Get It Right:

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 is a Citizen Clause

© 2010 Dan Goodman

The Supreme Court of the United States, on June 28, 2010, in the case of McDonald
v. City of Chicago (No. 08-1521), issued its opinion. The slip opinion can be found at

(Slip Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1521.pdf )

You may have to reload or refresh your browser for this link.

What one may not realized is that the Supreme Court did not address Petitioners’
Brief, at page 44; where it states:

“SlaughterHouse first observed that while individuals held both federal and
state citizenship, the Clause at issue protects only privileges and immunities
of national citizenship. SlaughterHouse, 83 U.S. at 74. It then purported to
quote Article IV as securing ‘the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States.’ Id., at 75.

The Supreme Court did not answered why Justice Miller quoted Article IV, Section
2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States (of America), on page 75 of the
Slaughterhouse Cases, as “the privileges and immunities of citizens OF the several
States” rather than “the privileges and immunities of citizens IN the several States.”
[Footnote 1] What they did do was this:

(slip opinion, page 6)

“Four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court
was asked to interpret the Amendment’s reference to ‘the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.’ The Slaughter-House Cases,
supra, involved challenges to a Louisiana law permitting the creation of a
state-sanctioned monopoly on the butchering of animals within the city of
New Orleans. Justice Samuel Miller’s opinion for the Court concluded that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights ‘which owe
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws.’ Id., at 79. The Court held that other fundamental
rights—rights that predated the creation of the Federal Government and that
‘the State governments were created to establish and secure’—were not
protected by the Clause. Id., at 76.
 In DRAWING A SHARP DISTINCTION between the rights of federal and
state citizenship, the Court relied on two principal arguments. First, the
Court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause spoke of ‘the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States,’ and the Court contrasted this phrasing with the wording in the
first sentence of the Fourteenth and in the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, both of which refer to state citizenship. (5)”

-----

Note 5: The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment makes ‘[a]ll

persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof . . . citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.’ (Emphasis added.) The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV provides that ‘[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” (Emphasis
added.)

It appears the source the Court used for this part of their opinion was “The
Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship,” by Roger Howell (1917). At pages
26 thru 27 it states:
http://books.google.com/books?id=haYLAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA26#v=onepage&q&f=false

“Another question relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens of

the several States which caused much interest at one time was with regard
to the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment. A wide difference of opinion
prevailed in this connection. The exact meaning of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States secured by the amendment was
unsettled, in the minds both of members of Congress and of the judiciary.
Thus Senator Poland thought that the amendment secured ‘nothing beyond
what was intended by the original provision in the Constitution that the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States.’ There was a well-defined opinion among the
judiciary also that the privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment were the same ‘fundamental’ rights inherent in citizenship as
had been outlined by Judge Washington in Corfield v. Coryell. This was the
view taken in one of the earliest attempts to define the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States which the States were forbidden
to abridge. This was in the case of United States v. Hall, in which it was said:
“What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States here
referred to? They are undoubtedly those which may be denominated
fundamental; which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several States which compose this Union from the time of their becoming
free, independent, and sovereign.’
 This view was repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Slaughterhouse
Cases. Here Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Court, DREW A
SHARP DISTINCTION between citizenship in the United States and
citizenship in a State. ‘It is quite clear,’ he says, ‘that there is a citizenship of
the United States and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each
other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in
the individual’; and he goes on to point out that the argument of the plaintiffs
in the case rested wholly upon the assumption that the citizenship was the
same, and that the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed were the same.
The description of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship given in
Corfield v. Coryell is quoted with approval, as embracing those civil rights for
the establishment and protection of which organized government is
instituted, and which the state governments were created to establish and
secure; no additional security of national protection was given them by the
Fourteenth Amendment. While clinging somewhat to the idea of
fundamental rights, Justice Miller says specifically that the sole purpose of
the Comity Clause was ‘to declare to the several States that whatever those
rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or
qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same neither more nor
less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your
jurisdiction.’ The case firmly established the rule that, in consequence of the
duality of citizenship in this country, there exists in correspondence to each
class of citizenship a separate class of privileges and immunities, both
protected against states violation, but entirely distinct in their character.”

