Joseph Victor Ejercito vs.

Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 157294-95 - 30 November 2006
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces
tecum against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada. Ms. Dela
Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of
manager checks detailed in the subpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same.

However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and
may not be enforced because the information found therein, given their extremely detailed
character and could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal
disclosure by the bank officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the extremely-detailed information
obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation
of the charges against him, such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the
production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court

HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the
exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in
Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction.

As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of
competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that
the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully
used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the
exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails.

The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank
accounts which where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before the
proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because the
Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months
before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of statutes,
such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are
deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute. Thus,
the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is
consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted in good faith.
 China Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Gotianuy
G.R. No. 140687 - December 18, 2006
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS: 1. The case stems from a complaint for a recovery of sums of money and annulment of
sales ofreal property and shares of stocks filed by Jose Gotianuy against his son-in-law George
Dee and his daughter Mary Margaret Dee.
2. Gotianuy accused his daughter of stealing his properties, US Dollar deposits with
Citybank amounting to P35M and $864,000. Margaret Dee obtained these amounts through
check issued by Citybank naming her as a co-payee of Gotianuy. She allegedly deposited the
checks with petitioner bank. Gotianuy died during the pendency of the case and was substituted
by his daughter Elizabeth.
3. Subsequently, employees of China Bank were sent subpoena to testify re: bank
deposits of Margaret Dee but petitioner invoked RA 1405 (Bank Secrecy Law). The lower court
held that the disclosure of the name only of a depositor does not constitute a violation of RA
1405. The CA affirms the lower court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly invoke the bank secrecy law to prevent the
disclosure.

HELD: No. Jose Gotianuy is a co-payee of the checks deposited in China Bank hence, he is
deemed also a depositor. A depositor is one who pays money into the bank in the usual course of
business to be placed to his credit and subject to his check of the beneficiary of the funds held by
the bank as trustee. As such, no written consent from Margaret Dee is needed in order to inquire
into the said deposits. Moreover, there was no issue as to the real source of the funds since even
Marygaret Dee declared that Gotianuy was the source of the Citibank US Dollar checks. As the
owner of the funds unlawfully taken and now deposited with the petitioner bank, Gotianuy has
the right to inquire into the said deposit. Clearly, it was not the intention of the lawmakers to
perpetrate injustice when it enacted the Bank Secrecy Law or RA 1405.
 PNB vs. Gancayco
G.R. No. L-18343 - September 30, 1965
Ponente: Regala, J.

FACTS: Defendants Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the
records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit
and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In
declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.
On the other hand, the defendants cited Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority,which allegedly provides an
additional ground for the examination of bank deposits.

ISSUE: Whether Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits.

HELD: Yes. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is
possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended
to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule
against the disclosure of bank deposits.
x x x [W]hile section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely
confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances:
(1) Upon written permission of the depositor;
(2) In cases of impeachment;
(3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
(4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of
unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty x x x.

[SEC. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of

Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been
found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other
persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to
his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the
name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.
Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.]
 Mellon Bank vs. Magsino
G.R. No. 71479 - October 18, 1990
Ponente: Fernan, CJ.

Section 2 of said law allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited
is the subject matter of the litigation. Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering
the amount converted by the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an inquiry into the
whereabouts of the illegally acquired amount extends to whatever is concealed by being held or
recorded in the name of persons other than the one responsible for the illegal acquisition.

FACTS: On May 27, 1977, Dolores Ventosa requested the transfer of $1,000 from the First
National Bank of Moundsville, West Virginia, U.S.A. to Victoria Javier in Manila through the
Prudential Bank. Accordingly, the First National Bank requested the petitioner, Mellon Bank, to
effect the transfer. Unfortunately the wire sent by Mellon Bank to Manufacturers Hanover Bank,
a correspondent of Prudential Bank, indicated the amount transferred as US$1,000,000.00
instead of US$1,000.00. Hence Manufacturers Hanover Bank transferred one million dollars less
bank charges of $6.30 to the Prudential Bank for the account of Victoria Javier.
Javier withdrew $475,000 from account No. 343 and converted it into eight cashiers
checks made out to the following: (a) F.C. Hagedorn & Co., Inc., two cheeks for the total amount
of P1,000,000; (b) Elnor Investment Co., Inc., two checks for P1,000,000; (c) Paramount
Finance Corporation, two checks for P1,000,000; and (d) M. Javier, Jr., two checks for
P496,000. Javier also brought several properties in the United States including the one of his
lawyer, Poblador.
Mellon Bank filed a complaint docketed as No. 148056 in the Superior Court of
California, County of Kern, against Melchor Javier, Jane Doe Javier, Honorio Poblador, Jrn, and
Does I through V. In its first amended complaint to impose constructive trust. The testimonies of
these witnesses were objected to by the defense on the grounds of res inter alios acta,
immateriality, irrelevancy and confidentiality due to RA 1405. The Javier spouses also contend
that inasmuch as the Mellon Bank had filed in California an action to impose constructive trust
on the California property and to recover the same.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not an account deposit which is relevant and material to the resolution of
the case may be covered under R.A. No. 1405.

