to me in the process leading to
this book is Carmen Luciano. She too is a leading figure in the international
network of researchers and clinicians bound together by a common interest in
RFT and ACT. In recent years she has been a never-ending source of knowl-
edge and inspiration to me.
Several individuals in Sweden have also been of particular help to me.
First and foremost, Jonas Ramner. Ever since we met at a conference in
Dresden in 1999, we have been engaged in an ongoing dialogue on the role
of behavioral psychology in psychotherapy. This dialogue has made a decisive
contribution to my writing this book. Jonas has also helped me by reading
and commenting on the Swedish manuscript, as have Jonas Bjrehed, Martin
Cernvall, and Billy Larsson.
As for the English version, Kelly Koerner, Rainer Sonntag, and Ian
Stewart have all read parts of an earlier version of the manuscript and made
many valuable suggestions. All deficiencies remain, of course, my own respon-
sibility. Elizabeth Ask de Lambert did most of the work translating the book
Learning RFT
into English, and Jasmine Star made the editing process extremely helpful
and smooth. Grel Gunnarsson and her colleagues in the medical library
at the county hospital in Kalmar, Sweden, have been of invaluable help in
obtaining articles and other literature. My heartfelt and sincerest thanks to
one and all!
xviii
A Personal Word of
Introduction
2
A Personal Word of Introduction
A WORD ON TERMINOLOGY
Skinner called the science of behavior that he developed behavior analysis.
However, this term is used in slightly different ways. Within behavior therapy
in Europe, it is sometimes used synonymously with the word conceptualiza-
tion. In this usage, a behavior analysis is understood as an initial phase of
behavior therapy. I will be using the term in the way Skinner did, which is
how it is still used in the United States. Used in this way, behavior analysis
is a designation of the science, as a whole, that aims at predicting and influ-
encing behavior, along with the practical work involved in doing this. There
is usually a distinction made between two branches within behavior analysis:
experimental behavior analysis and applied behavior analysis. Experimental
analysis of behavior is the type of experimental activity usually connected
with Skinner: Under carefully monitored conditions, different factors are
varied to determine whether an organisms behavior can be predicted and
influenced. In applied behavior analysis, the basic principles that can be
3
Learning RFT
OUTLINE
This book is divided into three parts. Part 1 provides some important back-
ground. Chapter 1 offers a short account of basic and well-known principles of
learning from the viewpoint of radical behaviorism, with a particular empha-
sis on concepts that must be understood in order to become familiar with
RFT. Chapter 2 provides a survey of how behavior analysis had tried to tackle
the power of thinking before the experimental data on which RFT is based
were available. The bulk of this chapter consists of an overview of Skinners
analysis of verbal behavior. Although his analysis has limitations (described
here as well), it remains important as a backdrop to RFT. In chapter 3, argu-
ments for renewed inquiry into human cognition and language conclude part
1 of the book.
Part 2 of the book is its core; this is where RFT is described. Chapter 4
presents and defines RFTs basic terminology and describes the type of experi-
ments the theory is based on. In essence, chapter 4 describes the fundamental
elements in human language. In chapters 5 and 6, I have attempted to show
how these building blocks are combined with an increasing degree of com-
plexity, and how they cast new light on complex human behavior. In chapter
7, part 2 concludes with an account of the problems that verbal (cognitive)
behavior creates for human beings, or the side effects of human language.
Part 3 of the book describes clinical applications. Chapter 8 takes a
look at psychological therapies in general from a behavioral perspective. The
remaining three chapters focus on clinical behavior analysis, with particular
emphasis on strategies and techniques based in RFT.
4
A Personal Word of Introduction
purpose is to give an overall introduction to RFT, the book has its limita-
tions. The main limitation lies in maintaining both a theoretical and a clini-
cal perspective. Though RFT is based on experimental research, this book
does not present the experimental work in detail; it simply gives an outline of
the experimental work and devotes more attention to the conclusions drawn
from that work. This book is more focused on concepts than data and details,
partly to give a general introduction, and partly to give an understanding that
facilitates clinical work. The book does not include more detailed presenta-
tions of the experiments in their entirety, such as how they are arranged and
performed. I have tried, however, to frequently refer to literature that contains
such presentations so that the interested reader can find more in-depth mate-
rial. There is also a paradox involved in this limitation. There is a degree of
learning RFT that can be achieved only by engaging in experimental work.
Yet this is a book by someone who has never done that, written primarily for
others in the same situation. Experimental psychologists will probably find
lack of precision and technical detail. The same might be true of others who
are very well acquainted with the existing scientific literature. At the same
time, some readers will probably find parts of the book too technical and
abstract. Still, this kind of book, in between, is what I wished to read when
I first encountered RFT. Hopefully it will be helpful to others who are now
in the situation I was in then.
ACT has a central position in part 3 of the book, on clinical applications.
This is only natural, as this therapeutic model has evolved together with RFT.
Alongside ACT, other forms of clinical behavior analysis, especially functional
analytical psychotherapy and behavioral activation, have their place. It has
not been my goal, however, to present any of these individual models in their
entirety, or to carry out an in-depth comparison. I want to pursue the agenda
outlined in The ABCs of Human Behavior (Ramner & Trneke, 2008): to
describe psychological therapy from the broad perspective of radical behav-
iorism, and to describe the therapeutic tradition that can be called behavior
therapy, behavioral psychotherapy, or clinical behavior analysis. I want to do
this with a special emphasis on how an understanding of RFT adds some new
elements to this tradition.
5
PART 1
Background
CHAPTER 1
Radical Behaviorism and
Fundamental Behavior
Analytic Principles
10
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
11
Learning RFT
this position, we cannot maintain that this is the way it really is. Radical
behaviorists repudiate the notion that the scientist operates from an objective
and neutral position. As mentioned earlier, from the perspective of radical
behaviorism you cannot understand behavior without studying its context.
All behavior takes place within a context. But neither can the context be
studied independent of behavior. This is because the scientists attempt to
study something is a behavior as well. After all, the object of our study is
something that we are acting upon, just by studying it. So just as we cannot
understand behavior without context, there is no context available for the
organism without behavior.
This point about the behavior of the scientist is also true in a more general
sense. Stimulus and response (behavior) are codependent and should be con-
sidered together. They make up a single unity (Kantor, 1970). We can separate
them for practical reasons, with a certain aim in mind. And the behavioral
science that Skinner wanted to create has an aim: to predict and influence
behavior. Radical behaviorists are not claiming to be uncovering reality;
rather, we maintain that this method, the scientific project of radical behav-
iorism, is a method that works for what we want to do. The pigeon in Skinners
experiment could say something similar: Pecking this spot works when it
comes to getting Skinner to give me food.
When we radically apply the fundamental principles of behavior that
we have identified, this leads to another important result, one involving the
definition of the term behavior. In everyday speech, the word behavior
normally refers only to external actions, which can be observed by anyone
else who is present. So how should we regard the things a person does but
that no one except the person himself can observe, things like feeling, remem-
bering, and thinking? Traditionally, these phenomena have been assigned to
another spherethe psycheas if they were of a different nature than the
things we can observe. Here too, Skinner called for consistency, maintaining
that there is nothing to indicate that the same principles are not valid for these
phenomena as well (Skinner, 1953, 1974). This means these phenomena are
also behavior, and that they can and should be analyzed according to the same
principles as behavior that is observable by others.
12
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
behavior? For a more detailed answer to this question, the reader is referred
to other publications (Catania, 2007; Ramner & Trneke, 2008). Still, I
will provide a short summary here, before turning to this books main quest,
which is to point out how these principles should be used to shed light upon
the function of human thinking.
The two fundamental principles for behavior analysis are operant and
respondent conditioning. The latter has been described since Pavlovs well-
known experiment with dogs at the beginning of the twentieth century,
including how their natural reaction of salivation can be influenced through
conditioning. Operant conditioning is the principle of learning that Skinner
investigated and demonstrated via his experiments, so that is where I will
begin.
13
Learning RFT
14
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
that specific social context or do so less often, then the earlier consequence
has been punishing. Punishment, too, can be separated into positive punish-
mentin which something has been addedand negative punishmentin
which something has been removed. Remember, however, that there is no
way of determining what is reinforcing versus punishing based on any intrin-
sic quality that signifies the consequence as such. Of course, it is true that
some consequences more often function as reinforcing to people, for example,
certain types of social attention. But this is not always the case. To be recog-
nized and addressed in a kind way is usually reinforcing for human behavior,
but we can all think of situations when this is something we want to avoid.
Likewise, certain consequences usually function in a punishing way, like
being hit, yet this is not always the case. There are situations when being hit
reinforces the behavior that preceded this consequence. A child who encoun-
ters only indifference, despite several actions meant to attract attention, may
repeat a behavior that leads to getting smacked, simply because the smack
involves attention. It is the function of the consequence that provides the defi-
nition. When the consequences increase the probability of a certain behavior,
this is reinforcement; and when the consequences reduce the probability of a
behavior, it is punishment. To recap:
DI F F ER E N T T Y PE S OF CONSEQU E NCE S
Reinforcement: A consequence that increases the likelihood that a
certain behavior will be repeated.
Positive reinforcement is when the consequence is
something that is added.
Negative reinforcement is when the consequence is
something that is taken away.
15
Learning RFT
ABC
16
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
17
Learning RFT
1As I will go on to describe later, this is a simplification that does not take
into account the difference between verbal and nonverbal discriminative
functions. The example works for the intended point in this case, though.
There are quite a few of these types of simplified examples in this chap-
ter. The alternative would have been to only use examples from organisms
without human language, but this would have affected the text in a negative
way and would hardly have helped the readers understanding. The problem
with these types of simplifications, which have been necessary within the
area of behavioral analysis due to its difficulty in handling phenomena like
language and cognition, will be dealt with in detail later in this book. It is
also important to remember that within behavior analysis we are aiming at
usefulness, not necessarily at covering all possible aspects of an event (see
Ramner & Trneke, 2008).
18
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
A B C
Antecedent Behavior Consequence
19
Learning RFT
20
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
21
Learning RFT
R E SPON DE N T L E A R N I NG
Unconditioned stimulus Unconditioned response
Assault Fear
Neutral stimulus
22
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
while I wait for him to pick up. After I have encountered this on several occa-
sions of calling, one day I hear the same melody on the radio. I start thinking
about my son, and maybe some emotional reactions, originally occurring due
to my interaction with him, also surface. How did this happen? The answer
is respondent learning. The melody has become a conditioned stimulus, and
thoughts and feelings connected with my son are a conditioned response. It is
easy to see how these reactions can in turn function as antecedents for more
operant behavior. I might, for example, call my son earlier than I would have
if I hadnt heard this melody on the radio.
Another way in which respondent and operant learning interact is in how
reinforcers and punishers are established. Stimuli that have not previously
functioned as reinforcers can acquire this function by being associated with
things that already function as reinforcers. Status symbols, designer clothes, a
photo of a loved one, or a favorite TV program can all have reinforcing func-
tions. These stimuli have acquired their function by being associated with
other reinforcers; for example, receiving interpersonal attention because of
status symbols. Reinforcers that have their function without being learned
such as interpersonal attention, food when you are hungry, and warmth when
you are coldare called unconditioned or primary reinforcers. Reinforcers
that have acquired their function by way of learning are called conditioned or
secondary reinforcers. The corresponding terminology also applies to punish-
ers: They can be unconditioned or primary punishers, or they can acquire their
functions through association with other punishers and therefore be called
conditioned or secondary punishers.
Extinction
Behavior that has been learned does not necessarily last forever. Whether
governed by consequences or by associations, behavior can cease or decrease
following the removal of particular contingencies. We often use the term
extinction for this; operant extinction or respondent extinction, respectively.
Operant extinction occurs when a certain behavior no longer provides that
which has been a reinforcing consequence. If my Tuesday calls to my son
begin to go unanswered, I will probably continue to call him on Tuesdays for
a while. But if I encounter that he never answers on Tuesdays anymore, Ill
stop calling him on that day. Tuesday is no longer a discriminative stimulus
for the consequence that was previously reinforcing. Tuesday night no longer
signals a historical connection between a specific behavior (calling my son)
and a certain consequence (he answers the phone).
23
Learning RFT
Generalization
The fact that, in an operant sequence of events, a certain stimulus func-
tions as a discriminative or motivational antecedent, or as a reinforcing or
punishing consequence, does not mean that a new event must be identical to
have the same function. If that were the case, learning would practically be
impossible, since two events are, in fact, never exactly the same. Instead, two
stimuli or two events need only be similar enough. If a certain social behav-
ior from my side, like addressing someone with a question, has taken place
under the condition of this person looking at me with a certain expression on
24
Radical Behaviorism and Fundamental Behavior Analytic Principles
his face, and if my asking the question has led to positive reinforcing conse-
quences, then this increases the likelihood that I will speak to someone again
when the conditions are similar; the situation need not be identical. How
similar the conditions must be in order to function in a discriminative way
depends on the individuals specific learning history. A young child initially
may have learned to say something in an interaction with a parent. This is the
condition under which the behavior has been reinforced. A glance, a facial
expression, or an utterance by a different person does not at this stage con-
stitute an antecedent for the child to interact in a similar way. This anteced-
ent function will, however, gradually spread, becoming generalized. As time
passes, a much broader category of conditions (different people, different
environments, different utterances, and slightly different facial expressions)
might function as antecedents for a certain social behavior.
This does not apply only to antecedents. Events that function as rein-
forcing or punishing consequences are generalized, as well. Friendly behavior
may be encountered in many different forms, but regardless of the differences
it can still have the same reinforcing function. The same goes for the things
that often function as punishers, like being criticized, for example. Another
example of a reinforcing function that can be generalized involves money.
Money is a conditioned or secondary reinforcer. In our experience, it has been
associated with other things that have been reinforcing, giving these pieces
of metal and paper reinforcing functions in themselves. Money has acquired
this function by association with such a large number of other reinforcing
functions that it becomes a generalized reinforcer. For most children, atten-
tion from adults also functions as a generalized reinforcer. In certain con-
texts, however, the same attention can have a punishing function. This shows
us, again, that whether a given stimulus is reinforcing or punishing is not an
intrinsic quality of that stimulus; rather, it can only be understood in context,
in the interaction between an organism and its environment.
Generalization is relevant in connection with respondent learning, as
well. The fact that I was assaulted in the main square of my hometown can
make me feel this fear in a similar square located in a different town if that
other square is similar enough. Or this fear can emerge in a totally different
situation from being in a square; for example, seeing someone in the subway
who is somehow similar enough to the person who assaulted me. Likewise,
hearing that familiar melody on the radio can make me think of my son even
if it is performed by a different singer and in a different version than the one
on his phone.
25
Learning RFT
Discrimination
Discrimination can be said to be the opposite of generalization. Just as the
function of an event can be spread to other events because they are in some
way similar, a function can be restricted to a more specific event in situa-
tions where a similar event doesnt have this function. Another persons facial
expression can be an antecedent for a certain social behavior on my part, and
we might assume that generalization has taken place in my learning history
since my first attempts at interacting with other people years ago. There are
quite a few slightly different facial expressions of other people that lead to
more or less the same type of social behavior from me. But what happens if
I want to play poker? In that case, the very small variations that I might be
able to detect in the other players expressions become antecedents for quite
different behaviors from my side. A certain glance may make me raise my
stakes, and if another player looks at me in a slightly different way, this can be
an antecedent for my decision to fold. The differences could even be so small
that Im unable to describe them, yet I still act on them. The fact that some
people are so much better than others at playing poker can partly be assumed
to be connected to a highly trained ability to discriminate when it comes to
other peoples behavior.
Generalization and discrimination, and the balance between them, is
an important part of all kinds of learning, both operant and respondent.
Sometimes we need to catch one very specific signal in a noisy surrounding,
while at other times it is important to act on anything that moves.
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CHAPTER 2
Thinking and Human
Language
VERBAL BEHAVIOR
Before we take a closer look at how speaking about private events evolves,
we need to reflect on speaking in a more general sense: what Skinner called
verbal behavior. From very early in language training, humans learn to use
combinations of sounds in a way that successively becomes very important
for how we interact. What is functionally crucial in this behavior, according
to Skinner, is the possibility of behavior being reinforced in an indirect way,
by how other individuals act, rather than as a direct result of the speakers
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Thinking and Human Language
SKINNERS DESCRIPTION OF
VERBAL OPERANTS
Skinner divided verbal behavior into several primary types: tacts, mands,
echoic behavior, intraverbal behavior, and autoclitic behavior (Skinner, 1957).
When we regard verbal behavior as operant responses, we see it as controlled
by antecedents and consequences, just like any other operant behavior. These
different responses (B in an ABC analysis) are distinguished by the different
relations between the form (what is said or written) and the variable (A and/
or C) that governs the response. The shape the response takes and its relation
to antecedents and consequences is what forms the basis for classification.
Tact
A tact is governed by a preceding stimulus: the stimulus that is being
tacted. An example would be saying chair when a chair is present. This
response, the utterance, is a direct result of seeing the chair. When we say
She is running, it is governed by the fact that someone (she) is moving her
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Learning RFT
body in a certain way. We tact our environment in this way because we have a
solid learning history in which tacting has been reinforced. From an early age,
we have experienced reinforcing consequences when, for example, in the pres-
ence of a cow, we have uttered precisely cow. If we said kitty in the pres-
ence of a cow, there were other consequences. The governing consequences
are primarily of a general and social nature; that is, tacting is followed by
generalized reinforcers. It is tacting we have in mind when in everyday speech
we speak of describing, telling, referring to, and the like. All of these
concepts, however, are highly imperfect for scientific purposes, and thus the
use of the neologism tact.
An ideal tact is completely controlled by the stimulus preceding it. In
an everyday context, we would say the statement is objective or corresponds
to the object referred to. This is the type of pure tact that we seek in scien-
tific linguistic inquiry. Tacts rarely have this character in normal life, and you
could probably question whether a pure tact is actually possible as anything
other than an ideal, even in scientific settings. Skinner wrote about distorted
or impure tacts (1957), by which he meant tacts that are controlled by other
factors, such as who is listening and how listeners act as a result of a given tact.
What we normally speak of as exaggeration is an example of a distorted tact.
The verbal operant is controlled by that which precedes it, but the size, for
example, is exaggerated, so the tact is distorted. When the Great Fisherman
talks about the size of the fish he has caught, his descriptions are governed not
solely by the size of the fish. If they were, the descriptions would be pure tacts.
Instead, they are probably governed by other elements, as well. If a statement
is portrayed as a tact when it actually is governed not at all by what precedes
it, but rather by something completely different, in everyday language we
would call it a lie.
Mand
A mand is verbal behavior controlled by a specific reinforcer, and it speci-
fies this same reinforcer. For example, your saying to a person Go away! is
reinforced by earlier experiences of having a person leave after you said this.
Saying Look at me specifies its own reinforcerthat is, the listener looks at
the speaker. The typical antecedent (A) of a mand is the presence of a listener
(a discriminative function) and a motivational operation (an establishing
operation) that makes the consequence in question desirable to the speaker.
The motivational operation that precedes Go away! is most likely that the
listeners presence is aversive to the speaker at the moment, whereas with
Look at me, something else is going on in the interaction between speaker
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Thinking and Human Language
and listener. Examples of mands are different types of requests and demands,
asking questions, and raising your hand to obtain permission to speak.
It is important to understand that both tacts and mands are defined by
their function, not by sheer topography. The very same word or expression
can have several different functions. This means that topographically identical
linguistic expressions can function both as tacts and as mands, depending on
the relation to antecedents and consequences in the specific situation. When
someone says the newspaper, it could be a tact if the governing variable is
an actual newspaper and the utterance is an answer to the question What
is that on the table? But the newspaper could also be a mand if it serves
as a request that someone hand the newspaper to the speaker. The relation
between what is said and the governing variables determines what type of
verbal behavior is at hand. A statement such as Those apples are nice can
seem like a tact but in fact be a mand, if this statement is reinforced by the
fact that the consequence that previously followed upon a similar statement
was that the speaker was given an apple.
Echoic Behavior
In echoic behavior, verbal behavior has an antecedent that is topographi-
cally identical to the response. It is a verbal response that follows a preced-
ing verbal response, echoing or repeating something that has been uttered.
Again, typical reinforcers are generalized social consequences like attention
and other interpersonal processes. Echoic behavior is a core part of early lan-
guage learning. The parent, for example, utters a word and then reinforces
every tendency in the child to repeat it. But echoic behavior continues to exist
as an important verbal behavior throughout life, like when we silently repeat
something we have just heard.
Skinner gave a few more examples of verbal responses that resemble echoic
behavior insofar as they all involve a response that is somehow a reiteration
of the antecedent. He described textual behavior, as well as transcription and
taking dictation. I describe all of these together with echoic behavior based
on this similarity. Textual behavior is saying something that is controlled by
a preceding stimulus in the form of a written text, where a formal correspon-
dence exists between what is written and what is said. Textual behavior, then,
is the response we would normally refer to as reading aloud. Taking dictation
is an inverse process: writing down something that is in formal correspon-
dence with what has been uttered, like when you write down a telephone
number someone just told you. Transcription is writing something wherein
the controlling antecedent is topographically identical with the response. In
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Learning RFT
everyday language, this is called copying. All of these verbal behaviors are
reinforced by generalized social reinforcers.
Intraverbal Behavior
Intraverbal behavior is also verbal behavior that has other verbal behav-
ior as its antecedent, just as echoic behavior; but in this case there isnt any
formal correspondence between antecedent and response. In this case, the
relation between the verbal antecedent and intraverbal behavior is arbitrary,
established by social whim. If I say one, two, three, and you say four, then
your response is intraverbal behavior. If I say What is casa in English? and
you say house, then this response, too, is intraverbal. Just as for all other
verbal operants except the mand, the important, governing consequences for
intraverbal responses are generalized social reinforcers.
Once again, note that the definitions of these different types of verbal
behavior are functional. What is crucial is the relation between the response
and the antecedents and consequences. Above, I said that the expression the
newspaper can be either a tact or a mand. But it could, of course, also be
echoic behavior if it were governed by someone else saying the newspaper
and the response is a reiteration of this. It could also be intraverbal behavior.
This would be the case if it were governed by someone else just having said,
What is another word for the local rag?
Autoclitic Behavior
Skinner described one more type of verbal behavior: autoclitic behavior.
This is verbal behavior, or parts of verbal behavior, governed by other verbal
behavior by the speaker and modifying this other behavior. An example of
autoclitic behavior is the word maybe in the response Maybe its the news-
paper when someone asks, What is that on the table? The word maybe
functions as an autoclitic because it modifies the totality and lets the listener
know something about the position from which the speaker is speaking, in this
case a position of uncertainty. Other autoclitic behavior, which would modify
the tact in a different way, would be a word like not, as in answering the
question about what is lying on the table with not the newspaper. Autoclitic
behavior can be whole words, as in the examples above, but it can also be
modification of a word, such as adding an s to the end when the answer is
newspapers. Punctuation, grammatical structure, and syntax are all forms
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Thinking and Human Language
33
Learning RFT
One way we learn to tact private events is when others are able to observe
phenomena that are parallel to what is being tacted. If others are able to
observe a flush or a swelling in a childs skin, they can assume that the child
experiences pain. In such a situation, the parent can reinforce verbal behavior
that tacts the assumed pain, such as if the child says ouch or hurts. The
childs verbal behavior is followed by reinforcing consequences, established
by the surrounding social environment. Other common, and commonly
accessible, phenomena are events that we know normally produce feelings.
One example would be when someone in the childs environment behaves
in an aggressive manner, and we afterward ask the child, Did that make you
feel scared? Having learned to tact our own private world, we use our own
experiences and assume that the child experiences something similar to what
we experience. However, a parents emotions may not always correspond with
those of her child, which leaves open the possibility of problematic tacting of
emotions on the part of the child.
A similar type of learning occurs when observable responses by the indi-
vidual are parallel to the private phenomenon that is tacted. Sounds, facial
expressions, and certain movements are observable responses that commonly
parallel an individuals private events. Experiences of pain, anger, interest,
and joy are often accompanied by other behavior. Children shy away, draw
closer, cast glances, and act in a number of different ways that are visible
to others in their social environment. The fact that these different forms of
observable behavior vary in accordance with private events makes it possible
for the environment to establish contingencies of reinforcement that, from
then on, influence the childs growing ability to talk about the things that
only she can observe.
Another way of learning to talk about private events occurs when the
child first learns to talk about the things she does that are observable both to
herself and to others around her. She then gradually goes on to learn to talk
about similar actions of her own that are observable only to herself. This is
especially relevant to what we commonly call thoughts or thinking, and the
same learning path is also relevant to what we normally call memories.
A child carries out a number of actions that she gradually learns to talk
about. She walks, waves, eats, watches the dog, stands still, plays, gets dressed,
and so on. No child can tact her own action without first having performed
it. (She can, however, utter a word that others use to describe something that
is performed without performing it herself. In this case, shes echoing some-
thing she heard someone else utter.) In order to tact her own actions, the
following sequence is required: The child does something that is observable
to the child herself and to her social environment. When this action is carried
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Thinking and Human Language
35
Learning RFT
36
Thinking and Human Language
while you simply listen (Lahav, Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007). Thinking about
running involves the same motor centers of the brain as running (Jeannerod,
1994; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). This means that thinking about
doing something is an action that in many respects resembles actually doing
what we are thinking about. At the same time, this private action has great
advantages. We can perform an action in the concealed setting of our imagi-
nation without facing many of the consequences that the external action
would involve. Doing things privatelythinking of doing themcan thus
be a way of testing and practicing. As we all know, this type of behavior plays
a significant role in what we often call problem solving. We try things in our
thoughts, and then we perform them more entirely, or else we refrain from
doing them. It is easy to see that this possibility is likely to have increased our
species ability to survive.
The path of learning I have just described is thus:
1. We do something.
2. We learn to talk about what we are doing, which in the above termi-
nology means we are tacting our own behavior.
3. We learn to speak without uttering any words; that is, we think.
Once we are doing this, this very behavior becomes something we can
tact. Perhaps you, as a reader, just noticed that you were thinking about some-
thing other than what this text says. In that case, you have something new to
tact: I was just thinking Therefore, when we talk about the fact that we
are thinking, this can lead to thinking about the fact that we are thinking. (In
cognitive theory, this is often referred to as metacognition.)