So the MacDonald Court, relying on this source, concludes that there is, since the
Fourteenth Amendment, two citizenships: citizenship of the United States and
citizenship of a State. And that each has its own privileges and immunities; that is,
there are privileges and immunities of citizenship of the United States as well as
privileges and immunities of a State. And that citizenship of the United States is
separate and distinct from citizenship of a State.

What the MacDonald Court failed to recognized is that since the Fourteenth
Amendment, there are two citizens also, a citizen of the United States and a citizen
of a State:

“The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of

counsel in the present case. It is, that the distinction between citizenship of
the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and
established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without
being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert
the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a
citizen of it.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 (16 Wall.) 36, at 74.

In addition, in the companion case, Bradwell v. State of Illinois, there is the following:
 “The Fourteenth Amendment declares that citizens of the United States are
citizens of the state within they reside; therefore the plaintiff was at the time
of making her application, a citizen of the United States AND a citizen of the
State of Illinois.

We do not here mean to say that there may not be a temporary residence
in one State, with intent to return to another, which will not create
citizenship in the former. But the plaintiff states nothing to take her case out
of the definition of citizenship of a State as defined by the first section of the
fourteenth amendment.” Bradwell v. the State of Illinois: 83 U.S. 130, at 138
(1873).
http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA138#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Also, there is the following decided after the Slaughterhouse Cases:

“The act was considered in Johnson v. United States, 160 U.S. 546, and we
there held that a person who was not a citizen of the United States at the time
of an alleged appropriation of his property by a tribe of Indians was not
entitled to maintain an action in the Court of Claims under the act in
question. There was not in that case, however, any assertion that the
claimant was a citizen of a State as distinguished from a citizen of the United
States. . . . [U]ndoubtedly in a purely technical and abstract sense
citizenship of one of the States may not include citizenship of the United
States . . . Unquestionably, in the general and common acceptation, a
citizen of the State is considered as synonymous with citizen of the United
States, and the one is therefore treated as expressive of the other. This flows
from the fact that the one is normally and usually the other, and where such
is not the case, it is purely exceptional and uncommon.” United States v.
Northwestern Express, Stage & Transportation Company: 164 U.S. 686, 688
(1897).
http://books.google.com/books?id=xOQGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA688#v=onepage&q=&f=false

“As applied to a citizen of another State, or to a citizen of the United States

residing in another State, a state law forbidding sale of convict made goods
does not violate the privileges and immunities clauses of Art. IV, Sec. 2 and
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution if it applies also and
equally to the citizens of the State that enacted it.” Syllabus, Whitfield v. State
of Ohio: 297 U.S. 431 (1936)

“The court below proceeded upon the assumption that petitioner was a
citizen of the United States; and his status in that regard is not questioned.
The effect of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
 Amendment, as applied to the facts of the present case, is to deny the power
of Ohio to impose restraints upon citizens of the United States resident in
Alabama in respect of the disposition of goods within Ohio, if like restraints
are not imposed upon citizens resident in Ohio.

The effect of the similar clause found in the Fourth Article of the
Constitution (section 2), as applied to these facts, would be the same, since
that clause is directed against discrimination by a state in favor of its own
citizens and against the citizens of other states. Slaughterhouse Cases (Live-
Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co.), Fed.Cas. No. 8,408, 1 Woods 21, 28; Bradwell v. State of
Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 138.” Opinion, Whitfield v. State of Ohio: 297 U.S. 431,
437 (1936).

http://www.loislaw.com/advsrny/doclink.htp?alias=USCASE&cite=297+U.S.+431

“. . .    As in case of the authority of the United States over its absent citizens
(Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421), the authority of a State over one of
its citizens is not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.” 
Milliken v. Meyer: 311 U.S. 457, at 463 (1940). 
http://www.loislaw.com/advsrny/doclink.htp?alais=USCASE&cite=311+U.S.+457

“If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high
seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which
the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of
Congress. . . . .

