Southern Hemisphere Vs Anti Terrorism Council, Et Al
Southern Hemisphere Vs Anti Terrorism Council, Et Al
Southern Hemisphere Vs Anti Terrorism Council, Et Al
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents
in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the
filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also
impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or
legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close
security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious
persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men
with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of
the State. Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection
between the purported"surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition
of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with
no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a
penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a
limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government
to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the
prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitions Dismissed