Twitter and Jihad en
Twitter and Jihad en
Twitter and Jihad en
the Communication
Strategy of ISIS
Edited by Monica Maggioni and Paolo Magri
ISBN 978-88-98014-67-5 (pdf edition)
I edition.
Introduction
by Paolo Magri............................................................................... 5
Part I The Message
1. The Caliphate between History and Myth
Paolo Branca ................................................................................ 13
2. The Centrality of the Enemy in al-Baghdadis Caliphate
Andrea Plebani, Paolo Maggiolini ............................................... 27
Part II Communication Strategies
3. The Islamic State:
Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look
Monica Maggioni ......................................................................... 49
4. IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project
Marco Lombardi ........................................................................... 83
Part III The Objectives of the Propaganda
5. The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe:
The Appeal of the IS Propaganda
to Would Be European Jihadists
Marco Arnaboldi and Lorenzo Vidino........................................ 125
6. The Discourse of ISIS:
Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination
Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee.......................................................... 145
About the Authors ...................................................................... 167
Introduction
Paolo Magri
Executive Vice-President and Director of ISPI
Part I
The Message
1. The Caliphate between
History and Myth
Paolo Branca
Islamic tradition itself celebrates the golden age of the first four
caliphs, who were Rightly Guided (rashidun). On the one hand,
this shows a desire to preserve an idealized picture of those early
days which is, at times, at odds with reality but all the more para-
digmatic. On the other, it is the expression of the awareness of the
subsequent fracture that resulted from an event regarded, in some
way, as irreversible. Theories and diatribes on the figure and the
functions of the supreme chief of the community stem precisely
from this crisis, its various interpretations and those that followed
in later times, often for the purpose of supporting a contemporary
trend rather than reestablishing historical accuracy. Moreover, it
should be noted that throughout history, as is often the case,
practice and theory started to drift apart and the caliphate, that was
officially abolished only at the beginning of the past century, was
in fact flanked or even replaced by authorities in other forms.
These found their legitimacy more in the need to recognize the
roles and functions of those who, in practice, held the power rather
than in the adherence of the latter to qualities and requirements
that were theoretically attributed to those who were supposed to
hold the destiny of the Community in their hands.
From a historical point of view, the destruction of Baghdad by
the Mongols in 1258 was certainly perceived in the Islamic world
as a sort of Apocalypse. In spite of the fact that the title of cali-
phate was handed down first to the Mamluks of Egypt and then
to the Ottomans, no universal caliphate ever followed. This last
glorious and centuries-old historical manifestation, that at least in
its name is a direct reference to the caliphate, never exercised
control over Morocco and on the Eastern front reached no farther
than Iraq, leaving outside of its influence vast areas of the Islamic
world like Iran, the Central-Asian region, continental India and its
islands, and most of Africas Muslim Countries. With the fall of
the Ottoman empire both the sultanate and the caliphate were
eventually abolished de iure, thus putting an end to the centuries-
old history of the caliphate as an institution and immediately
leading to the establishment of modern nation-states where the
The Caliphate between History and Myth 15
never truly came to be (as was the case with the Persians and the
Berbers) and the hegemony of a specific ethnic group within the
ummah itself (as was the case with the Arabs vis--vis the Turks).
Nationalism was also an integral part of the culture of those Euro-
pean countries that progressively started to flex their muscle and
to impose their power on the rest of the world. As such it was
regarded as the most suitable means to follow the Western lead in
the hope of bridging the gap that had widened over the past centu-
ries, and to face it on its own terrain. Thus the concepts and ideals
of nationalism entered the Arab and Muslim world. Paradoxically,
they found a more fertile ground in those countries where the fight
for independence from those who had contributed to introducing
those very concepts and ideals had required greater efforts. The
ambiguity of the relationship with the West, regarded both as a
model and an obstacle, originates in this paradox and was enriched
by other factors over time. Later developments would not be
understandable without considering that the elements of western
culture, no matter how innovative, did not entirely replace tradi-
tional ones nor did they amalgamate with them harmoniously.
Instead, they overlapped creating yet another stratification that
would prove quite precarious.
It should also be considered that, while epic and exciting, the
fight for national independence produced only partial results, and
other questions remained unsolved: nationalism that had brought
colonial occupation to an end had in fact legitimized, again
paradoxically, the territorial entities created by colonial powers,
splitting up what remained of the Ottoman empire according to
national interests. Which instances would be given priority in the
political arena of the newly created states? Perhaps those aiming
to overcome the unnatural fragmentation through a pan-Arabist or
pan-Islamic solution? Or additional autonomy would need to be
granted to groups that had not yet benefited from the battle for
independence (ethnic groups like Berbers and Curds or reli-
gious communities, like the Druze and the Maronites)? In this
way, just like the Islamic movements had had no choice but to
adhere to the nationalist campaigns while rejecting their ideology,
18 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
Religious delegitimation
1 This movement issued from the contrasts between the followers of Ali after he
accepted to end the fight in Siffin, in 657, and to resort to arbitrate in order to settle
the controversy that opposed him to his adversaries. While there is little doubt that
this was the immediate cause of the defection of the kharijiti from Alis camp, the
vicissitudes of this dissident movement are much more complex and revealing of the
deep-set positions that were rightly mentioned by specialists. What is particularly
interesting for the purpose of this publication is that the very name of this move-
ment and its passwords contained seeds of the positions that are still found today
in radical Islam, to which they refers more or less deliberately. The founding
principle was the one contained in the expression There is no rule but that of God
The Caliphate between History and Myth 19
(la hukma illa li-llah) and that one of the verses of the Koran that was most often
quoted was And fight them until there is no unbelief and [until] the religion, all of
it, is for Allah (Koran 8, 39). At the opposite end are those who deemed it prefera-
ble to leave (irja) the judgement on the faith of individuals to God, thus taking the
ideological edge off the controversies in favor of the interest of the Community that
aspired to live in peace and ensuring order under a single authority. This authority
was recognized more in light of the need of its existence than because of the
legitimacy of its origin and the impeccable nature of its behavior.
2 http://myreader.toile-libre.org/uploads/My_53b039f00cb03.pdf.
20 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
Ambiguous Springs
Conclusion
nonbeliever or non-Muslim (kafir, on which the term takfir is based). For Islam, a
declaration of takfir is a serious accusation and entails severe consequences for both
the accuser, who may be in turn accused of the same should his own declaration be
judged to be false, and for the accused, who may be sentenced to death. According
to IS, the question of takfir applies directly to the Muslim world, thus becoming an
instrument to legitimize the killing of Muslim believers accused of blasphemy or of
rejecting the true faith.
28 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
4C. Lister, Profiling the Islamic State, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, no. 13,
November 2014, p. 26.
30 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
8 See A. Plebani, The unfolding legacy of al-Qaida in Iraq, in Idem (ed.), New (and old)
patterns of jihadism: al-Qaida, the Islamic State and beyond, ISPI Studies, October 2014.
9 On this point see J. MacCary, The Anbar Awakening: an Alliance of Incentives,
10 This is the formula from which Dabiq, an IS magazine, takes its name. The
sentence, that opens every issue, is attributed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and sums up
the millenarianist vision of the group whose mission pursues the ultimate goal of the
apocalyptic battle at the end of time.
The Centrality of the Enemy in al-Baghdadis Caliphate 33
Among the first names on ISs black list there are certainly
the Shia communities in the regional area. Generally indicated as
rawafid (those who reject), the Shias soon became the main
target of the operations launched by what was then al-Qaeda in
Iraq because of their positions considered diametrically opposed to
those of orthodox Sunni Islam. The massacres perpetrated by al-
Zarqawis fighters against the Shia community in Iraq were mostly
based on tactical rather than theological considerations. However,
they contributed significantly to the emergence of a sectarian drift
that, while present and historically rooted in the Middle-Eastern
scenario and connected to precise geopolitical dynamics11, was
thus reawakened and amplified. The groups position did not
coincide with that of the mainstream jihadist galaxy, which may
not have particularly appreciated the Shia community as such but
that repeatedly voiced harsh criticism of the groups conduct12.
Similar considerations mainly limited to the theological plane
also accompany the fight undertaken by IS against the Sufis and
their sanctuaries. This position is not exclusive to the movement
founded by al-Zarqawi and adopts a vision of the world guided by
a dichotomy whereby the Sufis are regarded as heterodox, an
unmistakable expression of the contamination to which the Islamic
faith had been exposed for centuries.