2) Whether or not the principle of election of remedies bars recovery of Mellon Bank.

HELD: 1) Whether or not an account deposit which is relevant and material to the resolution of
the case may be covered under R.A. No. 1405: Yes. Section 2 of said law allows the disclosure
of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. 24
Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering the amount converted by the Javiers
for their own benefit, necessarily, an inquiry into the whereabouts of the illegally acquired
amount extends to whatever is concealed by being held or recorded in the name of persons other
than the one responsible for the illegal acquisition.

2) Whether or not the principle of election of remedies bars recovery of Mellon Bank:
The spouses Javiers reliance on the procedural principle of election of remedies as part of their
ploy to terminate Civil Case No. 26899 prematurely. With the exception of the Javiers,
respondents failed to raise it as a defense in their answers and therefore, by virtue of Section 2,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, such defense is deemed waived. 26 Notwithstanding its lengthy and
thorough discussion during the hearing and in pleadings subsequent to the answers, the issue of
election of remedies has not, contrary to the lower courts assertion, been elevated to a
substantive one. Having been waived as a defense, it cannot be treated as if it has been raised
in a motion to dismiss based on the nonexistence of a cause of action.

Moreover, granting that the defense was properly raised, it is inapplicable in this case. In
its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or
more coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the
term has been generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the
assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other. In its technical and
more restricted sense, election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more coexisting
remedies, with the effect of precluding a resort to the others.
 Union Bank vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 134068 - June 25, 2001
Ponente: Kapunan, J.

The bank can be compelled to disclose its accounts, as an exception under R.A. No. 1405, in a
litigation involving a cause of action of one bank to the other on an errouneously encoded check.
It is not one for bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials much less is there any showing
that the subject matter thereof is the money deposited in the account in question.

FACTS: A check for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was drawn against Account No. 0111-
01854-8 with private respondent Allied Bank payable to the order of one Jose Ch. Alvarez. The
payee deposited the check with petitioner Union Bank who credited the P1,000,000.00 to the
account of Mr. Alvarez.
Petitioner sent the check for clearing through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation
(PCHC). When the check was presented for payment, a clearing discrepancy was committed by
Union Banks clearing staff when the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was
erroneously under-encoded to One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) only. Union Bank only
discovered the under-encoding almost a year later. Thus, on May 7, 1991, Union Bank Notified
Allied Bank of the discrepancy by way of a charge slip for Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Thousand
Pesos (P999,000.00) for automatic debiting against the account of Allied Bank. The latter,
however, refused to accept the charge slip since [the] transaction was completed per your
[Union Banks] original instruction and clients account is now insufficiently funded.. Allied
Bank set up the defense of the Bank Secrecy Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Allied Bank can be compelled to disclose its accounts, as an exception
under R.A. No. 1405.

HELD: No. The complaint filed by herein petitioner against Allied Banking Corporation before
the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Arbitration Committee and docketed therein
as Arb[i]com Case No. 91-068 (Annex A, petition) is not one for bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials much less is there any showing that the subject matter thereof is the money
deposited in the account in question. Petitioners complaint primarily hing[e]s on the alleged
deliberate violation by Allied Bank Corporation of the provisions of the PCHC Rule Book, Sec.
25[.]3, and as principal reliefs, it seeks for [sic] the recovery of amounts of money as a
consequence of an alleged under-coding of check amount to P1,000,000.00 and damage[s] by
way of loss of interest income.
 In short, petitioner is fishing for information so it can determine the culpability of private
respondent and the amount of damages it can recover from the latter. It does not seek recovery
of the very money contained in the deposit. The subject matter of the dispute may be the amount
of P999,000.00 that petitioner seeks from private respondent as a result of the latters alleged
failure to inform the former of the discrepancy; but it is not the P999,000.00 deposited in the
drawers account. By the terms of R.A. No. 1405, the money deposited itself should be the
subject matter of the litigation. That petitioner feels a need for such information in order to
establish its case against private respondent does not, by itself, warrant the examination of the
bank deposits. The necessity of the inquiry, or the lack thereof, is immaterial since the case does
not come under any of the exceptions allowed by the Bank Deposits Secrecy Act.
 BSB Group Inc. vs. Sally Go
G.R. No. 168644 - February 16, 2010
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS: Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by
its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively
referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayan's wife, who was employed in
the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the
payments made by the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor's Office a complaint for estafaand/or
qualified theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representing the aggregate amount
of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company's customers in payment of their obligation were, instead
of being turned over to the company's coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to
her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank)
in Divisoria, Manila Branch. Upon a finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the
assistant city prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against
respondent.
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. She
was found guilty; that in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse
of confidence, being then employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of the
commission of the said offense and as such she was entrusted with the said amount of money.
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. The trial ensued. On the premise that
respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts
thereof to her personal banking account.
Petitioner, opposing respondent's move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank
account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which
respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. To this, respondent filed a
supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank
account under the provisions of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 1405. The trial court did not sustain
respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita
Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell ,Marasigan's testimony
sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent ,while engaged as cashier at the
BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the company by its customers,
endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with
Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan
for identification and marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then
deposited in her personal account with Security Bank. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is no difference between cash and check for purposes
of prosecuting respondent for theft of cash.

HELD: In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by
another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already
ensued from such act of execution. The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that
evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money
belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection
between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information
by claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line
of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the
commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances. In
estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in
relation to the formal allegation in an information for that offense; a check, after all, while not
regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash,
and the credit it represents instated monetary value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is
in this respect that what the offender does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully
taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one. In other words, in
pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation of the
checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their contents
and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has
indeed indorsed the same in his own name.
 Marquez vs. Desierto
G.R. No. 135882 - June 27, 2001
Ponente: Pardo, J.

FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union
Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against
Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint
Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without
her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.

ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

HELD: No. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending
case
 Philippine Savings Bank vs. Senate Impeachment Court
G.R. No. 200238 - February 9, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filedbefore
the Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition withapplication for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to stop
the Senate, sitting as impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum et Duces Tecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it issued against the Branch
Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch. The subpoena assailed by petitioners covers the foreign
currency denominated accounts allegedly owned by the impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona
of the Philippine Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of
CJ Corona?

HELD: [The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the
respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents to
COMMENT on the [merits of the] petition.] Yes, a TRO should be issued against the
impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the
alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief
Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines. This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of
foreign currency deposits.

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor.
In Intengan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S.
dollar deposits, the applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the
recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. 15thDivision of the Court of Appeals, the
Court also held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not
Republic Act No. 1405.

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositors right to
privacy in relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the
Impeachment Court has presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona. Also, while impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank
deposits under RA 1405, it is not an exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits under RA 6426.
 Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 94723 - August 21, 1997
Ponente: Torres, J.

FACTS: Respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured the 12-
year old petitioner Karen Salvacion to go with him in his apartment where the former repeatedly
raped latter. After the rescue, policemen recovered dollar and peso checks including a foreign
currency deposit from China Banking Corporation (CBC). Writ of preliminary attachment and
hold departure order were issued. Notice of Garnishment was served by the Deputy Sheriff to
CBC which later invoked R.A. No. 1405 as its answer to it. Deputy Sheriff sent his reply to CBC
saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is
merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which
has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. CBC replied and invoked Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli are exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. Central Bank of the Philippines
affirmed the defense of CBC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of RA 6426 amended
by PD 1246 otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a
foreign transient.

HELD: No. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as
it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances.
[T]he application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg
Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro. Simply stated, when
the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond
to the vehement urge of conscience. It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and
in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular
protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien
depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness
against legal tyranny.