SEPA CARIO, plaintiff-appellee, G.R. No.

L-2746 December 6, 1906

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, defendant-appellant. MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers, for appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
WILLARD, J.:
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
On the 23rd of February, 1904, Sepa Cario presented a petition to the Court of
Land Registration asking that she be inscribed as the owner of a tract of land of
79,227.80 square meters, situated in the Government reservation of Baguio, in the
Province of Benguet. The Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and
opposed the inscription on the ground that the land described in the petition was
pulbic land. The court belonw ordered the inscription; the Solicitor-General moved WILLARD, J.:
for a new trial, which was denied, and he has brought the case here by bill of
exceptions. The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in fact, Metcalf A. Clarke,
filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the
The land described in the petition in this case is a part of the land described in the owner of a tract of land in the municipality of Baguio, in the province of Benguet,
petition in the case of Cristobal Ramos 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 391). All the questions of law containing 146 hectares. The Government of the Philippine Islands, appeared in
presented in this case hare already been decided in the cases of Jones vs. The the Court of Land Registration and opposed the petition. The Government of the
Insular Government,2 No. 2506, and Vicente Balpiedad vs. The Insular United States that the land was part of the military reservation of Baguio. Judgment
Government,3 No. 2539, it being noted, however, that it was proved in this case that was entered in the Court of Land Registration in favor of the petitioner, from which
Sepa Cario was a native of the Islands. judgment the respondents appealed in accordance with the law then in force to the
Court of First Instance of the province of Benguet. The case was therein tried de
The only question that remains to be considered is whether there was proof of novo, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. The petitioner has brought
possession for ten years. The evidence in all these cases is practically the same. the case here by bill of exceptions.
Sepa Carino, the petitioner in this case, is a sister of Sioco Carino, the grantor of
the petitioner Jones, in case No. 2506. In this particular case it was proved that the The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory
land in question was given to the petitioner by her father, Mateo Carino; that it had information obtained in 1901. By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which
previously been in the possession of her grandfather, Ortega; that the respective this possessory information was obtained (art. 394), it produced only those effects
owners had lived upon and cultivated the land and that it had been inclosed. There which the laws give to mere possession.
was no evidence of any adverse occupation or possession by anyone. The
question as to the effect of the survey made at the instance of Ramos is considered The petition not having shown any title from the Government, and the land being
in the case of Vicente Ralpiedad, No. 2539, just decided. agricultural, the case is governed by the decisions of this court in the cases
of Valenton et al. vs. Murciano 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 434); Cansino et al. vs. Valdez et
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against al. 2 (4 Off. Gaz., 488); and Tiglao vs. The Insular Government 3 (4 Off. Gaz.,
the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered in 747). In these cases it was held that the mere possession of land such as that
accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the cause be remanded to the in controversy in this case would give the possessor and title thereto as
court of its origin for proper procedure. So ordered. against the Government; in other words, that the statute of limitations did not
run against the State in reference to its agricultural lands.lawphil.net

The petitioner, however, insists that although the statute of limitations as such did
not run against the Government of Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to
be conclusively presumed from immemorial use and occupation. To say that the
presumption of a grant is presumption of law is, in our opinion, simply to say that it
amounts to a statute of limitations; and for a court to hold that the statute of
limitations does not run against the Government as to its public agricultural lands, presumption arise if the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with
and at the same time to hold that if a person has been in possession of such lands the existence of a grant. In this case under consideration we can not find
for thirty years it is conclusively presumed that the Government has given him a any evidence which justifies us in believing that a legal grant can have
deed therefor, would be to make two rulings directly inconsistent with each other. been made, and under those circumstances we can not consider
possession since the date of the treaty as dispensing with the requirement
Considered as a presumption of fact, the contention could not be sustained in this that the title, if not perfect at that time, was one which the claimant would
particular case. Here the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the have a lawful right to make perfect had the territory not been acquired by
existence of a grant, It is known that for nearly three hundred years all attempts to the United States.
convert the Igorots of the Province of Benguet to the Christian religion completely
failed, and that during that time they remained practically in the same condition as In the case of Chaves vs. The United States (175 U.S., 552) the court made the
they were when the Islands were first occupied by the Spaniards. To presume as a following statement at page 562:
matter of fact that during that time, and down to at least 1880, the provisions of the
laws relating to the grant, adjustment, and sale of public were taken advantage of Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient
by these deeds from the Government for these lands would be to presume in length of time to prove a valid title. In United States vs. Chaves (159
something which did not exist. The appellant says in his brief (p.10): U.S., 452) the possession was under the claim of a grant made by the
governor of New Mexico to the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost,
The Igorot, no less than the American Indian, is an aborigine, and is but it had been seen and read by witnesses, and its existence had been
equally ignorant of the forms of law and procedure necessary to protect proved by evidence sufficient, as we stated in the opinion (p. 460), to
his interests. warrant 'the finding of the court below that the complainant's title was
derived from the Republic of Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the
There is, moreover, in the case evidence that in 1894 the petitioner sought to obtain date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the territory of New
title from the Government in accordance with the laws then in force. In 1901 he Mexico, within which the land was situated. We do not question the
made a contract with Metalcalf A. Clarke, by the terms of which he agreed to sell correctness to the remarks made by Mr. Justice Shiras in regard to
the land to Clarke for 6,000 pesos when he obtained title thereto from the evidence of possession and the presumptions which may under certain
Government, and this contract he does not say that he is the owner, but simply that circumstances drawn as to the existence of a grant.
he is in possession thereof. The court below found that the land is now worth
upwards of P50,000. We do not deny the right of the duty of a court to presume its existence in
a proper case, in order to quiet a title and to give to long continued
The possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the possession the quality of a rightful possession under a legal right. We
presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used recognized and enforced such a rule in the case of United
for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and States vs. Chaves decided at this term. in which the question is involved.
since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the We simply say in this case that the possession was not a duration long
petitioner for any purpose. enough to justify any such inference.

The petitioner relies upon the case of the United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) There is no proof of any valid grant, but on the contrary the evidence
and the case of The United States vs. Chaves (175 U.S., 509). In the case of offered by the plaintiff himself and upon which the bases the title that he
Hays vs. The United States (175 U.S. 248) the court said at page 261; asks the court to confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a body
which had no legal power to make it, and which, therefore, conveyed no
title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff
But this presumption is subject to the limitation that where title is claimed himself, that it was under this grant alone that possession of the lands was
from a deed which is shown to be void, it will not be presumed that there taken. We can not presume (within the time involved in this case) that any
was an independent grant (Smith vs. Highbee, 12 Vermont,. 113), or other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the plaintiff and of
where surrounding circumstances are inconsistent with the theory of a his grantors up to the time of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848,
grant. (Townsend vs. Downer, 32 Vermont, 183). had not been long enough to presume a grant. (Crispin vs. United States,
168 U.S., 208; Hayes vs.United States, 170 U.S., 637, 649, 653;
The substance of this doctrine is that lapse of time any be treated as Hays vs. The United States, ante 248.) The possession subsequently
helping out the presumption of a grant, but where a void grant is shown, it existing, we can not notice. Same authorities.
affords no presumption that another valid grant was made. Nor does such
As we understand it, it is well settled in the United States that prescription does not are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period within which
run against the Government as to its public lands in other words, that if a person documents must be presented a term sufficient in length and proportionate
desires to obtain title to the public lands of the United States situated within the to the distance the interested party may have to travel for the purpose of
boundaries of the States, he must do so in the way pointed out by the law. We do making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the
not understand that a person in possession of unsurveyed public lands in the State parties interested that in term designated, without a just and valid reason
of Minnesota, for example, whose ancestors had occupied that the land for fortyh therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will
years, could maintain in court a claim that he was the legal owner of the lands by be granted to others.
granted the land to his ancestors, a presumption founded not upon any
proceedings taken in the General Land Office to acquire a patent thereto, but upon In the regulations of June 25, 1880, it was provided as follows:
the mere possession for that length of time.
ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands
The same is true of the public lands of Spain in the Philippine Islands. In the case whose possession they are unlawfully enjoining within the time of one
of Valenton et al. vs. Marciano it was said: year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall
fail to fulfill their obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed the proper sum into the treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority
if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always vested in it, reassert the ownership of the Stated over the lands, and will,
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative after fixing the whole thereof, proceed to sell at public auction that part of
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State the same which, either because it may have been reduced to cultivation or
remained the absolute owner. is not located within the forest zone, is not deemed advisable to preserve
as State forest reservations. 4
But in any event, and whatever the law may be elsewhere, it seems clear that this
doctrine of presumptive grant can not apply to the Philippines in view of the In the royal decree of the 13th of February, 1894, published in the Official Gazzette
Spanish legislation for the Indies. From time to time there were promulgated laws of Manila of the 17th of April, 01894, it is provided in article 4 as follows:
which required the person in possession of public lands to exhibit their titles or
grants thereto. If these titles or grants were found to be good, they were confirmed, ART. 4. The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment
but if they were not, or if the persons had no grants or titles at all, they were evicted (composicion) under the royal decree of the 25th of June, 1880, but the
from the land. adjustments of which decree in the Gaceta de Manila, will revert to the
State. Any claim to such lands by those who might have applied for the
For example, in Law 14, title 12, 4, Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, it is adjustment of the same, but who have not done so as the above
stated: mentioned date, will not avail them in any way or at any time.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the
pretrial courts designate, at such times as shall to them most expedient, a public agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption
suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, after a lapse of thirty or any other number of years that the Government of Spain
and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by had granted to the possessor thereof a legal title thereto.
them for this purpose their title deeds thereto. And those who are in
possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts or by virtue of just The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No.
prescriptive rights shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to 926, the Public Land Act, for the reason that act is not applicable to the Province of
us to be disposed of at our will. Benguet. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, it was provided
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered accordingly and ten
that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of days thereafter the case be returned to the court below for execution. So ordered.
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal
lands, whether or not the same shall be cultivated or tenanted, may, either
in person or through their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit
to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands
G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907 From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the
witnesses for the Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884
MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant, Cario erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated
vs. to the north of that property now in question, property which, according to
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee. the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging
to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to
one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim,
Coudert Brothers for appellant. moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the
father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse,
ARELLANO, C.J.: had lived . . ..

Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh
in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a and located on the property described in the plan attached
parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon in which he
town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected thereon and now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is
constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied
lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario, H. some portion of the property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp.
Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 11 and 12.)
decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil
Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands 1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the
of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the
lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng. plan filed herein, such extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares,
inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory
Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the
reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land
set out in the former petition. therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country
road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center from north to south,
whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road, the
never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresionfrom the State. west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information
mentioned.

After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land
Registration rendered its judgment in these terms: 2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is
made in said possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now
actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the
Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and belongs to the
possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to class called public lands.
the date on which Cario constructed the house now there that is to
say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession for some
years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both 3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect
public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.) the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the
possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of
title of egresionof this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under
below are the following: agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property
authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13,
1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty 7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing
applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and
the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth
three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved to the Government,
has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in
past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No.
and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such 648,2herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which
land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.
more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to
refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for 8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions
the following reason: Second, because the possessory information authorized by contained in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The
said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by
the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time
with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in
article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if
to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to
After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it
possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was
possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.
said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under
universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period
of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included 9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part
under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to of same, according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the
unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law." extent of which is not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent
has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based
in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of
it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his
average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all
period of five years immediately following for example, if the denouncement of of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration,
purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the
from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws.
possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in
accordance with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after the
expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the
Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law. 1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right
had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law time immemorial;
remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as
it could only be of force when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, 2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but
which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government, which that, on the contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation
classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing 21.)
them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time
pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance
decree of February 13, 1894. against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this
decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter
let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So G.R. No. L-29675 September 30, 1969
ordered.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY,petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, JUDGE, Court of First Instance of Baguio City, KOSEN
PIRASO, SAMAY PIRASO, COTILENG PIRASO, PETER PARAN and MARTINA
PIRASO, DAISY PACNOS, SPOUSES ALBINO REYES and ISABEL
SANTAMARIA, and ARTURO TONGSON, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Frine'
C. Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio A. De Leon and Major Santiago O. Tomelden (Staff
Judge Advocate, PMA) for petitioner.
Crisologo Law Office for respondent Arturo Tongson.
Raul L. Correa and Francisco Ventura for respondents spouses Albino Reyes and
Isabel Santamaria.