Thus far, I have described two main ways in which we learn to talk about
private events. The first way is when people in the environment observe
phenomena that are parallel with private events in the individual, and they
use these parallel phenomena to reinforce the verbal behavior for which the
private events gradually become discriminative stimuli. The second way is
when behavior that is initially accessible to the social environment gradually
becomes private, through this behavior as a whole being punished or extin-
guished in certain contexts, while at the same time a part of the behavior
doing the same thing, only silentlyleads to reinforcing consequences. The
behavior as such can thereafter be tacted by the individual, just as other
private events are. Before we turn to the question of why the social environ-
ment places such importance upon teaching each new individual this type
of skill, lets look at a third possible way of learning the ability to tact private
events.
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Learning RFT
38
Thinking and Human Language
may be highly relevant to their own actions and to their ability to anticipate
that persons further actions. The point is not that these internal phenomena
are some kind of autonomous force; rather, the significance of such expres-
sions lies in how the private events they describe are related to the individuals
learning history.
Once the ability to tact private behavior is established, this ability also
becomes valuable to the individual. To quote Skinner once more, A person
who has been made aware of himself by the questions he has been asked is
in a better position to predict and control his own behavior (Skinner, 1974,
p. 35). Being able to foresee and control ones own behavior naturally implies
an increased ability to achieve things that are desirable to oneself.
Before I conclude this passage about the relationship between think-
ing and verbal behavior, I want to underscore, once again, that this is not a
description of every aspect that could be included in the concepts of think-
ing and thoughts. It could be argued that even before this learned ability of
silent verbal behavior is established, as described above, there is some sort of
rudimentary behavior in the child that might be called thinking (Vygotsky,
1986). It might also be argued that something like this is present in other
animals besides humans, in one way or another. How we view this argument
depends on what we include in the concept of thinking. In any case, we
know very little about this possible rudimentary capacity and what function
it has. And regardless of this, something novel and revolutionary happens as
the childs verbal behavior shifts from being solely public to also becoming
private.
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Learning RFT
be less developed and less precise than it is for other, more observable areas
in our field of experience.
RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR
Please wait outside, and Ill be right with you is a verbal statement that is
easy to analyze using operant psychologys basic formula, ABC. If, as a result
of this statement, the listener goes outside to wait for the person who made the
statement to join her, we could analyze it as follows: The statement functions
as an antecedent (A) for the behavior of going outside (B) in order for the
speaker to join the listener outside (C). According to Skinner, the antecedent
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Thinking and Human Language
41
Learning RFT
A DIFFICULT QUESTION
To utter a rule or an instruction is, by Skinners definition, verbal behavior.
However, as mentioned above, rule-governed behaviorfollowing a ruleis
not necessarily verbal behavior. If someone says, Wait outside, and Ill
be right with you, and I reply in turn, that would be verbal behavior. But
if I simply go outside to wait, then, according to Skinner, it is not. Rather,
it would be a result of previously experienced consequences and should be
understood in the same way we understand contingency-shaped behavior. But
this raises a difficult question: How is it, then, that we humans act with a view
toward the future, toward things we havent previously experienced, and that
we do this as a result of something that has been said or thought? How can we
understand the effect verbal behavior has on listeners in everyday situations
like the following? Lets assume someone tells you, Tomorrow, when you
hear someone honk five times, go outside and Ill be there. Then, the next
day, you go outside when you hear someone honk five times, even though you
have never previously encountered any reinforcing consequences for doing so
in that kind of situation. Or, for a slightly longer-term example, if a colleague
behaves disagreeably, you may think, The next time she acts like that, Im
going to give her a piece of my mind. Then, three weeks later when your col-
league does something similar, you do exactly that. The mechanisms at work
become even more interesting in the extreme long term, when we humans do
things in the present that seem to be governed by how we think things are
going to be after were dead, whether it has to do with prospects of going to
heaven, our childrens financial future, or the desire to finally find peace.
A more technical way of expressing the same question is to base it on
Skinners definition of verbal behavior that functions as rules or instructions.
He wrote that this behavior specifies behavior and consequences (Skinner,
1966). That leaves us with the question of how a verbal behavior now can
specify behavior and consequences that are not taking place in the present
and that the individual has not earlier experienced. And how are we able to
carry out new actions in order to achieve such consequences? How do we
manage to stop smoking based on the assertion Stop smoking, or youll have
a high risk of getting lung cancer, when the consequences we face in doing
this are primarily of a punishing type? The consequences that result could
include short-term effects like withdrawal symptoms or the loss of pleasant
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Thinking and Human Language
company during smoke breaks, whereas not getting cancer is very abstract
and temporally distant. How does this work?
Skinner answered this question by referring to a long history of verbal
conditioning (Skinner, 1957, p. 360), but he never pinpointed how to
describe such a potential learning history. Remember that a fundamental
principle for how both antecedents and consequences acquire their govern-
ing functions for behavior is that they are contingent on the behavior they
influence. Experimental behavior analysis sees the direct contiguity between
stimuli as absolutely crucial, for operant as well as respondent conditioning.
Skinner distinguished between this and rule-governed behavior, maintaining
that a complex learning history in one way or another bridges this dividing
line. But what would such a history look like? That is a question he never
answered. Early on, he mentioned the possibility of human language involv-
ing something more than the principles of operant and respondent condition-
ing, which he had accounted for (Skinner, 1938), but he later abandoned this
alternative.
Several leading behavioral analysts, like Michael (1986), Parrott (1987),
and Schlinger (1990), have brought this issue up, along with the observation
that a convincing answer has long been overdue within behavior analysis.
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Learning RFT
Within behavior analysis, on the other hand, the guiding principle is that
the causes of different behaviors are things that occur in the context of these
behaviors. Causes are processes outside the actual behavior, and therefore
they are accessible to direct influence, at least in principle. This is a pragmatic
approach, adopted because it supports the aim of behavior analysis, which
is not just to achieve prediction, but also to achieve influence. In this light,
assumed internal structures, like schemas, are problematic. After all, such
structures are not accessible to direct influence. They are merely assumed,
and they are not available for contact in time and space. All we can contact is
their effects: the phenomena they are assumed to cause. If something cannot
be contacted in time and space, then it also cannot be influenced in a direct
way. In behavior analysis, these theories based on assumed internal structures
and mental representations are seen as a historical remnant of prescientific
discussions that included the soul or the psyche (Skinner, 1963).
Arguments for internal structures as causes of behavior follow the
same pattern as everyday expressions we use when, for example, we say that
someone is eating because she is hungry. How do we actually know that
someone is hungry? This is simply a conclusion arrived at based on the per-
sons behavior, which is what we can observe. She is acting in a certain way in
relation to food. The expression being hungry only summarizes a number
of behaviors and phenomena that we can observe or contact in some other
way. Some of these phenomena can be contacted by everyone present, such as
seeing the person eating food or hearing her talk about it. Other phenomena
are available for contact only to the person who experiences them, like the
feeling in her stomach. But the assessment She is hungry is nothing more
than these phenomena taken together. If these phenomena are not present,
then hunger as an internal object disappears. Of course, this way of express-
ing ourselves is often linguistically convenient. It is, to use one of the terms
I have accounted for in this chapter, an example of how we tact our own or
someone elses behavior. But the fact that she is hungry does not suffice as
a scientific explanation for why that person is eatingat least not in behavior
analysis. The expression she is hungry is simply a summary of the behavior
one wishes to explain. In order to answer the question of why someone is
eating, it is necessary to examine the context of the behavior. You have to
search among the antecedents and consequences surrounding the behavior
of eating. The causes must be sought both in the present and in the historical
context.
Many modern cognitive theories or information processing theories
use neurobiology in their explanatory models (Siegel, 1999) and see differ-
ent brain structures and the activity taking place within them as causes of
behavior. Although seemingly more scientific, this is much the same as the
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Thinking and Human Language
45
Learning RFT
There is extensive literature on this topic available for interested readers (e.g.,
Andersson, 2005; Solso et al., 2005). My purpose has simply been to point
out, from a behavior analytic perspective, what unites these other perspec-
tives, and what makes them unacceptable as alternatives.
The fact that cognitive and behavior analytic approaches are very differ-
ent from each other does not eliminate their points of contact in connection
with the phenomena described. (I will return to this topic later in this book.)
Neither do the differences imply that a dialogue between these approaches is
useless. On the contrary, there are writers who argue that we are currently at
a point where such a dialogue could be productive (Overskeid, 2008).
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Thinking and Human Language
that are delayed in time. A verbal statement can have short-term consequences
that are hard to explain based on the classic principles. The statement Hide
behind the statue; the two guys in brown jackets are out to get you can have a
rapid effect on the listeners behavior. This is true even if the listener has never
had any unpleasant experiences connected with people in brown jackets, and
even if she has never been assaulted or hidden behind a statue when threat-
ened. Similar effects can follow upon self-generated rules: rules that can only
be apprehended by the person following them. There have been proposals for
an explanation of these effects through respondent-like associative learning
of some kind (Parrott, 1984). However, these explanations seem far-fetched
when it comes to more complex linguistic behavior, and they havent led to
any research-related progress connected to behavior analysiss second objec-
tive: influencing behavior (S. C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).
A REDUNDANT QUESTION?
My main quest in writing this book is to describe theoretical conclusions
based on new experimental findings concerning human language and cogni-
tion. I also want to show how we can use those conclusions to solve behavior
analysiss dilemma concerning verbal and rule-governed behavior. And all
of this is done with the purpose of increasing our understanding of complex
human behavior and our ability to influence it. This knowledge can then be
applied to the types of problems that make people seek psychological help,
and therefore can help provide clinical tools in working for change. But before
exploring this important issue, let me bring your attention to the question of
whether working to understand and influence the function thinking has for
humans is, in fact, clinically relevant. In chapter 3, Ill examine whether this
has any significance in working for change.
47
CHAPTER 3
Is the Power of Thinking a
Clinically Relevant Issue?
50
Is the Power of Thinking a Clinically Relevant Issue?
least largely, private events. Leading researchers and theorists have pointed
out this inconsistency (Dougher & Hackbert, 2000; Kanter, Busch, Weeks,
& Landes, 2008).
Clearly, behavior analysis has long contained this unsolved dilemma con-
cerning private events and their influence on human behavior as a whole. An
important aspect here is the possible power of thinking, and if it is real, how
that power functions. In many respects, this is essentially the same dilemma
as the one I described in the previous chapter; that is, the question of how we
are to understand and influence rule-governed behavior.
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Is the Power of Thinking a Clinically Relevant Issue?
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Learning RFT
of this kind cannot be held to be conclusive one way or the other. A recently
published review did, however, reach the conclusion that there is little empir-
ical support for the role of cognitive change as causal in the symptomatic
improvements achieved in CBT (Longmore & Worrel, 2007). Even leading
researchers who themselves clearly adhere to the cognitive model say that the
research situation today is such that we cannot make any decisive conclusions
about what exactly mediates the changes in cognitive therapy (Hofmann &
Asmundson, 2008). And this is said about a therapy model that has domi-
nated the scene for more than thirty years! During this same period, results
within the empirically supported therapies more generally havent seemed to
improve as cognitive models have come to predominate (st, 2008).
This means that even outside of behavior analysis, the question con-
cerning the power of thinking is in many ways unanswered. There is still no
clear scientific support for the notion that a specific focus on thoughts and
the power of thinking is essential to clinical therapy work. Such a focus is
definitely a part of existing, functioning therapies. But we do not know what
the significance of such a therapeutic strategy is, and even if an emphasis on
thoughts and thinking was proven to be essential, we still wouldnt know how
this focus should best be implemented in practice.
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Is the Power of Thinking a Clinically Relevant Issue?
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Learning RFT
his own behavior. In the terminology used earlier, the client learns to tact his
own behavior. Homework assignments are planned, and the therapist encour-
ages the client to describe his experiences afterward. In short, the therapy is,
of course, full of verbal behavior, both in the form of actions by the therapist
and in the form of skills that are encouraged in the client. Indeed, no advocate
of this therapeutic model would maintain anything else.
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PART 2
Relational Learning
CHAPTER 4
Derived Relational Responding
as the Fundamental Element in
Human Language
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DRR as the Fundamental Element in Human Language
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Learning RFT
A typical experiment
AFD AFD
Most people may feel that this is self-evident. But the fact that it appears
self-evident is probably due to the fact that this is something we are constantly
doing. This behavior is universal among humans, which makes it seem natural
to us. But if we are to explain verbal behavior, one of the difficulties lies pre-
cisely in that what we want to explain is something natural or obvious to
us. And yet, how obvious is this from a larger perspective? From repeated
studies involving different animal species, we know that this ability has not
been convincingly shown in any other species1 (S. C. Hayes, 1989), not even
1The fact that there has been no demonstration of other animal species
showing derived stimulus relations does not mean we should view this skill
as something exclusively human. Future studies, perhaps of higher quality,
could change our understanding in this respect. It seems clear, however,
that if other species do have some degree of this ability, it is to a much lesser
extent than humans do.
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DRR as the Fundamental Element in Human Language
chimpanzees that have had many years of language training with humans
(Dugdale & Lowe, 2000). Humans, in contrast, show this behavior from at
least two years of age (Devany, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986).
That a trained relation (E D) entails an additional relation (D E) is
just one aspect of derived stimulus relations. It is possible for two or more
trained relations to lead to the emergence of one or more other relations based
on a combination of the trained relations. Lets say that we perform training of
another relation: If D is present, choose Z, and do not choose any other avail-
able stimuli. This, through direct training, provides us with the relation D
Z. If this is trained, an additional relation will be derived: Z D. This takes
place in the same way that the relation between D and E occurred. We have
trained two relations, and two more have been derived: E D and D Z have
been trained, and D E and Z D have been derived. But since D is a part of
both relations, these two can be combined. Now, if Z is presented as an initial
stimulus and E is a possible option, the likelihood is high that study partici-
pants will choose E, provided that no other stimuli that are trained directly
or that are in a derived relation to Z are among the possible options. The same
goes for E as an initial stimulus with Z as one of the possible options. And this
is despite the fact that E and Z are not in any directly trained mutual relation.
The relations that have been trained display combinatorial mutual entailment.2
Although participants were trained in only two relations, they derived four
other relations.
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Learning RFT
E D Z
Directly trained
Directly trained
Mutual entailment
Mutual entailment
Combinatorial mutual entailment
Combinatorial mutual entailment
Fig. 4:3
The experiments I have described may seem rather abstract. But they
show us that humans can do something that other animals either cannot do
at all or possibly can do, but only to a much lesser extent. These experiments
also demonstrate a type of learning that does not seem to follow the principles
we know as operant and respondent learning. In these experiments, the train-
ing is aimed at making E function as a discriminative stimulus for choosing
D. However, D also acquires a discriminative function for choosing E. How
does this happen? In addition, E and Z each acquire discriminative functions
for choosing the other without the two being in any directly trained relation
with each other. In this case, they acquire their functions via combination of
the functions trained to occur between E and D (if E is given, choose D) and
between D and Z (if D is given, choose Z).
If we were to carry out such experiments with animals other than human
beings, the animal (say, a dog or a monkey) will act in accordance with the
trained relations after receiving the same type of training. There is a high prob-
ability that the dog will choose D if E is presented, and Z if D is presented. But
as far as the remaining options are concerned, it will simply choose randomly.
There do not seem to be any derived stimulus relations present to the animal.
The same thing is true for most children up to almost two years of age.
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All of this is strikingly similar to what we know from daily life. Lets say
that we are training a clever parrot and a likewise clever three- or four-year-
old girl, Sue, to say pretty Carla just after Carla steps into the room. We do
this by rewarding them when they repeat after us. The parrot is given a couple
of peanuts when it produces a sequence of sounds that gradually approximates
pretty Carla. Sue receives encouragement, probably by us saying, Thats
right, pretty Carla. Thats good, Sue. Keep it up! This type of interpersonal
contact (often called tuning or mirroring) has a reinforcing effect on Sues
behavior but little to no effect on the parrots. In this way, we train both of
them to say the desired words after Carla has stepped into the room. If this
is a particular type of parrot, it may sound rather like what Sue sounds like.
We say that the parrot has learned to speak. Still, it is easy to show that Sue
has learned some things that the parrot has not. If, at this point, we were to
say pretty Carla when Carla cannot be seen, nothing we know about parrots
or their way of behaving indicates that this has any meaning to the parrot.
Sue, on the other hand, is likely to turn around, look toward the door, and so
on. Neither the parrot nor Sue has been trained in accordance with If you
hear pretty Carla, look for or expect Carla. The relation that was trained was
seeing Carla produce the sound pretty Carla. However, it is likely that Sue
will also act on the derived relation: the sound pretty Carla Carla. This
relation does not seem to exist for the parrot.
I could give many examples illustrating the ability of young humans to
derive relations that dont seem to exist for other animals. We can teach a dog
to react to the word cookie by repeatedly saying cookie just before we give
the dog a real cookie. After the dog has had this repeated experience of the
word cookie real cookie, we can expect to find that when we say cookie,
the dog will in various ways behave as though a real cookie was on its way.
If instead we train the dog by first giving it the cookie, and then uttering the
word cookie after it has eaten it, the dog will never learn to react to the
word, no matter how many times we repeat this procedure. The dogs learning
process follows a certain order. From the relation real cookie word cookie
(which the dog experienced in the latter example), the dog will not derive the
relation word cookie real cookie. If we were to do the same thing with
a four-year-old child, the childs ability to react to a derived relation will be
evident. The child will react to the word cookie, even though the relation
word cookie real cookie has never been trained in a direct way. The word
cookie has acquired its function by way of mutual entailment.
On the surface, it looks like we can teach parrots and dogs parts of
human language. What small children learn at an early age, however, is an
additional form of responding. They are learning the fundamental skills in
human languaging.
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chair
h silla
ll stoll
66 Directly trained
M
Mutual
l entailment
il
DRR as the Fundamental Element in Human Language
Directly trained
Mutual entailment
Does this not seem very much like what we can easily observe in the
ordinary language training that constantly goes on in the dialogue between
children and their parents or other caregivers? Relations between words
both spoken and writtenand different types of objects, pictures, and events
are naturally trained in this very way in our social environments, and it seems
obvious that all of these different relations are not specifically and separately
trained.
The fact that the phenomenon of derived stimulus relations, which can be
demonstrated in monitored experiments, has such a strong similarity to what
we observe in human languaging skills has led researchers to the assump-
tion that this is a fundamental process of human language. Other findings
that convincingly point in this direction are from studies of individuals with
varying degrees of language difficulty. These studies have shown a correla-
tion between proficiency in language and the ability to demonstrate derived
relational responding in laboratory experiments. Individuals with very low
language scores tend to fail tests of derived relational responding (Devany et
al., 1986).
The link between language and derived relations has also been supported
by a number of studies using neurophysiological methods of measurement. In
these experiments, when people derive relations in the way described above,
the same type of brain activity is observed as can be recorded during obvious
language-related activities (D. Barnes-Holmes, Staunton, et al., 2004; Dickins
et al., 2001; Horne & Lowe, 1996).
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on that persons learning history, but the capacity to learn in these ways is
present at the very outset. It is a result of evolution. However, the evidence
suggests that derived relational responding is not a prewired capacity, like
respondent or operant conditioning, but that it is learned, and further, that
even if respondent learning is also in play (Rehfeldt & Hayes, 1998), derived
relational responding is something we mainly learn through operant condi-
tioning. What is there to suggest this?
1. Operant behavior evolves gradually, over time. Studies that elucidate
the development of derived stimulus responding in young children
demonstrate such gradual learning (Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993;
Luciano, Gmez, & Rodrguez, 2007).
2. Operant behavior is flexible and can be influenced. This also char-
acterizes derived relational responding, both in learning the reper-
toire in itself (Lipkens et al., 1993) and in learning new, individual
responses (Healy, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000).
3. Operant behavior is influenced by conditions that precede the
behaviorwhat we call antecedents. This applies to derived rela-
tional responding as well (Dymond & Barnes, 1995; Roche, Barnes-
Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, & McGeady, 2000; Dougher,
Hamilton, Fink, & Harrington, 2007).
4. Operant behavior is influenced by its own consequences; in fact, this
is the defining feature of this form of behavior. Our knowledge about
derived relational responses conforms with this (Y. Barnes-Holmes,
Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Strand, & Friman, 2004; Y. Barnes-Holmes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2004; Heagle & Rehfeldt, 2006; Berens
& Hayes, 2007).
This means we can formulate an answer to the first question I posed at
the beginning of this chapter: Within RFT, what kind of behavior do we refer
to when we speak of verbal behavior? Verbal behavior is the behavior of relat-
ing stimuli or events in a particular way. As certain relations are directly trained
according to the principles of operant and respondent learning, the verbally
competent human being derives additional relationsrelations that need not
be trained directly. The ability to relate stimuli in this way is in itself a learned
ability, learned through operant conditioning.
If this is correctthat is, if the fundamental process in human language
can be understood as operant behaviorthen interesting and important pos-
sibilities arise. Operant behavior can be influenced. An understanding of this
process would mean there are prospects for influencing human behavior in
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DRR as the Fundamental Element in Human Language
because the stimulus (the square, or a certain part of it) was associated with
an event that provoked an unconditioned fear response. In this case, the
assault is the unconditioned stimulus. In operant learning, events also acquire
new stimulus functions based on contiguity with other events. In chapter 1, I
explained how a certain facial expression in another person had a discrimina-
tive function for my behavior in addressing the person in question. How did
that specific facial expression in that type of situation acquire this stimulus
function? This occurred as a result of a process in which certain facial expres-
sions of other people (A) preceded my action of addressing them (B), and
certain consequences (C) resulted from my action.
Clearly, proximity of events in time and space is crucial to learning for
both operant and respondent conditioning. Another way of putting this is that
in both types of learning, direct relations between stimuli play a crucial role
in what stimulus functions are established. Certain stimuli have either a rein-
forcing or a punishing function for my behavior based on the direct relations
between these stimuli in my history. Certain stimuli have a function of trig-
gering anxiety in me at a certain point, based on their direct relations to other
stimuli in my history. If someone raises her voice, this may provoke anxiety or
fear, perhaps because of experiences I had with my parents or with a teacher
in my early years at school. The direct relation that has existed between events
influences which functions are established. Behavior analysis uses the term
contingencies for these relations in time and space (see chapter 1). The
influence these contingencies have on stimulus functions is applicable both
to respondent functions and to various functions in operant behavior: dis-
criminative, motivational, reinforcing, and punishing.
An additional factor plays a role in establishing stimulus functions:
what I described earlier in connection with the term generalization. Events
or stimuli are related in terms of physical properties. The facial expression
that now has a discriminative function for my addressing someone does not
have to be exactly the same as what Ive encountered earlier; it only has to
be similar enough. To enter an unfamiliar town square can cause fear if it is
similar enough to the square where I was assaulted, even if it differs in some
respects.
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was used to establish relations between stimuli so that the word chair took
on a discriminative function for Kyle choosing the word silla. In the same
way, silla acquired a discriminative function for choosing stol. But, at the
same time, the word silla acquired a discriminative function for choosing the
word chair (through mutual entailment) and chair acquired a discrimina-
tive function for choosing stol (through combinatorial mutual entailment).
This was established even though Kyle had no operant or respondent learn-
ing history that could account for how these words took on these functions.
Kyle encountered contingencies of reinforcement that explain whatever was
trained directly. But he also derived other relations, and these derived rela-
tions seem to govern the establishment of new stimulus functions. If alter-
ing stimulus functions is dependent on contingencies being established in
the way described for operant and respondent conditioning, each and every
connection must be trained directly or be established through generalization.
But derived relations seem to establish stimulus functions without any such
contingencies between stimuli.
The experiments Ive described thus far have demonstrated that discrimi-
native stimulus functions can arise through derived relations, but research
has shown that a number of other stimulus functions can be established in the
same way. One example is an experiment demonstrating that respondent func-
tions can also be established through derived stimulus relations (Dougher,
Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994). This is especially relevant
from a clinical perspective because respondent functions like fear and other
emotional reactions often play a central role in clinical problems.
This experiment was performed using the type of abstract, meaningless
visual stimuli described earlier. The individuals who took part in the study
were first trained as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Three stimuli
in the training sessionslets call them B, C, and Dwere used in a way that
put them in relation solely through mutual entailment and/or combinatorial
mutual entailment. No direct connections (contingencies) according to the
principles for operant or respondent learning were established among these
three stimuli. The stimuli were displayed on a computer screen. Another
group of stimulilets call them F, G, and Hwere related to each other in
a corresponding way, but not related to the first group. Following this, one
of the stimuli in the first group (B) was given a respondent function. This
was done by repeatedly administering a light electrical shock whenever B was
displayed on the screen. Through this respondent conditioning, B acquired a
new stimulus function. This was gauged through skin conductance, indicating
what we might refer to in everyday language as mild discomfort or fear.
Parallel with this, participants were given a simple task to perform on the
computer, for which they could earn a small amount of money. The purpose of
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DRR as the Fundamental Element in Human Language
this task was simply to motivate the participants to stay busy and alert in front
of the screen. As the participants worked, randomly selected stimuli (B, C, D,
F, G, or H) were displayed on the screen. That B caused increased skin con-
ductance would be expected, based on respondent conditioning. However,
in this experiment, C and D also caused increased skin conductance, even
though neither stimulus had ever been followed by an electrical shock, nor
had they been related to B based on contiguity or formal (physical) proper-
ties. However, when F, G, or H was displayed on the screen, participants did
not show the corresponding increase in skin conductance.
In a second experiment with a new group of participants, derived relations
were once again established among a group of previously unrelated stimuli: B,
C, and D. Then, in this experiment, all of the stimuli were given a respondent
function through a mild electrical shock that followed upon display of the dif-
ferent stimuli on the screen. After this, an extinction contingency was estab-
lished for one of the stimuli: B was now displayed without being followed by
a shock. As this was repeated, participants showed a decreased level of skin
conductance when B was displayed on the screen, something that would be
expected as a result of the extinction of a respondent function. At the same
time, the experiment showed that this extinction also took place for the
stimuli that were related to B through mutual entailment and combinatorial
mutual entailment (C and D). The experiment also included a control group.
They were not given the training that would result in the stimuli being put
in a derived relation, but they were trained for conditioning by receiving an
electrical shock after all three stimuli (B, C, and D) and for extinction with B
in the same way as the first group. In these individuals, extinction took place
in connection with B, but not in connection with C or D.
The researchers concluded that the experiments describe a process
whereby stimuli can acquire and lose a function of a respondent nature
without the long known conditions for respondent learning being in effect.