. . . When its action does not conflict with federal legislation, the
sovereign authority of the State over the conduct of its citizens upon the high
seas is analogous to the sovereign authority of the United States over its
citizens in like circumstances.” Skiriotes v. State of Florida: 313 U.S. 69, at 77,
78 thru 79 (1941). [Footnote 2]
http://www.loislaw.com/advsrny/doclink.htp?alais=USCASE&cite=313+U.S.+69

In addition, the MacDonald Court failed to recognized that since the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment there are now two separate and distinct citizens under
the Constitution of the United States of America (and not the Fourteenth
Amendment); a citizen of the United States and a citizen of the several States.

In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court dealt with two clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment; Section 1, Clause 1 and Section 1, Clause 2. Citizenship of the United States
and citizenship of a State were treated in Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Citizenship of the United States and citizenship of the several States were covered in
Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment:

“. . . [T]o establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which

should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States and also
citizenship of a State, the first clause of the first section was framed. . . .

The first observation we have to make on this clause is, that it puts at rest both the
questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It
declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their
citizenship of a particular State . . .

The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the
present case. It is, that the distinction between citizenship of the United States
and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. . . .

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a
citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon
different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.

We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great
weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section (second
clause of the first section), which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in
error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and
does not speak of those (privileges and immunities) of citizens of the several States.
The argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs, rests wholly on the assumption
that the citizenship is the same and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the
clause are the same.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, 72-74.

Moreover, it was decided that citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state
were now separate and distinct. Privileges and immunities of a citizen of a state were to be
found in the constitution and laws of the individual state. [Footnote 3] Privileges and
immunities of a citizen of the United States were to be located at Section 1, Clause 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Also, the Slaughterhouse court concluded that there were now two separate and distinct
citizens under the Constitution of the United States (and not the Fourteenth Amendment);
a citizen of the United States and a citizen of the several States.

To wit:

“We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this duty
devolves upon us. No questions so far reaching and pervading in their
consequences, so profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so
 important in their bearing upon the relations of the United States and of the several
States to each other, and to the citizens of the states and of the United States,
have been before this court during the official life of any of its present members. We
have given every opportunity for a full hearing at the bar; we have discussed it
freely and compared views among ourselves; we have taken ample time for careful
deliberation, and we now propose to announce the judgments which we have
formed in the construction of those articles, so far as we have found them necessary
to the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that we have neither the
inclination nor the right to go.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, at 67 (1873).

And:

“The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in

the present case. It is, that the distinction between citizenship of the United States
and citizenship of a state is clearly recognized and established. . . .

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a
citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon
different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.

We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this Amendment of great
weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section (second
clause of the first section), which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in
error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
and does not speak of those (privileges and immunities) of citizens of the several
states. The argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs, rests wholly on the
assumption that the citizenship is the same and the privileges and immunities
guaranteed by the clause are the same.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, 73-74.

Also:

“Fortunately we are not without judicial construction of this clause of the

Constitution (that is, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1). The first and the leading case on
the subject is that of Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the
circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania in 1823. 4 Wash C. C. 371.

'The inquiry,' he says, 'is, what are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several States? . . .'

This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states is

adopted in the main by this court in the recent case of Ward v. Maryland. . . .

Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are
those which belong to citizens of the states as such, and that they are left to the
state governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under
the special care of the Federal government, we may hold ourselves excused from
 defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no
state can abridge, until some case involving those privileges may make it necessary
to do so.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, 75-76, 78-79.

It is to be observed that the terms “citizens of the states” and “citizens of the several
states” are used interchangeably by the Slaughterhouse court. And they are employed in
contradistinction to the term “citizens of the United States.”

Citizenship of the United States is located at Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Citizenship of the several States is designated at Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America:

“The intention of section 2, Article IV (of the Constitution), was to confer on the
citizens of the several States a general citizenship, and to communicate all the
privileges and immunities which the citizen of the same State would be entitled to
under like circumstances.” Cole v. Cunningham: 133 U.S. 107, 113-114 (1890).
[Footnote 4]

http://books.google.com/books?id=oGYUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA113#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States are to be found at

Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the several States are designated at Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the
Constitution of the United States of America:

Privileges and immunities of a citizen of the several States are those

described in Corfield v. Coryell decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in 1823:

“In the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 76, in defining the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, this is
quoted from the opinion of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v.
Coryell, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct. 371, 380.”  Hodges v. United States: 203 U.S. 1,
at 15 (1906).

http://books.google.com/books?id=HuEGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q=&f=false

The location for these privileges and immunities is Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution:

“Fortunately we are not without judicial construction of this clause

of the Constitution (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1). The first and
leading case of the subject is that of Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr.
Justice Washington in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania
in 1823.
 ‘The inquiry,’ he says ‘is, what are the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States? . . .

