Infrastructure and Economic Growth - The Philippine Experience
Infrastructure and Economic Growth - The Philippine Experience
Infrastructure and Economic Growth - The Philippine Experience
ECONOMIC GROWTH:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Ambassador Albert del Rosario
was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines from 2011 to 2016. He also served as
Philippine Ambassador to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006.
Manuel V. Pangilinan
is CEO and managing director of First Pacific Company Limited. He is also the chairman of
MPIC, PLDT, Meralco, and Smart Communications, among others.
Edgardo G. Lacson
is an honorary chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI). He
was the former president of the Employers Confederation of the Philippines.
Ernest Z. Bower
is senior adviser for Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS). He is CEO of BowerGroupAsia (BGA), and a leading expert on Southeast Asia.
Introduction 1
Conclusions 19
References 21
Acknowledgements
viii
Infrastructure and Economic Growth:
The Philippine Experience
EPICTETUS E. PATALINGHUG, PH.D
Infrastructure matters because the quantity and quality of services reduce mobility
costs, improve access to different markets, and decrease income inequality (Calderon
and Serven, 2004; and Larde and Sanchez, 2014). The positive infrastructure-
growth mechanism (see Figure 1 below) states that improving infrastructure
services increases factor productivity and lowers production costs. The increased
profitability encourages investment and increases potential GDP growth. Increased
growth in turn increases income (Perrotti, 2011). However, what is not clearly
settled is how much infrastructure, which infrastructure, and when infrastructure
matters to output.
The latter issue is concerned with whether the stage of development affects the
effectiveness of infrastructure. The evidence on this issue is mixed. There is still
no consensus on whether large productivity differences between developed and
developing countries are due to the shortage of capital.
Another issue is how infrastructure is defined. Core or economic infrastructure
(rather than public capital) may have a greater impact on economic growth.
Furthermore, debates on the proper econometric modeling have dominated the
disagreements among researchers on how much infrastructure matters to growth.
This includes how to address endogeneity sources of infrastructure, such as reverse
causality and unobserved effects. Similarly, the definition of output in the regression
matters. Specifications using output level as dependent variable give a more
supportive positive effect than specifications using output growth or productivity
(Straub, 2011 and Estache and Garsous, 2012).
In countries where the efficacy of capital is low, a more desirable course of action
is to raise it through the maintenance of existing structures before generating
new investments (Pritchett, 1996). In countries undertaking massive catch-ups
in building infrastructure, once basic infrastructure is in place, investment in
maintenance may actually have a higher rate of return than new investment (Hulten,
1996).1 Moreover, the efficiency of infrastructure investments likewise depends
on the differences in the nature and efficiency of the regulatory framework, the
quality of contracts, the political economy of the process, the quality of the local
bureaucracy, and the level of corruption (Straub, 2011).
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 3
External market
Imports and Exports Economic growth
At the same time, while infrastructure has a positive effect on growth, the issue
of financing has not been addressed: Is tax-financing preferable to debt-financing?
Does the use of the public-private partnership (PPP) affect the outcome? It is
observed that public investment affects long-term private-sector performance in
an unbalanced way across industries and regions, and this outcome contributes to
the concentration of economic activity in the largest sectors and regions (Pereira
and Andraz, 2013).
Finally, it is suggested that the relevant challenge is to move away from past
research that tried to estimate the link between infrastructure and growth, and
instead concentrate on how the political economy, institutional quality, and
regulatory frameworks have affected the delivery and efficiency of infrastructure
services in the different sectors (Straub, 2008).
space to invest at least 5% of GDP for infrastructure. During these years, capital
investments bore the burden of fiscal adjustment: infrastructure outlay is usually
one of the first items to be subjected to budgetary cuts. After the value-added tax
reform in 2005 (increasing the value added tax from 10% to 12%) the fiscal space
improved, but the share of infrastructure spending to GDP remained below 3% (it
was only 1.8% in 2010) due to the lack of institutional and absorptive capacity in
the various government agencies to plan, design, and implement projects on time.