However, the self-styled caliphate does not devote its attention
solely to those forms of Islam that are traditionally accused of
being heterodox, but includes also a whole series of actors that,
while belonging to the Sunni Islamic world, do not recognize al-
Baghdadis authority. A doctrinal position that has led many
11In this instance, there is a clear reference to the geopolitical competition triggered
by what King Abdullah II of Jordan had at the time indicated as the Shia crescent,
meaning the growing political weight of Iran in the early 2000s. This theory is also
supported by the fact that the term rafida was often accompanied or replaced by
Persian-Safavid (safawi), thus anchoring the fight against the Shia enemy not only on
the religious and doctrinal plan, but also to geopolitics. Cf. V. Nasr, The Shia revival:
how conflicts within Islam will shape the future, W. W. Norton & Co, 2007.
12 Cf. S. Brooke, The Preacher and the Jihadi, in H. Fradkin, H. Haqqani, E. Brown
(eds.), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute Publications, vol. 2, 2005.
34 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
13 It is not easy to briefly explain the meaning of kharijite since this term has charac-
terized the whole history of Islam, referring to forms of religious and political
dissidence and attitudes defined by official powers as heretic vis--vis the Sunni
orthodoxy. In short, the use of this term aims to underscore the ambition of jihadist
movements to achieve the violent and militant overturn of the established religious
power and authorities, regarded as corrupt and rejecting the true principles con-
tained in the sources.
14 Cf. A. Plebani, (2014).
The Centrality of the Enemy in al-Baghdadis Caliphate 35
Arab Republic, Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, 14 November 2014, pp. 2-5.
20 http://www.doualia.com/2014/08/18/
The Centrality of the Enemy in al-Baghdadis Caliphate 37
21http://www.releaseinternational.org/iraq-ultimatum-to-mosul-christians-leave-by-
noon-or-be-killed/.
38 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
Thus the Yazidis became the ideal loot for IS, both in terms
of propaganda (the subjects on which to test and exercise the
heaviest bulk of violence, to be showcased on all available media)
and in the more material sense, with the enslavement of women
and children. The mainly symbolic reason for this massacre is
further confirmed by ISs decision to extend the battlefront to the
area of Jebel Sinjar (where the Yazidis reside) which holds no
particular strategic or operational value. This behavior can be
explained only by referring to the dynamics outlined above: the
jihadist leaders were not interested in the territories occupied by
the Yazidis or their possessions, but aimed to turn them into the
ideal sacrificial lamb to cement the unity of the composite front
put together by al-Baghdadi. It is distressing to read in the pages
of Dabiq22 that IS is actually feigning a positivist approach,
inviting the reader to become acquainted with this de-humanized
being, the Yazidi as mushrik. A plethora of selected sources and
opinions points in this direction without any specific purpose
except for an all-out effort to justify and rationalize the justness of
their murder, enslavement and humiliation. Dehumanized and
humiliated, the victims of IS become the ultimate symbols, exam-
ples of its unwavering and steadfast determination to establish a
new order that is pure and uniform, against all differences and
resistances. The enemy, stripped bare and helpless, serves a clear
purpose for Dawla al-Islamiyya, presenting a simplified interpre-
tation of religious tradition, shifting attention from the theoretical
plan to the suffering of the living flesh. At the same time this
operation also contributed to the psychological warfare that IS
engages in with no holds barred across all media platforms, show-
ing its strength, reifying as noted earlier the violence that it
delivers, and ritualizing the death and suffering of individuals and
groups alike.
23 The world taghut (literally rebel or cross the boundaries) denotes who exceed
their limits, imposing their rebellion against the will of God upon others. According-
ly, jihadist movements employ this word to address contemporary Arab leaders
considered morally corrupted tyrants.
24 B. Fishman, After Zarqawi: the dilemmas and future of Al Qaeda in Iraq, The
25 Ibidem, p. 23.
26 Islamic State Report, Issue 3, Shaban 1435, p. 1.
42 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
27 O. Holmes, S. al-Khalidi, Islamic State executed 700 people from Syrian tribe:
monitoring group, Reuters, 16 August 2014.
28 Islamic State Report, Issue 4, Shaban 1435, p. 2.
29 Dabiq, no. 5, 1436 Muharram, p. 12.
The Centrality of the Enemy in al-Baghdadis Caliphate 43
Conclusion
30 While IS has not introduced any concrete innovation in the strategy for the
reestablishment of the caliphate (al-khilafa), it clearly illustrated this path in the first
44 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
issue of Dabiq. The 5 stages or required phases would be: hijra (migration strategic
detachment from a hostile territory towards an area where the central authority is
weak); jamaa (congregation and training of new recruits); destabilizing the taghut
(creating chaos and bringing down the tyrannical regime); tamkin (replacing disorder
by creating a new state); khilafa (caliphate). Dabiq, no. 1, 1435 Ramadan, p. 40.
The Centrality of the Enemy in al-Baghdadis Caliphate 45
31 T.H. Eriksen, Ethnic identity, national identity and intergroup conflict: The significance of
personal experiences, in R.D. Ashmore, L.J. Jussim, D. Wilder (eds.), Social identity,
intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 63.
32 There is no life without jihad and there is no jihad without hijrah, Dabiq, no. 3,
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOORW63ioY0.
50 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i357G1HuFcI.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 51
5 European jihadists, It aint half hot here, mum. Why and how Westerners go to
fight in Syria and Iraq, The Economist, 30 August 2014.
54 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
Mosul, the city in Northern Iraq where the caliphate was declared,
did not appear in western newspapers and Italian ones in particu-
lar for years.
The second largest city in Iraq showed up in a few sporadic
lines in the news about the persecutions against Christians in the
Nineveh province or in the case of spectacular actions such as
when prisons were attacked to set the prisoners free.
Iraq has become a sort of black hole in the narration of the
world and its stories. Even in 2011, when the Syrian question
broke out, most media treated it as a different problem, separated
from the Iraqi one. Apparently it did not matter that the two States
share a 605 km (375 miles) border; that jihadists have been cross-
ing it continuously, first toward Iraq (since the very beginning of
the U.S. war in 2003) and in recent years in the opposite direction,
toward Syria; that the corridors of oils black market are indisput-
ably important; that hints have been made repeatedly at sinister
training camps for hard-to-identify rebels. None of this apparently
mattered, and the information was disregarded.
The media, who forget yesterday and focus on today, have be-
come an ideal terrain where jihadist story-telling can grow, con-
solidate and find its own codes undisturbed: some codes are
original, others use the same signs of western codes, but complete-
ly opposite meanings.
56 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
6 Bin Ladin acknowledges al-Zarqawi and calls for a boycott of elections in Iraq,
aljazeera.net [in Arabic], 27 December 2004,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=101846; Bin Ladin
praises al-Zarqawi and acknowledges his leadership of al-Qaida in Iraq,
aljazeera.net [in Arabic], 27 December 2004,
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=101852; an audio file
with this recording is available on al-Jazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/2004/12/27/1_517667_1_13.wma.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 57
9The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, International Crisis Group,
Middle East Report, no. 52, 27 February 2006.
60 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
10 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xaaht7_the-sniper-of-baghdad_lifestyle.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 61
11 http://www.archive.org/download/Labayk-ya-osamah/meduim-quality.ram.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 63
12 https://archive.org/details/moga_graveyard_au.
64 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
13 www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyMViLsIQxM.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 65
14 www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vcew3qmidRI.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 67
Cantlie operation had his character utter words that sound even
more sinister at a time when the White House is again considering
the possibility of bringing the Marines back to Iraq boots on the
ground to free Mosul, despite all previous announcements. The
Briton reminds us that ISs fighters are ready for battle and ex-
plains that Americans would better not flatter themselves, because
no surgical operation will earn them success on the ground, and
they will need to get their hands dirty. And he adds: this is a win-
win situation for the IS.
In his long speech Cantlie mentions newspapers, articles, edito-
rials from the previous weeks. Only his orange suit gives away his
condition.
Then, when John Cantlie appeared in besieged Kobane16 on 28
October, to show us the other side of the truth, it became really
difficult to remember that he was a hostage, not a reporter on the
ISs side. This time, the video begins with the new jingle dedicat-
ed to Inside reports. The ISs representation of the truth must be
based on verifiable and convincing information. That is why the
video starts with an aerial view, which the caption explains was
recorded by a drone of the IS army. Thirty-four seconds into the
video, Cantlie the reporter appears on screen against the back-
ground of moving images, an effect that is not that simple to
create. He is no longer wearing orange: in fact, he is all dressed in
black as the majority of the IS fighters are, when they are not
wearing their battledress. Cantlies speech is a challenge to the
U.S. strategy, it is a smirk against Kerrys statements. He looks
much calmer, his beard looks longer and, more importantly, his
tale shows even more accurate directing. Though filming images
outdoors in a city at war, the film director relies again on two
cameras. The shooting is slow and accurate. There is no sign of
haste. Cantlie refutes information coming from the Kurdish front
reporting fierce battles. He says, the situation is calm, there are
few gunshots, as you can hear and in closing he reminds us that
15 www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSp8_IAnc48.