This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the

States is adopted in the main by this court in the recent case of Ward
v. The State of Maryland.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 (16 Wall.) 36, at
75 thru 76 (1873). [Footnote 5]

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q=&f=false

The reason Justice Miller used “the privileges and immunities of citizens OF the
several States” is that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment there are
now three sets of privileges and immunities in the country of the United States.
They are: privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States, privileges and
immunities of a citizen of a State, and privileges and immunities of a citizen of the
several States.

At page 74 of the Slaughterhouse Cases, you will find the following:

”. . . Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a
citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the
former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen
of it . . .   .

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a
citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend
upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.   . . . .

Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and
of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they
respectively are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it
is only the former which are placed by this clause (first section, second
clause) under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter,
whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by
this paragraph of the (Fourteenth) amendment. . . . .” Slaughterhouse Cases:
83 (16 Wall.) 36, at 74 (1873).

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q=&f=false

And:

“We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this [the
Fourteenth] Amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next
paragraph of this same section (first section, second clause), which is the one
 mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those
(privileges and immunities) of citizens of the several states.  The
argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs, rests wholly on the assumption
that the citizenship is the same and the privileges and immunities guaranteed
by the clause are the same. . . . .

Fortunately we are not without judicial construction of this clause of the

Constitution (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1). The first and leading case of the
subject is that of Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in 1823.

‘The inquiry,’ he says ‘is, what are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several states? . . .

This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states is

adopted in the main by this court in the recent case of Ward v. The State of
Maryland.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 (16 Wall.) 36, at 74, 76 (1873).

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q=&f=false

As stated earlier, privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States are
located at Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment; privileges and
immunities of a citizen of a State are located in the constitution and laws of an
individual State, McKane v. Durston, supra; privileges and immunities of a citizen of
the several States are designated at Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution
of the United States of America, Hodges v. United States, supra and Slaughterhouse
Cases (83 (16 Wall.) 36, at 75 thru 76).

So Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States, since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, has nothing to do with State citizenship. It
has to do with citizenship of the several States, that is, citizenship of all the States,
generally. That is, it is a citizen clause! [Footnote 6]

______________________________________________________________

Footnotes:

1. It appears Petitioners were not aware of Justice Miller’s changing the wording in Justice
Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell. At pages 75 through 76 of the Slaughterhouse
Cases, it states:

"Fortunately we are not with judicial construction of this clause of the

Constitution. The first and the leading case of the subject is that of Corfield v.
Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania is 1823.

'The inquiry,' he says, 'is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens OF the
several States?'

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q&f=false

Notice that it does not state:

'The inquiry,' he says, 'is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens IN the
several States?"

The McDonald Court is apparently unaware of this also.

Taking the change of wording in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the
United States of America with the change of wording in the opinion of Corfield v. Coryell, and
add to this the fact that Corfield v. Coryell is the leading case on Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1
of the Constitution, one is led to the conclusion, without having read other cases on this
issue, that Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States was
modified by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just like Article III, Section 2,
Clause 6 of the Constitution of the United States of America (“between a State and Citizens
of another State.)” was modified by the Eleventh Amendment.

2. That there are two citizens; that is, a citizen of the United States as well as a citizen of a
State, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, is because the United States
government and an individual state government are still separate and distinct
sovereignties, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Congress (or the United States government) under the Constitution of the United States
(of America) is one of enumerated powers. A State of the Union is not the same as the
District of Columbia, or the territories and possessions of the United States government:

“Special provision is made in the constitution, for the cession of jurisdiction from
the states over places where the federal government shall establish forts, or other
military works. And it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United
States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction.” New Orleans v. United States:
35 U.S. 662, at 737 (1836).

http://books.google.com/books?id=nEcFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA737#v=onepage&q&f=false