Recently, the Duterte Administration promises to implement a Golden Age of
Infrastructure by allocating Php 8.2 trillion infrastructure budget over the next
six years. Table 2 shows the infrastructure outlays for 2015, 2016, and 2017 which
indicates that the infrastructure budget is increasing from Php 575.67 billion in 2015
to Php 860.65 billion in 2017; in terms of percentage of infrastructure spending as a
proportion of GDP, it increases from 4.3% in 2015 to 5.4% in 2017.
Quality of Roads 80 15 97 3 51 93
Quality of Railroads 43 13 84 8 78 48
Quality of Airports 66 21 98 1 38 75
Quality of Electric
86 36 89 3 56 87
Supply
Fixed Telephone
80 73 108 29 88 100
Connectivity
Mobile Telephone
49 24 76 14 31 28
Connectivity
Overall 81 16 106 4 71 99
How does the Duterte government plan to push for its infrastructure programs
and projects and address the slow bureaucratic process? The Department of Budget
and Managements (DBM) press release promises a 24/7 construction schedule
for major infrastructure projects, the strengthening of project monitoring by geo-
tagging, the streamlining of the approval process for major infrastructure projects,
the simplification of the implementing rules and regulations of the government
Procurement Reform Law, and the revitalization of the PPP program.
The lack of adequate infrastructure in rural areas has also been pointed out.
Public and private investments are disproportionally concentrated in urban areas
and in National Capital Region (NCR), CALABARZON2, and Region 3 (Central
Luzon). In 1992, an average region would have an economic infrastructure of only
31.67% compared to that of the NCR. The latters economic infrastructure was 6.5
times greater than the worst-equipped region of ARMM (Serafica, 2002).3
This infrastructure investment disparity has negative effect on economic growth
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7
Project
Policy Regulation Implementation
Planning
Transportation
7718) whose implementing rules and regulations (IRR) were only finalized and
implemented in October 2012. Governments use PPPs because they may offer
value for money, provide opportunity to transfer risk, are politically attractive, and
may address the governments budget constraints (Webb and Pulle, 2002).
PPPs are potentially advantageous compared to traditional procurement
because by bundling project development and operations and maintenance, they
induce the developer to internalize cost savings at the operations stage that are
brought about by investment at the construction stage. However, internalization
may be undesirable because of developer risk aversion or because of collusion and
manipulation of accounts between the operator and the regulator to the detriment
of the developer. PPP contracts need to be carefully reviewed by independent
authorities that can expose hidden rent backloading (Maskin and Tirole, 2002,
page 17), but this also makes PPPs have higher transaction costs than traditional
unbundled procurement contracts. The DOF should warn the government and the
users of the likely impact of PPPs. The Philippine experience in utilizing BOT in
infrastructure projects is reviewed in Llanto (2010).
This section looks at the broader interpretation of the BOT Law as a vehicle
or legal cover to undertake other modes of public-private partnership (PPP) in
infrastructure.5 The BOT Law was invoked as the PPP Law in practice during the
Benigno Aquino III administration. The same issues identified in the original BOT
Law still need to be dealt with, despite the liberal interpretation of the IRR to R.A.
7718.6 For instance, the competitive bidding procedures remain to be replaced by
unsolicited proposals in major projects such as the NLEX-SLEX Connector Road
Project and the proposal to build an alternative Manila International Airport. One of
the recommendations of Llanto (2010) is for the PPP Law to express the governments
preference for competitive bidding. It argues that unsolicited proposals should not
be part of the approach to infrastructure provision because they create incentives
for nontransparent and dubious back-of-the-room negotiations and cutting deals
between the proponent and potential implementing agency (page 127).