16 www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQSwGBkGb6o.
68 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
17 www.youtube.com/watch?v=RN3ktXbLzlY.
18 www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSp8_IAnc48.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 69
19 www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w_WkSq2Mcs.
72 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
men are waiting for the armies of Rome, the crusaders: the same
armies mentioned in hadith 692420, those coming to Dabiq, which
is the name of the trendiest magazine of the IS.
This is the very symbolic code the Islamic State has gotten us
used to. Nothing is left to chance. A century-old name used for a
glossy magazine; a message linked to the Prophets actions and
mediated by history and tradition is used as a tool to package an
extraordinarily contemporary media content. The result must give
us pause.
As we are about to see in the analysis of each issue, another
fundamental element is that very often the magazine refers to
events that took place only a few days earlier. This means that
Dabiq is neither amateurish nor improvised: there is a group of
editors choosing the contents of each issue, writing them in a
journalist-like way, impeccably arranging the lay-out and releas-
ing them in several languages. All this over just a few days.
Analyzed individually, the titles of the issues released since last
June are evocative and aim at spreading a very precise message,
which can both engage the reader and stimulate curiosity, thus
enlarging the potential readership. Clearly, Dabiq targets readers
who are interested in political Islam, for sure, but without neces-
sarily already being convinced jihadists. Step by step, these read-
ers are very skillfully explained about the caliphates reasons,
sense and projects. This is an explosive mixture for those already
pursuing the path of jihad, and an inspiring message for the non-
jihadists who might be in doubt.
Dabiqs first issue appeared on 5 July 2014, a month after Mo-
sul was conquered. The title on the cover reads: The return of the
caliphate. It is a political issue, which very carefully illustrates
the Islamic states program. In order to attract others, it explains
that caliph al-Baghdadis project is a successful one, that his
20Hadith 6924: Abu Huraira reported Allahs Messenger (may peace be upon him)
as saying: The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at al-Amaq
or in Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth at
that time will come from Medina (to counteract them). When they will arrange
themselves in ranks, the Romans would say: Do not stand between us and those
(Muslims) who took prisoners from amongst us. Let us fight with them.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 73
control over the territory is already strong and many tribes have
already joined in. The writers of the articles know that the issues at
stake are high: the IS is launching an attack against all other
jihadist groups at global level (first and foremost, al-Qaeda). With
this issue of Dabiq the Islamic State wants to spread the message
that the caliphates establishment is correct both from a political
and a doctrinal point of view, and that al-Baghdadi and his follow-
ers are better suited than others to fight their jihad, which they
discuss in triumphant tones.
Each issue of Dabiq deserves a thorough analysis. The second
was released on 27 July 2014 and it was titled The Flood. The
third appeared in October and dealt with the call to migration,
hijra, comparing the journey of those choosing to move to the
Islamic State to the journey of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina.
But it is the front cover of the fourth issue, published on 22 Octo-
ber, that drained the color from the faces of many Western securi-
ty agencies. A photoshopped picture portrayed a caliphate black
flag flying atop the obelisk in St. Peters Square. The cover story
was entitled The failed crusade and described the failing of all
military operations of the coalition forces against the IS.
Dabiqs fifth issue was released on 22 November 2014 with a
programmatic title: Remaining and Expanding. Its political
reasoning is an ideal continuation of the first issue: the goal is to
become the main reference for those who are leading the holy
war, but it is not limited to them. The goal is to be recognized as
the caliphate by all qaedist groups all over the world. The idea is
to become the political and religious entity of reference associated
with a corresponding territory. This same vision was confirmed by
several messages on the web, the social networks and official
information websites but, significantly, the Central Organization
felt the need to elaborate on it in its very fancy, very global maga-
zine.
In Dabiqs sixth issue, the cover story is about a report on al-
Qaeda in Waziristan. In this very long and interesting article a
Jordanian mujaheddin tells the story of his trip through Afghani-
stan and the tribal area between Pakistan and Afghanistan and his
74 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
search for the ideal place where to fight the jihad. What is particu-
larly interesting, however, is the clearly diverging view of some
qaedist groups compared to the caliphates vision as the day-to-
day narration of events unfolds. Besides any philosophical and
religious consideration, the report confirms the caliphates criti-
cism against traditional al-Qaeda positions especially at doctri-
nal and operating level and it provides valuable peeks into the
life of a contemporary jihadist. It is also an engaging tale of a
great adventure, an irresistible element for youth looking for
heroic role models.
In light of all this it is worth taking a moment to consider the
style used by the author and the translator. The long text includes
tens of terms connected to the jihad that are not simply translated
into English, but systematically quoted in Arabic and then trans-
lated. This is a precise educational method, revealing the intention
to help the readers to become acquainted with jihadist terms
even if their familiarity with Arabic is limited. It is a perfect
product to recruit foreign fighters, where world-scale proselytism
is clearly at work.
Issue 6 is built around two other key elements: the umpteenth
report by John Cantlie, who has turned into the Islamic States
media story-teller (until when?, one could wonder), and the open-
ing article dedicated to the attacks in a caf in Sydney. The most
interesting aspect lies the fact that the whole article aims at show-
ing how western media smeared the character of Islamic State
mujaheddin Haron Monis, portraying him negatively for the sole
purpose of discrediting him. This goes back to the media war, the
information battle which the ISs men have decided to fight sys-
tematically. The analysis of the action in Sidney and the criticism
against western media goes hand in hand with Cantlies counter-
tale in Kobane, Mosul and Aleppo.
And it does not end here. The juiciest elements of the narration
are highlighted in the Islamic States multimedia communication
platform: just like in western media, scoops need to reach as many
readers and viewers as possible. That is why Dabiqs issue 6
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 75
21 https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=q73BYnrCMis.
The Islamic State: Not That Surprising, If You Know Where To Look 77
22 http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/?p=452.
78 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
to think that the head of the organization dealing with social media
and multimedia production is Ahmad Abu Samra, among others.
He grew up in Stoughton, Massachusetts, and was an excellent
student and a genius at university. He became a great expert in
communication and IT, and was employed by a U.S. telecommu-
nication company. There, Abu Samra learnt the marketing rules he
is thought to be applying in the promotion of the IS brand. Alleg-
edly, he is the bright mind behind the idea of building an ad hoc
narration for the caliphates endeavors, translating them into a
filmed series halfway between an action movie and a videogame,
thus turning web supporters into virtual fighters. The result is a
series of low-cost, adrenaline-filled, epic moments and the sense
of a mission to reestablish justice, which becomes explosive
material in the recruiting campaign aimed at youth who are sensi-
tive to the jihads appeal.
According to the latest information, the 34-year-old lives in
Syria, in the Aleppo area, and he is supposed to be responsible for
the launch of the Dawn of Glad Tidings app that can be down-
loaded from the Google Play store to spread news and notifica-
tions in order to enlarge the media machine of the Islamic State
and make it look even more sophisticated in terms of technical
infrastructure.
Various divisions within the IS deal with social media: the of-
ficial account releases all videos, while provincial accounts release
local news. Single mujaheddins accounts allow them to keep
telling their everyday life and experience on the ground, says
Abu Bakr al-Janabi23, an Islamic supporter who often translates
and spreads the groups messages.
Behind all this, there are various organizations for the centrali-
zation and spreading of messages. The main one is al-Furqan
Media, which keeps posting documents on epic battles and the
idyllic caliphate world, while Fursan al-Balagh Media deals with
translations to spread the message globally. Together, they set up a
Conclusion
In recent years, especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the
subsequent attacks in Europe, researchers have tried to pin down
the new features of international terrorism.