Luis R. Gaduang for respondents Kosen Piraso, et al.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is by statute provided that all persons "claiming title to parcels of land that have
been the object of cadastral proceedings" in actual possession of the same at the
time of the survey but unable for some justifiable reason to file their claim in the
proper court during the time, limit established by law, "in case such parcels of land
on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be
declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings" instituted within
the forty-year period next preceding June 20, 1953, the time of the approval of this
particular enactment, are granted "the right within five years" from said date to
petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings but "only with respect to such of
said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, ... ." 1

The jurisdiction of respondent Judge Pio R. Marcos to act in accordance with

Republic Act No. 931 in connection with the petition for a reopening filed by
respondent Kosen Piraso, joined by his kinsmen, likewise respondents, all
surnamed Piraso, is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding, included
in which are the other respondents, Daisy Pacnos and the spouses Albino Reyes
and Isabel Santamaria, petitioners being the Republic of the Philippines and the
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy.

In the language of the petition: "This is an original action for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
whereby herein petitioners seek to annul and set aside: (1) The Order, dated July
13, 1967 ... denying the Motion to Dismiss dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City
Fiscal of Baguio City in behalf of oppositors-government agencies, and thus
insisting on assuming jurisdiction over the case (without the requisite publication in no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; (2) that the causes of action
the Official Gazette of the petition) and over the subject matter (a military alleged in the petition are barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
reservation); (2) The Decision, dated October 7, 1967 ... decreeing the registration (3) that the petition states no cause of action.
of a parcel of land with an area of 28,215.58 square meters ... within the so-called
'U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center' in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos; (3) The On July 13, 1967, the respondent Judge denied the said motion to dismiss. Then
Order of August 2, 1968 ... which in effect denied the Motion to Annul Decision came on October 7, 1967, a decision by respondent Judge, decreeing the
dated February 9, 1968 filed by the Solicitor General, and instead ordered the registration of a portion of the land (28,215.58 square meters of Lot 140, Baguio
issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in favor of respondent Albino Cadastre), subject matter of the Pirasos' petition in favor of respondent Daisy
Reyes; ... and (4) The Order, dated August 24, 1968 ... allowing respondents Kosen Pacnos. The Solicitor General received his copy of this decision on December 4,
Piraso, et al. to adduce their evidence of alleged ownership ..., all issued in Civil 1967.1awphl.nt
Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Record No. 211 of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City, entitled 'In the Matter of the Petition for Reopening of Judicial
Proceedings, Kosen Piraso, et al., petitioners'." 2 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by the City Attorney of Baguio of
December 9, 1967, denied by respondent Judge on December 15, as "having been
filed out of time."
It was likewise therein alleged that Civil Reservation Case No. 1 "settled the
ownership, private and public, of the Baguio townsite, terminating with the Decision
of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City dated November 13, 1922." 3 Prior to On January 3, 1968, the City Fiscal of Baguio City joined by petitioner
said case, however, a military reservation known as the U.S. Fleet Naval Superintendent of the Military Academy and the Director of Lands jointly filed a
Rehabilitation Center consisting of Lots 140 and 141 of the Baguio Cadastre with notice of appeal. There was on February 7, 1968, an ex parte motion for extension
an aggregate area of 29 hectares, more or less, was set aside pursuant to of time to submit a record on appeal. An opposition thereto was filed by counsel for
Executive Order No. 1254 of October 10, 1910, issued by the then President respondent Daisy Pacnos. On February 15, 1968, the Solicitor General filed a
William Howard Taft of the United States, as attested by Proclamation No. 114 of motion to annul the decision dated October 7, 1967, based on lack of jurisdiction.