The government indeed created the PPP Center, a unit attached to NEDA,
to handle project identification, preparation of project proposals, review of PPP
contracts, and approve projects and contracts. Likewise, it is tasked to build capacity
with other government agencies for project design, technical analysis, contract
review, and monitoring the implementation of PPP projects; and to coordinate
12 INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
with the PPP units established in various agencies such as in DOTr, DPWH, and
other implementing agencies. In practice, the PPP Center was mired in turf battle
with its mother agency, NEDA, particularly with NEDAs Investment Coordination
Committee (ICC) group.
The Philippine Infrastructure Workshop in March 1, 2006 claimed that public-
private partnership (PPP) would be the only viable option for key infrastructure
development in the short-term, given the fiscal conditions of the Philippine
Government (Llanto, 2010, page 7). In advising the economic rebirth of Sri Lanka
after the civil war, Noble Laureate Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University advised
Sri Lanka not to embrace the PPP route because he asserts that such partnerships
usually entail the government bearing the risk, while the private sector takes the
profits. Typically, the implicit cost of capital obtained in this way is very high.7
At the height of PPP excitement at the beginning of the Benigno Aquino III
government, SMC President Ramon Ang urged the government to drop all state
guarantees for projects under the PPP program (such as the viability gap funding,
VGF, mechanism) and just ensure that the bidding process is fair and square.8
Stiglitz point is dramatized by the resort to the PPP mode by the Department of
Education (DepEd) in its School Infrastructure Project (Phase I and Phase II) at the
time when the government had excess liquidity and had the capacity to borrow at
lower interest rate than the private proponents for project financing. In the end, the
projects turned out to be too expensive.
Another case is the Daang Hari-SLEX Road, which was on the verge of being
completed by DPWH. It was auctioned to the Ayala Group as a message by the
Aquino government of its serious commitment to pursue the PPP strategy. It
was completed way behind schedule with a 17% guaranteed rate of return for the
proponent and a duration of 30 years for a road stretching only 4 kilometers.
The new DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno proposed a hybrid PPP in the
first 100 days of the Duterte Administration to exploit the complementarities
between the government and the private sector. The former builds because it has
the capacity to negotiate right-of-way with private property owners and has access
to concessional or low-interest fund such as the official development assistance
(ODA) and, after completing the project, it has the capacity to bid its operations
and maintenance (O&M) to the private sector, which has a comparative advantage
in efficiently performing these tasks at the operational level. This makes sense if the
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 13
government wants to avoid the lengthy approval process of projects under the PPP
option. Unfortunately, the build, build, and build euphoria under the Golden
Age of Infrastructure pronouncement leaves out any mention of the hybrid PPP
approach.
The influence of big business groups in the Philippines is shown in Table 4,
which presents data on the winning business groups in the bidding of public-private
partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects since 2012. Ayala Group has captured 4
out of 13 PPP projects with a worth of Php 74.05 billion (two of these projects are
joint ventures with the Metro Pacific Group which won one PPP tollway project
worth Php 35.43 billion). The indicated project costs are the amount of respective
winning bids for these projects. The most successful business group in the PPP
infrastructure market is the SMC Group which cornered 3 PPP projects worth
Php 111.44 billion, excluding the Caticlan Airport Project won in 2009. The most
successful PPP bidder, in terms of number of successful awards, is the Megawide
Corporation, which is not affiliated with any local business group. Megawide
cornered 5 of the 13 PPP projects worth Php 48.66 billion, including two public
school infrastructure projects. However, Megawide withdrew from the Php 5.61
billion Philippine Orthopedic Center Modernization Project due to lack of interest
of the implementing agency (Department of Health) to implement the project within
the agreed timelines. However, Megawides PPP projects are mostly short-duration
projects, except for the Southwest Integrated Transport System Project. The Ayala
(except for the Automatic Fare Collection System Project), SMC, and Metro Pacific
PPP projects are concentrated in the long-duration projects. Evidently, the latter
groups dominate the PPP awarded projects in terms of both value and duration.