In other words, stimulus functions were altered through derived relations.
In RFT, alteration of stimulus functions based on derived relations is called
transformation of functions.
Other, similar experiments have shown the same type of transformation
of other stimulus functions, including reinforcing (S. C. Hayes, Kohlenberg,
& Hayes, 1991), self-discriminating (Dymond & Barnes, 1994), mood (Y.
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, & Luciano, 2004) and sexual
functions (Roche et al., 2000). This indicates that stimulus functions can
be altered in at least two separate ways: They can change in the way long
described within operant and respondent conditioning, and they can also
be altered, or transformed, through derived relational responding. In the
first case, stimulus functions are established through contingencies: direct
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DRR as the Fundamental Element in Human Language
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I will now establish a new relation involving the figures # and @, inde-
pendent of the direct contingencies described above. Ill do this by adding
a typical contextual cue that all readers will respond to: # is larger than @.
That this relation can be established regardless of the physical properties of
the stimuli related is evident, in this case by the fact that the new relation is
in some ways contradictory, since readers actually perceive @ as the larger
figure. Despite this, no reader has any problem in acting or reacting in accor-
dance with the newly established relation. The following shows this: Lets give
one of the figures a specific function by saying that @ is a sum of money. If
you could now choose between # and @, which one would you choose?
At an early age, humans learn to relate stimuli in a way that is not neces-
sarily governed by stimuli being contiguous (in the present or historically)
or by physical properties of the stimuli that are related. This finally brings us
to the answer to the third question posed at the beginning of this chapter:
What are the factors that govern verbal behavior? This special way of relating
is governed by contextual cues that specify the relation regardless of the properties
of the stimuli that are being related. There is an example of such a cue in the
text above: is larger than. The stimuli that are used in this way are mainly
sound combinations in the shape of what we call words and sentences (or
visual combinations in the case of written text), but other stimuli, like differ-
ent gestures, can function in this way as well. Because the contextual cues that
govern which relation is established can be independent of the stimuli that are
related, the relation becomes arbitrarily applicable. Anything can be put in
relation to anything else. Since derived relations are established by arbitrary
stimuli that are agreed upon by the social context, in RFT these relations are
often called arbitrary relations. Correspondingly, relations that are based on
contiguity between stimuli or on formal, physical properties of the stimuli
that are being related (as is generalization) are called nonarbitrary relations.
In everyday life, arbitrary and nonarbitrary relations are constantly com-
bining to affect stimulus functions and thus human behavior. Therefore, in
everyday examples it is often impossible to determine whether stimulus func-
tions were established directly or by derived relational responding. However,
from experimental work we do know that verbally competent individuals
derive relations in the way described, and that such relations occur in much
larger numbers than directly trained relations do (Wilson, ODonohue, &
Hayes, 2001). It is therefore reasonable to argue that the majority of the rela-
tions that arise in a certain linguistic context are derived relations. At the
same time, interaction of the two kinds of relations is an ongoing process.
The example involving Kyle showed how the relation chair stol was
established not by direct training, but through derived relations. However, if
Kyle learns to use this Swedish word as a variant of the English word chair,
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Learning RFT
directions and using the same contextual cues, in this case sound combina-
tions. It is important that the training be done in both directionsand it is
also what typically takes place very early in childrens natural language train-
ing. At seeing her father, the child hears Daddylook, theres Daddy, and
after the question Where is Daddy? Wheres Daddy? the childs behavior
is reinforced if she orients toward her father. In this last example, there is no
formal similarity between the word and the object (the dad), but the direct
contingencies that have been established by ongoing repetition and associa-
tion are used, and they provide a direct relation through respondent learning.
After the child has seen her father a large number of times while simulta-
neously hearing the word Daddy, this wordthrough respondent condi-
tioningwill trigger a perceptual experience in the child similar to actually
seeing her father, just like I described earlier in connection with seeing a red
car. Skinner referred to this as conditioned seeing, or seeing in the absence of
the thing seen (Skinner, 1953, 1974).
In formal language training, a number of different stimuli are used:
Where is the ball? Look, theres the ball. Wheres the kitty? Theres the
kitty. If the child orients toward these stimuli or does any other action in
relation to these stimuli, this behavior is reinforced. The training is performed
in both directions (word ball actual ball; actual ball word ball) while
the contextual cuessound combinations as well as movements and ges-
turesremain consistent. Although the objects vary, certain contextual cues
stay the same. Gradually, the child abstracts these contextual cues as decisive
for the relation between different stimuli. This means the training can move
on, using new stimuli that lack physical similarities and also have no previ-
ously trained relation in the childs learning history. The same contextual cues
(is, goes together with, same as) are still used. If the child acts based on
the objects being the same or going together, this is reinforced: Yes, thats
right! In this way, the child learns to relate stimuli that are new and that lack
formal similarities. Once she does this based solely on the arbitrarily estab-
lished contextual cues the social environment provides, we have an arbitrarily
established relation of coordination. Suddenly, based on a certain socially
produced context (mainly sound combinations) being present, one thing can
mean another, regardless of the individuals earlier history in connection with
the stimuli involved or the physical similarities between them. If a four-year-
old boy has experienced riding in a small rowboat and has learned to call it
a boat but has never experienced going by ferry, the word ferry can take
on a number of functions for him when he is told that a ferry is a large boat.
Once this repertoire is in place, the child will also successively learn to do this
silently, according to the principles described in chapter 2.
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exercises are repeated again, allowing the child to act in relation to objects
and events based not on their physical properties, but on relations that are
in line with the arbitrarily, socially established contextual cues; in this case,
the words more and less. When the child responds in accordance with the
contextual cues, independent of the nonarbitrary relations between stimuli,
this is reinforced. This same type of training takes place naturally when, for
example, children learn the relation between coins.
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Directly trained
Mutual entailment
A number of studies have shown that we are able to put stimuli or events
in arbitrary relations other than coordination. These studies are performed
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was displayed, the skin conductance was at a higher level than when E was
displayed, even though only E had been directly connected to an electrical
shock and F had never been directly connected to an electrical shock or to
other stimuli that were. In fact, one of the participants pulled off the electrode
when F was presented on the screen. The severity of the electrical shock used
in the experiment was calibrated to each individual participant to make it
slightly unpleasant but not painful. The person in question thus had this expe-
rience because of the ability to relate stimuli and, specifically, the aspects of
more than and less than.
The researchers came to the conclusion that this once again demonstrated
an alteration of stimulus functions based on a derived relation. They also con-
cluded that this alteration meant not only that a stimulus had acquired the
function of another stimulus (as in a relation of coordination or equivalence),
but that the transformation of stimulus function involved was governed by
the specific relation of more than, which was established in the experiment.
Other relations between stimuli have been studied in a corresponding way
and have been shown to influence stimulus functions as well. Two examples
are opposition (Dymond & Barnes, 1996; Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004a)
and perspective (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003).
RELATIONAL FRAMING
Relating in the particular way described in this chapter is termed relational
framing. A more technical term for this is arbitrarily applicable relational
responding (AARR). This behavior is a generalized operant. The term gen-
eralized is often used to describe operant behavior when it is important to
emphasize that a particular behavior can only be described in a functional
sense, and that it completely lacks topographical description. Other examples
of such behavior are imitation or doing something novel. Any type of action
could belong to these categories, regardless of its appearance or topography.
Relational framing is also this type of action (generalized operant behavior).
When we speak of framing things in different types of relations (opposition,
comparison, spatial, temporal, and so on), the term relational frames is
metaphoric. It refers to the way a frame can contain anything. This term does
not imply that relational frames exist as mental objects. It is a way of saying
that people can put things in various types of relations; that is, we place them
inside frames. Obviously, the placing, too, is metaphorical. This relating is not
based on any formal or physical properties of the related stimuli; rather, the
relations come about as a result of this specific form of human behavior, which
in turn is controlled by contextual cues. Relational framing is a behavior that
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Imagine an apple.
Now, compare that experience with what you notice while reading this
sentence:
In both examples, the context (in this case the rest of the sentence) estab-
lished around the word apple cues the same kind of relation between the
word apple and the readers experience of a real apple: a relation of coordina-
tion. But the functions that are brought to bear for the reader probably arent
identical for the two sentences. Your imaginary contact with an apple shifted,
meaning that different stimulus functions were contacted, even though the
same relation was cued. The socially and arbitrarily created context not only
cues a particular relation, but also determines which stimulus functions, out
of many potential functions, are transformed by this relation. The words
imagine in the first sentence and imagine eating in the second cued dif-
ferent transformations of functions. The change in the context that the reader
encountered (in this case, a sentence) transformed which functions of a real-
life apple were brought to the fore for the reader. Other functions of an apple
would be contacted with yet another contextual change:
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DRR as the Fundamental Element in Human Language
another example: Larry is better than Peter at playing tennis. The words
better than most likely function as Crel here, as they control which relation
is established between Larry and Peter. The words at playing tennis function
as Cfunc by governing which function is brought to bear, in this case through
a comparative relation.
Crel and Cfunc are functional classes, so we cannot say that any given factor
can always be designated as one or the other. To make this determination, we
have to analyze a given process or event, as is always the case for a functional
analysis. The distinction between contextual cues that govern the relation and
contextual cues that govern which stimulus functions among the many possi-
bilities are transformed is not always an essential one, but it can be. One situ-
ation where the distinction is important is in certain clinical interventions.
This is something Ill return to in part 3 of the book.
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this out. These gaps are filled by RFT by way of its new definition of verbal
behavior, which makes it possible to define rule-governed behavior precisely.
(I will return to this in chapter 6.) It is important to note that, under this new
definition, a specific behavior that is verbal according to Skinners definition
may or may not be verbal according to RFT. For example, a tact as defined by
Skinner is not necessarily verbal from the perspective of RFT. If a child tacts
a dog, this response could be the result of having seen a dog at an earlier
point and having uttered a dog and then receiving reinforcement that was
contingent upon this response. Yet all of this can occur without the phrase a
dog participating in a relational frame, in which case the tact is not verbal
according to RFTs definition because it has been established solely through
direct contingencies. Many times, though, when children use the phrase a
dog, it is also in derived relations with real dogs (and other things), and the
childs response is then verbal in the RFT sense, as well. A similar distinction
between the Skinnerian definition of verbal behavior and the RFT definition
can be made for the other verbal operants described by Skinner. (For a more
detailed comparison of Skinners definitions and those of RFT, see D. Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2000.)
SUMMARY
Verbal behavior, according to RFT, is to put stimuli (events) in relation and
to act on or react to stimuli based on the resulting relations. This behavior
is learned in early language training and is a generalized operant. This par-
ticular way of relating is primarily controlled not by the nonarbitrary rela-
tion between the stimuli being related, but by other contextual cues. The
stimuli that function as such cues are mostly sound combinationswhat we
would normally call words. But other contextual factors, such as gestures or
even features of the nonsocial environment, can also have this function. This
means that anything can be related to anything else, since the social environ-
ment can manipulate the governing contextual cues.
This behavior is called relational framing, or, more technically, arbitrarily
applicable relational responding (AARR). The latter term illustrates several
of the considerations discussed in this chapter. Responding makes clear
that this is a behavior. Relational responding lets us know that this behav-
ior involves relating events to each other. That these relational responses are
arbitrarily applicable tells us that this relational responding is not based on
any nonarbitrary or formal (physical) relations between the stimuli being
related; rather, it is based on aspects of the context that specify the relation
such that the relational response can be brought to bear on any stimuli or
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89
CHAPTER 5
Analogies, Metaphors, and
Our Experience of Self
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Analogies, Metaphors, and Our Experience of Self
problems (S. C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Rehfeldt & Barnes-
Holmes, 2009). However, this book restricts itself to applications in the field
we normally call psychotherapy.
Before I can go on to the applications related to psychological problems
and psychological therapy, I need to describe a few more key concepts in
RFT. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to two of these fundaments: first, as
already touched upon, the fact that arbitrarily applicable relational respond-
ing can be used to relate relations to other relations and thereby create what
we call analogies and metaphors; and second, how this behavior creates our
experience of self.
ANALOGIES
As mentioned above, the ability to think analogically is widely seen as being of
fundamental importance to human language and cognition. In an anthology
on analogical reasoning written by researchers within different fields of appli-
cation (Vosniadou & Ortony, 1989), several contributors discuss how we are
to understand the different types of comparison and mapping (a common
term in cognitive models of analogical thinking) that are constituent parts
of analogies (Collins & Burstein, 1989; Gentner, 1989). The core idea is that
knowledge is transferred from one field of experience (often called base or
vehicle) to another (usually called target). The base is the field of experi-
ence which is most familiar; the target is then the field where knowledge is to
be expanded, which is done by relating the two fields. The well-known analogy
between the solar system and an atom is a classical example. When using this
analogy, we assume that the solar system is more familiar, so it functions as
the base, with the atom being the target. This ability to act on or react to pat-
terns and similarities is thought to be very fundamental to human cognitive
abilities and as such is currently the subject of many studies within the wide
field of research known as cognitive science. Researchers are trying to design
computer models of the phenomenon, searching for its biological bases, and
studying how people behave through psychological experiments (Gentner,
Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001). The basic phenomenon is often described as the
ability to relate both objects and the relations between objects (Holyoak &
Thagard, 1997; Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff, & Boronat, 2001). One problem that
arises in trying to familiarize oneself with this field of research is the lack of
agreed-upon basic models. It may be an exaggeration to say that each writer or
researcher has his own model, but even so, it would be an exaggeration with a
point. Many different models are presented, and most seem to lack common
points of departure (Collins & Burstein, 1989; Kokinov & Petrov, 2001).
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RFT allows us to describe the human behavior that underlies our ability
to create analogies. We can do this using thoroughly operationalized con-
cepts in the way that has always been the distinguishing feature of behavior
analysis.
Analogies originate in relational framingspecifically, the relational
framing of relations. Relational networks that are already established, and
which in themselves usually consist of both arbitrary and nonarbitrary rela-
tions, are related. This is not, in principle, anything novel as compared to what
I described in chapter 4. If different stimuli or events can be related arbitrarily,
then relations can also be related arbitrarily, following the same principles.
Lets look at a rather uncomplicated and typical analogy: Volvo is to Saab
as nectarines are to peaches. Here we have a relation that is already estab-
lished, the relation we traditionally call the base. Nectarines are in a known
relation to peaches. This is a relation of similarity: Both are edible, taste
sweet, have a similar shape, grow on trees, and so on. By putting this relation
in coordination with the relation between Volvo and Saabthe target of this
analogystimulus functions are transferred from one relational network to
the other. Someone who had just been asked to choose either Volvo or Saab
and who thought the difference was quite large now has a new basis for his
choice. Through a relation of coordination between two different relations
(the relation between nectarines and peaches is in coordination with the rela-
tion between Volvo and Saab), the stimulus functions are transformed, which
could have an impact on the listeners behavior.
Note that both arbitrary and nonarbitrary relations are a part of the
analogy. That the words used refer to certain actual phenomena is arbitrarily
established. Certain relations in the respective networks are arbitrarily
established as well, like the fact that both nectarines and peaches belong to
the category we have learned to call fruits. Likewise, Volvo and Saab are in
arbitrarily established relations; for example, both are trademarks of motor
vehicles. At the same time, the analogy makes use of nonarbitrary relations
of similarity. Nectarines and peaches are similar in certain respects, and
Volvo and Saab are also similar in certain respects; both names refer to a car
with certain qualities. The analogy is based on an abstraction of a similarity
between similarities.
What is fundamental in an analogy, according to RFT, is that a relation of
coordination is established between two networks of relations. The relations
within these networks are, however, not necessarily relations of coordination.
In the example of an atom and the solar system, the analogy points to the
spatial relations in the respective networks: One way of envisioning an atom
is that certain parts of the atom orbit around other parts, just as in the solar
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METAPHORS
Metaphors are a particular type of analogy, so they also rely on different rela-
tional networks being related mutually in coordination. Heres an example of a
typical metaphor: To argue with him is to be run over by a steamroller. This
example fits well with the above description of analogies. We have described
two events that make up two relational networks between different stimuli.
One consists of a person who argues with others, and the other consists of a
person being run over by a steamroller. Both networks contain arbitrary rela-
tions (such as the relation between the words that are used and the objects
they refer to or how it feels to be run over by a steamroller, which most listen-
ers have never experienced and can contact only through verbal functions)
and nonarbitrary relations (such as the listeners experience of arguing with
others or the direct experience of having seen something being run over by a
steamroller). These two are placed in an arbitrary relation of coordination by
a contextual cue: is. Just as with the analogies discussed above, this relation
of coordination is nevertheless not exclusively arbitrary. It employs a nonar-
bitrary similarity between the two networks in at least one particular sense:
how it would be to try to stop or influence this person or a steamroller. The
two relational networks contain different types of relations, but the relation
that exists in both and is related here is a causal relationthat of standing
in the way of someone or something on one hand, and the consequences of
doing this on the other.
How, then, do we distinguish between a metaphor and an analogy? In
the examples of analogies given earlier, there is symmetry between the non-
arbitrary relations used in the analogy. In the analogy An atom is like the
solar system, the atom is the target and the solar system is the base, but the
analogy could work in the other direction. The nonarbitrary spatial relation
applied in the analogy (one part orbits another) is the same for both of the
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again because metaphors are a good example of when the difference between
Crel and Cfunc matters.
Lets return to the metaphor To argue with him is to be run over by a
steamroller. There are several elements in the context where this is uttered
that function as Crel, most obviously is. This governs what kind of relation
is established between the two events: one of similarity. The real-life simi-
larity between arguing and being run over could also function as Crel. The
probability of this is greater if the person who hears the metaphor has some
experience of arguing with the person in question, meaning he has been in
touch with this similarity independent of the metaphor. The person who hears
the metaphor without having any previous experience of the person in ques-
tion, however, will get a clear idea of the similarity only after having heard the
metaphor, which means this factor is less obvious as Crel. The more general
similarity between being run over and being in an argument could possibly
come into play, but it probably has less significance.
However, something must govern which functions in the metaphors
target are going to be influenced. A relation of coordination is established
between the two networks (is), but not all of the stimulus functions of the
base are transferred to the target. Very few people who hear this metaphor
would come to the conclusion that the person in question has a steering
wheel, rolls forward, or weighs tons. There is something in the context that
governs which functions are transformed, that is, something that plays the
role of Cfunc. Here, too, the nonarbitrary similarity (or more precisely, the
hierarchical relation) between arguing with someone who is very obstinate,
on one hand, and being run over, on the other, comes into play. Which func-
tions are brought to the fore can also be governed by other elements in the
described situation, such as what the person said. If the person who hears
the metaphor has first witnessed a dispute with the person described by the
metaphor, factors in that event will no doubt also serve as Cfunc.
Again, it is not essential to accurately map out exactly what is Crel and
what is Cfunc. Though you could possibly do this in a restricted experimental
environment, its hardly possible out there, in real life. Chances are exceed-
ingly slim that we can map out in such a detailed way the events and pro-
cesses that we experience or that people tell us about. Our knowledge is not
sufficient, and in most cases this type of analysis becomes very speculative.
What is important is to understand the principal difference between these
two types of contextual control. Remember behavior analysiss fundamental
aims: prediction and influence. When it comes to influence, the distinction
between Crel and Cfunc is important, because it can be easier to influence a
process by altering the contextual cues that govern function rather than by
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different objects, but as time passes units emerge, such as Me get dolly, Me
get ball, Me happy, I want, and so on. Certain parts of these units are
shifting and others are permanent. One thing that is permanent is the link
between the childs own behavior and the words I and me. The way the
child acts in coherence with this, like actually saying I or his own name in
connection with his own actions, is continuously reinforced by the people
in his social environment. Along with this successive use of words that are
related to the childs own actions, stimuli that are available only to the child
himself will also be correlated both with the word I and with other words
for himself; words like names, nicknames, and the like. So talking about I
or me starts out as a part of bigger units of speech that are learned through
operant conditioning. Later, the smaller unit I is selected and coordinated
with private eventsstimuli detectable only by the child himself (Kohlenberg
& Tsai, 1995). In this way, the child learns to tact his own behavior, includ-
ing private events. Parts of the stimuli present for the child as this happens
control the tacting of I. But according to RFT, something further is needed
for the complex phenomenon of self to emerge.
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from the perspective of others. When we humans experience our own unique
perspective (I), we do so from our experience that an alternative perspective
(youor he, she, or it) is possible (Buber, 1970). The same dynamic applies to
the two other relations thought to be a part of perspective taking: here/there
and now/then. Here is dependent on there for us to experience it the way
we do, and now is similarly dependent on then. If the concepts of you,
there, and then were to vanish (which is hardly even conceivable to any
of us), then I, here, and now would lose their respective qualities. What
we now experience or mean by these expressions would cease to exist. The
way I experience having a perspective of my own, seeing things from precisely
where I am situated, is supported by the experience that a different perspec-
tive, seeing from where someone else is situated, is possible.
This discussion is an attempt to describe parts of our experience that are
so natural and deeply ingrained that they are difficult to talk and write about.
According to RFT, this experience of perspective evolves from three different
and yet interdependent relations that we can describe as I/you, here/there,
and now/then. The two first are spatial relations, and the third is temporal.
These three relations are learned as a part of our ordinary language training
through an innumerable variety of everyday questions such as these:
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Self-as-Perspective
The perspective of continuity of self has a peculiarity. We cannot observe
this perspective in itself. It can never become an object for us to observe. We
can talk or write about it, just as I am doing now, and we can observe the
consequences of being able to take this perspective. We can make observa-
tions from a specific perspective or locus, but we can never observe this locus
or perspective as such. Of course, this is rather obvious, because from which
perspective would we observe it? All we have is I-here-now. And whatever we
observe, it simply cannot be this locus, as that is the vantage from which we
observe it.
Consequently, our very own perspective is void of content. It is simply the
point from which we observe, act, and live our lives. That is why RFT refers to
this aspect of our self-experience as self-as-perspective, or self-as-context. This is
the context within or perspective from which we experience what we experi-
ence. But the concept of self goes beyond this. We do not experience ourselves
as being constantly void of content or as a freely floating perspective. When
someone asks me about myself, I can usually describe myself in various ways,
and I can also observe aspects of my experience that I would call myself.
In our attempts to analyze the phenomenological area that we describe when
using the word self, we thus need to do some more reasoning. Within RFT
this is done by describing two more aspects of self: self-as-process and self-
as-story. This is not to say that these three cover all of the possibilities or that
other aspects of self arent valid or useful, but for behavior analytic purposes
we need these three aspects.
Self-as-Process
Self-as-process is similar to Skinners concept of private events, which we
can learn to tact. It is the ongoing, observable process of ourselves: behavior
that is occurring in the moment and that makes up part of what each of us
calls myselffeelings, memories, bodily sensations, and thoughts. It always
exists here and now. This means that both through direct experiences and
through language training, it will be connected to what the individual thinks
of as I. Note, however, that it is not constant in the way self-as-perspective
is. We do not always think or remember the same thing. Our bodies do not
always feel the same, and our emotional state varies.
Being firmly in touch with self-as-process is very useful. For example,
what we remember and feel in many ways constitutes a summary of our
history. And as described earlier, the fact that this link is useful to the people
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in our surroundings explains why we have learned to talk about it. How I feel
right now says something about my tendency to act in different ways, and
it lets people who have reason to relate to me know something about me. If
I am in touch with myself as a process in the present moment, my options
for acting flexibly in regard to the things that are important to me increase,
and so do my options for interacting with others. If I notice that I am angry
right now, I can use my awareness of this state to inform my next step. If
my history has predisposed me toward aggressive behavior in a certain type
of situation and I am not in touch with my own process of moving toward
hitting someone, this can have troublesome consequences. In the same way,
a slight affective process can be useful to me as a signal to consider pursuing
an action. For example, noticing a sense of interest or curiosity in relation to
some event or object can be a starting point for finding out more about it. If
I dont notice this process, I run a higher risk of missing out on events that
might have been valuable for me. Knowing oneself in the sense of self-as-
process means being in touch with ones own history, including parts that
were not originally verbal but now are, as a result of this very behavior.
When we notice affective states and bodily sensations in ourselves, what
we are observing is to a certain extent biologically given reaction patterns
(Ekman, 1992). In addition, it is partly our history of respondent learning
and partly our history of relational learning. To a verbally competent person,
nothing, feelings included, is simply what it is in itself. A feeling is never
simply the feeling as such; it is also precisely what it means to me. It is
always a result of the individuals ability to frame relationally, and the indi-
viduals history in this respect puts its imprint on everything. Butterflies in
your stomach can mean either Oh, this is wonderful or This isnt going
to end well. This line of discussion brings us to the border between self-as-
process and the third aspect of our experience of self as described in RFT:
self-as-story.
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Words and thoughts rapidly invade our experience for many reasons,
among them that verbal behavior can occur simultaneously with more or less
any other behavior (Parrott, 1984). In general, it is difficult to carry out several
nonverbal actions simultaneously with the same object, but it is easy to think
of something while at the same time carrying out other actions with the same
thing. It is easier to think of a chair while painting it compared to standing
on it to reach the ceiling while simultaneously painting the chair. This is so
obvious that we normally do not think about it. But the very fact that verbal
behavior usually does not have a direct effect on our physical environment
makes it extremely common for verbal behavior to proceed simultaneously
with almost anything we do. Part of this verbal behavior describes and relates
our own actions.
A story or conceptualization of ourselves is of course very useful. It con-
tributes to continuity and supplies the individual with a type of summary of
who I am. This sort of summary is essential in our interactions with others.
Because it can be presented, it can, to a certain degree, stand in for direct
experience of an individual by his social community. It can summarize his
history, what he thinks is important, what he can be expected to do, and so
on. For this individuals social community, this story becomes a shortcut to
knowledge about him. This hearkens back to the above discussion of the func-
tion of learning to talk about ourselves as processes. Self-as-story is, however,
much more verbally elaborate than self-as-process, while also possibly omit-
ting a lot of what is going on with the individual in the moment. A typically
formalized way of using self-as-story is the type of summary we present in a
job interview or when we introduce ourselves in a new social environment.