the then Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes, and Executive Order No. 5139 of
June 19, 1929, issued by the then President Herbert Hoover, as attested by On August 2, 1968, respondent Albino Reyes filed an ex parte motion for the
Proclamation No. 260 of the then Governor-General Dwight F. Davis. After issuance of a decree in his favor, having previously manifested to respondent
independence, the United States relinquished to the Republic of the Philippines all Judge that respondent Daisy Pacnos had transferred her right to him. On the same
claims to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots, their day, respondent Judge issued an order considering that the motions for
relinquishment being formalized by an agreement of December 6, 1956. 4 Then reconsideration and the motion to annul decision filed by the Solicitor General and
came this categorical assertion in the petition that the land involved in this other government lawyers "have been rendered academic and of no moment on
proceeding "is limited to what is admittedly, and by unquestionable proof, within the account of the filing of the notice of appeal on January 3, 1968," but in his opinion
so-called U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and 141, Baguio of no avail the time to do so having lapsed. Moreover, no record on appeal was
Cadastre." 5 submitted. He likewise directed in said order the issuance of a decree to
respondent "Albino Reyes, married to Isabel Sta. Maria, Filipino, with residence at
From a summary of the facts appearing in the Petition, the need for including the Dagupan City." Another order specifically to that effect came from respondent
other respondents was made clear. It was therein set forth that on May 21, 1965 Judge on the day in question. The last order of pertinence to this petition came
the Pirasos, respondents herein, relying on the controlling statute set forth at the from respondent Judge on August 24, 1968, setting for hearing on September 11,
opening of this opinion, sought the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC 1968 the claim of the respondents, surnamed Piraso.
Rec. No. 211 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, praying for the issuance
in their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132 (Lots 140 Then on October 18, 1968 came this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The next
and 141, Baguio Cadastre) consisting of 290,283 square meters, more or less, day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondents to file within ten days
situated in Baguio City. On September 11, 1965, respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an from notice an answer, not a motion to dismiss. A preliminary injunction was
opposition. She sought in a pleading dated March 14, 1966 to be allowed to likewise issued without bond.
introduce evidence to prove her alleged right to registration of a portion of the land,
consisting of an area of 28,215.52 square meters, subject of the proceedings. This Subsequently, on November 8, 1968, the petitioners, through the Solicitor General,
motion was granted in an order of the respondent Judge dated May 16, 1966. filed a motion for leave to amend the petition, alleging that the property, "subject
matter of the case which respondent Daisy Pacnos succeeded in obtaining a
On January 26, 1967, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Baguio City, in behalf of all favorable judgment of registration ... and which respondents Albino Reyes and
the government agencies oppositors, filed a motion to dismiss the main petition and Isabel Santamaria subsequently succeeded in securing a decree of registration"
other related petitions, alleging thereto the following grounds: (1) that the court has was thereafter transferred on August 16, 1968 to one Arturo Tongson, who, thereby,
would be affected by the outcome of the petition. The proposed amendment, and by unquestionable proof, within the so-called U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation
according to this motion, would consist of his inclusion as one of the respondents. Center, Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre." 8 For the first paragraph of their
Accompanying his pleading is the amended petition for certiorari and prohibition. answer is explicitly worded thus: "1. That they admit the allegations of the Petition
On November 21, 1968, we adopted a resolution in the following tenor: "The motion with respect to the Nature of the Case ... and with respect to the Parties and
of the Solicitor General for leave to amend petition for certiorari and prohibition with Jurisdictional Averments ... ." 9 The above assertion of the petitioner was thus given
preliminary injunction in L-29675 (Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs Hon. Pio R. conformity by respondents Reyes and Santamaria. Nonetheless, they would seek
Marcos, etc., et al.), is [Granted]; the amended petition for certiorari and prohibition to blunt the force of their admission by alleging: "That they deny the allegations in
with a prayer for preliminary injunction is hereby accepted. Respondent Arturo par. V-A-1 of the Petition, the truth being that the land in question, particularly the
Tongson is required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a area decreed in the name of the answering respondents, is not part of a military
motion to dismiss) to said amended petition." reservation. The proclamation declaring certain areas to be naval reservations of
the Government of the United States (Annex B of the Petition) expressly states that
In the meanwhile, even before the motion for leave to file amended petition was such reservations are "subject to private rights if any there be." Upon the
filed, respondents, the Pirasos, submitted their answer on November 4, 1968. To Philippines' becoming independent in 1946 the said areas, by virtue of Executive
the assertion in the petition, fundamental in character, that the reopening sought by Agreements, reverted to disposable lands administered by the Bureau of Lands of
private respondents refers to lands "admittedly and by unquestionable proof, within the Republic of the Philippines." 10
the so-called U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center," the Pirasos answered in this
wise: "The land in question is not a military reservation under the Republic of the There is a similar express admission in the answer filed on December 13, 1968 by
Philippines although it was formerly reserved and placed under the control of the respondent Arturo Tongson, its wording being almost identical with the answer of
Navy Department for the use as Naval Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria: "That in so far as they are borne out by and
during the American regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. made part of the records of the case, he admits the allegations of the Petition with
5139 (Annex "B" of the petition), and was subsequently released or turned over to respect to the nature of the case ... and with respect to the Parties and
the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U.S.- Jurisdictional Averments ... ." 11 Again, this particular respondent did attempt to
Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6, 1956 but the same has not been weaken the force of the above admission by the assertion that the land decreed in
reserved for military purposes by the Republic of the Philippines." 6 They would favor of respondent Albino Reyes is not part of the military reservation. He would
hedge further by the disclaimer of any acceptance on their part that the land subject justify this seeming contradiction thus: "At any rate, when said areas were turned
of the petition forms part of the naval reservation, with the further qualification that over to the Philippine Government by virtue of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases
in any event, even if it be admitted that there is such a reservation by the Agreement, the land in question reverted to the disposable lands administered by
government, such lot is subject to private rights. the Bureau of Lands of the Republic of the Philippines." 12

That respondents Pirasos could not very well explicitly deny the allegation that the In the light of the allegation in the petition and the admissions made in the answers
lot in question forms part of the naval reservation is quite apparent from its of respondents, the Pirasos, Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria as well as Arturo
memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument filed on April 7, 1969, wherein in Tongson, even as sought to be qualified, it would seem to be fairly obvious that the
disputing the point raised by petitioners that the lower court acted without lots in question sought to be reopened in the proceeding before respondent Judge
jurisdiction, they stated the following: "Contrary to the allegation of the City Marcos form part and parcel of a naval reservation. It cannot escape attention that
Attorney, we humbly state categorically that the land involved in this case is no the above private respondents did try by highly sophistical reasoning, invoking
longer a reservation in its strict sense. It ceased to be a Naval Reservation of the distinctions far from persuasive, to avoid the legal effect of the admissions as to the
United States of America upon the termination of its sovereignty over the islands. It location of the disputed lots within a reservation. They must have realized that
was formerly reserved and placed under the control of the U.S. Naval Department unless successful in this attempt, doomed by failure from the outset, the facts being
for the use of Naval Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during the simply against them, the jurisdiction of respondent Court can, as petitioners have
American Regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139 done, be successfully impugned. That is what petitioners did; they must be
(Annex "B" of the petition), and was subsequently released or turned over to the sustained.
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the U.S.-Philippine
Military Bases Agreement on December 6, 1956. The said parcel of land (Lot 140 of 1. Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is quite explicit
the Baguio City Cadastre) until this time was not reserved for military purposes by and categorical. Only persons "claiming title to parcels of land that have been the
the Republic of the Philippines." 7 object of cadastral proceedings" are granted the right to petition for a reopening
thereof if the other conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit
The answer of respondents, Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria, to the amended of doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of cadastral
petition filed on November 21, 1968, expressly admits what petitioners so proceedings, then this statute finds no application. Considering that as far back as
emphatically insist on that this petition before us "is limited to what is admittedly, October 10, 1910, the then President of the United States, William H. Taft, issued
an executive order reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could 2. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made more patent by
not have been the object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsite another specific restriction of the right of a person to seek reopening under this
reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922. 13 statute. For the power of the Court to order such reopening is limited "to such of
said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
The Cadastral Act 14 was enacted on February 11, 1913, taking effect on its otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
passage. As is made clear in the first section thereof, when public interest requires Government ... ." 20 Included in the petition is an executive order of the then
that titles to any land be settled and adjudicated, in the opinion of the then President Herbert Hoover of June 19, 1929, declaring to be a naval reservation of
executive, the Governor General, he could order the Director of Lands or a private the Government of the United States "that tract of land known as lot no. 141,
surveyor named by the landowners, with the approval of the Director of Lands, to residence Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved for naval
make a survey and plan of such lands. 15 Clearly, it does not include the survey of purposes ... ." If there were still any lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by
lands declared as reservations. this reaffirmation of a presidential determination, then binding and conclusive as we
were under American sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval
reservation.
An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, 16 specifically governs the subject
matter of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or any interest
therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or 3. The private respondents are thus bereft of any right which they could assert
hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith under Republic Act No. 931. Such an enactment is the basis of whatever standing
brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, that would justify their reliance on the specific power granted courts of first instance
buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall to reopen cadastral proceedings. Such jurisdiction is thus limited and specific.
become registered land in accordance with the provisions of said Land Registration Unless a party can make it manifest by express language or a clear implication
Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was from the wording of the statute too strong to be resisted, he may not set in motion
sustained as against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process the judicial machinery under such specific grant of authority. This, private
clause, in a 1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron. 17 respondents have failed to do as the statute in terms that are crystal clear and free
from ambiguity denies them such a right. Petitioners have made out their case
for certiorari and prohibition.
In a 1918 decision, this Court had occasion to indicate clearly that the proceeding
under this statute, while analogous too, is not covered by the Cadastral Act. Thus:
"It will thus be seen that Act No. 627 contemplates a sort of cadastral proceeding WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the order
wherein private owners may be forced to come in and register their titles, under of respondent Judge of July 13, 1967, denying the motion to dismiss dated January
penalty of forfeiture of all right in the land included in the reservation in case they 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of Baguio City in behalf of oppositors-government
fail to act. The validity of a law of this character cannot be questioned; and this agencies; his decision dated October 7, 1967, decreeing the registration of a parcel
court has uniformly upheld the Act now under consideration." 18 of land with an area of 28,215.58 square meters within Lot 140, Baguio Cadastre,
or within the so-called "U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center" in favor of respondent
Daisy Pacnos; his order of August 2, 1968 which in effect denied the motion to
What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the part of the annul decision dated February 9, 1968 filed by the Solicitor General, and instead
private respondents to seek a reopening under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling ordered the issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in favor of
in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision.19 We there respondent Albino Reyes; and his order, dated August 24, 1968 allowing
explicitly held: "The defendant's contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral respondents Kosen Piraso, et al, to adduce their evidence of alleged ownership.
case, has jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legally established The writ of prohibition is likewise granted perpetually restraining respondent Judge
military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military reservations from further taking cognizance of and further assuming jurisdiction over the
is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1 LRC Rec. No. 211 as sought by the
provides that 'All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine private respondents. The preliminary injunction issued is hereby made permanent.
Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and With costs against private respondents.
declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations
of the Land Registration Act, ... .' "

The conclusion is therefore inescapable that, as contended by petitioners,

respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private
respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 931.
 Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the
VICENTE SOTTO January 21, 1949 Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose
In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court. correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only
impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by
Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his
Vicente Sotto in his own behalf. answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good
FERIA, J.: faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable
members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any
Sotto, who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no
he should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written consideration.
statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for
contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of
daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows: court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent
powers of the court to punish for contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231 and 232 of the old Code of
the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down
who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the by this Court on the inherent power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is
source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle
more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States,
majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice
majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows:
only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of
the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority, IT is
Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several
hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction,
bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, whether they are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the jurisdiction independently of any special express grant of statute. In many
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to punish for contempt is
expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned,
originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the and in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as
expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to
could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his answer, empower them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been
published. But, in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend himself In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American
or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for hearing or Jurisprudence, this Court, in In reKelly, held the following:
oral argument on January 4, the hearing being later postponed to January 10,
1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
submitted for decision. respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending
to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their
threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or
 public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of
courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy.
or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon
court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been
contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the
inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish for adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in
contempt tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice, as many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In re Kelly, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court.
35 Phil., 944, 945.) The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe
be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill which the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; foundation.
inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was
amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with
such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or inserted; the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the
and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him
thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and statements during
be determined by this Court in applying said act. the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11,
alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the for contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through
press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must
Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen,
to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very
case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order appropriately said U. S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The
to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct,
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the
and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the
Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice, for in his above- principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its
quoted statement he says: prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be
scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business
during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not
I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must
be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of
free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail,
will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a but it cannot close my mouth; " and in his other statement published on December
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment
an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ." that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the
Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed of our
be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the
flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594). court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a
precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me because the cause is
noble and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice" in citing him
contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court know
sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the respondent misrepresents
judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says
that the cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with
show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through
attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.
following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel
Parazo for contempt of Court.