Looking further at the influence of the business groups in power plant
privatization, Table 5 shows the information on major power plants privatized, the
cost of the project (winning bid), the installed capacity of each project in megawatt
(MW), and the winning business group. In category A: outright privatization of
government-owned power plants, Aboitiz Group and Lopez Group captured most
of hydroelectric and geothermal power plants. In category B: privatization of the
administration of power purchase agreements with independent power producers,
the SMC group, followed by the Aboitiz group, are the clear winners. And category
C: privatization of the concession contract of the monopoly electricity transmission
network, the SM group won this lucrative business.
14 INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
As documented in other countries by Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Khanna and
Yafeh (2007), we have demonstrated that diversified business groups also dominate
in the Philippines, and that business groups benefitted from privatization-related
programs of the government in industries dominated by few major players (e.g.
infrastructure, power, airlines, and telecommunications).
Privatization programs implemented after 1986, but before the implementation
of the PPP program in 2012, produced a more oligopolistic industrial structure
in most industries such as telecommunications (Metro Pacific Group versus
Ayala Group), port terminal services (Razon Group versus Tanco Group), power
distribution (Metro Pacific Group monopoly in Metro Manila, and Aboitiz
Group monopoly in Metro Cebu and Metro Davao), water distribution (Ayala
Group versus Metro Pacific Group in Metro Manila), airlines (Lucio Tan Group
versus Gokongwei Group), shopping mall (SM Group versus Gokongwei Group)
and supermarkets (SM Group versus Lucio Co Group). The rise of oligopolistic
structures in some industries is not necessarily due to government-linked or
government-favored business groups, but it can also be attributed to government
policies that intentionally or unintentionally provided fiscal incentives favorable to
big businesses or implemented regulatory rules that can only be complied by big
businesses. Furthermore, policy-induced entry barriers are reinforced by a lack of
competition policy in the country.9
The Department of Finance (DOF) is bracing for the likelihood of
unprogrammed payments to private companies due to court rulings favoring
private contractors involved in PPP projects that dragged the government to court
to billions of pesos in claims. The Supreme Court ruled last April 19, 2016, and
upheld in a follow-up resolution on June 21, 2016, that the government must pay
Philippine International Air Terminal Company (PIATCO)the contractor to
build the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3 (NAIA 3)USD 326.93
million in just compensation. The government may have to shell out money to
compensate other PPP contractors such as Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI)
and Maynilad Water Company (MWC) which filed separate arbitration cases
against the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) before the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of Arbitration in
Singapore in 2013, claiming that MWSS did not act on their toll rate hike petitions,
as provided for in their 1997 concession agreements with the government. MWSI
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 17
is seeking Php 3.44 billion in foregone revenues, and MWC is claiming Php 79
billion for projected total losses from 2015 to 2037. In addition, the Manila North
Tollways Corporation (MNTC) (operator of North Luzon Expressway or NLEX)
has filed a case against the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) before the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in Geneva, and the Cavite
Infrastructure Corporation (CIC) did a similar move before the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in New York for TRBs inaction on their proposed toll fee hikes
during the Benigno Aquino III AdministrationMNTC claims Php 2.44 billion in
foregone revenues in 2012 and 2014, while CIC seeks to recover Php 877 million
in losses.10
These cases illustrate why the PPP option in infrastructure, especially a badly-
designed PPP project, is an inappropriate strategy for an infrastructure catch-up
strategy because, in these cases, access to basic infrastructure services is priced at
the contractors pass-on costs (cost-plus pricing) and not based on the consumers
willingness and ability to pay (demand-based pricing).
Delays in the rolling out projects for tender and the shortcomings of the BOT/
PPP Law in dealing with competition, regulation, coordination, and operation or
implementation problems still remain (Navarro and Llanto, 2014). For instance,
SMCs PPP project to build the Caticlan airport started in 2009 and remains
unfinished, and its NAIA Expressway Project (targeted to be completed in October
2014) is just half-finished. Finally, the SMC-Citra Skyway Project has targeted the
following milestones, which are consistently missed:
In sum, the PPP option is more expensive and hounded by bureaucratic, legal,
right-of-way, and pricing problems. It would be desirable for a government that
is not financially challenged to build catch-up infrastructure by sticking to its
traditional role of infrastructure provision, while utilizing the managerial expertise
of the private sector to operate and maintain the projects. In other words, the O&M
PPP mode (or its narrower version called management contract) can be utilized
as the preferred and dominant option. This mode is actually similar to what Sec.