Studies on radicalization processes, on the other hand, are
more recent. These focus on the mechanisms through which
individuals change their attitudes and embrace a potentially devi-
ant behavior based on a radical or extremist ideology. The end
result of these mechanisms is the individuals recruitment to join
organizations or extremist groups that use violence to achieve their
social and political goals or to destabilize the context where they
operate. Although radicalism cannot be considered a synonym for
terrorism, the process that pushes people to embrace radical
1 A summary table, with the titles and publication dates of the analyzed contents,
can be found at the end of the chapter.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 85
2Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941-1989) was a Palestinian Sunni theologian and master
and the mentor of Osama bin Laden. He was an important inspiration, guide and
even organizer of the fighting jihad and invited all Muslim to join forces against the
enemy to reclaim the lands of Islam and establish the caliphate.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 87
world, we will bring the war to them in the real world on the
ground.
And so on and so forth. These messages were posted in response
to the decision by Twitter to suspend several accounts that dissem-
inated IS-related materials from the battlefield. But this measure
failed: the suspended accounts resurface under slightly different
names and are always connected to users in the U.S., Canada,
Switzerland, The Netherlands, etc. The so-called foreign fighters
are well positioned also in this virtual war. However, the aware-
ness that external observers can access social media led to the
announcement, at the beginning of 2015, that a dedicated messag-
ing platform would soon be launched to protect the privacy of
users.
As we know, the use of these tools was popular long before the
massive intervention of IS: these are the instruments of the digital
generation, they are highly pervasive, they allow people to be
constantly connected and are intimately familiar to the young
people who are recruited.
While it is clear that IS has not used social media in an innova-
tive way, it has managed to include them in a wider scheme: they
are part of the overall media strategy that IS has developed giving
proof of remarkable competence. In the hands of IS, social media
have become story telling instruments, ensuring high circulation
in virtual places where fighters share their experiences from the
battlefield. Recently, by avoiding posts that contain excessively
crude images that may be censored by providers, these stories
from the front have legitimately remained online. Their enthralling
and subjective narratives have further promoted viral emulation
which lies at the heart of the recruitment process.
one that the jihad has long been considering (the use of poison to
contaminate water and food). More significantly, however, it is a
dangerously viral video that encourages imitation among dissatis-
fied youngsters living in the banlieues, who may act locally as
lone wolves (lone fighters who have now become zombies3),
the greatest threat to daily life in the West.
Finally, the video shows impeccable direction and perfect tim-
ing. The attack against France appeared at exactly the right politi-
cal moment: on the same day when What are you waiting for
went online, France decided to step up its military effort in the war
against IS.
Foley is not the first reporter murdered by the jihad. Daniel Pearl,
correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, was beheaded on 1
February 2012. Sadly, the list does not stop here.
The pace is impressive and the sequence of media products
persistently shows the same ritual: the prisoner is kneeling, wear-
ing the orange jumpsuit of Guantanamo inmates. After reciting the
curses against the West imposed by the caliphate, he is beheaded
with a knife. The throat cutting ritual is willingly used and pro-
moted as a distinctive mark of the caliphate. It shows continuity
with the project of al-Zarqawi, but such brutality is reserved to the
kuffar alone, thus making the threat even stronger. Let us remem-
ber, for instance, that on 9 February 2015 an IS citizen accused
of sorcery was beheaded with an axe and not with a knife. Again,
the diversification of the instruments of death has a significant
symbolic and communication impact.
3 Zombies: skilled individuals who have been trained to fight. They gather in semi-
structured and flexible networks, characterized also by sentimental and soft ties (for
instance, the survivors of the attack against Charlie Hebdo in Paris who come from
the same battlefield). They take action for internal or external reasons. (Note:
Dabiq, the IS magazine, had indicated the director of Charlie as a target!).
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 91
and potentially not effective by its own nature and consider the
following points instead:
The pilot was killed on 3 January; rumors about his death had
already been circulating on Twitter and other information had
been gathered. An accurate reading of the sequence (starting
from the picture shown by Kenji Goto, with the pilot wearing
the orange jumpsuit, and finally the video with the execution in
the cage) clearly shows the evolution of his imprisonment and
the frequency of the use of the cage where he ended his days;
It can be assumed that the Jordanians were already aware of the
pilots death, which had taken place before the release of the
video, considering how they handled ISs ransom request (at
the same time as Kenji Gotos);
Terrorists Sajida al-Rishawi and al-Karbouly, whose release IS
had demanded, were immediately executed;
Right from the start, it is safe to assume that this was the only
epilogue IS was expecting to reach. The pretense could not last
until the conclusion of the hypothetical exchange;
The week after the pilots capture, IS launched a Twitter
hashtag about Tips to kill a Jordanian pilot pig, and a second
hashtag that read We all want to slaughter Moaz: it was a
sort of online poll to decide how to kill the pilot. Suggestions
included beheading, burning him alive, and crushing him with
a bulldozer. The tweets were retweeted thousands of times;
Fragments of the full video (22 minutes) of the pilots death
have been circulating on Twitter, along with some stills, since
3 February;
Some of these fragments can be considered as autonomous
videos, for instance:
o The sequence that shows the pilots death, built with a
dramatic crescendo using mixed images of the effects of
air strikes, flying pilots, interviews with the prisoner and
finally al-Kasaesbeh who moves closer to the cage in an
area full of debris. A handful of IS men watch on standing
in a theatrical pose: their positions have been carefully
thought out, and what they wear a camouflage suit and
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 95
sites that showed the video in full. The different attitudes have
stirred up a debate on whether or not (and how) to disseminate
communications from IS on Western media. This marks the
emergence of the issue of media responsibility.
These are the aspects that are worth reflecting on. Once again, the
ISs communication strategy prevails: it is clear that the exchange
of prisoners was never an option, but the new way of handling
communication allowed IS to change the usual format of behead-
ings (Kenji Gotos videos with the picture of his friend and the
Jordanian pilot) and close the case with a disruptive, burning
video, that was held up for one month before being released.
Everything had been planned since the beginning in order to
change the perspective that the Western public was beginning to
get used to, drag viewers into the empathic sharing of a horrific
event and set the trap for Western media that felt compelled to
report the news.
The IS director is like a cat playing with a mouse: after allow-
ing the prey to catch its breath, it is hit with the deadliest of blows.
This type of communication also sends a direct message to Jor-
dan, where the opposition to IS is not to be taken for granted many
groups of society and 3,000-4,000 men are already fighting with
the jihadists. It is also a threat to the caliphates neighboring
countries a target for IS expansion and consolidation. Finally, it
clearly shows the identity of possible targets and the fate that
awaits the soldiers of the coalition.
The video also seems to add something to the complex com-
munication strategy of the caliphate, which is trying to present
itself as a state and, with these images, provokes an instinctive
reaction to brutality. A second objective emerges, in addition to
that of institutionalizing IS. We may call it double radicalization,
as will be explained in the conclusion. If we look at the sequence
of communications on the first five beheadings, the Kassig video
in mid-November, the two Japanese prisoners videos and the
killing of the Jordanian pilot, the objective appears clearly and
deliberately. The first five videos follow the same script, both in
the announcements and in the execution, and have a strong impact,
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 97
5 After the drafting of these notes, the first, albeit clumsy, attempt to burn a mosque
was reported: The Islamic Cultural Center in Massa Lombarda was targeted on the
night between Wednesday and Thursday (4-5 February 2015). At around 4.30 a fire
started and burnt the window-sill of the building on the corner of via Marchetti and
via Quadri. An improvised device made of rags soaked in flammable liquid was
thrown at the mosque. Flames damaged the window, the frames and several prayer
rugs inside. The smoke blackened the walls of the building.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 99
of knowing that each new episode is proof that the presenter is still
alive.
Uncertainty grows after the reportage from Aleppo which inev-
itably requires a change in format and questions the role of the
journalist (a role that he maybe resuming for the caliphates an-
nounced TV channel, KhilafaLive). The topics correspond to the
critical points on the public and political agenda of the countries
that fight against IS. There is no blood, no violence, every concept
is clearly argued, the message is we can talk about this.
In the second Cantlie documentary series, the topics presented
are enriched by tales of ordinary daily life in the caliphate. This
creates even greater dissonance with the representations found in
the Western media. The target audience is more informed than the
average, more interested in what happens in the lands of the cali-
phate and in the consequences of the possible reactions of the
West. It is also potentially reactive and participates in the Western
debate.
The series, that can be described only briefly, are carefully
constructed by someone who is intimately familiar with both the
IS communication strategies and the target audience. Once again,
nothing is left to chance when it comes to the ISs use of media as
instruments of war that are as effective as an AK47 rifle. The
complex planning of the ISs communication strategy is also clear
in the article signed by Cantlie himself that appeared in issue 4 of
the IS magazine Dabiq, on 22 October 2014, in which he ex-
plains the meaning of his reportages.
One of the foul words used in recent studies on new media and
their use is gamification. The concept, introduced in 2010, is very
interesting: it expresses the idea that daily behaviors, often boring
and mandatory, can be influenced and guided by a fun activity or
game, which is voluntary and pleasant by nature. Somehow,
gamification is a communication facilitator that helps accepting
such routines.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 101
6 A teaser trailer is a short promotional video usually focusing on one single se-
quence.
7 Traditional Islamic vocal music, widely used in the jihad.
104 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
8 For further information on Dabiq, see the chapter 3 by Monica Maggioni in this
publication.
9 Hadith 6924: The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at al-
Amaq or in Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the
earth at that time will come from Medina (to counteract them) They will then
fight and a third (part) of the army would run away, whom Allah will never forgive.
A third (part of the army) which would be constituted of excellent martyrs in Allahs
eye would be killed and the third who would never be put to trial would win and
they would be conquerors of Constantinople.
106 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
10 On 15 and 16 December 2014 the Lindt coffee shop in Sidney was attacked by
Haron Monis. The attack ended with the death of the terrorist and two of about
thirty hostages.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 107
The Islamic State has imprisoned and later beheaded some jour-
nalists and activists from Western non-Muslim lands, many who
later turned out to be spies or ex-army soldiers. However, late-
ly (end of 2014) the Islamic State has changed its position and is
being a lot more transparent with journalists. It is allowing them
the right to travel in the Islamic State and see the services it is
providing for the people.
Transparency has become a strategic cornerstone: although
they reveal nothing new, the contents are reorganized to reflect the
caliphates view, and are aimed at a wider Western audience and
particularly new recruits. Cantlies work should be considered in
this context, as well as German journalist Todenhoefers, whose
opinions even critical ones are recontextualized in the book as
an example of transparency, which, according to the clever and
correct interpretation of the Islamist strategy is a rewarding
approach.
On this point, the book contains an interesting section that is
found at page 80-81, under the title The Islamic State Online: It is
surprising to notice that the Islamic State does not have a website
of its own. Its entire network of propaganda consists of the follow-
ing media types:
Professionally edited videos. (i.e. al-Furqan, al-Hayat)
Social media accounts (i.e. on Twitter)
E-books and eMagazines. (i.e. Dabiq magazine)
The Islamic States online world is similar to its practical real life
world, in that everything is decentralized. Example: In real life,
nobody knows where Khalifah Ibrahim (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) is
located, similarly no-one has one centralized website they can visit
to find the Islamic State and its content. This is really important
because by hiding Khalifah Ibrahims location, no-one can easily
assassinate him. Similarly, by not having a website, no-one can
hack it and claim an online victory. The Islamic States content
(videos, e-books, social media accounts) are scattered all around
the Internet. Just like the different provinces of the Islamic State
are scattered in different locations. Each province has its own
responsibility in creating its own videos and social media accounts
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 111
11 The term Daish (al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham) is the Arabic acronym for
Isis (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant); it was used in April 2013 by Iranian
media and later adopted by anti-IS Syrian fighters. Also, in Arabic Daish sounds
like Daes, which means he who crushes something under his feet and also like
Dahes, which means he who sows discord.
12 Sajida al-Rishawi was sentenced to death for her role in the terrorist attacks in
Amman in 2005, where 60 people died. Al-Karbouly, an al-Qaeda fighter, had been
on death row since 2008 for planning terrorist attacks against Jordanian citizens in
Iraq.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 113
news agency), use the word revenge. Considering that both had
been tried by the legitimate court of a sovereign state, their refer-
ence should have been limited to the execution of the sentence,
as that is what it was. In contrast, journalists insisted on the emo-
tional side of the event, thus playing the game of the IS communi-
cation strategy. Counter-narrative actions must necessarily involve
the whole media system, which should be aware of the responsi-
bilities that stem from a situation where each and every communi-
cation is part of a strategic game of conflict where everyone is
involved, media included. The same comments apply to most of
the IS communications that are indiscriminately reported in the
media, with no consideration for effects and responsibilities. This
situation that is passed off as freedom of expression is actually a
dangerous and irresponsible game in the context of the new forms
of hybrid war.
In the so-called hybrid war, where actors and battlefields are
most diverse, communication plays a central role, which goes far
beyond traditional psychological warfare operations. At the end
of January 2015 the announcement was made that the British army
would soon create a specialist brigade for online fighting. It is
the 77th Brigade, already identified as the Twitter Troops. As of
1 April, their task will be to fight the pervasive presence of IS,
especially on social media. It is an important step in military
enforcement strategies: for the first time, specific kinetic activities
in the virtual world are formally launched (in this case, non-
conventional, non-lethal combat actions), with explicit objectives.
It will be interesting to see if this new approach can be shared with
other units which may be created in other allied countries.
Along the same lines, after the attack against Charlie Hebdo
(Paris, 7 January 2015), Anonymous stepped in. This is a global
network of hacktivists who have declared war on IS and are
determined to fight it in cyber space13 with operation #OpCharlie-
13 The Anonymous statement of 10 January 2015 reads: People of the world, the
time is serious. On 7 January 2015, freedom of speech was hit. Terrorists broke into
the offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine and killed several cartoon artists, journalists
and two policemen. Disgusted and shocked, we cannot fall to our knees. It is our
114 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
duty to react. We are all affected by the death of Cabu, Charb, Tignous and Wolin-
ski, talented artists who were massacred for their opinions and for the freedom of
the press... Charlie Hebdo, historical figure of satirical journalism, was targeted by
coward killers. Anonymous has always fought for the freedom of expression and
press. We will never stop. Anonymous must remind every citizen that the freedom
of the press is one of the fundamental principles of democracy. It is everybodys
responsibility to defend it. We have always fought for the freedom of expression.
We will not stop now. Any attack against the freedom of expression is an attack
against Anonymous. We do not allow it. All companies and organizations connected
to these terrorist attacks should expect a massive reaction by Anonymous. We will
track you down. We will find you and we will never stop. We are Anonymous. We
are legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 115
Promoting viral
Social media Potential supporters, Radicalization, Social
behaviors and
(FB, Twitter, etc.) Islamist radicals, etc. recruitment platforms
imitation, story telling
Enemies of the Showing the
Communication of Terrorizing and brutality of death,
caliphate wide Video
horror (beheadings) threatening promoting
Western audience
emotional reactions
Promoting the Creating
Counter-
debate on the IS, counter-narratives:
information Informed and
focusing on the recontextualization
(Cantlie: Lend Me interested Video
critical points on of contents from
Your Ears and Western audience
the Western public the point of view of
reportages)
agenda IS
Creating
counter-narratives:
Normalization: recontextualization
Information Families of (potential)
spreading news of contents from
(Islamic State News supporters, Western-
that emphasize the the point of view of Pdf
and various ers who are critical of
normality of daily IS; promotion of
brochures) actions against IS
life in the caliphate the normality of
daily life in the
caliphate
IS members, Explaining and
especially Using a traditional
Magazines, e-books providing political,
foreign fighters, and medium and Pdf
(Dabiq, Inspire, etc.) theological and
competent multiple strategies
tactical guidelines
Western audience
Gamification Using games as a
Digital youth, Socializing with the tool for socializa- Online
(Grand Theft Auto:
not just Islamists caliphate and IS tion and normaliza- game
Salil al- Sawarim)
tion
Dissemination of all topics already raised by IS communica-
Convergence
tion activities, targeting a wide public; individuals will then
(KhilafaLive, Web TV
find their own niche areas in terms of language
gamification,)
and time.
Conclusion
are used to, aimed at recruiting people. On the other hand, howev-
er, it fuels indignation by exasperating and surprising another
audience (the European public) and fostering a violent reaction
against a generalized enemy, a beast (the most common com-
ment that appeared in the media) that is specifically characterized
by the fact of being Muslim.
The result is a second radicalization involving those members
of the European and Western population who are led to react. The
first signs of this phenomenon are the following:
Between 4 and 5 February a clumsy attempt to burn the
Islamic Cultural Center in Massa Lombarda was made: At
around 4.30 a fire started and burnt the window-sill of the
building on the corner of via Marchetti and via Quadri. An im-
provised device made of rags soaked in flammable liquid was
thrown at the mosque. Flames damaged the window, the
frames and several prayer rugs inside. The smoke blackened
the walls of the building;
A growing sense of fear and uneasiness is spreading, particu-
larly among younger people, which tends to turn into violence.