Think of how much of our interaction with children involves teaching
them to create this story. We ask questions and make statements like these:
What did you do then? What did you think about that? Are you a boy or
a girl? You look so much like your father. You are so cute. These questions
and statements, along with the dialogues that follow, help children form a
conceptualized self. An important part of this story is that it is coherent and
a connected whole. This becomes evident when the individual does things
that dont seem to resonate with the already existing story of me in a certain
context. For example, if someone whose self-as-story includes being kind and
forthcoming loses his temper in a certain situation and rejects someones
request, this can lead to the person telling himself and others things like I
wasnt myself. Something similar occurs if someone says something about
us that doesnt correspond to our own story. We look for explanations and
ways of formulating the story to make it coherent. We defend our story about
ourselves, and if we do change it, we do so in a way that makes it stay logically
consistent.
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SUMMARY
This chapter described how basic relational framing provides the building
blocks for more complex relational behaviors such as relating networks of rela-
tions in analogy and metaphor. It also described how perspective taking forms
the foundation of our experience of self, which manifests in several ways. All
of this is central to human behavior in general, and thereby also key to what we
often refer to as psychopathology. Next well turn to what Skinner referred
to as rule-governed behavior. This is the area in which verbal behavior has its
most far-reaching consequences for the conditions under which we humans
live. It is also in connection with this ability that the side effects of language
become most evident. We will get to those side effects in chapter 7. But, first,
lets take a closer look at rule-governed behavior in itself.
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Relational Framing and
Rule-Governed Behavior
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person in question can follow this rule as though it is generally valid, that is,
valid essentially all the time. This is an example of how rule-governed behav-
ior can follow implicit rules, which, according to RFT, is easily explained: The
rule that is followed is not necessarily the rule that was stated. The rule that is
followed is the rule that was contacted. And which rule is contacted is deter-
mined not only by what was said, but also by the listeners learning history,
both direct and derived. This learning history gives the circumstances that
are present a specific function and thereby influences the individuals actions.
My history could be such that merely being in the presence of other human
beings puts me in contact with Be careful and youll make it!
So the question of how a rule can specify behavior and consequences that
are not current and that the person has not earlier experienced (Schlinger,
1990) is answered by invoking arbitrarily applicable relational responding (D.
Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Dymond, & OHora, 2001; OHora, Barnes-Holmes,
Roche, & Smeets, 2004). A rule puts the listener in contact with a relational
network1 that transforms the functions of the stimuli that are related to the
network. At her actual visit to Stockholm many years after the rule about going
to the museum was stated, the current circumstances have certain stimulus
functions for the travelerfunctions they wouldnt have had if the rule had
not been uttered and the traveler had not related and did not now relate the
present Stockholm to a certain museum. Going to the Vasa Museum while in
Stockholm can, of course, be governed by completely different factors. But if,
in this case, it is a result of the rule that was stated many years ago, then this
happens because present conditions have acquired their stimulus functions
through the social game we learned to take part in when we learned to relate
events arbitrarily.
1The reader is once again reminded that the use of the term relational net-
work does not imply that any such objects exist. To talk about relational
networks is to say that humans act in a particular way: relating events in a
potentially complex way. This way of relating affects the stimulus functions
of such events.
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Pliance
Pliance is rule-governed behavior under the control of a history of
socially mediated reinforcement for coordination between behavior and the
antecedent verbal stimuli (i.e., the relational network or rule), in which that
reinforcement is itself delivered based on a frame of coordination between
the rule and behavior (S. C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, p. 108).
It is similar to what we mean by doing as you are told, as said in everyday
language, because it implies having previously encountered reinforcing con-
tingencies that promoted doing precisely this. The behavior of following the
rule, in and of itself, is what matters in pliance, since the consequences are
controlled by the rule giver and are dependent on following the rule. Typical
pliance is when one person yields to what someone else says in order to obtain
that persons approval, provided that this is done based on the consequences
that are specified in the rule. If I am stopped by the police and asked to show
my drivers license, doing so is probably an example of pliance. The rule that
precedes pliance is called a ply. When the rule is stated, this behavior by the
speaker is an example of the type of verbal operant that Skinner called a mand
(described in chapter 2).
The governing consequences are, of course, only apparently contacted
through the rulethis being an antecedent. The subsequent behavior has not
yet encountered its actual consequences. In rule-governed behavior the con-
sequences specified in the rule need not have been contacted by the listener
at a previous point, distinguishing this behavior from that governed by direct
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Tracking
Tracking is rule-governed behavior under the control of a history of
coordination between the rule and the way the environment is arranged
independently of the delivery of the rule (S. C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2001, p. 109). A typical instance of tracking would be the behavior of
someone driving in a certain direction after hearing, Go straight ahead for
about half a mile, then make a right turn when you see a gas station, and two
hundred yards ahead is the sports field. This example is valid provided that
the person drives as directed under the influence of the apparent correspon-
dence between the rule and the factual location of the sports fieldapparent
when hearing the rule uttered, that is. After all, in this case it is the rule that
governs the behavior, not the actual location of the sports field. If the rule
is followed by the listener, it functions as a track. As a verbal operant of the
speaker, it is an example of a tact (see chapter 2).
Tracking is taught by the social community after a certain degree of
pliance is in place. Lets go back to the example of the child and the laptop.
When a young member of the human herd, through pliance, can override
immediate consequences (like the rewarding effect of touching her mothers
laptop), she will go on to contact other available consequences. These con-
sequences are not necessarily socially mediated; they are a result of how the
environment is arranged, and she would not have contacted them if immedi-
ate consequences had still been dominating her behavior. In the learning situ-
ation, this may occur because the social community arranges for the child to
contact the consequences this way, or simply because everything is constantly
changing. If the child were to stay close to the laptop without touching it in an
instance of pliance, then at a minimum she will contact the laptop when it is
not touched. Lets say that the laptop was just about to display a sequence of
interesting pictures. If she indeed does not touch the laptop, she will encoun-
ter these pictures as a consequence of not touching. These consequences may
now in turn be specified by the social community, provided that the relevant
training of relational framing has occurred. Rules can now be formulated that
seemingly put the child in contact with these consequences, and her behavior
can thereby be influenced via these very rules. This means the young member
of the herd goes from being able to act on rules that specify consequences
placed there by the social community to being able to act on rules that put
her in apparent or indirect contact with all kinds of events.
Let me give you a perhaps more likely example of how the social com-
munity arranges for this learning to take place. When a child has finished
playing, her father might say, Look how dirty your hands are. Lets go and
wash them to make them clean again. Lets assume that the child comes along
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due to pliance. She follows the rule based on a history of reinforcement that
can be described as Youre supposed to do what Daddy tells you. When the
childs hands are washed, her father might remark on how clean her hands are
without adding any social consequences as a result of the girl doing as she was
told. At this point, the father can help his daughter discriminate the changes
that take place and provide relevant relational training, like framing events in
terms of coordinate, temporal, and causal relations. He could say, Look, your
hands are really dirty. Rinse them with water, and lookwhat happened?
He could ask the child what she did, what happened then, and why it hap-
pened. (For a more thorough account of this kind of training, see Luciano,
Valdivia-Salas, et al., 2009.) The social community provides the child with
many samples of rules that specify behavior and actual consequences that are
reinforcing or punishing in themselves, independent of the socially mediated
consequences that are dependent on rule following as such. This will gradu-
ally make it more likely that the child tracks further rules. Initially this will at
least apply to interactions with people who are important to the child. This is
the starting point of what I described above as the speakers credibility.
Augmenting
Augmenting is rule-governed behavior due to relational networks that
alter the degree to which events function as consequences (S. C. Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, p. 109). Augmenting occurs in conjunction
with either pliance or tracking.
How augmenting occurs is explained by RFT as follows: A relational
network is related to a consequence and thereby alters the strength or func-
tion of this consequence. Let me return to the girl who has learned to wash
her hands. Use the green soap, Maria, and your hands will be clean. This
rule can be followed by the girl washing her hands with the soap as an
instance of pliance. In this case the behavior occurs because, for Maria, the
rule implies consequences of following rules as such. It could also be that
Maria has learned tracking, and that she uses the soap based on the specifica-
tion that her fingers will be clean. But if the rule she follows is If you use the
soap, youre a smart girl, this might be an example of augmenting. This is the
case if being a smart girl has a reinforcing function in itself. Augmentals are
rules that are not restricted to specifying a consequence that has not been
contacted but will be (like the location of the sports field or clean hands);
they also allow us to contact consequences that are abstract and can exert
influence over behavior without ever being contacted directly. For example,
a person can act on rules that specify consequences after death, which, by
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definition, no living person has contacted. Likewise, we can act based on con-
sequences that are too abstract to be available for direct contact, such as an
equitable international economic order.
Note that this type of rule-governed behavior is connected to either
pliance or tracking. Augmenting can be described as a separate unit, but the
way in which it exercises its function is by influencing tracking and pliance
through altering the reinforcing or punishing qualities of the specified
consequences.
Two types of augmenting are described in the literature: formative aug-
menting and motivative augmenting. Formative augmenting is behavior due
to a rule that establishes a given consequence as reinforcing or punishing. A
formative augmental, then, gives reinforcing or punishing qualities to some
outcome that previously did not have these qualities by relating it to an already
established reinforcer. A formative augmental creates a motivator, so to speak.
Lets say someone sees a worn Donald Duck magazine in a flea market but
doesnt have any special interest in old comic books. Then someone else says,
Hey, thats the very first issue of Donald Duck magazine. Its a rarity. For the
listener, this statement can function as a formative augmental that makes it
more likely that shell buy the magazine. Very first issue and a rarity are
already verbally established reinforcers. By being related to them, the worn
magazine becomes a reinforcer as well. A rule (in this case a track) like Buy
this and you will be the owner of a rarity might affect this persons behavior.
Another example occurs when a man is introduced to someone who doesnt
strike him as particularly interestingthat is, not until someone tells him
that the man is the brother of a woman who does interest him. The statement
may then function as a formative augmental for his further actions in relation
to this person. His contact with this person has acquired new worth, and with
it a higher probability that his actions will be influenced by a track like Stay
close to this guy, and you will be close to Barbaras brother, as the formative
augmental suddenly puts him in contact with a previously established rein-
forcer. 3 Speaking to this unknown person has become reinforcing through a
formative augmental.
3The observant reader probably notices the similarity between the process
described and generalization. Note, however, that generalization requires
that there exist a formal similarity between stimuli, or that the stimulus
that acquires its function by generalization has been contingent with a pri-
mary reinforcer. This is not the case here; the stimulus functions are altered
through arbitrarily applicable relational responding.
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5It is also possible that his behavior was governed by direct contingencies.
Again, we are up against the difficulties with everyday examples. We would
have to know the individuals learning history to be certain to what extent
a behavior is governed by direct contingencies versus rules.
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Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004b; Whelan, Barnes-
Holmes, & Dymond, 2006; Ju & Hayes, 2008).
SELF-RULES
Self-rules are rules directed toward oneself that influence ones own actions.
Taking into account the analysis thus far in this book, self-rules therefore
require both a certain level of competence in rule following and an experi-
ence of self along the lines of the aspects of self discussed in chapter 5. A
core characteristic of the behavior of following self-rules is the same as for
rules given by others: A certain behavior follows, controlled by the appar-
ent consequences specified by the rule, rather than by direct contingencies
alone. As Ive emphasized, this is the very foundation of the human capability
that might be summed up as delayed responding. Self-rules can be relatively
simple, like If I hurry, Ill be able to catch the bus, or more complex, like If
I can just get rid of my anxiety, Ill be able to do what I want in life.
The ability to lay down rules for oneself is consistent with what Ive out-
lined about a growing experience of self and the ability to follow rules given
by others, and in principle there is no need to add anything to this. On the
contrary, given these abilities you might say that developing self-rules is inevi-
table (Luciano, Valdivia-Salas, et al., 2009). We could describe the sequence
in the following way.
A child learns, through direct contingencies of reinforcement, to tact her
own behavior, including private events like thoughts and feelings, as described
in chapter 2.
Relational framing increases the complexity of this behavior, since dif-
ferent phenomena can be related arbitrarily in line with the training the child
receives from the social community.
Parts of this training help the child develop increasingly complex tacting
of me and, in tandem, gradually acquire the three aspects of self described
as self-as-perspective, self-as-process, and self-as-story.
The child can now observe herself as an object of other peoples actions
and her own actions.
Alongside this, the child learns rule-governed behavior. The process
starts with rules provided by others: Mary, eat your food. Early on, this
utterance will probably be echoed by the child. After the first basic ability of
relational framing (coordination) is in place, the echoic behavior of the child,
Mary eat food, can be transformed to I eat food. A next step is a rule such
as If you [Mary/I] eat the food, we can watch TV afterward. Pliance is fol-
lowed by tracking and augmenting. The different words that are a part of the
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training the child receives in relating stimuli arbitrarily will gradually become
a part of various relational frames, and so the childs behavioral flexibility
increases. Whatever you can say aloud, you can also learn to say silently. So
self-rules evolve alongside both the ability to engage in rule-governed behav-
ior in general and successively more complex experiences of different aspects
of me.
Imagine a preschool-age boy who has just been told that the person he
has always called Mother is not his real mother, but that she is his younger
siblings real mother. If mother is in a relation of coordination to experi-
ences like security, joy, and a number of other things that are important to
the boy, he might suddenlysimply based on the negation is notderive
thoughts about not having these things. He could derive thoughts about his
mother leaving him, provided that, for the boy, mother is in a relation of
coordination to the experience of the mother being there for him, and under
the condition that he has the skill of framing temporally. He may also derive
thoughts about his younger siblings and his relationship to themmaybe
thoughts about being different from them. This ability to relate events,
together with a number of things that are actually going on in the situation,
can become a part of the story about who he is. It is easy to see some self-rules
that may result. Since what he has been told has put him in apparent contact
with a number of events that are painful to him, it is possible that he will
want to avoid experiencing this again. This can lead to a self-rule like Dont
talk about this, since talking about it will necessarily put him back in contact
with this pain. Note that I am using the word apparent again. It is clear that
the boy can be experiencing considerable suffering. And yet he has not actu-
ally encountered any of the possibilities he is deriving or that scare him. All
he has encountered is a series of his own responses, what we call thinking.
This may seem obvious to us, since we are all in the same social game, but it
is actually a remarkable thing.
This discussion hints at some of the consequences of the capability for
arbitrarily applicable relational responding and rule-governed behavior that
are essential to clinical problems and clinical work. (I will return to this in
part 3 of the book.) Nonetheless, we should not let this overshadow the fact
that the ability to follow self-rules first and foremost increases our behavioral
flexibility. We can tell ourselves to keep studying, even when it is taxing and
anything but rewarding, in order to pass our exams and be able to work in
the field of our choice. We can talk to ourselves about things we have never
experienced and direct our actions in a way that increases the likelihood of
actually achieving something previously unexperienced. We can hold on to
our ideals and orient our actions and lives toward accomplishing long-term
goals that serve both ourselves and others.
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is the fundamental condition for this skill. When through relational framing
we manipulate variables to make the appearance of a solution more probable
(to paraphrase Skinner), we can use this skill to formulate self-rules that can
in turn come to influence further behavior.
Some problem solving is strategic: What we want to achieve is clear; it is
only the path to the goal that is unclear. A typical example is when someone
gets lost on her way to a certain address. She finds herself in an unknown
neighborhood and tries to reestablish her bearings by looking at a map and
her surroundings, and by considering different possibilities. Another example
could be what happens during an appendectomy if the surgeon realizes this
particular patients anatomy deviates from the usual, and thus new solutions
are required. Yet another example is a psychologist working with a young boy
who refuses to go to school, so that the boy can take up his schoolwork again.
This one may border on being a situation where the goal itself is unclear. In
this type of problem solving, rather than simply seeking the achievement of
a known goal, we are faced with a variety of possible consequences, which
necessitates comparing them with each other and making choices. A more
typical example of this type of problem solving is a young person who has
just finished college and is asking herself what to do with her life over the next
few years. Other examples are choosing a spouse or partner, or an occupation.
Yet other examples are what we often refer to as existential questions: What
do I want my life to stand for? or What is important to me? Augmenting
has a decisive function in this type of problem solving. Verbally constructed
consequences that are globally desirable to the individual can come to control
a wide range of behavior. I can relate specific actions and consequences that
are close at hand to different valuesto what I think is important in life.
In all of these situations, we relate both events we have experienced
and those we have not to ourselves; to different possible behaviors and con-
sequences. I can seemingly put myself in contact with everything from the
beginning of the universe, humanitys purpose in the world, and dinner with
my in-laws last night to the laundry I forgot to hang this morning, what I
will be doing five years from now, my own death sometime in the future, and
what will happen after that. I can relate any or all of this to something I am
planning to do tomorrow and to how I feel about things in this very moment.
And I can do all of these things while lying in my own bed. But most of the
time I do this as a part of dealing with everything I actually encounter in
life: when I talk to my coworkers, rebuild my summer cottage, bone up for an
exam, have sex, organize political meetings, fix my car, or do my shopping in
the mall. In all of these situations I encounter the world the way it is arranged.
And in all of these situations, the ability to be both speaker and listener and
to follow self-rules and thereby solve problems increases my flexibility in an
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Relational Framing and Rule-Governed Behavior
SUMMARY
From the standpoint of behavior analytic assumptions, all human activity can
be understood based on the contingency between a behavior and its ante-
cedents and consequences. When a person has learned arbitrarily applicable
relational responding, this has far-reaching consequences for how her learn-
ing activity continues. It allows antecedents to acquire stimulus functions
that are restricted neither to the direct contingencies that the individual has
actually encountered in her history nor by the physical qualities of different
stimuli. Antecedents that have acquired their functions in this way, through
relational framing, can now specify behaviors and consequences that are not
yet present, and thus function as what we commonly call rules or instructions.
This explains the human ability to act in relation to long-term consequences,
rather than being completely controlled by direct contingencies. Or, in more
everyday words, this allows us to put off immediate gratification.
As discussed, behavior that is influenced by verbal antecedents is called
rule-governed behavior. Two different types of rule-governed behavior can be
distinguished based on their historical reinforcing contingencies, and a third
type interacts with both of these. Pliance is the fundamental type of rule-
governed behavior; it involves rule following that helps us contact socially
mediated consequences that are dependent on rule following as such. It is
through pliance that we first learn to follow rules and instructions. Once this
skill is learned, we can learn tracking: rule-governed behavior by which we
contact consequences that depend on how the world is arranged, indepen-
dently of the rule. The third type of rule-governed behavior, augmenting, is
combined with pliance and tracking and affects the degree to which differ-
ent consequences function as reinforcing or punishing. Augmentals function
as verbal establishing operations. Figuratively speaking, you might describe
these three forms of rule following like this: In pliance you seek what the rule
giver holds in her hand. In tracking you seek whatever is on the map. In
augmenting you seek consequences based on the value you assign to them.
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Rule following vastly increases our ability to act flexibly in our social
environment, as well as our physical environment. This ability seems to be the
most general effect of verbal behavior (Catania, 2007). There is a cost to all
of this, however: Rule following has certain side effects. In the next chapter, I
will describe this dark side of our human ability to frame events relationally.
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CHAPTER 7
The Dark Side of
Human Languaging
It is easy to see the huge advantage human beings have in being able to put
stimuli into arbitrary relations, especially when a set repertoire of rule-gov-
erned behavior is in place. This allows us to sidestep immediate gratification
and deal with events before they take place. We can carry out long behavioral
sequences, and we can act on consequences that are distant in time or in space
or that are very abstract. At the same time, this force also has a dark side
(Trneke, Luciano, & Valdivia-Salas, 2008).
Typically, the experiments are carried out as follows: The participants are
given a simple task, such as pressing a button when certain lights come on.
Some of the participants are told what they need to do in order to earn points
(for example, Press the button only when this specific light is lit). Another
group is given more general directions that do not specify the way in which
points are earned. All of the participants are given immediate feedback when
successful; that is, they can see when they have earned points. The advantage in
knowing the rule is obvious, and those participants who know it initially earn
their points faster than those in the control group. But after a while, the control
group starts earning the same amount of points as the other group. They learn
by trial and error. When both groups have started to earn points equally, the
contingencies are altered so that all participants must use a new method of
pressing the button to earn points. This change is made without any of the par-
ticipants knowing the new way to respond to earn points. The various studies
all demonstrate the same phenomenon: The participants who initially learned
how to earn points by means of a rule have greater difficulty in discriminating
the new contingencies. At this point, the control group more quickly learns how
to earn points based on what has become reinforcing. The rule that was helpful
in the beginning becomes an obstacle. It seems to stand in the way of quickly
adapting to the altered and nonarbitrary relations between different events.
Most of us are acquainted with this from our own experiences. Our
notions (rules) of how something ought to be or how something should be
done can get in the way when we attempt to learn new things. We continue
to do things that do not work, following rules that say they should work. We
go on arguing for a certain position, even though it does not take us in the
direction we meant it to, following rules that say we are right. We struggle to
forget things we cannot forget, following rules that say it isnt good to think
about these unpleasant things.
This brings us to the main subject of this chapter: how rule-governed
behavioras seen from an RFT perspectivecontributes to what we usually
call psychopathology. But before we take a closer look at how the different
types of rule-governed behavior interact to create difficulties, lets take a look
at an even more fundamental consequence of relational learning: that arbi-
trarily applicable relational responding necessarily means that we humans
have a broad interface with pain.
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of learning theory, we say that, for a given individual in a given context, some
things are appetitive while other things are aversive. A common way new
situations acquire either of these functions is through generalization. Things
seem pleasant or unpleasant based on their resemblance to things we have
encountered earlier, or because, through respondent learning, they have been
associated with something pleasant or unpleasant. However, by means of
relational learning, things can be related to each other independent of these
nonarbitrary relations. Contextual cues can establish new arbitrary relations.
This means that things that we have not yet encountered or that lack physical
links with the things we have come across can nevertheless have functions
for us. These functions can be appetitive as well as aversive. This is due to our
ability to frame events relationally at the fundamental level of mutual entail-
ment and combinatorial mutual entailment, as described in chapter 4.
Lets compare this with a situation where a nonverbal creature flees from
a predator to find shelter. In such a situation, the creature can learn that a
certain behavior leads to safety in the presence of a certain predator. Once
the animal is sheltered, its position will have stimulus functions immediately
connected with this place of shelter, without these functions being related
to the predator. At this point, the function this place has for the animal is
what we humans would call safety or security. In order for the function to
be related to the predator, the events of the learning situation would need to
occur in reversed order. According to the principles of operant and respon-
dent conditioning, only if the animals encounter with the shelter precedes its
encounter with the predator can the shelter have stimulus functions related
to the predator.
Suppose a human being were in a similar situation. Humans, too, would
find functions of safety and security connected with the place of refuge. This
spot will, however, also be related to the predator through mutual entailment.
(In fact, the previous example, wherein an animal experienced the human phe-
nomena safety and security, is, strictly speaking, incorrect.) As humans,
we cannot think of security without it being related to its opposite. In part,
security is what it is to us precisely because of its not being its opposite. The
two are related verbally, through mutual entailment. But for the animal in
the example above, this place of shelteras far as we knowis simply this
place: the place in and of itself, in the situation in which the animal finds
itself at that moment. This is never the case for a verbally competent human
being. Things are always related to their opposites, as well as to a number of
other things. You might say that the ability to frame relationally means that
a phenomenon that is very similar to generalization puts humans in touch
with an almost endless number of events or stimuli, but without the type of
restrictions that apply for generalization.
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This has a decisive impact on the way we humans experience our reality.
One important consequence is the functions our private events acquire. These
private events are almost constantly present. Furthermore, all of our painful
experiences contain such private eventsthings noticed and known only by
the individual who experiences them. Through mutual entailment, private
events acquire stimulus functions via their relations with the events the indi-
vidual has experienced. If E acquires discriminative functions for D, then
D, through mutual entailment, can acquire similar functions for E, as noted
in connection with the laboratory experiments in chapter 4. Moreover, our
ability to frame events relationally does not stop with these basic functions.
Derived relational responding offers almost infinite possibilities. Starting
with a specific experience, we can, for instance, put this into a comparative
and temporal relation and thus contact something worse after this. Private
events become potentially painful in themselves, and through our ability to
frame relationally, our interface with pain increases exponentially.
Imagine the following situation: You are spending time by the Mediter
ranean. The night is pleasantly warm. The day was wonderfulrelaxing and
invigorating at the same time. You get together with some good friends. The
plan is to enjoy a nice meal together. People are talking all around you, and
you hear bits and pieces of an intriguing story. The ocean is as smooth as a
mirror just below the large patio where you are sitting. The waiters are begin-
ning to bring your plates. Everything is just delightful; you are having a great
time. Then there is the thought If only Peter could have been around for
this.
Even our good experiences are related to bad ones. Pain can be present
anywhere. Indeed, we can be transported anywhere at the speed of thought
without even moving. While this does provide a huge window of possibilities
for us humans, it also creates a broader interface with pain. As long as pain is
connected with a certain situation in the external world, we generally have the
option of leaving to escape. There may be times when this option is not avail-
able, but quite often it is. However, where can a person run in order to escape
from the pain he contacts through his own languaging? In the long run, the
conditions under which we live as humans mean that there is no escape. Once
the ability to put things in arbitrary relations is established, we are inevitably
stuckfor good and for bad.
Consequently, pain is built into things that, in themselves, are far from
painful. Consider a six-year-old girl who drew a picture at school. Her father
says, Thats nice. You really did well on that! Given her verbal competence,
the child will also be in contact with the opposite of what is said, that is,
not so nice and not doing very well. She may not contact this at the very
moment when her father speaks, but she may do so at a later time, such as
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when she tries to draw another picture and it doesnt turn out the way she
wanted it to. She will not need anyone else to make the judgment that this is
not so nice or that she did not do well. Her ability to frame relationally
puts her in contact with this in a specific context. There is no way out of this
human predicament.
All of this is a part of the power of thinking. Thinking can take us any-
where, including where we do not want to go. Private events can become
painful in themselves. Thoughts of pain, even types of pain we have never
experienced, acquire stimulus functions from real pain.
Yet neither these thoughts nor other private events are the real problem
(Luciano, Rodrguez Valverde, & Gutirrez Martinez, 2004). They are a
natural part of human language. Due to our ability to frame relationally, our
interface with both aversive and appetitive functions increases exponentially.
These are the conditions under which verbally competent human beings live.
The real problem arises when, based on these private events, we begin to
take actions that are followed by consequences and that dont work well. As
youll recall from the discussion of self-as-story in chapter 5, verbal behavior,
especially of the private kind, can occur simultaneously with but independent
of overt behavior. We can think, feel, and remember without this, in and of
itself, having much effect on our environment. It is when we act overtly, and
thereby contact consequences, that our lives are more generally affected. And
it is when private events come to control overt action that the essential step
in human psychological problems is taken, as seen from a behavior analytic
perspective. This brings us back to rule-governed behavior. As discussed in
chapter 6, rule-governed behavior can be influenced by private stimuli, such
as self-rules. Many potential pitfalls arise when this human repertoire, in
itself a result of relational framing, is combined with our broadened inter-
face with pain. We all too readily learn to use this repertoire (rule-governed
behavior) in a dysfunctional way in relation to thoughts, feelings, memories,
and bodily sensations, especially in order to control painful aspects of these
private events.
Even if this isnt a completely inevitable process, it is easy to understand
why it takes place. Rule-governed behavior is successful for humans in many
different areas, and particularly in the area of avoiding danger and other
events that could have negative consequences in our lives. It is usually helpful
to clear away obstacles to what we want to achieve. When thoughts, memo-
ries, and feelings acquire stimulus functions from events that have been or
could have been aversive, it is natural for us to deal with these phenomena in
the same way we are used to dealing with other things that hurt us or impede
us. Simply put: Make a plan for getting rid of the difficulty or obstacle and
execute the plan. It is in connection with this strategyintentionally trying
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to control private eventsthat we most clearly can see the dark side of rela-
tional framing. Especially in light of the fact that rule-governed behavior has a
tendency to continue even in situations where it does not fulfill its purpose, as
evidenced by the experiments described earlier in this chapter. This behavior
is insensitive to direct contingencies. So if we try to control painful private
events by following rules saying that these phenomena should or must be
eliminated, the fact that these phenomena are not subject to our efforts might
not stop us from continuing to follow such rules. As a result, we risk ending
up in vicious circles that restrict our lives.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF
RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOR
For the sake of clarity, I will go through the problems connected with each
type of rule-governed behavior separately. In real life, however, they are all
continuously interacting with each other. The most essential issue here is how
augmenting interacts with the two more basic types of rule-governed behav-
ior to alter the function of present contingencies, creating different types of
pitfalls.
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the consequences specified by the rule being arranged by the social commu-
nity. The verbal networks that make augmenting possible are also arranged
by the social community, though in a more complex way; they are shaped
by the social interplay that lies at the very base of languaging. The relational
networks that serve as augmentals, intensifying the governing function of
consequences, can be very abstract. And the more abstract the governing
consequences, the harder it is for immediate consequences to have an impact
on behavior. The fundamental problem in connection with augmenting is that
its interactions with pliance and tracking lead to increased insensitivity to
direct contingencies.
Lets return to the problems connected with pliance. As mentioned,
augmenting can easily make the problems with pliance persist and increase.
Although there are individuals who seek appreciation from others in order
to obtain tangible forms of reinforcement, generalized pliance usually occurs
under the influence of more abstract, verbally constructed consequences.
Abstract consequences like being a good person, being successful, or
being lovable may have become established as the ultimately desirable
consequence for a particular individual. These types of consequences may be
coordinated with specific actions, like doing what others do, agreeing with
what others say, staying within a certain pattern of behavior, or never saying
no. This type of learning history strengthens an arbitrary relation of coordina-
tion between, for example, being lovable and adapting to others in various
ways. This will, in turn, affect the stimulus functions of a behavior that involves
not adapting. For a person like this, the various forms of not adapting will
have punishing functions. This is because not adapting is in opposition to
being lovable, which is the self-evident aim or value for this individual. Lets
take a detailed look at what is going on in problematic augmenting based on
generalized pliance when a person systematically acts on a self-rule such as
To achieve what I want, I need to act in a way that makes me feel good, and
I feel good when no one criticizes me and when I get appreciation from people
around me.1 This is the result of advanced relational framing:
1. Certain thoughts and feelings that are evoked by peoples criticism
or their failure to express appreciation (for example, I am bad; Im
not the way I should be) are put in opposition to actions that are
aimed at specific goals. In essence, If I have these thoughts and feel-
ings, they will stop me from acting in a certain direction.
1Note that the person does not necessarily observe any thoughts when the
rule following occurs. He may report having these thoughts or he may not.
The rule may be implicit. What is essential is that the person is in fact act-
ing in this way.
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2. The persons goals are put in coordination with feeling good; that is,
I need to feel good to be able to act toward these goals.
3. Feeling good is established as a necessary component (causal or con-
ditional framing) of reaching the things that really matter to that
person.
Another example of problematic augmenting is a depressed person who
dwells on past events. If asked whether going over things again and again
seems to lead him anywhere, he will probably acknowledge that it does not.
Still he keeps doing it. Negative reinforcement plays a significant role here.
This activity helps him avoid something he experiences as painful. Perhaps
he avoids other thoughts by dwelling on the past. But negative reinforcement
is not the only governing consequence. This persons rumination probably
belongs to a functional class of behavior that we would call problem solving.
This is what you are supposed to do to deal with problems. So this is actually
another example of how a behavior is reinforced by doing what I need to do
in order to feel good. Thinking things through is seen as the right thing to
do. We might ask why this type of problem solving becomes so intense for a
certain person in a certain situation. People whose thoughts constantly refer
to the past often say that this is an attempt to feel better. And why is feeling
better so important? Because it is seen as a means of reaching other important
goals or values in life. This ruleI have to work to get rid of my depressed
feelings in order to feel good, and I need to feel good to be able to achieve
what is important in my lifefunctions as an augmental that alters stimulus
functions in various ways. The thoughts the person is avoiding by dwelling on
past events become even more aversive through augmenting, since they are
no longer just painful in themselves; they are now in opposition to reaching
important things in life, as well. At this point, the augmental intensifies efforts
to get rid of the undesired thoughts because the rule specifies that this is what
it takes to achieve important goals and live in accordance with ones values.
Imagine a person who is experiencing hallucinations. Lets assume that
this person is tracking the rule If I stay in bed today, I will not hear voices.
When asked why it is important not to hear voices, the person might respond
that life is easier to handle without hearing voices, that he doesnt risk being
locked up in a mental institution, or that he wants to get away from thoughts
of going insane. This tracking may work in the short term, but it does not
track more long-term consequences. As a result, the behavior becomes part
a long-term vicious circle, as described above. Augmenting could potentially
complicate this situation further through a self-rule like I have to make sure
I dont hear voices, since a normal person doesnt hear them. As a result,
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of what the text means. You may find it remarkably difficult; the meanings of
words are so evident to us. This does not necessarily indicate that it is impos-
sible to switch this meaning off, or that the indirect stimulus functions must
dominate. It might be possible that, perhaps by means of some meditation or
focusing technique, you can unlink the meaning from the actual text, so that
you simply note the visual contrast between black and white. However, this
is not the fundamental attitude we have learned to take in relation to written
text.
Another way of experimenting with direct and indirect stimulus func-
tions is to say a word aloudquickly and repeatedlyfor a while. If you
havent done this before, give it a try now. Take the name of the city or town
where you were born and repeat it quickly and loudly for a while.
What did you experience? When doing this, most people experience
short moments when the meaning disappears and they only hear a sound.
How does this work? Based on RFT you might say that the context that
normally sustains indirect stimulus functions is altered, and this is what
makes the functions diminish. Performing this exercise changes the aspect
of the context referred to as Cfunc in RFT. Indirect stimulus functions are not
inherent; they arise as a result of how we behave, sometimes together and
sometimes by ourselves. It is possible to alter these functions by influencing
contextual factors. In the examples above, the effect is obviously transitory.
The normal context is solidly present.
Indirect stimulus functions do not dominate everywhere and in all cir-
cumstances. Humans live in a world where both direct and indirect stimulus
functions influence our behavior. In some situations, direct stimulus func-
tions dominate. If you are a skilled pianist and you are playing one of your
favorite pieces by heart, then you are doing this mainly under the influence of
direct stimulus functions of the moment. If someone were to start speaking to
yousay they suggest that you play it in a different wayyou would notice
the disturbance, but you could undoubtedly let this go and really immerse
yourself in playing this music so that you would still mainly be under the influ-
ence of direct stimulus functions. To continue with a behavior and simply let
your next step be influenced by whatever you face directly is an ability that is
still intact in humans, even if it must compete with rule-governed behavior.
The dominance of indirect stimulus functions need not be a problem.
Most of the time, arbitrarily applicable relational responding increases the
flexibility of our actions. That it increases the risk of rigidity in other situ-
ations is simply the other side of the same coin. Yet the risk of being overly
influenced by a strict dominance of indirect stimulus functions is real. Earlier
in this chapter I described this in connection with problems related to the
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different forms of rule following. When this dominance becomes strong, RFT
uses the term fusion to indicate that certain actions are completely dominated
by, or fused with, indirect stimulus functions. Fusion occurs when certain verbal
(indirect) stimulus functions dominate over other potentially available stimulus
functions, both direct and indirect (Strosahl, Hayes, Wilson, & Gifford, 2004; S.
C. Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig, & Wilson, 2004). I can act wholeheart-
edly based on the assumption that licorice tastes terrible without ever having
tasted it, regardless of other potentially available direct stimulus functions
(how it would taste if I tried it) or indirect stimulus functions (other opinions
about licorice). I can act completely in line with the assumption I am not
able to talk to him, even though other direct stimulus functions (what would
happen if I talked to him) or indirect stimulus functions (other views on what
I am able to do) are potentially available. Again, it is important to emphasize
that it is fusion in action that can become problematic. You might put it this
way: Fusion is action; it does not refer to a mental process that in some way
precedes the behavior. The potential pitfall connected to dominance of verbal
functions is fused behavior followed by consequences, not inflexible thoughts
in themselves.
EXPERIENTIAL AVOIDANCE AS A
CENTRAL PROCESS IN CONNECTION
WITH PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
A fundamental point made in this chapter is that the dark side of arbitrarily
applicable relational responding becomes most evident when rule-governed
behavior is focused on controlling private events. The reason for this behavior
is that private events can easily attain aversive functions through arbitrarily
applicable relational responding. This was also a prominent theme in the
preceding survey of how different types of rule-governed behavior can turn
into behavioral traps. We all too easily come to focus our actions on control-
ling private events. This type of rule-governed behavior, called experiential
avoidance, is defined as actions aimed at controlling or eliminating affects,
thoughts, memories, and bodily sensations (S. C. Hayes, Wilson, Gifford,
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). The outcome of this behavior is generally para-
doxical. It may work in the short run, but in the long run it heightens our risk
of actually increasing the type of experiences we are working to avoid. At
the same time, life as a whole becomes restricted and life satisfaction wanes.
I have illustrated all of this above, in the passages on the negative effects of
rule-governed behavior aimed at controlling private events, and extensive
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behavior. Other species can also discriminate their own actions, but because
of our capacity for relational framing, the complexity of human self-discrim-
ination is enormously greater (D. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001). We humans
can put our own actions into a number of different relational frames. This
means we can contact this actionearlier or later on (temporal framing),
not performing this action (oppositional framing), more of this action
(comparative framing), or this action over there (perspective framing), for
exampleand all without the action having to be at hand or even having
occurred previously.
In addition to this, we are able to put our experience of self in relational
frames. Through verbal behavior, we can learn to discriminate that I am the
one who is performing this action. We do this through verbal perspective
taking, as described in chapter 5. This skill is combined with rule-governed
behavior to form self-generated rules where the individual is both speaker and
listener.
The ability to discriminate oneself in this way can be affected by the
problematic complication discussed above: the dark side of relational
framing. If thoughts can acquire aversive functions from essentially any
direction through relational framing, then my thoughts about myself can also
acquire aversive functions. This can take place through direct experience. For
example, when I experience something painful, this is directly related to my
experience of myself. It can also take place through other peoples narrative of
myself, such as if I am often told that Im not the way I ought to be, that I do
things the wrong way, that Im bad, or that Im stupid. If direct and indirect
means are combined, the probability increases that I will develop a narrative
of myself that is painful in different ways, and through this narrative I risk
having my life circumscribed. However, even if I do not have powerful experi-
ences like theseeither of pain in itself or of frequently being presented with
an aversive story of myselfI still will not escape this possibility. Although
my experiences and the story of myself that others have handed to me might
be dominated by appetitive functions, my verbal ability will necessarily also
put me in contact with aversive functions in relation to myself. All organ-
isms constantly discriminate between aversive and appetitive stimuli. These
discriminative responses increase in a dramatic way in connection with the
ability to frame events relationally, especially when framing comparatively.
Since humans, through verbal perspective taking, learn to relate to them-
selves as objects, the following question becomes inevitable: Am I appetitive
or aversive? In more everyday language, the question might be phrased along
these lines: Am I good or bad? Am I the way I should be? Am I good enough?
Just as both direct and indirect aversive stimulus functions are related
to private events in general, they are also related to the experience of me.
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The Dark Side of Human Languaging
Because my private events are in a very special and direct relation with my
sense of self, it is easy to understand that they will acquire functions that are
central to my behavior. They do, after all, take place within me. In the discus-
sion of how our experience of self originates, in chapter 5, I described how
our stories of ourselves are connected with risks of rigidity and of falling into
verbal pitfalls. The more I act in fusion with my story of myself, the greater
my risk of acting in a way that in the long run has a negative and restricting
effect on my life. This is particularly applicable if my direct and indirect learn-
ing history has resulted in a limiting story that increases the probability of
problematic rule following.
Lets suppose that my story of myself describes me as someone who can
suddenly do something completely crazy or who cannot make it alone. It
isnt hard to see how a narrative like thisif I act in fusion with itpromotes
a kind of rule following that sustains guardedness and behavior that lacks
independence. Such a narrative also assigns indirect aversive functions to
aspects of self-as-process. A certain feeling that I notice, say feeling insecure,
can become an obstacle to action, an antecedent to avoidance. This type of
avoidant behavior tends to result in negative reinforcement because, in the
short run, my feeling of insecurity decreases when I act in a guarded way.
Following this rule can therefore potentially increase my tendency to act in
fusion with the story, which will come to further dominate my behavior as a
result. And all of this can take place even in situations where this behavior
causes severe losses in my life. Experiential avoidance has become a trap.
A number of psychological problems and psychiatric diagnoses can be ana-
lyzed in a corresponding way. Responsibility-focused stories of self are often
important elements in connection with obsessive-compulsive syndromes.
Stories dealing with guilt are often key in depressive conditions. Stories about
the individuals own body and appearance have central functions in connec-
tion with eating disorders, and narratives about oneself and ones need for
interpersonal affirmation often have these functions in connection with bor-
derline personality disorder. These are just a few typical examples.
Many people explain that they seek psychological counseling because
they feel low in self-confidence or self-esteem. Many of these individuals
express their problem in terms such as Theres something wrong with me
or Im not normal, or they seem to assume that there is something wrong
inside that causes their dilemma or their symptoms. Many of these descrip-
tions of the problems are problematic in themselves and constitute some of
the verbal traps that restrict the individual. Still, these phrases also point out
that an important part of the human dilemma is connected with how we act in
relation to our experience of self. This experience of self can acquire aversive
functions through verbal learning and can be further complicated through
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Learning RFT
the problematic types of rule following described in this chapter, which lead
to experiential avoidance.
SUMMARY
Human language is enormously useful, yet it also has some problematic side
effects. The behavioral repertoire of derived relational responding results in
the human capacity to transform stimulus functions by way of mutual entail-
ment and combinatorial mutual entailment. As a result, the possibilities of
contacting nonpresent events increase dramatically, so aversive stimulus
functions can potentially become omnipresent. In addition, our capacity
for relational framing also makes rule-governed behavior possible. This too
is very useful, but it opens the door to getting caught in different types of
behavioral traps. Among the types of rule following that I have described,
augmenting seems to be potentially the most problematic. When we follow
augmental rules about what is necessary in order to have a good and mean-
ingful life, many private events attain strong aversive functions. Deliberate
efforts to control them then seem to offer the only way forward. However,
this path all too often becomes a dead-end street. Theres a certain futility in
this kind of rule following, since these private events arent typically subject
to efforts to control them, and, paradoxically, the very effort to avoid these
events actually increases the likelihood that they will occur. Compounding
the problem, and perhaps worst of all, these efforts can turn into an essential
aspect of life, resulting in other behaviors being abandonedbehaviors that
might have increased the probability of contacting positive reinforcement in
the long run. These vicious circles are established by the basic problem of
acting in fusion with these rules. Because many of these rules are self-gener-
ated and also often specify what the person should do in regard to himself,
an important part of these problematic behaviors is enacted in relation to our
experience of self.
It isnt inevitable that we get caught in traps like these, and even if we end
up on such a dead-end street, it isnt necessarily a terminal point. Our behav-
ior can be influenced by a number of different contextual factors. Therefore,
changing contextual factors as a means of diminishing destructive rule fol-
lowing is the goal of any psychological treatment based on the principles
presented in this book. It is my aim, in part 3 of the book, to explore how to
approach this type of treatment.
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PART 3
Clinical Implications
CHAPTER 8
Learning Theory and
Psychological Therapies
All psychological therapies must deal with two separate arenas, two princi-
pally different sets of conditions. One arena is that shared by therapist and
clienttheir time spent in sessions. The other arena is the rest of the clients
life, where he encounters the problems or difficulties that have made him seek
help. The first is the only arena the therapist can influence directly, as she is
present there. At the same time, the second arenathe clients life outside of
therapyis, of course, in the long run more important to the client. That is
where change needs to take place.
This provides the therapist with two possible ways of exerting influence,
as seen from a behavior analytic perspective: through client-therapist inter-
actions when the clients problematic behavior is present during sessions, or
through the therapists ability to influence the clients rule-governed behavior.
In the first case, if the client behaves the same way during therapy sessions as
he would have out there in real life, there is a possibility that the therapist
can offer different circumstances from those that normally influence the cli-
ents actions, giving the client an opportunity to learn something new. An
example is a person who typically turns quiet and withdraws from others
when he feels disappointed and sad, and for whom this behavior is a problem.
If this occurs in his interaction with the therapist, the therapist may act in
a way that creates circumstances that change the clients behavior. Perhaps
the therapist notices how the client withdraws and calls his attention to this
while also encouraging a different type of behavior. If the client tries a new
way of behaving, like expressing his disappointment, the therapist can act in
Learning RFT
a way that reinforces this new behavior. This process is also a fundamental
part of exposure therapy. For example, a person with obsessive-compulsive
problems may not dare to keep knives within reach for fear of harming others.
In this case, therapy will typically include creating situations, arranged by the
therapist and client collaboratively, wherein knives are within reach. This may
occur in the consulting room or in a place where this problem is usually trig-
gered, such as the clients home. The therapist works to support new behavior,
in this case for the client to have access to or handle a knife in a way he has
earlier avoided, and she tries to arrange for consequences that reinforce this
new behavior.
Both of these examples demonstrate how the therapist can build on
behavioral principles to arrange a new context for the clients problematic
behavior when it occurs, and in this way increase the probability of behavioral
change. In the latter example, the therapist arranges a setup of antecedents
and consequences for both problematic and new behavior. Of course, the
therapist herself is also a part of the clients context when the two of them
are interacting. However, given what I mentioned about therapys two arenas,
it is evident that changes that occur when the therapist is present are not the
primary goal. It is change in the second arena, the clients own life, that we
are aiming for in therapy. If this is to happen, generalization is necessary; the
client learns something new as he works with the therapist, and this is subse-
quently generalized in his day-to-day life. But for such changes to be lasting,
the consequences that face the client out there, in real life, must reinforce
this new behavior as well. If not, there is a risk that the newly learned approach
from therapy wont be firmly established in the clients ordinary life and thus
will be easily extinguished. The therapist does not control consequences that
take place in the second arena, so in their work for change, therapist and client
must take this into consideration as they create a treatment plan. In the cli-
ents day-to-day life, are there natural reinforcers for the clients new way of
behaving? To go back to the example of exposure therapy, we can assume
that in most cases there is more reinforcement for the ordinary use of knives
than there is for always avoiding them. Likewise, expressing ones disappoint-
ment and sadness, rather than withdrawing, is probably reinforced, at least in
certain contexts, though not necessarily in all.
Paths to desired changes can thus involve a process along these lines:
The client practices new behavior in his interactions with the therapist and
encounters new consequences that reinforce this behavior. He then acts
in the same way in his day-to-day life and encounters even more reinforc-
ing consequences, making it more likely that the new behavior will occur in
other, similar situations. In collaboration with the client, the therapist has
set up a new context consisting of both antecedents and consequences, and
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Learning RFT
a successful way, and if his fear that he will do something he doesnt want to
do isnt realized, then he too has learned something new. Most likely, even
without the help of the therapist, the client will then be able to formulate rules
along the lines of If I act like this at home, things might turn out more the
way I want them to, simply based on his experience in therapy.
Of course, this chain of events isnt inevitable, and it doesnt necessarily
follow that formulating rules like this will lead to changed behavior outside
the consulting room. But this is a common way in which a change of behavior
takes place. And in most types of psychological therapy, the therapist uses this
type of strategy in a deliberate way. An important part of therapy is exactly
this: formulating rules and trying to increase the probability that the client
will follow them.
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Learning Theory and Psychological Therapies
actions in relation to a client in fact change the clients behavior, this must be
occurring according to behavioral principles, if we assume that these prin-
ciples are universally valid. When a psychoanalyst or a cognitive therapist
achieves changes in a clinical setting (Leichsenring, 2005; Dobson, 1989;
Beck, 2005) this takes place because their actions in therapy influence ante-
cedents and consequences of the behavior that has been changed. There is no
other possibility when we look at this from a behavioral perspective, regard-
less of whether the therapists themselves describe their work for change from
a different theoretical angle. In the remainder of the book, I will describe a
psychological therapy that is based on behavioral principles, with a special
emphasis on conclusions drawn from relational frame theory. But first, let me
outline a view we can take on two other important psychotherapy models
as seen from this perspective. I do this from the conviction that behavioral
principles are universally valid.
As I do this I am aware of two potential risks: First, there is a risk that this
could be interpreted as presumptuousthat the claims seem too grand. That
is an inevitable risk. The claims of learning theory are grand. This theory does
not profess to explain only certain aspects of human behavior or a certain type
of therapy. It takes as its starting point the view that behavioral principles are
universally applicable, that these principles describe how we humans learn
everything we learn and how it is possible to influence this learning process.
Second, there is a risk that some who advocate the therapy models ana-
lyzed here will feel that my descriptions arent fair, since I will summarize
these models and, to a large degree, will disregard the explanations offered
by these therapies. All I can do in regard to this concern is clarify my own
starting points. I am not attempting to describe a theoretical integration of
the psychology of learning and other theories, nor do I intend to account for
any form of dialogue among the theories of the different models. My inten-
tion is to give the reader a behavioral perspective on other models of psy-
chological therapy. Such a perspective is possible; we can look at the central
components of psychodynamic1 and cognitive therapy from the principles of
learning theory.
1I am using the term psychodynamic therapy to denote all forms of psy-
chological therapy based on what is usually called psychodynamic theory
or psychoanalytic theory. The borders between the different terms in use
are not always distinct. Here, the term refers to the whole range of such
therapies, from extensive psychoanalysis five sessions a week for many
years to short manual-based therapies, for example, the kind described for
so-called affect phobia (McCullough et al., 2003).
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Learning Theory and Psychological Therapies
161
Learning RFT
This behaviorbeing able to tact ones own behavior and its connec-
tion to other eventsis called insight, both in psychodynamic therapy and
in everyday language. From the perspective of learning theory, it could be
called outlookwhich might be a more fitting expression (Ferster, 1972). You
learn to discriminate, and, since in this case it is verbal discrimination, you
learn to tact your own behavior as well as the connection between what you
do and other events. Doing this is a prerequisite for what Skinner spoke of
as the other possible way of exerting influence in psychotherapy in general,
and in psychodynamic therapy specifically: formulating rules for behavior
outside the therapeutic setting. Technically put, the therapist is to establish
antecedents that increase the probability of a certain behavior taking place
in a situation other than the one at hand. In other words, the therapist does
something to increase the chances that a certain rule-governed behavior will
occur in a setting other than in session with the therapist.
If this self-discrimination occurs as a result of therapy, the client will
formulate rules like these whether or not the therapist actively helps him do
so. In psychoanalysis the therapist usually gives this kind of help sparingly,
but many other types of psychodynamic therapy make more room for mutual
work to form such rules. Indirectly, this occurs in classical psychoanalysis too,
since the client is a verbally competent human being and possesses the skills
needed to create self-rules.
Clearly, these two essential ways of influencing the clients behavior can
and do interact with each other. If a certain new behavior results in new and
different consequences in interactions with the therapist, and especially if this
happens repeatedly, this experience can form the foundation of a rule of this
type: If I also do this when Im disappointed in Lee, he might listen. The
person acts, meets certain consequences, tacts a contingency, and formulates
a rule that specifies a possible behavior and a possible future consequence. If
the person subsequently acts according to this rule, this is the type of behav-
ior described as tracking in chapter 6.
We can describe different types of psychodynamic therapy, and other psy-
chological therapies as well, based on the balance between these two strategies
for working to change client behavior. In frequent and long-term psychoanal-
ysis, the direct contingencies that are established in the interaction between
therapist and client are very likely to play a large part in any changes. Therapy
provides what some early interpreters of psychoanalysis called a corrective
emotional experience (Alexander, French, & the Institute for Psychoanalysis,
1946, p. 66). Generally speaking, however, psychoanalysis has a strong empha-
sis on understanding and talking about the connection between actions,
thoughts, emotions, and external events. The classic psychoanalytic interpre-
tation can be understood as a verbally formulated discrimination of any such
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Learning Theory and Psychological Therapies
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Learning Theory and Psychological Therapies
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Learning Theory and Psychological Therapies
propose. The purpose of this book is to show how learning theory, including
more recent findings in this field, is directly applicable in clinical practice.
An argument that has been given for developing the special description of
ACT that dominates most published texts about the model is that it is meant
to facilitate learning by therapists who are not very familiar with learning
theory, so they can readily make use of the ACT model in their work (S. C.
Hayes, 2008). Since I, quite to the contrary, intend to describe the behavioral
foundations, this argument does not apply here. Second, I want to stress that
the new interventions recommended in ACT are not defined as belonging to
any specific model of therapy. Learning theory is a scientific theory and its
practical applications are freely available, rather than being associated with
any specific model of therapy. Last but not least, I want to describe a psycho-
logical treatment that is based on principles rather than well-defined manuals.
The therapy models that have their foundation in behavior analysis all under-
line that they are governed by principles rather than by manuals. This goes for
acceptance and commitment therapy and functional analytical psychother-
apy, as well as for behavioral activation. And yet these approaches are often
described precisely as if they were distinct, delimited models, rather than
simply different aspects of the same therapeutic traditionand this despite
the fact that they all openly admit their close affinity. Consequently, differ-
ent attempts have been made to integrate the different models (Callaghan,
Gregg, Marx, Kohlenberg, & Gifford, 2004; Kanter, Baruch, & Gaynor,
2006; Kanter, Manos, Busch, & Rusch, 2008). These attempts usually involve
adding aspects of one model to one of the other models. In the remainder of
the book, I want to take a more fundamental approach. I intend to describe
clinical behavior analysis as one integrated therapy model, based on the prin-
ciples of behavioral psychology and with a particular focus on the contribu-
tion offered by RFT. This is not done from a position of arguing with any of
the individual models or with the more common ways of describing them. My
intention is to highlight their common ground and point to the possibility of
a coordinate application.
The structure I will follow is taken from functional analysis. The thera-
pist can, in a given moment, focus her interventions on influencing either the
antecedents or the consequences that surround a specific behavior. In the
next chapter, I will describe some common starting points of clinical behav-
ior analysis. In chapter 10, I will go on to describe interventions that focus
on consequences, and in chapter 11 Ill look at interventions that focus on
antecedents. In all of these chapters, a key focus will be on interventions that
have their basis in RFT.
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CHAPTER 9
General Guidelines for Clinical
Behavior Analysis
in time and in different contexts than the situation in which they are given.
Another important aspect of rules is that the behavior they govern is relatively
insensitive to direct contingencies.
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General Guidelines for Clinical Behavior Analysis
logs, and questionnaires in the hope that this will provide more direct contact
with what occurs in the second arena. While this is an important contribu-
tion, filling out rating scales is, of course, not the same behavior as that the
scales aim at describing. There is no getting around the quandary that, at the
beginning of a therapeutic relationship, what the therapist faces first and fore-
most is verbal behavior. This illustrates a point I made in chapter 3: that an
increased understanding of verbal behavior is incredibly important in psycho-
logical therapies. Talk therapy needs a language theory! So lets take a look at
what we need to do in the initial phases of a therapeutic interaction based on
the theoretical view presented in this book.
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General Guidelines for Clinical Behavior Analysis
might be wrong and what she should do. Periodically, she feels low. She thinks
about how her life has been ruined and believes that what happened during
her holiday trip caused this injury. She has intervals when she feels good, but
then the same feelings return. She has seen medical doctors and gone through
different examinations in order to eliminate physical problems, but each time
she is told that nothing is wrong with her.
After Anne has given the above account and different examples of how
she gets mired in brooding in everyday situations, the following dialogue with
the therapist takes place.
Anne: Now, when Im here with you, you mean? Yes, I actually
do feel some of it now. Its like I can never get rid of it.
Its hopeless! Something went wrong when that thing
happenedsomething in my brain. And still, I dont think
about what actually happened that much. It happened
and it was terrible, but it feels like a long time ago. I got
to talk about it when I came home. But something went
wrong inside me. And I guess the doctors dont seem to be
able to find it or do anything about it. What could it be?
It just fouls up my work completely. I cant think straight.
Where will all of this lead? I was offered a new position
last month, but I dont know if I have the guts to accept it.
What if I cant handle it? What if this never stops?
Therapist: Yes, and even more specifically, what you seem to do when
you feel it. Its like there are two parts in what happens,
and it seems to be happening right here and now. First you
feel some of the weirdness, and then you start reasoning
and asking questions: Whats wrong? Where will this lead?
and so on. It seems like youre trying to sort it out. Or am
I misinterpreting you?
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Learning RFT
Anne: No Okay Yes, I see what you mean. I dont think Ive
seen it that way before, but now that you say it, I think
youre right. First something reminds me of itagain
and then I just kind of dive right in there. Yeahthats
exactly what usually happens.
Note how the therapist uses what Anne has told her about her problems.
When, after hearing Anne, she sees something in their interaction in the room
(the first arena) that is similar to what Anne is relating from the second arena,
the therapist focuses on this in her analysis. Together with Anne, she tacts the
different parts in an ABC analysis of the behavior taking place here and now,
then compares this with what Anne can observe in her daily life.
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General Guidelines for Clinical Behavior Analysis
of the time, problematic behavior is simply about doing too much of some-
thing. Annes example, in the dialogue above, is typical in this regard. She
asks herself questions, she thinks about them, and she tries to sort it all out.
No one would suggest that this is something that she should stop doing alto-
gether. This behavior is very useful in many situations and is even vital to us
humans. But Anne does too much of this behavior, and she uses it in contexts
where it doesnt work.
The other type of behavior that gradually becomes important to tact in
the therapeutic setting is alternative behavior. This is behavior that, when per-
formed, increases the probability that things will turn out as the client wants
them tobehavior that increases the workability of life. Alternative behavior
can often be described as a deficit: behavior that exists in the clients reper-
toire but is seldom used, or at least not used in the context where it would
increase the workability of life. Of course, it may be that a desired alternative
behavior doesnt exist in the clients repertoire. There could be someone who
has neverin any situation whatsoeverput his foot down to someone in
a position of authority, for example; someone who reports that he doesnt
even know how to go about something like that. In many cases, however, this
description is actually a way of saying, I dont want what I think that would
entail, rather than a true indicator of a complete lack of capability.
In principle, then, there are two types of behavior in focus in a clinical
functional analysis: problematic behavior and alternative behavior. We could
say that we have two types of clinically relevant behavior. This brings us to a
point where RFT can cast light on what the therapist should be especially on
the lookout for.
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Learning RFT
in, can easily develop into behavioral excesses, as in Annes example. When
Anne experiences thoughts that something is wrong or that something isnt
going to work out, indirect stimulus functions dominatefunctions that she
accesses through arbitrarily applicable relational responding. Anne doesnt
act based on simply having a thought; she acts based on the content of the
thought, or what we might commonly refer to as its meaning. She acts on the
basis of a story that, among other things, deals with the future. You might say
that instead of regarding this story as something that is taking place within
her in the moment, she regards her future life from the perspective of this
story. She dives right in, to use her own term. If we were to inquire more
closely about the point of this behavior, Anne would probably describe it as an
effort to dissolve the threatening aspects of the story, either by understand-
ing what its about and thereby being able to thwart the threat, or by realizing
that its nothing dangerous. There is nothing inherently unnatural or strange
in this behavior. This is what we all do when we face threats. Annes problem
is that her experience of this threat is distributed throughout her life, and
the resulting behavioral strategy dominates and doesnt actually work well in
regard to what she wants to achieve. When those bodily sensations return, her
thoughts about what this means return, as well. She cannot get rid of them.
Her attempts to get rid of these experiences actually constitute the type of
behavior that adds to her problems and restricts her life.
Annes behavior is an example of experiential avoidance. She is occupied
with these attempts to eliminate or control phenomena within her experi-
ence that are not under voluntary control. Because her therapist knows that
this is a common behavioral strategy, she has reason to look for exactly this.
Behaviors that vary widely in external qualities can nevertheless serve the
same function of experiential avoidance. Although the behaviors are topo-
graphically different, they are functionally alike since they serve the same
purpose. They belong to the same functional class. You can try to get rid of
unpleasant feelings, painful thoughts, or distressing recollections in different
ways: In a face-to-face interaction, you might look aside and fall silent. But
you could also talk energetically or raise your voice, if your purpose in this
is the same: ridding yourself of the unwanted experiences. In a situation like
Annes, another person might try to think of something else. Anne, on the
other hand, thinks about it more. These topographically distinct behaviors
can be functionally alike if both aim at getting rid of the unpleasant experi-
ence. As another example, when people experience grief, both increased activ-
ity and passive withdrawal can be aimed at reducing the feelings of sorrow
and loss.
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FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS IS
THERAPY BEGUN
What therapist and client do in a functional analysis is mutually tact the cli-
ents behavior and the relations between this behavior and the contextual
factors that influence it. This brings us back to Skinners statement that a
person who has been made aware of himself by the questions he has been
asked is in a better position to predict and control his own behavior (Skinner,
1974, p. 35).
How tacting ones own behavior, and the contingencies that influence it,
can at a later point alter the kind of behavior that is being tacted is explained
by RFT. Verbal behavior, such as words or thoughts, can alter stimulus func-
tions of other events through mutual entailment and combinatorial mutual
entailment. Take Anne and her effort to eliminate the feeling that something
is wrong with her. Her behavioral starting point has been that if she thinks
more, she will reach what she is striving for: somehow eliminating the threat.
This does not necessarily mean that shes had this in her thoughts explicitly,
but she has been acting from such an assumption. She has behaved as if such
an approach is the most viable way forward. In the following interaction, the
therapist uses a functional analysis in an attempt to affect the stimulus func-
tions of the behavior of diving right in.
Therapist: So, first, something reminds you. This time I guess it was
my question. And then you dive right in there What do
you feel is the point in that? The point in diving in there?
Anne: Point? I dont know. What am I supposed to do? I have to
try to solve it somehow, you know.
Therapist: So you could maybe say that this trying to solve it is the
point. Thats what its all about: solving it.
Anne: Yeah, you could maybe say that. There has to be a solution,
you know.
Therapist: Yes, that sounds like a reason for diving in there, I think
to find a solution. Is it working?
Anne: (silent for a moment) Its not working at all. The more I
think about it, the worse it gets.
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Learning RFT
CAPTURING BEHAVIOR
In the example with Anne, the therapist captures something the client does in
the moment, as a natural part of the interaction. The therapist brings the focus
to something the client does in the moment, which then becomes the subject
of dialogue and intervention. In Annes case, this happens early in the course
of therapy, but it often takes more time for such a process to become clear to
the therapist. In any case, it is important for the therapist to constantly remain
alert to this possibility. These situations where clinically relevant behavior is
occurring are useful in two ways: The therapist can use the behavior as the
basis for a functional analysis performed together with the client, and she can
also intervene for change in other ways.
Functional analytical psychotherapy places a special emphasis on this
type of analysis of interpersonal behavior as demonstrated in relation to the
therapist and describes many different ways to use this kind of interaction
to facilitate behavioral change (Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991; Tsai et al., 2008).
However, as the example with Anne demonstrates, not all relevant behavior
is interpersonal, strictly speaking. It is true that Annes problematic behavior
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General Guidelines for Clinical Behavior Analysis
is demonstrated in the dialogue with the therapist here, but in the second
arena, Annes daily life, she does more or less the same thing, but with herself
as the listener.
Many times it is ambiguous to the therapist whether a problematic
behavior is playing out in the interaction. When the clients story about what
happens in the second arena describes what the therapist interprets as a prob-
lematic behavior, the therapist can seize the opportunity to simply ask the
question. Richards story provides an example of this.
Richard has felt dejected for years. He says he has perhaps always been
a bit on the gloomy side. He works as a teacher and thinks that his perfor-
mance has gone downhill gradually over the past year. He has periodically
been away on medical leave with depressive burnout and has been taking
antidepressants, but they havent helped appreciably. He says that he actu-
ally likes most of the things he does in his work, but that he isnt given the
most appealing tasks any longer, reporting, The young overachievers get all
of them. He ends up in the background at home, too. He and his wife, Erin,
have two children in their early teens. Erin is active and devoted, both in her
own work and in their family life. Richard feels like hes falling behind. He
tags along with Erins initiatives but finds himself more and more passive. His
family has started to complain that he keeps digging in his heels and that they
cant count on him. In his dialogue with the therapist, Richard has a rather
docile attitude. He answers questions and is mostly attentive, but he does
seem dejected. The following dialogue takes place during his fifth session.
Richard: I feel burdened. Whatever I do, it doesnt make any
difference. Its like a haze. I manage to get through the
days, but nothing ever seems to change. See, theres just no
strength.
Therapist: When you feel burdened like this and theres no strength,
what do you do?
Richard: You mean at work?
Therapist: Yes, as an example.
Richard: I try to do what I can. You have to take one thing at a
time. Its no use getting burnt-out again, you know. I can
remember when things were worse, but its not much fun
this way either. Im just hanging in there.
Therapist: And what do you do at home?
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Richard: I guess its the same thing. Im feeling more and more
burdened at home too. But Erin keeps it up, and I guess I
tag along.
Therapist: When I hear you say youre tagging along, it sounds rather
passive, at least to melike lying low. Does that sound
right to you?
Richard: Yes, sure. I dont know what to do. Theres no strength left.
Therapist: Okay, theres no strength and youre lying low, but still
hanging in there.
Richard: Yes, so far
Therapist: Is lying low something you think youre doing here?
Richard: What do you mean, here?
Therapist: Here with me, in our conversations. Ive noticed that you
listen to me, that you answer questions, and that you
participate in what were doing here. And at the same time,
I wonder if somehow youre lying low here, tooas if its
no use here either, as if youre acting the same way here as
you do at home or at work.
Richard: (after a moment of silence) Yes, now that you mention it.
I mean, I want this to help; I want it to get better. But I
think Im lying low here too. I do. I guess its something
that comes naturally to me, maybe.
EVOKING BEHAVIOR
A lot of problematic behavior can be captured in the interaction between
client and therapist. In my experience, more so than may seem to be the case.
But there is also a need for the therapist to evoke client behavior. We need
to access the clients behavior in a direct way, beyond what is demonstrated
or triggered by the questions in a dialogue. This is necessary to perform a
functional analysis and to intervene for change more directly.
Behavior therapy has a long tradition of doing precisely this. The term
usually used for this type of therapeutic work is exposure. This is also the
single psychological intervention most widely supported by scientific data
(Barlow, 2002). It is used in all types of evidence-based therapies, most
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typically in treating anxiety disorders. While the strategy is simple, this does
not necessarily mean that accomplishing this type of intervention is easy.
On the contrary, it can be rather difficult and require a high degree of com-
petence in the therapist. In exposure, therapist and client deliberately seek
the type of conditions under which the clients problematic behavior usually
occurs. In treating a specific phobia, like fear of injections, therapist and client
arrange a situation where an injection is to be given. In treating compulsive
washing, the therapist and client might go to visit bathrooms. In treating
post-traumatic stress characterized by painful memories, the client is asked
to recall what is tormenting him. All of this is done precisely for the purpose
of evoking behavior. The aim is to allow the therapist to be present when the
clients problematic behavior occurs, partly to help the client recognize what
he is doing that doesnt work, and partly to influence the client in finding
a response that works better for him. Exposure therapy doesnt focus solely
on the client being exposed to aversive phenomena; it also looks at what the
person does when he is exposed. Being exposed to the problematic situation
is usually a necessary part of learning something new. It is in this situation
that the person can learn alternative behavior, and also learn to recognize it so
that it might be integrated into his behavioral repertoire. We might therefore
say that skills training is a part of exposure therapy.
Deliberately evoking behavior in the arena of therapy has a wider appli-
cation than you might think when you hear the word exposure. It is every-
thing that the therapist does, often in agreement with the client, in order for
clinically relevant behavior to occur in this arena. For example, if bulimic
behavior is the focus of therapy, deliberately evoking behavior might mean
arranging for the client to have a meal just before the therapy session. For a
client with a different problem, it might involve the therapist sitting silently
and adopting a neutral waiting attitude if the clients problematic behavior is
triggered under these types of conditions. Different types of role-playing can
be used to evoke what the client needs to work with.
Within ACT, a number of experiential exercises are used to evoke or
elicit behavior (S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). They are used both
to discriminate problematic behavior and to help the client find alternative
ways of behaving. In addition to using exercises that have been specifically
developed from the theoretical principles ACT is founded on, the therapist is
also encouraged to create new exercises that fit the moment and are based on
the same principles. Some of these exercises are more like what is traditionally
called exposure, in that they aim at establishing a situation where the client
can be expected to experience negative affect. This is natural, considering that
experiential avoidance is seen as a major problem. One such exercise involves
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the therapist and client placing their chairs in close proximity, then silently
looking into each others eyes for a couple of minutes. This exercise utilizes
the fact that most of us feel uncomfortable when what we think of as our per-
sonal territory is infringed upon. And yet there is no real threat at hand. The
instructions for this exercise are simply to sit still in this way and note how it
feelsto note the different thoughts that come up and any other reactions.
Afterward, therapist and client talk about what was noted, including thoughts,
feelings, and bodily sensations. The client may have noticed an impulse to cut
the exercise short. In that case the conversation can revolve around what it
was like to just sit and observe this. Or maybe the client did cut the exercise
short, providing an opportunity to talk about that. If the clients problem is
experiential avoidance, the conversation will be about the two types of clini-
cally relevant behaviorproblem behavior and alternative behavior.
The following dialogue with Anne illustrates another exercise that is also
aimed at discriminating these two types of behavior. Or perhaps, as in the
eye-contact exercise, it is aimed at behaviors that are in some sense analogous
or functionally similar to what the client has described.
In her dialogue with the therapist, Anne has described the difficulties
shes trying to manage: physical symptoms, lack of concentration, and alarm-
ing thoughts. She describes her own efforts, how those efforts dont really
work, and also her frustration at not being able to find an alternative.
Therapist: Theres an exercise that I use sometimes. Would you be
willing to try it?
Anne: Sure.
Therapist: (brings out a notepad) I want to make a note of some of the
things you think are the worst problems, the things that
bother you and that you said you want to get rid ofyour
lack of concentration, for example (jots down something on
the notepad). What else is essential?
Anne: The tiredness, the tension in my body
Therapist: (writes what Anne mentions) How about the thoughts about
not being your usual self and the risk that things are never
going to get better?
Anne: Thats the worst partthat its going to go on like this.
The therapist notes the things Anne tells her and then holds the pad up
with the notes facing Anne so that she can see them.
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Therapist: Place your hand against this, against the writing on the
pad.
Anne: (holds the palm of her hand against the pad, fumbling a bit)
Okay
Therapist: (presses her hand against the pad from the other side) Keep it
in check. Keep it away from you!
Anne: (puts more weight behind her pressure) Like this?
The therapist and Anne press the notepad from their opposite positions,
making the pad go back and forth a bit.
Therapist: Good! Remember what this is like (lowers the notepad).
Notice what that was like and compare it to this (places the
notepad in Annes lap, with the scribbled notes facing up).
Anne: (after a moment of silence) Well, thats a little different.
Therapist: In what way?
Anne: Well, its easier to hold it in my lapin one way. But its
awful too. I dont like that.
Therapist: No. Which of the two positions requires more strength?
Anne: Well, that would be keeping it away from me. But that feels
good too, in some way. At least Im doing something.
Therapist: Okay. Which of these two positions is more similar to
what you are doing out there, in your life?
Anne: Keeping it away from me. Thats what I do all the time.
Thats it. Thats what I do all the time, actually.
The dialogue during and after an exercise like this one can evolve in
different directions. Sometimes clients remove the notepad as soon as its
placed in their lap. Its important for the therapist to be open to the clients
actual experience and remember that this is what she should base her work on
throughout. The dialogue is not an attempt at persuasion; its a way of trying
to evoke behavior that is clinically relevant and helping the client notice it.
There are many possible aspects to map out, based on this exercise. What are
the advantages of these different behaviors, and what are the disadvantages?
In which of these two positions is the client more free to pursue a valued
direction in life? If, like Anne, clients can clearly see that keeping it away is
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what they do, what would keeping it in their lap involve, if they were to do
this in day-to-day life?
In these types of therapy situations, the goal is to map out and influ-
ence two types of behavior: problematic behavior in the shape of experiential
avoidance, and alternative behavior. The exercise above, with the notepad,
can suggest what the alternative is. Remember that, according to RFT, the
fundamental problem with experiential avoidance is that verbal behavior
in the shape of rule following is overly dominating. Exercises like the one
described above can provide the client with a way of contacting an alterna-
tive, based on direct stimulus functions. For a short moment, verbal control
is circumvented.
USING METAPHORS AS
THERAPEUTIC TOOLS
Experiential exercises are used in therapy to try to dodge the dominance that
indirect stimulus functions so easily acquire for us humans. Another tool that
can be used for the same purposes is metaphors. Using metaphors as tools
in psychological therapy is not a new device, and it definitely isnt a unique
contribution from RFT and the research it is based on. This therapeutic tool
has a long history within psychotherapy, especially within the nonempirical
traditions (Evans, 1988; Kopp, 1995; Mays, 1990). At the same time, with
the help of RFT, we can answer the question of why metaphors can be such
an efficient tool. Understanding the significance of metaphors and analogies
within human language also gives us some guidelines for how they can be
used.
Metaphors are verbal tools. At the same time, they also contain rela-
tional networks where direct stimulus functions play a decisive role. Recall
the metaphor that Sue and Larry are like cats and dogs, from chapter 5. Here
are two relational networks. We have Sue and Larry on one side, and cats
and dogs on the other. The relation between these networks is arbitrarily
established through the contextual factor are like. But each network also
contains a number of direct stimulus functions that are established in the
listeners history; for example, the experience of cats and dogs and how they
usually relate to each other. And the point in this metaphor is that the rela-
tions between these direct stimulus functions can influence the listeners way
of relating to Sue and Larry. In an instant, as soon as the metaphor is uttered, a
large number of relations between stimuli are cued for the listener. These rela-
tions between stimuli are collected from events the listener has experienced
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Learning RFT
Consider again the exercise involving the notepad, wherein the therapist
tried to help Anne discriminate two different behaviors in relation to the pain
she experiences: keeping it away from her versus keeping it in her lap. If, as
in the dialogue above, the exercise leads to the client discriminating the dif-
ference between these two as relevant to actions out there in real life, then
the exercise can be used as a type of metaphor. This can be done directly
after the exercise via questions from the therapist: If you were to keep these
troubles (lack of concentration, tensions, troubling thoughts) more in your lap
in your daily life, in what way would you do that, do you think? The therapist
could also return to this at a later stage, when the client relates something that
has taken place in the second arena. The therapist may ask, What you are
describing nowwould you say that was pushing it away from you or keeping
it in your lap?
Both experiential exercises and the use of metaphors are thus ways of
trying to minimize the traps inherent in rule following and are therefore fun-
damental throughout therapy. This does not mean that rule-governed behav-
ior is absent in the type of therapeutic processes illustrated in these examples.
The client is a verbal being and will constantly create self-rules in these situ-
ations, independent of whether the therapist is taking an active part in this
process or not. The hope is that these rules can become more flexible if they
are based, firstly, on direct stimulus functions through experiential exercises
and, secondly, on metaphors that make use of the clients direct experiences.
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The attentive reader may notice that I am now approaching a certain type
of rule-governed behavior: augmenting, which I discussed in chapter 6. In a
model of psychotherapy based in RFT, there is an emphasis on the difficulties
and traps inherent in rule-governed behavior. But there is more; such a model
of psychotherapy also draws on the significant contribution of rule-governed
behavior in creating more flexibility in human behavior. We can seemingly
contact something we want and make that our direction, even when what
we desire is not directly accessible. It need only be present to us through
our ability to frame relationally. This can be very useful. Clarifying in which
direction the client wants to move and the purpose of change is an important
part of therapy. In everyday language, we might refer to this as motivation.
Ill return to this in chapter 11, which focuses on working on rules, or verbal
antecedents.
THE FOUNDATION OF A
CLINICAL BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
THAT INCLUDES RFT
In a clinical functional analysis, we are interested in two types of clinically
relevant behavior. One is problematic behavior or a behavioral excess belong-
ing to a broad functional class: experiential avoidance. The other is an alter-
native behavior. In principle, the latter can be any form of behavior, as long
as it doesnt belong to the class of experiential avoidance and aims for some-
thing elsepreferably a consequence that is globally desirable to the client.
The therapists task is to help the client to reduce experiential avoidance and
experiment with alternative behavior.
This may sound simple, but it rarely is. If it were simple, the client would
probably have done it already. The side effects of human languaging block
the way. Derived (indirect) stimulus functions contribute to the type of traps
described in chapter 7 and summed up in the term fusion. As humans, our
actions are often fused with our own languaging; we follow explicit or implicit
rules even when this type of behavior does not help us reach what we want.
We are thus trying to achieve two things in therapy, and these primary thera-
peutic goals run through an individuals course of therapy as a whole, without
necessarily occurring in any particular order.
The therapist attempts to undermine nonfunctioning rule fol-
lowing and acts to help the client defuse, to shift to behavior that
is more flexible in relation to indirect stimulus functions.
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General Guidelines for Clinical Behavior Analysis
The therapist tries to help the client change direction and turn
toward things he values, things he wishes to accomplish or
be true to. The therapist helps the client define consequences
that are globally desirable for him and also helps the client
act in a way that increases the probability of contacting those
consequences.
Therapy thus takes into account the side effects of human languaging, as
well as its possibilities.
All behavior is influenced by the context in which it occurs. It is influenced
by the things that follow upon behavior (consequences) and by the things
that precede it (antecedents). By altering these two aspects of the context, the
therapist can influence the client. It is therefore natural to categorize thera-
peutic strategies accordingly, into strategies that primarily alter what follows
upon behavior, on one hand, and strategies that alter what precedes behav-
ior, on the other. Chapter 10 will focus on consequences, and chapter 11 will
focus on antecedents.
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CHAPTER 10
Altering the Context with a
Focus on Consequences
When we say that the therapist, in her work with a client, can focus on either
the consequences or the antecedents that surround a specific behavior, it is
important to clarify one thing: We can never truly address only one or the
other. All kinds of behavior have both antecedents and consequences that
exert different types of influence on what takes place. In the type of inter-
action involved in clinical work, the therapists actions will always provide
both consequences and antecedents for the clients behavior. In the same way,
the clients actions will provide both consequences and antecedents for the
therapists behavior. There is no escaping these conditions of human interac-
tion. There is no neutral ground, no way of doing nothing. If the therapist
remains silent after the client says something, this will be the consequence
the client faces after saying what he said. If the client then goes on to say
something more, the therapists silence was a part of the antecedents that pre-
ceded this action by the client. If the therapist says something, looks away,
changes position, or acts in any other way, it is part of the antecedents and
consequences that the client encounters in the moment and that influence his
further actions. Mutual influence is a part of the human condition whenever
two people interact. There is no other possibility. And this influence takes place
through the consequences and antecedents established in the interaction.
When I write about focusing on consequences (or antecedents), I am
saying that, in a given moment, the therapist can focus on one or the other.
It is simply a way of describing the therapists intention. If she has an inten-
tion of focusing her actions toward establishing consequences that reinforce
Learning RFT
a certain behavior on the part of the client, this is not a description of the
entire process that occurs when she does this. In fact, there are inevitably
many things occurring alongside whatever the therapist is trying to do, and
the therapist is unaware of many of them. It would probably be impossible to
describe everything that goes on. At best, the therapist is clearly aware of one
or a few essential variables that she can alter.
INFLUENCING THROUGH
CONSEQUENCES: THE CLASSICAL
STRATEGY OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
The most important conclusion in Skinners work was that consequences of
behavior are of primary significance in influencing subsequent behavior due
to how different consequences reinforce or punish the behavior that precedes
them. As a result, behavior analysis is strongly dominated by attempts to estab-
lish consequences that change behavior. Most of this work has been aimed at
helping individuals with fairly serious problems, such as mental retardation
and autism (Smith, 1996; Remington et al., 2007). In order to exert influ-
ence by establishing direct consequences for behavior, the therapist has to be
present when the problematic behavior occurs. Since people with these types
of problems have traditionally often been institutionalized, more possibilities
for such influence have existed. Autistic children have been treated in accor-
dance with these principles in their home environments, as well, though this
requires the therapist to spend many hours a week with the child (Cohen,
Amerine-Dickens, & Smith, 2006).
As pointed out earlier, this intense interaction between therapist and
client doesnt occur within the framework of clinical settings. Psychoanalysis
is the type of therapy that has the most time-consuming framework of inter-
action, but this too is sparse compared to the forms of therapy that applied
behavior analysis has traditionally offered its highly functionally impaired
clients. In regard to frequency of contact, clinical behavior analysis is more
like other forms of psychotherapy. Therapist and client generally meet once
or possibly twice a week. The total number of therapy sessions ranges from
a few to many over the course of one or even several years. In this respect,
clinical behavior analysis doesnt differ from what is standard in the types of
psychological therapy normally called psychotherapy.
Considering the behavioral principles that form the foundation of
behavior analysis, exerting influence by establishing direct consequences for
behavior is a natural and fundamental approach. This also applies to clinical
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Richard: Yes, Erin wants us to go to visit her sister. And next week
is a busy week in school.
Therapist: How do you feel about this?
Richard: Im not sure. You know how hard it is for me to pursue
something that involves Erin. Can you help me out here?
How do you handle women who always want to make all
the decisions?
At one level, Richard is asking for advice. The therapist could suggest a
solution and maybe do some role-playing around how Richard might act in
relation to Erin. At the same time, the therapist notices that Richard is acting
in his typically problematic way, here and now. He is lying low and seeking an
initiative from the therapist. The therapist brings this fact into focus.
Therapist: Im wondering a little about what youre doing right now,
here, with me. I get the feeling that youre lying low
waiting to see if Ill take charge or give you something you
can tag along with.
Richard: What am I supposed to do? Youre the expert.
Lets stop and examine what the therapist is doing and what the result
is. The therapist notices a problematic behavior on Richards part: his typical
version of experiential avoidance, what he does because it feels safest. Richard
is lying low, taking a passive attitude, and seeking initiative from someone
else, in this case the therapist. At this point, the therapist establishes a conse-
quence that consists of simply tacting Richards behavior, the very behavior
they have defined together as problematic. Technically speaking, the therapist
tries to establish a punishing contingency. She does something intended to
make it less likely that Richard will repeat this behavior. We dont yet know
what function this response will have for Richards behavior, but we can
assume that the therapist intends to establish an aversive consequence. How
are we to understand thisthat when she describes what Richard does using
everyday language, she acts in a way that can function as a punishing contin-
gency? We can understand this through RFT. In an earlier dialogue, this very
behaviorwithdrawing and lying lowhas been defined as the problem.
What Richard does increases his difficulties. When as a consequence of his
actions Richard encounters this comment, it puts him in touch with I am
doing what gives me my problems. The therapist tacts Richards behavior in
that moment, and since this tact is in a relation of coordination to what I do
that makes things worse for me, it is likely to be aversive to him, provided
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Altering the Context with a Focus on Consequences
that he actually shared the initial assessment that this behavior is something
that contributes to the pain he experiences.
Although we assume that this action on the part of the therapist can make
a positive contribution to change in Richards life, it also involves two diffi-
culties. The first is the terminology. Surely, no therapist wants to punish her
client; this sounds inhumane. In order to avoid this unsympathetic terminol-
ogy, therapists and theorists have sought other words to describe this process,
and it might be wise to avoid a terminology that causes misunderstandings.
Some speak of weakening a behavior instead of punishing it. Another way of
putting it is to say that you block or obstruct the clients problematic behavior.
The important thing is to understand what we are referring to, regardless of
which terminology is used. The therapist establishes a consequence for the
clients problematic behavior, and this is intended to reduce the chances of
the behavior being repeated. In basic behavioral terminology, this process is
called a punishing contingency, if it really has the intended effect.
The second problem with this course of action is more important than
terminology or the risk of misunderstandings. When an aversive consequence
is established, there is always the risk that avoidant behavior will simply
increase in response. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in this example.
Richard took an even more passive attitude: Youre the expert. Lets look at
how the therapist handles this.
Therapist: Yes, well, that is my role. Thats how it works. And of course
this is exactly what we expect from experts: to give us
something we can hang on to. You definitely have a point
there. But you and I have talked about how this becomes a
kind of a trap for youthat you tend to start lying low, just
waiting for others to take the initiative and then you tag
along. And even if this is what Im supposed to do, as some
kind of expert, I wonder if you might be getting stuck in
this trap now, right here in our conversation?
Richard: ( first silent, then sighing) Yeah, I can see what youre saying.
I think thats right. I want someone to give me the answer.
And that makes me even more passive. I start backing off.
Its so hard.
Therapist: Yes, it is hard. And if you were to make some more room
for yourself right here and now while were talkingjust
when you feel that its hardhow would you go about
that? Is there a crack in the wall somewhere, a place where
you could start to create some room?
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to share his own experiences. And at work he wants to prove his abilities and
have enough space to do things he thinks will be beneficial for the students
and the school. He doesnt like being passive and just tagging along. He wants
to be a person who can take the initiative, at least more than he currently is.
In the functional analysis that the therapist and Richard have created
together, it is clear that his passive attitude increases in situations where
things feel uncertain. Externally the situations are different, but they have
in common the fact that other people are acting to achieve what they want or
what they believe in and Richard notices that he wants something else. Even
at this early stage, things begin to feel difficult, so he waits. He feels that
others disregard him, and he tends to ruminate over why it turned out this
way and conclude that this is the inevitable outcome.
An alternative to lying low and waiting is, of course, to step forward and
take up some space in the situations that feel difficult and uncertain. One situ-
ation where this behavior might be demonstrated in relation to the therapist
is in regard to homework assignments. Lets assume that the therapist sug-
gests a homework assignment in which Richard brings up with a colleague
that he would like to switch tasks during an upcoming teachers seminar. The
therapist clearly shows, in various ways, that she thinks this is an appropri-
ate homework assignment. If Richard objects and tells her that he would like
to structure the homework differently, this could be seen as an instance of a
desirable alternative behavior in relation to the therapist. This provides an
opportunity to establish a reinforcing consequence, which the therapist could
do by simply listening to Richard and taking his objection seriously.
Determining, in the moment, what therapist behavior will function as
reinforcing for the clients alternative behavior is a difficult task. A supportive
question the therapist can consistently ask herself is what behavior on her part
might resemble a naturally occurring consequence in the clients day-to day
life (the second arena) that would reinforce alternative behavior. In this light,
the task in therapy is to offer a consequence in the current interaction that
corresponds to this. In the example with Richard, his behavior of objecting
and giving his own opinion can be reinforced by giving due consideration to
what he says.
Another important question for the therapist to keep in mind is whether
the alternative behavior is actually reinforced in their interaction. Is Richards
behavior of taking up space in his interaction with the therapist increasing as
the therapy sessions proceed? If not, reinforcing contingencies havent been
sufficiently established, per definition. If this is the case, the therapist needs
to examine her own behavior and probably needs to change it. If, on the other
hand, Richard does demonstrate more alternative behavior in relation to the
therapist, she can try to note the types of situations where this happens, and
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Altering the Context with a Focus on Consequences
thereby gain a better understanding of which parts of her own behavior are
benefiting the therapeutic goals.
It is important to note a risk involved in this work: that the reinforc-
ing contingencies that are established may not be natural (Ferster, 1967), in
which case they may not function as intended. Or they may function as rein-
forcing in interactions with the therapist, but not support generalization of
the behavior in the clients life outside of therapy (Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991;
Tsai et al., 2008). Its especially important to be vigilant against establish-
ing consequences aimed at influencing the clients behavior in a direction the
therapist desires that doesnt align with the clients goals. If this occurs, it
would be what in everyday speech we call manipulation.1
I described above how the therapists tacting of the clients problematic
behavior can function as an aversive consequence for this behavior. In a cor-
responding way, the therapists tacting of alternative behavior can function as
a reinforcing consequence for that behavior. Whether this happens depends
on whether the functional analysis that defines a desirable alternative behav-
ior is adequate. Lets suppose that Richard and the therapist agree that the
behavior of taking up more space is desirable for Richard. And maybe, in his
interactions with the therapist, this behavior has sometimes been followed by
reinforcing consequences. When this behavior takes place again, perhaps the
therapist says, It just occurs to me that what youre doing now is different;
that its like youre making more room for yourself. As a result, in addition to
the reinforcing consequence of obtaining something he wants, Richard now
contacts the verbally established consequence doing something new that
helps me make changes. This is probably a reinforcing consequence for this
behavior, provided that what the therapist says corresponds to Richards own
experience. If it does not, there is the obvious risk that the interaction instead
becomes yet another example of Richard doing what he so often does: accom-
modating himself and tagging along. In this case, the therapists comment
would actually function as reinforcing for Richards problematic behavior.
This is another example of how important it is for therapists to be aware of
the actual results of their interactions with clients.
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EXTINCTION OF PROBLEMATIC
RULE FOLLOWING
Based on RFT, we can draw the conclusion that rule following often con-
tributes to psychological problems, as described in chapter 7. Establishing
new direct contingencies in the interaction between client and therapist can
contribute to breaking down this type of destructive verbal control. The
direct experience of getting things you want through a behavior (for example,
through taking up space) can, in the long run, circumvent a behavior gov-
erned by a rule (for example, Id better lie low). Of course, the dominance
that verbally established contingencies often have for humans is not absolute.
Behavior is constantly shaped by the interaction between the two essential
paths to learning: through direct stimulus functions, and through derived
(indirect) stimulus functions. New direct experiences that occur in the
therapeutic interaction can break the dominance of verbal rules in a specific
regard.
An analysis according to RFT provides yet another primary way of alter-
ing consequences in ways that can be helpful for the client. Lets return to
the therapists dialogue with Anne. During their fifth session theyre talking
about Annes difficulties with concentrating and how this disrupts her work.
Anne describes how, during a meeting at work, she realized that she hadnt
caught what someone else just said. She became tense and thought, Here I
go again. Thoughts about how things would never work out started to come
up, and she wondered if others noticed how weird she was feeling.
Anne: Its hopeless. I dont know whats going on.
Therapist: It sounds like this is difficult for you. And you want to get
a grip on whats going on.
Anne: I cant live like this! Something has to be done about it.
Therapist: Okay then, there are several thoughts here: One is that
you cant live like this. Another is that something has to be
done about it.
Anne: I have to find a solution.
Therapist: So thats another thought: You have to find a solution.
Anne: What do you mean? I dont get it?
Therapist: Another one: I dont get it.
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clients out of verbal traps. This is what Annes therapist is trying to achieve
in this dialogue. She does this while focusing on offering consequences other
than those that normally maintain Annes problematic verbal behavior.
Anne says that something has to be done about this. In an ordinary
dialogue, listeners will, in one way or another, act on the indirect stimulus
functions that this statement has in relation to them. They may, for example,
suggest something that could be done. Or they may agree that something
should be done, although they dont know what. Even if they reply by saying
that it may not be necessary to do something about the situation, this is also a
behavior that reinforces the verbal behavior in itself. It is coherent with verbal
behavior as a whole, and as explained in chapter 4, coherence is a generalized
reinforcer that is established early on in a childs language training. This is
clear if Anne, in response to a potential reply that nothing needs to be done,
gives reasons for why something actually must be done about this. In a case
like this, Anne is performing even more of the verbal behavior she is so accus-
tomed to performing. Shes accustomed to thinking about what she should do,
about why it doesnt turn out as shed like, and about whats wrong. Also, just
like all verbally competent humans, she is accustomed to giving reasons why
she acts as she does. And the normal consequence of giving reasons is that
the other party either accepts her reasons or lets her know why those reasons
are not accurate or applicable. By not offering these types of reinforcing con-
sequences for Annes verbal behavior, the therapist is aiming at extinguishing
Annes problematic behavior within the therapeutic interaction.
First the therapist focuses on direct stimulus functions. Annes behavior
is dominated by the indirect stimulus functions of her statement. She acts in
fusion with these functions; her behavior is dominated by them. The therapist
does not, however, go along with this, as we normally do in a verbal dialogue,
but instead points out what is actually present: Look, heres a thought. When
this is repeated Anne is confused and possibly frustrated. The normal way
of speaking (and thinking) is not working. The consequences are not what
they usually are. Anne first acts as though her description is being called into
question, and she delivers reasons for why she has to do what she does. Yet
the consequences still are not typical. She handles this as she is accustomed
to doing: She increases her efforts to understand the situation. The therapist
then says something that is likely to be aversive if you are really out to under-
stand whats going on: If you think you understand what I meanwhatever
I mean, thats not it. How is such a statement to be handled?
The last comment, which becomes a self-conflicting rule for the behav-
ior of trying to understand, could constitute a punishing contingency. This
speaks to the risks associated with this type of contingency. As I pointed
out earlier, it is important for the therapist to do something more than just
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she hasnt contacted before. Perhaps shell encounter a new type of response
from someone. Perhaps shell manage to carry out a work assignment that had
frequently been interrupted as she switched her focus to how poorly she con-
centrates. Once Anne has experienced various new contingencies, something
else occurs, as well. If Anne, in a certain situation, once again dives right in
to her old, problematic ways of responding, its more likely that shell lose this
new, rewarding experience. That could then function as a naturally occurring
negative punishment contingency for her old way of responding.2 This contin-
gency can then also contribute to maintaining Annes new behavior.
2Naturally, this does not mean that anyone is punishing anyone else. I
remind the reader of the definition of the term punishing within behav-
ioral theory: a consequence that leads to a reduced probability that the
behavior that preceded it will reoccur.
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long ago, noting that giving advice and instructions are basic components in
all kinds of therapy (Skinner, 1974, p. 204). Both the possibilities and the
specific problems involved with verbal antecedents have been described in
chapters 6 and 7. In the final chapter of this book, well return to this topic
and its clinical implications.
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risk of such experiences. As a result, he lives a rather isolated life and avoids
social contact except with his family of origin. He lives alone in an apart-
ment, and because of his difficulties, he is unable to work and is on disability.
Sporadically, he hears voices that confirm his experiences. The voices speak
maliciously of him and sometimes even threaten him. Most of the time he
doesnt hear voices, but he still experiences the harassment going on behind
his back. Scott also does a lot of brooding on everyday events; he thinks
about what others think of him, what they have said about him, and why.
In the initial functional analysis, the therapist and Scott identified two
types of problematic behavior: He withdraws, and he also devotes a lot of
thought to whether the events of each day are examples of harassment. These
two behaviors seem connected in that the brooding is also a part of his strat-
egy for not having to face perceived harassment. The experience of being
someone who is harassed is painful; it brings his attention to his feelings of
loneliness and how painful this is for him. In his fifth session, Scott relates an
example of what typically happens.
Scott: I was standing in line, waiting for my turn at the counter.
Then I hear some people in front of me say something I
cant make out, and one of them looks at me. What the
heck is that all about? I dont even know them. So what are
they up to? My brother says they probably werent talking
about me, though
Therapist: And what do you think?
Scott: (sighs) I dont know. Dont know for sure. But when I was
standing in line it seemed very clear to me. Thats exactly
what happenswhat always happens. Why do they want
to pick on me?
Therapist: Okay, so whatever its really about, we know one thing:
You get this thought that theyre talking about you. And
that feels really lousylike being harassed.
Scott: Exactly.
Therapist: So what do you do?
Scott: What do you mean? What can I do?
Therapist: I just mean, what did you do when this happened? Youre
standing there, you see them looking at you, you get the
thought that theyre talking about you, and you get the
feeling of harassment. So what did you do?
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1Let me remind the reader that the use of the word rule here deviates
somewhat from the way this word is used in our everyday lives. Normally
a rule is something with a specific expression. The definition is topographi-
cal. However, this is not the case here. Here a rule is an antecedent that has
influenced a certain type of behavior: what we call rule-governed behav-
ior. It is the behavior and its learning history that define what precedes
the behavior (the antecedent) as a rule. Something that topographically
would be defined as a question (What would it be like to stay there?) can
acquire the function of a rule.
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upon the behavior they are talking about (withdrawing or staying there) are
not consequences the therapist can control. They are indeed speaking about
consequences, but that is quite different from establishing consequences. The
only behavior that can be reinforced, or possibly punished, is behavior occur-
ring in the moment. And when it comes to the behavior of carrying out a
functional analysis, there is an impact. The therapist reinforces this behavior
in different ways during the dialogue by rewarding Scott for describing events
from the second arena and for his effort to discriminate different contingen-
cies: what he does, on one hand, and what precedes and follows his behavior,
on the other.
To first perform a functional analysis in this way, then reinforce this
behavior in the therapy session, and, finally, based on the analysis, mutually
arrive at alternative behavioral strategies is the core of the therapeutic model
called behavioral activation (Martell et al., 2001; Dimidjian et al., 2008).
These alternative strategies are then given as homework assignments for the
client to experiment with between sessions. The experiments are subsequently
analyzed, and new strategies are formulated and tested in new homework
assignments. The aim of therapy is thus establishing of verbal antecedents
rulesfor the clients actions in the second arena. The decisive question is,
of course, whether the new behavior actually encounters reinforcing conse-
quences. As mentioned, these consequences are out of the therapists control.
In the same way that experiential avoidance is at the core of the analysis
used to establish consequences, as discussed in the previous chapter, expe-
riential avoidance is also at the core of the work to establish antecedents for
alternative behavior. This is clear in the dialogue with Scott. The analysis
accomplished in the client-therapist dialogue points to Scotts avoidance of
the feeling of harassment. The therapist tries to help Scott to tact the con-
nection between the behavior and its consequences (How did it turn out
when you did this?) and introduces a possible antecedent for alternative
behavior (What would it be like to stay there?). The basic strategy is simple,
but doing this in a way that helps the client is often complicated. The task is
to formulate possible rules in a way that influences the client to go on to test
and try new behavior.
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behavior works independently of the rule giver. When the behavior works, the
client contacts the desirable consequence.
Lets say that Scott stays in the original line (or in a similar situation)
while still feeling harassed, and the consequences seem positive to him in
some respect. He may notice that it is easier for him to do his shopping, that
the feeling of being harassed wanes, or that people dont actually talk about
him in the way he had feared. Or maybe he discovers that they sometimes
do, but he is able to interact with them in a way that works for him. If Scott
keeps following the rule of staying there when his feelings and thoughts are
occupied with the issue of being harassed, and he does this based on appar-
ently contacting these new consequences through the rule, then the process
is an example of tracking. If he continues to behave in a similar way several
more times, the direct contingencies will take on a more dominant function.
The direct experiences of what actually works will take over. Scott contacts
new consequences because of his new behavior.
In many therapeutic situations, at the outset it can be difficult to get the
client to experiment in this way. People who are depressed or who have very
strong assumptions about the way the world is may not be ready to experi-
ment to see what happens. Remember, too, that the consequences the thera-
pist wants the client to contact are not something the therapist can control.
Suggesting to Scott that he should experiment with staying there when he
feels harassed doesnt guarantee that the consequence he will encounter if he
does will actually reinforce his behavior of staying there. One way of tack-
ling this potential difficulty is to begin with experiments where the therapist
feels that reinforcing consequences are very likely to occur. Another alter-
native is to work with consequences that the therapist actually can control.
For example, the therapist could say that certain homework assignments
are always included in this therapy and make it clear that, in order to com-
plete the therapy, the client must carry out the assignments. And in fact, this
component is a constituent of most therapeutic setups, since adapting to the
therapeutic model is a part of all therapies. If the client doesnt comply, he
runs the risk that therapy will be suspended. Another example of controlling
consequences would be if the therapist asked the client to do something for
the therapists sake. In both of these examples, the therapist is in command of
the consequences specified in the rule.
If the client follows the rule because his therapist wants this or
because thats what youre supposed to do in this type of therapy, this
behavior would be an example of pliance. While it is often problematic for
pliance to dominate (as explained in chapter 7), attempts to establish pliance
can nevertheless be used as a first step in an effort to establish well-function-
ing tracking. Something that is initially done because the therapist wants
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it done can, of course, also result in consequences beyond those the thera-
pist is in control of, and in this way the behavior can become a first step in
strengthening tracking. As described in chapter 6, this is the way we have
all learned to track from the outset. Scott might initially stay there instead
of walking away because he wants to satisfy or please his therapist. Even so,
this may be an avenue toward encountering new, alternative consequences
in the second arena. If these consequences are reinforcing for the behavior
of staying there, his behavior may gradually shift to tracking. The rule-gov-
erned behavior of staying rather than withdrawingeven in situations where
he feels like people are talking about himwill then be working for him,
independently of the rule giver.
Even if the therapist doesnt try to establish pliance, there is good reason
to assume that this behavior plays a role in many therapeutic interactions.
Clients often do things because they want to satisfy or please the therapist.
While this can be a step in the process toward well-functioning tracking, if it
blocks the path to change, it can be a problem. The latter aspect is something
I will return to later in the chapter.
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Thoughts and feelings come and go, but we, who notice
them, were here all the time.
Scott: I dont know I feel really insecure. I dont know who I
am, really. Its like Im sometimes this and sometimes that.
Therapist: And when you feel like that, and you get the thought that
you dont know who you arewho is noticing that at that
moment?
Scott: Noticing what it feels like, you mean? Well, I guess thats
me. Yes, well, thats actually true (laughs).
How are we to understand what the therapist is doing in this sequence?
She tries to establish a context within which thoughts and feelings acquire a
different function than they often do in our day-to-day life. She does this with
a special focus on areas where we tend to get stuck in verbal traps. The traps
that result in experiential avoidance come in different forms as described in
chapter 7; however, all verbal traps are characterized by fusion, by behavior
that is dominated by derived stimulus functions. You could say that we take
off into the story offered to us by our own relating. Words and thoughts
acquire power. This is what its like for Scott. The combination of his life
history and current circumstances provides him with his experience of being
harassed. He thinks that others are talking about him, and he acts on these
thoughts. One thing he does as a result is withdraw from people. Note that
the crucial point in this discussion is not whether Scotts thoughts are what we
normally call true. The point is that when he experiences these (true, untrue,
or whatever) thoughts, he does things that clearly dont lead to good outcomes
for him.
In the dialogue above, the therapist tries to establish a different context
for these thoughtsa context that gives them a different function, even if
they remain present. This is therefore an example of the therapist attempting
to alter that part of the current context that serves as Cfunc. Her intention is
to change Scotts behavior in connection with these thoughts, not to change
or correct the actual thoughts. The therapist does not try to find alternative
thoughts; she tries to help Scott develop an alternative behavior when these
thoughts are present. Scott is used to behaving in a certain way based on the
content of his thoughts. The therapist provides a context within which he can
notice the process rather than respond to the content. She talks about thoughts
(and feelings) the way we normally talk about external things: Look, there it
is. From the viewpoint of RFT, this means she is helping Scott take perspec-
tive on his private events. A verbally competent person always acts from the
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Scott: (reads a few sentences from the paper) Well, thats clear
enough.
The therapist and Scott sit down.
Therapist: Maybe we could do something similar with the things
you brought upall of your thoughts concerning what
happened in the reception room, your troubling thoughts
and questions. Which ones are worst?
Scott: What do they want with me? Why dont they leave me
alone?
Therapist: Are those the worst?
Scott: (after a moment of silence) I think the worst is this: They
dont like me.
Therapist: Yeah, that is a troubling one. (Silent for a moment.) Do you
think you could take that and keep it at some distance
from you? Write it on the wall over there (points to the wall
behind them), below the painting. See if you can write it
there, just so you can see it there in your minds eye. You
could close your eyes if that makes it easier.
Scott: That feels weird. Id rather keep them open.
Therapist: Thats just fine. See if you can write it on the wall: They
dont like me. Take your time, theres no hurry. (She
waits.) Have you got it up there?
Scott: Yes. Its a little indistinct.
Therapist: Thats okay; it doesnt have to be crystal clear. But you see
it there?
Scott: Yes.
Therapist: Can you see what kind of handwriting you wrote in? You
know, cursive or block letters, or what?
Scott: Its printed, with block letters.
Therapist: Good! Is it all in one line, or are the words below each
other?
Here the therapist is applying the principle of defusion to the specific
threatening content that Scott describes. The therapist helps Scott take
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even though I dont go to Chicago very often nowadays. How about youdo
you have any images of Chicago as passengers on your bus?
It would be fitting to engage in a short dialogue to check that the client
follows what is being described here. If he does, the therapist can go on to
describe thoughts and feelings as other passengers on the bus. She can mention
that some passengers seem rather neutral, others seem nice, and some seem
unpleasant, perhaps even repugnant. She can bring in private events that the
client has told her about and that seem to have a painful governing function
in his life. For example, Scotts therapist could mention the feeling of harass-
ment as one of the unpleasant passengers. The therapist can also talk about
how we dont notice all of the passengers all of the time, but that in certain
situations they stand up, or they may even come forward to breathe down our
necks and tell us how to drive. In Scotts case, his therapist could continue by
saying something like Take that feeling of harassment, for example. It keeps
coming up to the front of the bus, with lots to say, doesnt it? Pretty heavy-
duty stuff, too. Would you say its telling you how to drive, as well?
Up to this point, the metaphor has established private events as being
at a certain distance from the driver. Another aspect of the metaphor is how
it can be used to talk about who is steering the bus. The therapist can talk
about how the driver could drive according to what the passengers tell him
or how he can choose to drive in spite of what theyre saying. She can draw
out the traps that the client (and people in general) sometimes ends up in
by letting different passengers decide where to steer the bus; in Scotts case,
the feeling of harassment makes him steer away from the line he had been
waiting in. The therapist can talk about what we humans typically do to make
passengers sit down quietly and not come forward to threaten or distract us.
She can talk about how, even when hostile passengers are right behind us,
breathing down our necks, we can still keep driving this bus of ours. No one
else is at the wheel. There is a fundamental difference between the driver and
the passengers.
This approach allows the therapist to speak metaphorically about experi-
ential avoidance. At the same time, the metaphor can be used to help clients
accept whatever they find threatening in the back of the bus, which will help
increase their flexibility in relation to what they usually avoid.
ACT offers a number of metaphors and encourages therapists to make
use of them (S. C. Hayes et al., 1999; Luoma et al., 2007). It also encourages
therapists to develop new metaphors together with their clientsmetaphors
that are personally relevant and useful for particular clients. Of course, the
therapists ability to identify suitable metaphors requires a solid understand-
ing of the principles of treatment in order to determine what needs to be high-
lighted. One metaphor for defusion that I use now and then is from a context
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2This may be particularly true in Sweden, as this scene is a part of the Disney
potpourri of classics and specials that has been aired on Swedish television
every Christmas for the last fifty years or so. Thank you to the client who
first brought this metaphor up!
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is a theory that is concerned precisely with languaging as such, and all talk
therapies primarily make use of language. From a deeper understanding of
languaging, we are able to demonstrate in greater detail how these strategies
should be developed and used.
The first strategy, described above, is contained in the term defusion.
Its object is to establish an increased distance between the clients experi-
ence of a continuous self (self-as-perspective, discussed in chapter 5) and the
private events that have taken on dysfunctional control of the clients life. The
goal, of course, is to thereby reduce the probability of experiential avoidance.
The second main strategy is to work with the experiential obstacles the client
experiences and their relationship to what the client feels is important in life
(Luciano et al., 2004).
One of the basic principles of learning theory is that we humans are gov-
erned by consequences. The consequences of our past actions have a strong
impact on our future behavior. This is the fundamental thesis in operant psy-
chology. Once we have learned arbitrarily applicable relational responding,
this capability changes what can function as governing consequences. As a
result, external things and internal experiences no longer function only as
what they are in themselves; they can also acquire a number of different func-
tions depending on what they are related to. And since this relating is, to a high
degree, governed by a socially arbitrary game, the variability is immense.
For nonverbal beings, the things that can function as reinforcing conse-
quences are sharply delimited. Primary reinforcers can have such a function,
and so can reinforcers that have been established by being directly connected
with primary reinforcers. The same is true for stimuli that have a formal, physi-
cal similarity to any of these. For a verbal being, however, variability is increased
because networks3 of different derived relations can make an event reinforcing.
For example, a consequence of a certain action can be reinforcing if it is in a
relation of coordination with being a good person. Yet it can also be punishing
if it is in a causal (if-then) relation to the future misfortune of my children.
3At the risk of repeating myself, I want to remind the reader that this does
not mean that such networks actually exist, either in the external context
or in an imaginable internal world. This is simply a way of describing a
behavior that is governed by complex derived relations. These relations in
themselves are, in turn, a way in which the individual responds, governed
by contextual factors. The reason I am repeating myself a bit in this regard
is that our everyday language is so permeated with mentalistic concepts
that they are hard to avoid, even when one strives to use a more stringent,
scientific language.
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it also becomes what obstructs me from what I desire. And the more impor-
tant this desire is, the more aversive the feeling of insecurity will be, precisely
because it seems to block moving ahead in that direction. This makes it all the
more important to get rid of, and so the cycle continues.
In efforts to eliminate experiential avoidance, these two strategies work
together well. The first strategy, defusion, can undermine the tendency
of private events to influence behavior here-now. This is done by framing
the private events with problematic stimulus functions as I-there-then.
Transforming their stimulus functions in this way makes it easier to relate to
them as something that can be brought along for the trip, instead of some-
thing that is in opposition to engaging in valued actions. As a result, they are
also likely to become less aversive as time passes. Richard may still feel inse-
cure in certain situations. But if he has brought this feeling along while acting
in the direction of what he desires and experienced positive consequences of
these actions, his relationship to his feelings of insecurity will change as well.
They may still be unpleasant, but they are no longer aversive in the sense that
they block his path toward what he sees as important in life.
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major Spanish test the next day. Its the same way at work.
Ive tried to talk to the principal, but nothing happens.
And when it comes to my work, Im not sure I even know
what I want. I think Ive done my best, but
Therapist: So youve come to a halt. Do you have any idea what you
could do in this situation?
Richard: No, it seems hopeless. And Im not really sure what the
point is any more. Is work really that important? I dont
know.
Therapist: What is important, then?
Richard: I wish I knew. Thats exactly it. Well, my family is important.
But theyre doing okay either way. Its like it doesnt really
matter. I dont really know what is important.
Therapist: That sounds like a good reason to just lie low. How does
that sound?
Richard: No, thats no good. Its not good the way it is, I know
that. I just dont know what I want. Theres a void. I think
everyone is so used to me lying low. Thats how it has
always been. It might be too late, I guess.
Therapist: And how does that sound; if its too late?
Richard: (noticeably affected) Heavy. Too damn rotten. Its like Im
never given the chance. Theres no space for me.
Therapist: (silent for a moment) You know what it makes me think
when you describe these difficult things that are so heavy
for you?
Richard: No, what?
Therapist: It makes me think that what is important, what matters to
you, is right here. Right here, along with the heavy and the
rotten stuff.
Richard: How do you mean? To me its all just hell.
Therapist: Im thinking of what you said about never getting the
chance. That theres no space for you. Theres something
about this getting a chancewhat it would be like if there
was a space for you. It sounds important
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Its one thing to say that nothing is important, nothing matters, and you
dont know what you want. Thats verbal behavior, and pretty common, at
that. And if a client says this, there is an important point in it. Many times it
tells the therapist something about the difficulty the client finds himself in.
But saying that nothing matters is rarely an actual description of the clients
experience. In other words, it is rarely a tact and particularly not a pure tact.
It is more often a mand. It is a verbal statement governed by earlier conse-
quences of saying this, consequences like what the listener says or does at
that point. One common consequence when someone says he doesnt know,
or that nothing matters, is that the person hes talking with counters this
somehow; the other person provides advice. Another common consequence
is that the other person stops asking. The latter is especially common after
someone says, I dont know. Both of these consequences would probably
lead Richard deeper into his typical dilemma.
The therapist does not, however, interpret what Richard says as a state-
ment about what is at hand. The reason for this is that she doesnt think people
are generally indifferent. As humans, we are governed by consequences. What
follows upon our actions is of importance to us, just as is true for other animals.
We can talk in different ways and for different reasons, but that doesnt change
our basic conditions. In order to enter into a dialogue about this, the therapist
draws nearer to Richards pain and points out that what is important is in
relation to what is painful. This isnt peculiar, when you think about it. In
fact, it seems natural. Psychological pain exists precisely because something
important is inaccessible. If nothing were important, why would anything feel
difficult, rotten, or heavy? Richards use of words also points to this link when
he talks about not being given a chance and there not being space for him.
There are many fruitful ways of continuing this dialogue with Richard.
Hopefully he will be able to see that there is something important here, in
being given a chance and a space. The therapist can ask him how he thinks
hed like to use a chance or space if it were given to him. They can also talk
about what would be necessary for him to take a chance himself or to take
up space if this isnt given to him. The latter issue is probably important to
discuss with someone like Richard. Its also likely that there will be reasons
to return to the two strategies discussed above: first, to help Richard take
perspective on the things that are heavy and painful, and second, to alter the
relation of opposition between these experiences and actions that are directed
toward taking up some space.
The point above, that there are always things that are important to us, no
matter what we say, may need to be clarified. Even if uttering I dont know
what I want often represents a mand and a quest for specific consequences,
the difficulties in knowing what one wants can also be real. Among other
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things, knowing what one wants requires the ability to discriminate a number
of ones own subtle processes. To learn this is to learn to tact ones own
private events as they take place, developing what was called self-as-process
in chapter 5. Some of us have had good training in this skill, and others have
not. Some people have primarily learned to identify other peoples actions
and needs and therefore have developed generalized pliance. As a result, they
may not be skilled at tacting their own private events. Another possible reason
why an individual may have problems accessing what he wants is that certain
private events may seem very threatening. This can lead to deliberately avoid-
ing focusing on those events. Over time, this can have a side effect of making
it difficult for the person to access other private stimuli, as well, beyond those
initially avoided.
Learning to tact self-as-process can thus be an important skill in identi-
fying what matters in ones life and therefore is also important in becoming
motivated to choose ones direction. The work connected with this in clinical
behavior analysis is similar to what has been described in other therapeu-
tic models (Greenberg & Pavio, 1997). Taking it in small steps, the thera-
pist works on helping the client to focus on and to discriminate what goes
on in himselfusually in the form of emotional and physical phenomena.
Alongside this, it generally remains important to work on defusion and clari-
fying values. This is because even the behavior of tacting what is taking place
within oneself can become complicated in connection with rule-governed
behavior. If this occurs, defusion exercises may be important to help the client
develop more self-discrimination.
The issue of knowing what one wants gives us yet another example that the
work with antecedents and the work with consequences always go together.
The specific intention here, though, has been to point out the importance of
talking about the important things in life as a way of establishing motivational
antecedents. The therapist tries to establish conditions that function as aug-
mentals for alternative behavior.
UNDERMINING DIFFERENT
FOUNDATIONS IN THE
FUNDAMENTALISM OF LANGUAGING
In chapter 7, I described different types of problematic rule-governed behav-
ior. One common example of this is when pliance is generalized and thereby
blocks well-functioning tracking. Another example is when tracking of fairly
short-term consequences blocks the tracking of more long-term consequences.
232
Altering the Context with a Focus on Antecedents
The rigidity of this type of rule following is often increased by more com-
prehensive, abstract rules about what is important in life that strengthen the
governing force of the consequences specified in the more concrete rules. In
this case, problematic augmenting is dominant.
One important type of rule-governed behavior occurs when verbally con-
structed consequences that are globally desirable for the individual are gov-
erning. In the discussion above, I described how these types of consequences
(what I want, what is important in life) can be used to motivate alterna-
tive behavior. But these rules can also participate in the clients problematic
behavior. If we take a closer look at the three clients Ive described, we can
see that their problematic rule-governed behavior follows some rules that
are rather concrete. However, these rules acquire their motivational strength
from more comprehensive rules. The interventions Ive described as ways of
undermining verbal antecedents may need to address both the concrete rules
and those that are more comprehensive and abstract.
Lets return to Anne. Her problematic rule-governed behavior (experien-
tial avoidance) quickly becomes obvious in the dialogue. Bodily sensations
and phenomena she doesnt recognize in herself lead to a self-generated rule
about how the situation has to be solved, and these experiences are followed
by behavior that is aimed at achieving thisamong other things, what she
metaphorically calls diving right in. This behavior turns into an example of
tracking where fairly short-term consequences of feeling better dominate
and also block Annes contact with more long-term consequences. Defusion
strategies would involve undermining the governing antecedents by helping
Anne take perspective on both the bodily sensations and the catastrophic
thoughts she has in connection with them. The therapist would also work
to change the functions of the physical sensations from being obstacles (in
opposition to valued action) to being something Anne could bring along
while she does what she wants to do.
At the same time the therapist could look for more comprehensive rules
that may be at work. This may not be necessary, but the more difficulty Anne
has in doing something other than what she normally does, the greater the
need to seek motivational antecedents that exert strong control on her prob-
lematic behavior.4 One way of doing this is by asking what makes it so impor-
tant to her not to experience those physical sensations. Anne might reply
that it simply feels wrong, and that this indicates that something is wrong.
Again, the therapist can try to help Anne to frame this as I-there-then rather
4Of course, when carrying out a functional analysis, there is also reason to
look for consequences that contribute to this situation.
233
Learning RFT
than as I-here-now and to act not as though this is an obstacle, but instead as
though it is something that can be brought along. In this type of dialogue it is
fairly common for clients to say things like It occurs to me that this is prob-
ably what Ive always doneeven before that terrible episode. I think it has
always been important to me to have things feel normal. Nothing is supposed
to feel disturbing. Many times this is followed by recollections from earlier
events in life. If Anne were to say something along these lines, then based on
RFT the therapist might suspect that this suggests a motivational antecedent
to Annes problematic behavior. It could be an augmental that makes it even
more important to Anne to dive right in or otherwise do whatever she can
to eliminate or control her private events. The same therapeutic strategies are
still applicable in this case.
Theoretically, we are once again approaching a problem I briefly touched
upon in chapter 6 in connection with the discussion about implicit rules. In
the current discussion of rule-governed behavior, where is the rule? In this
case it seems like a post hoc construction. Anne describes her behavior as if
she followed a rule that nothing is supposed to feel disturbing. She may say
that she often thinks in this way, which makes it clearer that we are dealing
with verbal behavior here. A common variation would be demonstrated if
Anne said that she hasnt thought along these lines for many years, but that
she can remember often thinking in this way as a child, or that her parents
often spoke in this way. But there is also the possibility that she doesnt rec-
ognize these thoughts at all, from recent times or the distant past. She simply
notices her own behavior as something that she has done for a long time, that
this is something she has always done. In this case, the question of whether
this behavior should be regarded as rule-governed or as controlled by direct
contingencies cannot be answered. We wouldnt know enough about Annes
learning history to determine this. Be that as it may, it is now possible for Anne
to relate verbally to her own behavior. She can discriminate it as something
I do (there-then) and thereby arrive at the experience of having a choice. At
this point the therapist may ask a question such as What would be important
to youwhat would you like to do if you werent focusing on making sure
nothing disturbs you? Hopefully this would function as an antecedent for
alternative behavior.
Readers who are accustomed to working within a psychodynamic or cog-
nitive frame of reference will, of course, recognize these processes. We are
now dealing with phenomena that in psychodynamic therapy fall under the
heading of the subconscious and within cognitive therapies are associated
with schemas or underlying beliefs. These different theoretical constructs
attempt to describe the same or similar phenomena. From a behavior ana-
lytic perspective, however, it is important to emphasize that we do not gain
234
Altering the Context with a Focus on Antecedents
235
Learning RFT
that he (here) can have (there), and helping him take this experience along
while he turns toward the things that are of value to him, is the aim of the
work in therapy. This is done in the hope that he will thereby encounter con-
sequences that are better for him than those he is contacting by doing what
he does now.
SUMMARY
There is room for more than one way of working with verbal antecedents
within clinical behavior analysis. Giving instructions for alternative behavior
plays an important role. This takes place explicitly when the therapist suggests
something, but it also occurs implicitly when the client draws conclusions from
what goes on in the therapy setting and then generates rules himself, based
on this. Our knowledge of how this happens has been considerably increased
through the research RFT is based on. My specific focus, however, has been
on how we can work with the dark side of rule following by undermining the
control that verbal antecedents have over human behavior. One particularly
important factor in this is the function that private events acquire when we
act to control or eliminate them. Ive described two main strategies intended
to alter the functions of private events that serve as problematic antecedents
for behavior. One strategy involves developing the clients experience of a
continuous self (self-as-perspective) and distinguishing the governing private
events from that ongoing, continuous sense of self. When we humans act in
fusion with private events, they serve as natural starting points and therefore
dominate our behavior. When we frame them as I-there-then, their stimulus
functions are transformed and we have a better chance of behaving flexibly in
relation to these events. This is defusion, and it gives us a better possibility of
successfully applying the other primary strategy Ive described. The second
strategy is aimed at undermining the function of private events as obstacles
to actions that might take the client toward long-term and generally desir-
able consequences. The intention is to move from behavior governed by these
experiencesparticularly behavior based on these experiences being in oppo-
sition to valued actionsto behavior where these experiences are brought
along in the direction the client wants to go. In both of these strategies, the
therapist works to change the context within which the clients problematic
verbal behavior occurs.
The focus on these two strategies is a direct outgrowth of an understand-
ing of verbal behavior based in relational frame theory. This doesnt mean that
these approaches are entirely novel or that there is nothing similar in other
236
Altering the Context with a Focus on Antecedents
237
Afterword
There are at least two good ways to be practical. One is to tell someone how
to do something in a given situation. That is a great way to make a difference
quickly, but it does not tell the person what to do when the situation is differ-
ent. Another approach is to tell a person how things work, and then to make
suggestions about what to do based on that understanding. This approach is
admittedly more complicated, but if it is successful, the person understands a
good deal more. The principles are known.
A person with that level of understanding might see entirely different
alternatives for what should be tried. New situations are less frightening pre-
cisely because they are a bit less new when their depths are plumbed. It is
easier to be creative while still staying linked to what is known.
This book is a practical book of the second kind. Those of you who have
stuck with the book now have a sense of what I mean. It is not by accident.
Trneke had a purpose in mind: to show how learning theory, including
more recent findings in this field, is directly applicable in clinical practice
(p. 170). He wanted to describe a psychological treatment that is based on
principles rather than well-defined manuals (p. 171). I believe he has done
so, from the ground up. As supplemented by his book The ABCs of Human
Behavior (Ramner & Trneke, 2008), this book carries behavioral thinking
into a practical psychology adequate to serve as a foundation for clinical work,
regardless of label or tradition.
This is a variant of an old ideaas old as behavior therapy itself. In the
early days of behavior therapy (in the early 1960s), the idea was that behav-
ioral principles could be scaled into a complete psychology of human struggle
and achievement. Unfortunately, it was not to be. There were bold efforts,
Learining RFT
but the principles were not adequate to deal fully with human cognition. The
vision foundered and practitioners turned to clinical and commonsense theo-
ries of cognition.
As Trneke has shown, it is different now. The bottom-up, inductive
vision in behavior analysis has continued to unfold. There is now a lot more
to be said.
There is nothing of importance in human cognition that is obviously
outside of the theoretical reach of RFT. Empirically, much more remains, of
course, and I do not mean to imply that RFT ideas are correct in any ultimate
sense. All ideas are limited, and to some degree, that means all scientific ideas
and theories are incorrect. There is no reason to suspect that has changed in
the last day or month or year or decade. But even limited ideas can be useful
for a timeperhaps a long time. Thus, I do not mean that this analysis is
right. I mean only that behavioral psychology is in the game. The analysis is
plausible, empirical, and evolving. And unlike many theories of cognition that
are out there, this approach tells practitioners what language and cognition is,
how it comes to be, what its benefits and weaknesses are, and how it can be
modified to better serve human interests.
The principles in this book give every sign of being useful for a time
maybe even a long time. Behavioral and RFT principles are not designed
to apply merely to acceptance and commitment therapy, or even functional
analytical psychotherapy or behavioral activation. They are designed to have
broad scope and to undergird all forms of psychotherapy. They are designed
to relate to all forms of education. These principles are designed to be appli-
cable at home, in business, in the consulting room, or at school. They arguably
apply to all verbal events, even the ones occurring at this moment.
I understand this sounds grand. It cant be helped. As Trneke points out,
learning theory is inherently grand in its vision.
What readers can do with a book like this is not to believe but to step
forward boldly and responsibly and apply their new understanding to see how
well it works. What will your world look like clinically (and at home, at work,
and in your relationships) as you begin to think about language, thought, and
reasoning from a deeply functional and contextualistic viewpoint?
Answering that question is an exercise that is both fun and practical. It
promises to liberate practitioners. For those with scientific leanings, it points
toward a very different way to be empirically supported: know the principles,
analyze the situation in terms of these principles, act based in part on that
understanding, and evaluate how it turns out, recycling as needed. Instead of
being restricted to empirically supported packages, we can explore empirically
240
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241
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258
Niklas Trneke, MD, is a psychiatrist and licensed psychotherapist in private
practice in Kalmar, Sweden. Together with Jonas Ramner, Ph.D, he has pre-
viously authored The ABCs of Human Behavior.
262
Index
263
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fusion: behavior characterized by, 219; learning: arbitrary relations and, 77-80;
definition of, 148; of language and discrimination and, 26; extinction
action, 190; with our self story, 151; and, 23-24; generalization and,
verbal traps characterized by, 218. See 24-25; operant, 13-20, 22-23; pliance,
also defusion 119; respondent, 20-22, 23; tacting
of private events, 33-38; tracking,
G 120-121
learning theory, 158-159, 160, 169, 226,
generalization: augmenting vs., 122n;
operant conditioning and, 24-25; 240
psychodynamic therapies and, 161; LeDoux, Joseph, 11
respondent conditioning and, 25; Linehan, Marsha, 1
stimulus functions and, 71; tacting listening: rule-governed behavior and,
private events through, 38 40-42; verbal behavior and, 40
goals, therapeutic, 188-190, 229
grammatical rules, 203 M
mands, 30-31, 118
H manipulation, 201
memories, 176
Hayes, Steven C., xiii, 241
hierarchical relations, 80 metaphors, 96-101; analogies
homework assignments, 200, 210, 213 distinguished from, 96-97; contextual
hopelessness, creative, 180 cues and, 99-101; defusion achieved
through, 223-225; human knowledge
rooted in, 92; prevalence of, 99;
I therapeutic use of, 186-188. See also
I-here-now perspective, 103-104, 111, 219 analogies
implicit rules, 115-116, 126, 234 mind, theory of, 105-106
indirect stimulus functions: definition moral behavior, 124
of, 74; risks related to dominance of, motivation: client lack of, 229-231;
146-148 influenced by augmenting, 123-124
information processing theories, 43, 44 motivational function, 16, 19
insight, 162 motivational operations, 18, 124
intraverbal behavior, 32 motivative augmenting, 123
I-there-then perspective, 219, 229, 236 mutual entailment, 63, 64, 66-67, 84
mutual influence, 193
K
knowing oneself, 108 N
negative punishment, 15
L negative reinforcement, 14, 15, 142, 144,
language: action fused with, 190; 151
analogies used in, 92, 93-96; networks, relational, 116n, 186, 226-227
coherence as quality of, 84-85; nonarbitrary relations, 76
dark side of using, 133-152; derived nonverbal beings, 226
stimulus relations and, 66-67; indirect notepad exercise, 184-185, 188, 228
stimulus functions and, 146-148;
metaphors used in, 92, 96-101; O
problematic aspects of, 209. See also obsessive-compulsive syndromes, 151
verbal behavior
264
Index
265
Learining RFT
266
Index
and, 76, 77-80; contextual factors and, tracking: affected by augmenting, 140,
74-77; derived stimulus responses and, 142, 144-145; pliance used to practice,
71-74; direct, 74, 146, 147, 202, 204; 213-215; psychological problems
explanation of, 69-70; indirect, 74, connected with, 140-142; as rule-
146-148; perspective taking and, 219; governed behavior, 120-121, 131
relations between stimuli and, 80-83; transcription, 31
rule-governed behavior and, 114-116, transformation of stimulus functions,
131; transformation of, 73, 74, 84 73, 74
story about ourselves, 108-110, 151
strategic problem solving, 130
subconscious, 126, 234
U
unconditioned punishers, 23
unconditioned reinforcers, 23
T unconditioned response, 21, 22
tacting: of behavior, 179, 210; unconditioned stimulus, 21, 22
explanation of, 29-30, 125n; of private
events, 33-38, 232
taking dictation, 31
V
validation, 198
talk therapy, 168, 172-173, 209 values: lack of clarity about, 229-232;
target field of experience, 93 private events as obstacles to, 225-229,
temporal framing, 150 236; rule following and, 124
temporal relations, 80, 81 verbal antecedents: for new behavior,
terminology overview, 3-4 210-213; undermining, 215-223, 236
textual behavior, 31 verbal behavior, 28-43; autoclitic
therapeutic relationship: in clinical behavior and, 32-33; behavior analysis
behavior analysis, 172-173; in and, 46-47; derived stimulus relations
psychological therapies, 155-158, 163, and, 60-69; echoic behavior and,
166 31-32; extinction of problematic,
therapy. See clinical behavior analysis; 203-204; intraverbal behavior and,
psychological therapies 32; mands and, 30-31; metaphors and,
thoughts: behavior analysis and, 46-47, 186-187; new definition of, 87-88;
49-51; cognitive therapy and, 51-54; private events and, 38-40; problematic
described as private events, 27-28; aspects of, 209; psychotherapy and,
learning to tact, 35-37; metaphors 168, 172-173; RFT definition of, 68,
for defusing, 223-225; pain related 88; speakers and listeners in, 40; tacts
to, 136-138; power of thinking and, and, 29-30, 33-38. See also language
54-56, 89; regarding in perspective, Verbal Behavior (Skinner), ix, x
222; self-rules as, 128; social verbal discrimination, 161-162
environment and, 38-39. See also verbal traps, 218
private events
267
ww ou Si
more tools for your practice w. r B gn u
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LE ARNING RFT
to Relational Frame Theory
Learning
Relational frame theory, or RFT, is the little-understood behavioral theory be-
hind a recent development in modern psychology: the shift from the cognitive
paradigm underpinning cognitive behavioral therapy to a new understanding of
language and cognition. Learning RFT presents a basic yet comprehensive intro-
duction to this fascinating theory, which forms the basis of acceptance and com-
mitment therapy. The book also offers practical guidance for directly applying
RFT
RFT in clinical work.
In the book, author Niklas Trneke presents the building blocks of RFT: language
as a particular kind of relating, derived stimulus relations, and transformation of
stimulus functions. He then shows how these concepts are essential to understand-
ing acceptance and commitment therapy and other therapeutic models. Learning
RFT shows how to use experiential exercises and metaphors in psychological treat-
ment and explains how they can help your clients. This book belongs on the book-
shelves of psychologists, psychotherapists, students, and others seeking to deepen
their understanding of psychological treatment from a behavioral perspective.
There is no better place to start learning about RFT than this excellent
book. Trneke teaches the principles of RFT simply and elegantly . . . I
wish a book like this had existed when I first learned about RFT.
Russ Harris, author of The Happiness Trap and ACT Made Simple An Introduction to
NIKLAS TRNEKE, MD, is a psychiatrist and licensed psychotherapist in private practice in
Relational Frame Theory
and Its Clinical Application
Kalmar, Sweden. Together with Jonas Ramner, Ph.D., he has previously authored The ABCs
of Human Behavior.