Diokno labeled as hybrid PPP.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 19
Conclusions
1
World Bank (1994) points out that inadequate maintenance imposes large and recurrent capital costs.
2
Region IV-A covering the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.
3
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao.
4
MWSSs corporate office (CO) manages the concession fees paid by the private water concessionaires,
while MWSSs regulatory office (RO) regulates the private water concessionaires. Before 1997, MWSS was both an
operator and regulator in the water sector.
5
PPP is defined as an agreement between a government and a private firm under which the private firm
delivers an asset, a service, or both, in return for payments contingent to some extent on the long-term quality or
other characteristics of outputs (World Bank, 2007, page 2).
6
R.A. 7718 identifies only nine (9) possible PPP contractual arrangements such as build-and-transfer (BT),
build-lease-and-transfer (BLT), build-operate-and-transfer (BOT), among others. But the IRR of R.A. 7718
specifies that other schemes or variations may be undertaken as long as they are approved by the President.
7
Joseph Stiglitz, Sri Lankas Rebirth, Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2016, page A12.
8
Gil Cabacungan, Jr., End Project Guarantees, Government Urged, Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 24,
2011, page A1.
9
The Philippine Competition Act (R.A. 10667) was signed into law by Pres. Benigno Aquino III on July 21,
2015. The five Commissioners of the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC) were appointed in January 2016.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. 10667 were issued on June 3, 2016 to take effect on June 18,
2016. However, San Miguel Corporation sold its telecom assets, such as 20 megahertz in the 700 band (used for
4G/LTE), for Php 70 billion to Globe Telecom and PLDT/Smart on May 30, 2016. PCC is undertaking a full review
of this transaction to determine whether it substantially changes the market structure and its potential impact on
public welfare. Globe Telecom and PLDT/Smart are challenging the authority of PCC to review the transaction
on the assumption that PCCs Memorandum Circular 16-001 (issued on February 12, 2016 and which took effect
on February 27, 2016) requires only the concerned parties for mergers and acquisitions worth over Php 1 B and
implemented before the effectivity of the IRR to formally notify the PCC and shall be deemed approved. But
PCC asserts that PCC Memorandum Circulars are transitory in nature and do not dilute the authority of PCC to
conduct substantive review under R.A. 10667, especially where national interest and public policy require it. On
July 12, 2016, PLDT/Smart and Globe sued the PCC at the Court of Appeals for launching a review and sought a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. On August 26, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued
a writ of preliminary injunction which indefinitely stopped the PCC from reviewing the deal between SMC and
PLDT-Globe.
10
Department of Finance, Duterte Administration May Pay for More Sins of the Past, http://www.dof.gov.
ph.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 21
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ADR Institute gratefully acknowledges all those who have extended their
support, cooperation, and commitment in the development of this project. This
publication would not have materialized without their help.
We would also like to thank Prof. Victor Andres Dindo Manhit, President of
the ADR Institute, for his leadership, vision, and guidance in making this endeavor
possible.
Last but not the least, we would like to thank the following for their hard work
and dedication, and for working tirelessly towards the completion of this project:
Deputy Executive Director for Research, Ms. Angelica Mangahas, and Senior
Research Associate, Ms. Weslene Uy, who both served as the editorial staff;
Our design consultant, Ms. Carol Manhit, for the publication lay-out and cover
design;
And the rest of the ADRi team headed by Executive Director, Atty. Katrina
Clemente-Lua, Deputy Executive Director for Programs, Ms. Ma. Claudette
Guevara, Program Associate, Ms. Vanesa Lee, and External Affairs and Social
Media Associate, Ms. Krystyna Dy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR