Contract Management Thompson
Contract Management Thompson
Contract Management Thompson
33 Contract
Management
Contents
33.1 Introduction 33/3 33.7 Engineering contracts 33/14
33.7.1 Contract strategy 33/14
33.2 Project and contract organization 33/3 33.7.2 Choice of contract type 33/14
33.2.1 Introduction 33/3 33.7.3 The main types of contract 33/15
33.2.2 Organization of design and construction 33/5 33.7.4 Management contracting 33/15
33.2.3 Decision making and control 33/5
33.2.4 Project management 33/5 33.8 Contractual measurement and valuation 33/15
33.2.5 Project objectives 33/5 33.8.1 Bills of quantities 33/15
33.2.6 Safely 33/6 33.8.2 The concepts incorporated in the
traditional bills of quantities 33/16
33.3 Commercial considerations and cashflow 33/6 33.8.3 Development of the bills of quantities 33/16
33.3.1 Cashflow 33/7 33.8.4 Method-related charges 33/16
33.3.2 Contract cashflow 33/7 33.8.5 Pricing and tendering policy 33/16
33.4 Construction planning 33/8 33.9 Project management 33/16
33.4.1 Compiling a programme 33/8 33.9.1 Guidelines for project management 33/17
33.4.2 Resource scheduling 33/8
33.4.3 Programming techniques 33/10 References 33/18
Operate
Design Construct
tank farm tank farm
Notes: (1) Only one year of operation shown
(2) 86.01 is January 1986
Design Construct
process plant process plant
Design Construct
tank farm tank farm
LEGEND
Design Construct Design Construct Fixed costs
process plant process plant stage Il stage (I Time related
costs
Quantity -
proportional costs
HAMMOCKS
Design office overheads
Construction Overheads
Indirect production costs
Base case
Target completion date
Cumulative value ( million)
6 month delay in
commissioning
Reduced production
growth rate
Paybackperiod
Contract completion
tender is based will represent the most efficient use of the
contractor's resources to achieve the work defined in the con- Predicted
tract documents. It follows that any delay or change in the work revenue (2)
content may also affect the timing of the flow of money to and
from the contractor, and may involve additional funding from
his capital as illustrated in the contract cashflow example given
in section 33.3.2 below. If the disruption is caused by the client,
the contractor will expect to be recompensed.
At any time, a contractor will probably be employed on a Contract duration (weeks)
variety of contracts in different locations for different clients and
will also be tendering for future work. His commercial skill is to
utilize a relatively small amount of capital and to 'turn it over'
as many times as possible by employing it to finance several
Actual completion
e.g. a mobilization payment at the start of a construction
contract.
(2) Time-related charges which are paid or received in regular
increments over a period of time, e.g. the cost of site Delayed
overheads, the weekly hire charge for a crane and pay- revenue
ments to employees. payment
(3) Quantity proportional charges which are related to the
quantity of material used or to the number of units of
production of a factory or power station. Contract duration (weeks)
(c)
Only in this way will it be possible to use the model to predict
realistically the effect on investment or return of such diverse Figure 33.4 Contract cashflow. The contractors' investment is
factors as variations in output, delay, disruption, cost or wast- sensitive to change in payment and to delay
age of materials.
HISTOGRAM SHOWING
DEPLOYMENT OF
BRICKLAYERS
(1) Realistic estimates of capital and running costs. Payback period 80 months
(2) Realistic time-scales and programmes for project imple- Net present value @ 10% discount rate 6.13 million
mentation. Internal rate of return (i.r.r.) 27.6%
(3) Appropriate specifications for performance standards.
and it is strongly advised that a similar range of criteria are
At appraisal, the level of project definition is likely to be low and employed when determining any investment.
therefore risk response should be characterized by a broad- It is, of course, most unlikely that those precise values will be
brush approach.14 It is recommended that effort should be achieved due to all the risks and uncertainties which exist at the
concentrated on: early stage of project development. The chain line in Figure 33.3
indicates that, should the market growth rate be only 15%, the
(1) Seeking solutions which avoid/reduce risk. surplus would be reduced to 12.8 million and i.r.r. to 22.9%.
(2) Considering whether the extent or nature of the major risks The obvious effect of a 6-month delay in completion of the
are such that the normal transfer routes may be unavail- plant, shown by the broken line in Figure 33.3 would be to
able or particularly expensive. reduce the surplus to 15.9 million and i.r.r. to 23.7%. A far
(3) Outlining any special treatments which may need to be more serious consequence could be loss of the market to a
considered for risk transfer, e.g. for insurance or uncon- competitor.
ventional contractual arrangements.
(4) Setting realistic contingencies and estimating tolerances
consistent with the objective of preparing the best estimate
of anticipated total project cost.
(5) Identifying comparative differences in the riskiness of
alternative project schemes.
Probability (%)
the plant.
In practice, a combination of all these uncertainties and risks
is likely to be experienced and a better prediction of the
prediction 27.6%
probable range of outcome of this project can be obtained from
the cumulative probability diagram (Figure 33.7). This diagram
is generated by substituting 1000 combinations of these factors
Original
in the basic model on a random basis in a Monte Carlo
simulation.14-16 The base case prediction is seen to be optimistic
when uncertainties are taken into account as there is a 77%
probability that i.r.r. will be less than 27.6%. It is predicted that
there is 50/50 chance of achieving an i.r.r. of 21% but that
extreme values of zero and 40% are just possible. Although
analyses of this type require judgement to be made on the likely
range and probability distribution of each variable, the Author
strongly recommends that this discipline of a rigorous risk
analysis is adopted for all major projects.
The output of power and market factors is also seen to
Internal rate of return (%)
dominate the sensitivity diagram for a real project, the proposed Figure 33.7 New manufacturing plant: cumulative
Severn tidal power scheme,15 (see Figure 33.8). Again, the most probability diagram. There is a 77% probability that the internal
sensitive engineering factors are delays in completion of the rate of return will be less than the base case prediction of 27.6%
works and installations of the turbines.
Variable
Cost of turbines
Installation of turbines
Delay in construction
Material embankment cost
Dredging and foundation cost
Transmission cost
Energy output
Change in variable (%)
Mechanical maintenance
Civil maintenance
NPV ( million)
Figure 33.8 Severn tidal power scheme: sensitivity
analysis. The amount of power produced, the selling price, and the
delay in completion of the project again have the most serious
effect on project viability
33.7 Engineering contracts (2) The organizational system for design and construction.
(3) The type of contract.
Construction work of all types is normally undertaken by a (4) The Conditions of Contract and other contract docu-
contractor, a specialist in the particular field of work, who is ments.
employed for this purpose by the client. In most cases, the client (5) The tendering procedure.
will invite a number of suitable contractors to submit tenders
and subsequently will award the contract on the basis of the The project manager must then choose from the optious avail-
lowest realistic and acceptable tendered price. able within each of these five strategic areas.
This approach is adopted worldwide and has led to the
development of well-defined systems of working and Standard
Conditions of Contract for different types of work. Each of 33.7.2 Choice of contract type
these traditional procedures has been developed to meet a There are three essential requirements of any contract:
particular set of circumstances and will work well, provided
their limitations are accepted, as the associated case law is well (1) Incentive. The aim is to provide an adequate incentive for
established. efficient performance from the contractor. This must be
It is, however, important for engineers to realize that, because reflected by an incentive for the client to provide appropri-
of the diversity of both construction work and clients' require- ate information and support in a timely manner.
ments, no single uniform approach to contractual arrangements (2) Flexibility. The aim is to provide the client with sufficient
can be specified or advocated. A number of alternative strategies flexibility to introduce change which can be anticipated but
are available to the client and each contract should be formu- not defined at the tender stage. An important and related
lated with the specific job in mind. For example, a client may requirement is that the contract should provide for syste-
wish to be directly involved in site management or may prefer to matic and equitable evaluation of such changes.
delegate this responsibility entirely to the contractor, the need (3) Risk sharing. The aim should be to allocate all risk between
for early completion of the work may dictate that the contractor client and contractor. This must take account of the
is appointed before design is completed, risks may be appor- management and control of the effects of risks which
tioned in various ways between the parties, the contractor may materialize. The contractor will include a risk contingency
be required to undertake the detailed design or to provide sum in his tender as protection against the risks he has been
varying amounts of finance - these and many other consider- asked to carry.
ations will all influence the client's contract strategy.
Obviously, this strategy will also be greatly affected by the The inter-relationship of these requirements with the type of
nature of the work to be completed under the contract. The contract is demonstrated in Figure 33.9 in which the require-
fabrication and positioning of an offshore oil production plat- ments are expressed in terms of contractor's incentive, client's
form is a high-risk venture which may involve advanced or new flexibility and exposure to risk. It is apparent that, generally, a
technology and will be subject to severe time constraints. The contractor's incentive and a client's flexibility tend to be incom-
contract for building a chemical plant may include the provision patible. For example, a lump-sum contract imposes maximum
of unique process know-how offered by the contractor who will incentive on the contractor but also implies a very high level of
consequently undertake detailed design, construction and com- constraint on the client against introducing change. The con-
missioning of the plant. Tunnelling implies uncertainty - and verse is true at the other extreme of a cost-reimbursable plus
therefore risk - about ground conditions, whilst minor road- percentage fee contract.
works or house building are likely to involve repetitive use of There are many detailed points of difference between the
traditional techniques with relatively little financial risk and the various types of contract. Those of most importance to the
overriding requirement of minimum cost.16 client in making an appropriate choice are summarized below.
References
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