Although no statistical data are available, in January the num-
ber of worried parents whose children (usually aged 14-20) are
afraid when they meet someone who speaks Arabic and ask (or
say) what they can do to go and fight against IS, was on the
rise;
Political debate within individual European countries is becom-
ing inevitably radicalized. This translates into stances that con-
tain elements of xenophobia and racism. As a result, any action
against the caliphate becomes more difficult (any measure
wishing to be effective requires a joint effort);
The statements of traditionally influential imams - such as
Ahmed al-Tayeb (4 February 2015) from the University of Al-
Azhar in Cairo, the most prestigious center for the teaching of
Sunni Islam- have proved rather ineffective. After the Jordani-
an pilot was killed he condemned the terrorist act and stated
that the Koran-prescribed punishment should be asked for
these aggressors who fight God and his Prophet: death, cruci-
120 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
fixion or the amputation of their hands and feet but the ef-
fect was nil, as traditional Islam no longer carries a significant
influence on IS. This showed the obvious weakness that al-
Tayeb and other religious leaders now suffer in the world of
radical Islam, and at the same time engaged them in the poten-
tial emerging conflicts in the West, as defenders of Islam. IS is
effectively impairing their power of representation14.
Both strategies aim at both establishing the caliphate as the
leader of the Islamist world which is fragmented into a multitude
of discordant groups looking for a new commander-in-chief
and at threatening Europe (identified as the weak plurality of the
West), while establishing the legitimacy and supremacy of IS in its
destabilization.
If, as is likely, this also relates to the difficulties that the cali-
phate is experiencing in its expansion and to its ability to exploit
the vulnerabilities of its opponents who constantly fall into the
traps laid by IS we can soon expect an exacerbation of the
conflict at all levels of the hybrid war.
After all, a radical clash between Islam and the rest would on-
ly play to the advantage of IS.
Given the specificities of the media conflict, responses must be
based on the development of specific counter-strategies in the
context of the hybridization of the conflict, where actors and tools
blend and communication is a real and virtual battlefield at the
same time.
Also, we need answers to more general issues such as the im-
possibility to govern the Web, given the absence of legal instru-
ments that define the freedom of action of each individual accord-
according to shared rules; the responsibility of Western media
that are used more and more by IS as channels to spread its own
messages for the effects that the information they convey;
14Unfortunately, even data that describe the situation in more general terms do not
paint a rosier picture: according to a survey carried out at the end of August 2014,
92 per cent of Saudi Arabians still consider the Islamic State compliant with the
values of Islamic law.
IS 2.0 and Beyond: The Caliphates Communication Project 121
hidden soldiers unknown to most, who have left their mark in the
world2. In recent years, al-Qaeda has intensified its messages to
the Western audience: it has translated its materials into various
European languages and it has been using a framing that is attrac-
tive to young Muslims who have grown up in the West.
Although sophisticated, al-Qaedas media efforts pale in com-
parison with the modernity, reach and effectiveness of its former
branch and now rival: the Islamic State. The group led by al-
Baghdadi has outshined al-Qaeda, both in terms of quality and
reach of its communication activities. This chapter will look at the
IS European media campaign and explore some techniques, style
choices and communication frames which seem to be the most
widely used by propagandists in the Old Continent, and the most
suited to European tastes. In looking at how the Islamic State
spreads its message in Europe and the kind of people who are
particularly attracted to it, we will also try to illustrate the evolu-
tion of the European jihadist scene towards new forms of net-
works. This development which, as will be explained, is limited
to our continent seems to be strongly influenced by and to fol-
low the same communication environments which determined the
propaganda strategy of the IS in Europe. Finally, the paper will
present the specific case of Anas el Abboubi, a young Italian
jihadist, as a good example to empirically confirm the ideas pre-
sented by the authors.
2The Emirs Speech: Zawahiri Addresses Al-Qaeda, Janes Terrorism and Insurgency
Centre, 25 August 2011.
The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe 127
the beginning of 2013, the time that can be defined as the first
wave of European fighters leaving for Syria3.
The study of the linkage4 mechanisms that can be observed in
this first wave of departures shows the key role played by a galaxy
of small cells scattered throughout Europe in connecting aspiring
European jihadists and various armed groups in Syria. In this
context, the network of groups belonging to the Sharia45 move-
ment appears to be very relevant. The different branches of this
network allowed their supporters to get in contact with so-called
facilitators, people with the necessary contacts to open a privi-
leged channel with a specific jihadist group. For countless aspiring
jihadists, getting in contact with these people was the turning point
in their original plan.
Studying groups like Sharia4 is particularly important if we fo-
cus our attention on the communication model that they have
chosen6. As we will see, the most modern forms of proselytism
and calls to the jihad now coming from Syria and Iraq follow a
communication strategy that Europe has already seen in the last
five years. In this respect, some of the groups that led to the birth
of the Sharia4 universe such as the English groups al-
Muhajiroun and Islam4UK were precursors of trends which are
now easy to observe. The main characteristic of their communica-
tion style is the shift from a vertical structure to a bottom-bottom,
horizontal approach; this creates a communication environment
where each addressee and consumer is also a potential issuer and
producer of materials. Back in 2009 Islam4UK already relied on a
large team of multimedia content creators, who published their
products on six official YouTube channels, several websites and a
3 D. Weggemans, E. Bakker, P. Grol, Who Are They and Why Do They Go? The
Radicalization and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters,
Perspective on Terrorism, vol. 8, no. 4, 2014.
4 L. Vidino, Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe,
RAND, 2011.
5 For further information on the Sharia4 network, see M. Arnaboldi, Sharia4: Un
7 C.Z. Raymond, Al Muhajiroun and Islam4uk: the group behind the ban, ICSR, 2010.
8 Terrorism gang jailed for plotting to blow up London Stock Exchange, The
Telegraph, 9 February 2012.
9 The two chat rooms can be accessed on
http://www.paltalk.com/g2/group/1365669164/DisplayGroupDetails.wmt and
http://www.paltalk.com/people/users/The%20Road%20to%20Jannah/index.wmt
respectively (visited on January 21, 2015).
10 The Muslim Against Crusaders chat room describes itself as follows: We belive
the shariah shall be implimented into british kaffir society and islam will rule the
world [sic].
11 The Italian branch of Sharia4 also runs its own blog; it is still active at
For instance, the various Sharia4 logos all show the map of the country where they
are located, one of its most famous monuments and a flag with the shahada, the
Islamic declaration of faith.
The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe 129
Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 38, no. 1, pages 1-22,
2015. In dissemination mechanisms, particular emphasis is placed on the role of
women: many Twitter accounts belong to women and have the sole purpose of
spreading content. The name of these users is often preceded by the Arabic word
Umm (mother).
15 J. Carter, S. Maher, P. Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in
Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks, The International Centre for the Study of Radicaliza-
tion and Political Violence, Kings College, 2014.
130 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
16 The recent study by E.F. Kohlmann, Charlie Hebdo and the Jihadi Online Network:
Assessing the Role of American Commercial Social Media Platforms, House Committee of
Foreign Affairs, 27 January 2015, also shows the completely opposite mechanism. In
some cases, it is the jihadist websites which republishes and thus legitimizes contents
primarily published on social networks (an example is the
https://www.alplatformmedia.com/vb/ forum).
17 In addition to Dabiq, in May 2014 two IS official journals had already been
published the first called Islamic State News, a more military publication, and Islamic
State Report, a political one. In December 2014, the al-Hayat Media Center also
launched a short magazine aimed specifically at French readers, called Dar al-Islam.
18 Al-Hayat Media Center only deals with English language contents. Other official
media centers are al-Itisam, al-Furqan and the Ajnad Foundation. See M. Al-
Ubaydi, B. Price, D. Milton, N. Lahoud, The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understand-
ing the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point, December 2014.
19 Before leaving for the Islamic State, Al-Almani was a rapper and he had produced
three albums for the Streetlife Entertainment label under the alias Deso Dogg.
20 New ISIS Media Company Addresses English, German And French-Speaking Westerners,
and forums connected to the Islamic State then spread the news
and disseminate the link to download the magazine. At this point,
the IS mujaheddin add the social media dimension and advertise
Dabiq through their official accounts. Finally, the followers of
these accounts including Europeans share and repost, thus
allowing the IS to reach a potentially unlimited audience. A self-
feeding dissemination process of this kind takes away the role of
primary subject of information from traditional media and turns
them into objects, held hostage to uncontrolled news flows. Social
media have allowed terrorist organizations to break away from
mainstream journalism and to spread contents regardless of the
priorities of newspapers and TV channels.
The symbiosis that has developed between the European and
the Middle-Eastern jihadist scenes sheds light on the modern
mechanisms of influence between individual mujaheddin. Through
social media, each jihadist can put pressure on the rest of their
contacts. People who have already reached the affiliation group
can convince their friends to do the same, giving advice and
offering support. This model of interactivity between individuals
is essentially horizontal and free from hierarchies. In terms of
communication, the current European jihadist landscape has
evolved compared to the vertical patterns of the past years; it has
few leaders, as it has given more power of influence to the bottom.
A very useful concept when describing the characteristics and
dynamics of the various European jihadist cells is that of swarm21,
a term that refers to the group as a whole. First of all, the activi-
ties, behavior and ideology of the various groups are shaped by a
few individuals only (whom we may call the choreographers),
whose influence guides the collective flight of the swarm. An
illuminating example is given by online conversations: often,
during a debate, it becomes clear that some users are going to have
the last word or have more weight than others. These mechanisms
21The application of swarm dynamics to the European jihadist scene has already
been introduced, in relation to The Netherlands, in The Transformation of jihadism in the
Netherlands: Swarm dynamics and new strength, General Intelligence and Security Service
(AIVD), Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, June 2014.
132 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
22 J. Klausen, (2015).
23 J. Carter, S. Maher, P. Neumann, (2014).
24 J. Klausen, (2015).
134 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
25 The term kharijita originated at the time of the first Islamic civil war to indicate
the faction of those Muslims who, after supporting Ali and hindering Muawiya in
the fight for the succession to Uthman, the third caliph, decided to stop their
activities and accepted an arbitrate. In jihadism, the term is now used to indicate that
a group is not compliant with the true spirit of Islam: the word comes from an
Arabic root which means to exit, to detach oneself.
26 The Hadith are the tales of the Sunna, i.e. the Muslim tradition. For the purpose of
this paper, not all hadith have the same value; their relevance depends on the
reliability of the transmission chain.
27 It is not by chance that their collections are called sahihani, the two true ones.
28 General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), (2014).
The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe 135
29 One Twitter account is exclusively devoted to cats and mujaheddin in the Islamic
State; it can be accessed on @ISILCats (Islamic State of Cat).
30 The zakat, the third pillar of Islam, is a tax that each Muslim must pay to help the
empty concept, but it has important repercussions, since it is the opposite of the
shirk (polytheism) that several radical thinkers see, for instance, in the Christian
Trinity or in democracy, regarded as a way to elevate the power of man at the same
level as Gods.
32 Foreign fighters are joining jihadi groups in unprecedented numbers, Public Radio Interna-
33 La metamorphose opere chez le jeune par les nouveaux discours terroristes: recherche-action sur
la mutation du processus dendoctrinement et dembrigadement dans lislam radical, Cpdsi,
November 2014. See also the related article, Dpressif et issu dune famille athe: le
profil type du jihadiste franais, France 24, 18 November 2014.
The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe 137
anisms that have been observed in central and northern Europe for
some years.
The most revealing case is probably that of Anas el Abboubi,
one of the few Italian jihadists who seem to have joined the militia
of the Islamic State in Syria. Investigations on el Abboubi began
in September 2012, when the Digos (General Investigations and
Special Operations Division) in Brescia, alarmed by some state-
ments made by the young man during a visit to the police station,
decided to open a file on him36. Born in Marrakech in 1992, he
moved to Italy at the age of seven and settled with his family in
Vobarno, a small town in the quiet Valle Sabbia, 40 km from
Brescia37. The family is described as well integrated and Anas
seems to favor Italian, which he speaks with the strong accent like
any Brescia native would, over Arabic. As a teenager he attended
a technical high school in Brescia and developed a passion for rap.
He became relatively well-known on the local hip-hop scene under
the name McKhalif38.
But something changed very rapidly at the beginning of 2012.
Almost overnight he turned from a rebellious teenager who en-
joyed binge drinking and light drugs into a rapper inspired by
Islam and then into a Muslim militant39. In the summer of that
year he abandoned rap altogether and described music as a haram
(forbidden by religion) activity. He began to wear long white
tunics and broke off many of his friendships. He also began to
spend a lot of time online, visiting jihadist websites and forums.
He created various profiles on Facebook (Anas Shakur, Anas
Abdu Shakur) and Twitter (@anas_abdu), and changed the con-
tents of the YouTube channel (McKhalif) that he had used as a
rapper, in order to make it more compliant with his new ideolo-
gy40.
36 http://questure.poliziadistato.it/Brescia/articolo-6-91-56067-1.htm (visited on 21
January 2015).
37 U. Vallini, A colloquio con pap El Abboubi, Valle Sabbia News, 15 June 2013.
38 R. Mora, Dr. Domino, il fenomeno del rap, Giornale di Brescia, 28 January 2013.
39 Interview with police officers, Brescia, October 2013; A. Troncana, His mother:
He is a great boy. His schoolmates: A taleban, Corriere della Sera, 13 June 2013.
40 http://www.youtube.com/user/MCKHALIF (visited on 21 January 2015).
The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe 139
41 Interview with police officers, Brescia, October 2013. When he was arrested, el
Abboubi was about to translate the book The Missing Obligation: Expelling the Jews and
Christians from the Arabian Peninsula, written by the leader of the Egyptian jihad,
Mohammed Abdus Salam Faraj.
42 Order to implement a precautionary measure in the el Abboubi case, Court of
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=307303602715564&set=pb.10000307
7808791.-2207520000.1385657145.&type=3&theater (visited on December 5, 2013).
The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe 141
building, piazza della Loggia and the Kennedy overpass. Pre-trial detention order in
the el Abboubi case, Court of Brescia, 7456/11, 10 June 2013; W. Petenzi, Nel
mirino dello studente pure questore e piazza Loggia (The Chief of Police and
piazza Loggia among the students targets), Corriere della Sera, 13 June 2013.
50 Order of application of supervision measure, Court of Brescia, 28496/12, 10 June
2013.
51 Court of Review of Brescia, 348/2013, 1 July 2013; interviews with the public
Conclusion
This chapter has tried to show how the current use of social
networks is the result of a series of innovations introduced in
Europe in the last five years by the farsighted approach of the
Sharia4 movement. Their success, combined with the massive
linkage from Europe to the Levant, has contributed to export the
model at global level.
This exchange of expertise in the use of social networks has
had two significant consequences. First of all, there appears to be a
close relation between the European (and North American) ji-
hadist scene and the jihadists who fight on the Middle Eastern
front (the destination of most fighters issued from the Old Conti-
nent). This has led to the coordination of operations (sometimes
limited to a strong influence), shared ideologies and dissemination
of knowledge. Secondly, the global jihadist scene is now able to
reach an incredibly wide audience and can count on an unprece-
dented heterogeneity among its members.
Starting from communication innovations, the European ji-
hadist scene has structurally changed (and is still evolving). Its
organization has become more and more horizontal and shows
swarm dynamics. This translates into high flexibility, cohesion
and the absence of hierarchy. Anas el Abboubis case clearly
shows that similar mechanisms are developing also in Italy, while
they may still be at a very early stage.
The European Islamist theater should not be seen as a mere pe-
riphery of the primary jihadist groups who are active in the Arab-
Muslim world. Its characteristics are actually more important than
ever to foresee the possible future trends of the Islamist landscape
in general, especially in terms of communication, propaganda and
the use of technologies. The European scenario, however, is still
highly dependent on the major reference groups; without them, it
is reasonable to expect a significant decrease in the production of
contents.
6. The Discourse of ISIS:
Messages, Propaganda
and Indoctrination
Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee
1
Mohammed Al-Ubaydi, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton and Bryan, December 2014.
The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic
State, WEST POINT: THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER .
2
ibid
148 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
Local population
3
Awal Dhuhur lil Khalifa Al-Daishi Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, Al-Arabiya, 2014,
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/iraq/2014/07/05/- -
- .html.
4
Daish Yusdir Wathiqat Al-Madina fi Ninewa, Al-Arabiya, 2014,
http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/2014/06/13/- -
- - -.html..
The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination 149
5 M. Georgy, ISIS Militants Kill Over 300 Members Of Defiant Iraqi Tribe, The
Huffington Post , M., 2014. [Online],
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/02/isis-albu-nimr-
massacre_n_6089678.html; J. Varghese, Mass Grave of 230 from a Syrian Tribe
Killed by ISIS Found, 2014, [Online], http://www.ibtimes.co.in/mass-grave-230-
syrian-tribe-killed-by-isis-found-video-617701.
6 Badr Al-Ibrahim, Daesh Wal-Wahabbiya Wal-Takfir: Al-Ikhtilaf Wal-Tashabuh,
Figure 6.1 From left (above) to right (below): Boxes of aid carrying ISISs
slogan; distribution of gas cilynders; bags of aid with the groups slogan; the
Institute of the Islamic State for Religious Sciences in Atharib; and a converted
police car with ISISs slogan
on the streets and asking people about their needs and complaints
and monitoring the prices of the basic needs. As part of its propa-
ganda, the group published pictures of its social services, such as
providing cheap medical care, distributing aid or gas to local
residents, opening classes to teach Quran, reaching out to children
and patrolling the cities in police cars8.
ISISs online activities propagated this image of efficient gov-
ernance and sought to put it in the context of comparison with the
Iraqi and Syrian central governments. The Iraqi government has
8
This video, for example, shows members of the group distributing food for
households in a Syrian village: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9j27z2roYto.
See also: L. Dearden, Islamic State: Propaganda photos claim to show Isis militants
delivering food aid in Rutba, The Independent, 2014. [Online],
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/islamic-state-propaganda-
photos-claim-to-show-isis-militants-delivering-food-aid-in-rutba-9721349.html.
The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination 151
can find almost any race and nationality here; 7) Every newly
married couple is given 700USD as a gift. (Im not sure if its still
available now); 8) You dont have to pay taxes (if youre Muslim);
9) No one conducts business during prayer time and you can see
people leave their shops open and pray either in the masjid or near
their shops; 10) The number of mixed marriages and mixed-race
children are high. Its beautiful to witness brotherhood with no
racism.
Of course, there is no mention of how ISIS can provide those
services and what its sources of funding are. More importantly,
this narratives contradict a lot of information coming from the
local population in those areas. One Facebook (FB) page, called
Mosul Eyes, has been communicating whats happening in
Mosul through the voices of real people living there. The picture
published on this FB page portrayed the population living in dire
conditions, lacking services, under oppression and terror.
Salafization of society
As a Salafist organization, ISIS believes that justice has no other
meaning but submission to the Sharia rule. Accordingly, a just
State is, by definition, an Islamic Salafist State. Therefore, people
have to follow its mandates as the group purifies society from
non-Islamic rules and practices. The group installed a large bill-
board in Mosul showing one of its militants placing one of his feet
on what seems to be books of law, while carrying a machine gun
in his hand; on the side of the billboard Arabic words read: Under
my foot man-made laws. Another one had this sentence written in
Arabic: We want to have nothing but gods law to judge us. A
similar message was seen in a mural with the slogan The Islamic
State: a book guides and a sword brings victory9.
The local Radio, Al-Bayan, broadcasts religious sermons and
lectures that teach the audience about the superiority of Gods
rule, instead of those invented by man. The diwans that have
become ministries published their instructions to the residents on
9
A.J. Al-Tamimi, The Islamic State Billboards and Murals of Tel Afar and Mosul, s.l.:
Pundicity. 7 January 2015.
The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination 153
Figure 6.3 - ISISs billboard with the slogan: under my foot man-made laws
10
Daish Yusdir Wathiqat Al-Madina fi Ninewa, (2014).
11
Daish Tuharik Souq AlTibaa wa Mussalihuha Yastaaduun li Itlaq Mahtta
Ifhaiyya, Zawiyya, 2014,
https://www.zawya.com/ar/story/ _ _ _ _ _ _
_.
12 A.B. Annaji, n.d. Idarat Attawahush: Akhtar Marhala Satamur Biha Al-Umma, s.l.:
ing its beliefs in the social fabric and, at the same time, seeking to
change that fabric by calling on true Muslims to migrate to the
land of Khilafa and by violently repressing its Sunni opponents.
The salafization of society found its most tragic expression in
the way non-Sunni religious minorities were treated. Using its
literalist interpretation of Quran and Sunnah, ISIS declared that
Christians had to choose between converting to Islam or paying a
tribute to the State. A warning was issued by the ISIS judiciary
diwan on 17 July 2014, to give Christians a third option: rapid
departure from the city without taking any of their properties13.
The Yazidi minority was treated even more harshly because ISIS
considered them a polytheist group that should be annihilated, and
it explained the religious basis for this decision in its online maga-
zine, Dabiq. It also published a pamphlet illustrating the rules
related to the enslavement of Yazidi women according to its
interpretation of Sharia14.
The terrorist group published decrees regarding the dress and
behavior of Muslim women, explaining the religious basis for the
niqab, quoting Quran and the Prophet Muhammad. The instruc-
tions defined the legitimate hijab and urged women not to leave
their homes late at night or without a man from their families15.
ISIS also issued Bayan Al-Hudood the statement of Islamic
penalties16 which established the penalty for common crimes.
Death will be the penalty of anybody convicted of insulting the
Prophet Muhammad or Islam or engaging in homosexual relations
17
S. Al-Nassir, Al-MosulL Diwan Daish Al-Ta'alimi Yahdhuff Qasa'id Hub Al-
Watan wa Yulghi Al-Adab Al-Insaniya min Al-Manahij, Alaan.tv, September .
[Online], http://www.alaan.tv/news/world-news/113873/isis-educational-deletes-
poems-patriotism-and-eliminates-the-humane-letters-from-the-curriculum-in-mosul.
18
Personal communication.
The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination 157
19
Al-Tamimi, (2015).
20
S. Malm, ISIS release new footage claiming to show a child executing two
Russian 'spies' by shooting them in the back of the head, Daily Mail, 2015, [Online],
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2908498/ISIS-release-new-footage-
claiming-child-executing-two-Russian-spies-shooting-head-just-staged-fake.html
Withnall, A., 2015. Isis 'execution video' purports to show 10-year-old boy shooting dead two
'Russian spies'. [Online] Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-execution-video-
purports-to-show-10yearold-boy-shooting-dead-two-russian-spies-9975648.html.
158 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
21
Al-Baghdadi Bi Khitab Al-Khilafa: Alyawm Lakum Dawla Fahajitu Ilaiha, CNN
Arabic, 2014, [Online], http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/07/01/baghdadi-
speech-isis.
22
Personal communication.
23
The Islamic State. 2014. [Film] s.l.: Vice News.
The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination 159
24
The Islamic State in Iraq and Assham, Wilayat Al-Khubr, 9 February 2014.
160 Twitter and Jihad: The Communication Strategy of Isis
27 A. Marshall, How Isis got its anthem, The Guardian, 2014. [Online],
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/nov/09/nasheed-how-isis-got-its-
anthem.
28 G. Fraser, To Islamic State, Dabiq is important - but its not the end of the
29
For further details: A. A.-R., Al-Bakri, Daish wa Mustaqbal Al-Alam: Bayna Al-Wad'i
Al-Siyassi wal Hadith Al-Nabawi Al-Sharif, Cologne, Dar Al-Ghurabaa Lil Nashr,
2014.
The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination 163
30
A.M. Al-Masri, Al-Harb Al-Salibbiyya Al-Jadida Dhidh Al-Muslimeen, 2014, [Online],
http://www.muslm.org/vb/printthread.php?t=537782&pp=15.
31 For further information of foreign jihadists, see: T. McCoy, How ISIS and other
wise they dont. John Cantlie, the British journalist taken hostage
by ISIS, has written an article for the sixth issue of Dabiq, in
which he praises ISISs decisions and actions and criticizes the US
policy.
The fourth issue of Dabiq was named "The Failed Crusade",
addressing the attempts by the U.S.-led coalition to counter the
Islamic State. Through serious and ironic language it portrays this
campaign as one doomed to fail. This certainty is expressed
through these words: This (meaning Islam) is the religion to
which victory was promised. The picture on the cover is of the
iconic St. Peters Square in Rome, displaying the groups ambi-
tions of world conquest. The magazine published a speech by Abu
Mohammed Al-Adnani, ISIS spokesperson, in which he vows that
we will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave
your women, with the permission of Allah, the Highest. This is
his promise to us; He is glorified and he does not fail in his
promise. If we do not reach that time, then our children and
grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves
in the slave market32.
Conclusion
32
Dabiq, Issue 4.
The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination 165
33
Jrgen Todenhfer published his interview with Abu Qatada on his Facebook
page: https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=10152723644955838&pnref=story.
About the Authors