And:
 “The general government, and the States, although both exist within the same
territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and
independently of each other, within their respective spheres.  The former in its
appropriate sphere is supreme; but the States within the limits of their powers not
granted, or, in the language of the tenth amendment, ‘reserved,’ are as independent
of the general government as that government within its sphere is independent of
the States.”  Collector v. Day: 78 U.S. (Wall. 11) 113, at 124 (1870).

http://books.google.com/books?id=zMEGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA124#v=onepage&q&f=false

Did the Fourteenth Amendment changed this? No:

"Notwithstanding the adoption of these three Amendments (the Thirteenth,

Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), the National Government still remains one
of enumerated powers, and the Tenth Amendment, which reads, 'the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,' is not shorn of its vitality."
Hodges v. United States: 203 U.S. 1, at 16 (1906).

http://books.google.com/books?id=HuEGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA16#v=onepage&q&f=false

So:

“Upon the admission of a State into the Union, the State doubtless acquires
general jurisdiction, civil and criminal, for the preservation of public order, and the
protection of persons and property, throughout its limits, except where it has ceded
exclusive jurisdiction to the United States. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 662, 737; 9 L.Ed. 573, 602 (other citations ommited)” Van Brocklin v. State of
Tennessee: 117 U.S. 151, 167-168 (1886).

http://books.google.com/books?id=ldcGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA167#v=onepage&q&f=false

And:

“We conclude, however, that no such hearing is required in this case. We are of
the view that the ‘equal footing’ clause of the Joint Resolution admitting Texas to the
Union disposes of the present phase of the controversy.

The ‘equal footing’ clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to
sovereignty. See Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 245. It does not, of course,
include economic stature or standing. There has never been equality among the
States in that sense. Some States, when they entered the Union, had within their
boundaries tracts of land belonging to the Federal Government; others were
sovereigns of their soil. Some had special agreements with the Federal Government
governing property within their borders. See Stearns v. Minnesota, supra, pp. 179 U.
S. 243-245. Area, location, geology, and latitude have created great diversity in the
economic aspects of the several States. The requirement of equal footing was
designed not to wipe out those diversities, but to create parity as respects political
standing and sovereignty.” United States v. State of Texas: 339 U.S. 707, at 715 thru
 716 (1950).

http://www.loislaw.com/advsrny/doclink.htp?alais=USCASE&cite=339+U.S.+707

Also:

“If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we
see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its
citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a
legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress. Save for the
powers committed by the Constitution to the Union, the State of Florida has
retained the status of a sovereign. Florida was admitted to the Union ‘on equal
footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever.’ And the power given to
Congress by §3 of Article IV of the Constitution to admit new States relates only to
such States as are equal to each other ‘in power, dignity, and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution itself.” Skiriotes v. State of Florida: 313 U.S. 69, at 77 (1941).

http://www.loislaw.com/advsrny/doclink.htp?alais=USCASE&cite=313+U.S.+69

To this:

“ . . . [W]hen a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of
the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States.”
Coyle v. State of Oklahoma: 221 U.S. 559, at 573 (1911).

http://www.loislaw.com/advsrny/doclink.htp?alias=USCASE&cite=221+U.S.+559

As such, the United States government and an individual State government would now
have its own citizens, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment:

“We have in our political system a government of the United States and a
government of each of the several States.  Each one of these governments is distinct
from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and
whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect.” Cruishank v. United States: 92
U.S. 542, at 549 (1875).

http://books.google.com/books?id=PGwUAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA2-
PA549#v=onepage&q&f=false

The only way a citizen of the United States could become a citizen of a State also, in the
several States, is through an amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
Otherwise, each State of the Union would have to provide for such in its laws or
constitutions. Which could mean (up to) 50 different statutes or provisions in their
constitutions:
 “Consequently, one who is created a citizen of the United States, is certainly not
made a citizen of any particular State.  It follows, that as it is only the citizens of the
State who are entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
States, . . . , then a distinction both in name and privileges is made to exist between
citizens of the United States, ex vi termini, and citizens of the respective (several)
States.” Ex parte Frank Knowles: 5 Cal. 300, at 304 (1855).

http://books.google.com/books?id=0p4WAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA304#v=onepage&q&f=false

(Note:     This case was decided before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
(1868) and the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873).

The court, in this part of its opinion, deals with the concept of the uniform rule
regarding the naturalization of foreigners by the several States.  In essence, the
court concludes that unless there is a uniform rule prescribed by Congress for the
several States for naturalizing foreigners, then those who are naturalized would
only be a citizen of the United States and not a citizen of a State; whereas if there
was a uniform rule then foreigners naturalized would be a citizen of the United
States as well as a citizen of a State.

    If there is no uniform rule prescribed by Congress for the several States for
naturalizing foreigners, then one who is naturalized under this condition cannot be
a citizen of a State.  So in this situation, one would be a citizen of the United States
(and not a citizen of a State) and one would be a citizen of a State.  This is, in
substance, the holding in the Slaughterhouse Cases, that because of the Fourteenth
Amendment, citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State were now to
be considered separate and distinct.  That being a citizen of the United States was
separate and distinct from a citizen of a State.  The only difference between these
two cases is that the Fourteenth Amendment, makes a citizen of the United States a
citizen of a State, also; that is, a citizen of the United States AND a citizen of a State,
by residing in a State.)

Without an amendment to the Constitution of the United States (of America) or a statute
or provision in the constitution of each individual State, a citizen of the United States would
be an alien in a State of the Union.

Thus because of the Fourteenth Amendment, a citizen of the United States can become
also a citizen of a State, by residing in a State of the Union. As such a citizen of the United
States would be a citizen of the United States AND a citizen of a State, owing allegiance to
both the United States government AND the individual State government:

“ . . . The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States AND
a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will
be different from those he has under the other. . . . .

“The [citizens] of the United States resident within any State are subject to two
governments: one State, and the other National. . . . It is the natural consequence
of [such] citizenship which owes allegiance to two sovereignties and claims
protection from both. The citizen (of the United States) cannot complain, because
 he has voluntarily submitted himself to such a form of government. He owes
allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres
must pay the penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he
can demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction.” Cruishank v. United
States: 92 U.S. 542, at 549, 550 thru 551 (1875).

http://books.google.com/books?id=PGwUAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA2-
PA549#v=onepage&q&f=false

3.     “. . .   Whatever may be the scope of section 2 of article IV -- and we need not, in this
case enter upon a consideration of the general question -- the Constitution of the United
States does not make the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of one State
under the constitution and laws of that State, the measure of the privileges and immunities
to be enjoyed, as of right, by a citizen of another State under its constitution and laws.”
McKane v. Durston: 153 U.S. 684, at 687 (1894).

http://books.google.com/books?id=mmkUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA687#v=onepage&q=&f=false

“The provision that no State shall abridge the (privileges or) immunities of citizens of the
United States does not refer to citizens of the States. (2) It embraces only citizens of the
United States. It leaves out the words ‘citizens of the State’ which are so carefully used, and
used in contradistinction to ‘citizens of the United States,’ in the preceding sentence. It
places the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States under the protection of
the Federal Constitution, and leaves the privileges and immunities of a citizen of a State
under the protection of the State Constitution. (3)”

(Source: “Justice and Jurisprudence: An inquiry concerning the Constitutional Limitations

of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment;” Brotherhood of Liberty;
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company; 1889, Page 541.)

http://books.google.com/books?id=lBQTAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA541#v=onepage&q&f=false

(2) Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, at 349.

(3) Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, at 350.

http://books.google.com/books?id=JmoLAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA349#v=onepage&q&f=false

“In America there are two citizenships, distinct from each other, and depending upon
different characteristics and circumstances, and the essential difference is caused by a
difference of jurisdiction. In strict conformity to this distinct, the Constitution prohibits a
State from making or enforcing ‘any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.’ (1) The limitation is not as to laws affecting the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the several States, equality of citizens of States is secured by
another provision. (2)
 The privileges and immunities of the citizen of one State removing to another State are the
same, no more, no less, than the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the State into
which he or she removed. (3) The privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States
rest for security and protection with the States themselves,--where they rested before the
Constitution was made. These privileges and immunities are not placed under the care of
the United States except so far as the Constitution declares that, ‘The citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.’ These
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States are fundamental., (4) and are
commonly set forth in Bills of Rights found in the State constitutions.”

________________________

(1) Amendment XIV.

(2) Article iv, sec 2, c. 1

(3) See p. 150.

(4) Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Washington, C. C. 371, 380; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wallace, 180 and see
pp. 191-211 of the present volume.

(Source: “The Essentials of American Constitutional Law;” Francis Newton Thorpe, Ph.D.
LL.D. of the Pennsylvania Bar; New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. The Knickerbocker Press;
1917, Page 213 thru 214.)

http://books.google.com/books?id=s3tDAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA213#v=onepage&q&f=false

4. “Th(is) clause established a general citizenship among the citizens of the several States.--
In Cole v. Cunningham, (fn 59) the court said:

‘The intention of section 2, Article IV (of the Constitution), was to confer on the citizens
of the several States a general citizenship, and to communicate all the privileges and
immunities which the citizen of the same State would be entitled to under like
circumstances.’

________________________

59. 133 U.S. 107, 113-114.”

(Source: “The Constitution of the United States, Its History and Construction, Volume II;”
David Kemper Watson, LL.B., LL.D., of the Columbus, Ohio, Bar; Chicago: Callaghan &
Company; 1910; Chapter XLV, Page 1218.)

http://books.google.com/books?id=7GlCAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA1218#v=onepage&q&f=false
And,

“§256. Same — Intention of the constitutional provision. — The intention of the first
clause of the second section of the fourth article of the constitution was to confer on the
citizens of the several states a general citizenship, and to communicate all the privileges
and immunities which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under the like
circumstances. (fn 68)

________________________

68. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 113-114 (33:538).”

(Source: “Federal Procedure at Law; A Treatise on the Procedure in Suits at Common Law in the
Circuit Courts of the United States;” C.L. Bates, of the Bar of San Antonio, Texas; Chicago: T.H. Flood
and Company; 1908; Page 229.)

http://books.google.com/books?id=EOY9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA229#v=onepage&q&f=false

5. "In speaking of the meaning of the phrase 'privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States,' under section second, article fourth, of the Constitution, it was said by the
present Chief Justice, in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, that the intention was 'to confer
on the citizens of the several States a general citizenship, and to communicate all the
privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same State would be entitled to under
the like circumstances, and this includes the right to institute actions.' " Maxwell v. Dow:
176 U.S. 581, at 592 (1900).

http://books.google.com/books?id=8toGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA592#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thus, a citizen of a State, as distinguishable from a citizen of the United States, would be
entitled to privileges and immunities of a citizen of the several States:

“There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the State of North Carolina, had
the right to sue Harris in Maryland to recover the debt which Harris owed him.
Being a citizen of North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the several States, one of which is the right to institute actions in the
courts of another State.” Harris v. Balk: 198 U.S. 215, at 223 (1905).

http://books.google.com/books?id=ceIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA223#v=onepage&q=&f=false

A citizen of the United States would be entitled to privileges and immunities of a citizen of a
State under Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
 “The Fourteenth Amendment declares that citizens of the United States are
citizens of the state within they reside; therefore the plaintiff was at the time of
making her application, a citizen of the United States AND a citizen of the State of
Illinois.

We do not here mean to say that there may not be a temporary residence in one
State, with intent to return to another, which will not create citizenship in the
former. But the plaintiff states nothing to take her case out of the definition of
citizenship of a State as defined by the first section of the fourteenth amendment.”
Bradwell v. the State of Illinois: 83 U.S. 130, at 138 (1873).

http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA138#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Therefore, there are two state citizens in the several States; one under Section 1, Clause 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment with privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States
and one under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 with privileges and immunities of a citizen of
the several States:

“Because the ordinance and specifications, under which the paving in this
case was done, require the contractor to employ only bona fide resident
citizens of the city of New Orleans as laborers on the work, it is contended, on
behalf on the plaintiff in error, that thereby citizens of the State of
Louisiana, and of each and every State and the inhabitants thereof, are
deprived of their privileges and immunities under article 4, sec. 2, and
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
It is said that such an ordinance deprives every person, not a bona fide
resident of the city of New Orleans, of the right to labor on the contemplated
improvements, and also is prejudicial to the property owners, because, by
restricting the number of workmen, the price of the work is increased.  

    Such questions are of the gravest possible importance, and, if and when
actually presented, would demand most careful consideration; but we are not
now called upon to determine them.  

    In so far as the provisions of the city ordinance may be claimed to affect the
rights and privileges of citizens of Louisiana and of the other States, the
plaintiff in error is in no position to raise the question.  It is not alleged, nor
does it appear, that he is one of the laborers excluded by the ordinance from
employment, or that he occupies any representative relation to them.
Apparently he is one of the preferred class of resident citizens of the city of
New Orleans.” Chadwick v. Kelley: 187 U.S. 540, at 546 (1903).
http://books.google.com/books?id=bdkGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA546#v=onepage&q=&f=false
6. An error (actually two) has been shown. The Supreme Court should change their slip
opinion before it is made a part to a preliminary print, and thereafter, a bounded volume.

Here is another source giving meaning on Article VI, Section 2, Clause 1 of the
Constitution of the United States, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
relation to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States:

“The ‘privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states’ are those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by citizens of the several states which compose this union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. They may be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the government, the enjoyment of
life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as
the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole.” Brawner v. Irvin,
169 Fed. 964, 967 (quoting and adopting definition in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.
C. 371, 380, 6 Fed. Cas. 546; quoted in Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. [83 U.S.] 36,
21 L. Ed. 394, and in Hodges v. United States, 27 Sup. Ct. 6, 203 U.S. 1, 51 L. Ed. 65);
Shaw v. City Council of Marshalltown, 104 N. W. 1121, 1123, 131 Iowa, 128, 10 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039 (citing and adopting definition in Corfield v. Coryell, 4
Wash. C. C. 371, 6 Fed. Cas. 546,).”

(Source: “Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases;” Second series; St Paul:
West Publishing Company; 1914; Volume 3, page 1214.

http://books.google.com/books?id=9pENAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA1214#v=onepage&q&f=false

And:

Ҥ244. Privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states under
the constitution.—The constitution as originally adopted declares that: “The
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states.” (52) This provision secures valuable rights to the citizens of
the several states, and is in effect, a limitation upon the states; it inhibits each state
from denying to the citizens of the several other states the privileges and
immunities possessed and enjoyed by its own citizens. (53)

________________________

52. U. S. Const. Art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 1.

53. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (19:357); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
130 (21:294); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 264 (43:432); Ward v. Maryland, 12
Wall. 418, 433 (20:449)
 (Source: “Federal Procedure at Law; A Treatise on the Procedure in Suits at
Common Law in the Circuit Courts of the United States;” C.L. Bates, of the Bar of San
Antonio, Texas; Chicago: T.H. Flood and Company; 1908; Page 220.)

http://books.google.com/books?id=EOY9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA220#v=onepage&q&f=false

Also:

“ ‘ . . . The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States protected by the
fourteenth amendment, are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and
essential character of the federal Government, and granted or secured by the Constitution.’
Duncan v. Missouri (1904) 152 U.S. 377, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485; Slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.

The provisions of section 2, art. 4, of the federal Constitution, that citizens of each state
shall be entitled to privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, are held to be
synonymous with rights of the citizens. Corfield v. Coryell, supra. This section is akin to the
provision of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, as respects privileges and immunities,
but the former is held not to make the privileges and immunities (the rights) enjoyed by
citizens of the several states the measure of the privileges and immunities (the rights) to be
enjoyed as of right, by a citizen of another state, under its Constitution and laws. McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 Sup. Ct. 913, 38 L. Ed. 867. This rule necessarily classifies citizens
in their rights to the extent that a citizen of one state when in another state must be
governed by the same rules which apply to the citizens of that state as to matters which are
of the domestic concern of the state. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L.
Ed. 538; People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232; Butchers’ Union v. Crescent City,
Mo., 111 U.S. 746, 4 Sup Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585; Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602; Douglas v.
Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465.”

http://books.google.com/books?id=T_QKAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA246#v=onepage&q=&f=false