A New Philosophy of Society - Manuel de Landa
A New Philosophy of Society - Manuel de Landa
A New Philosophy of Society - Manuel de Landa
Introduction
Index 141
v
Introduction
1
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I ET Y
explain the case of the female refugee one has to invoke. in addition to
her awareness of the meaning of the term 'female refugee', the objective
existence of a whole set of institutional organizations (courts, immigra
tion agencies, airports and seaports, detention centres), institutional
norms and objects (Jaws. binding court decisions, passports) and ;
institutional practices ( confining, monitoring, interrogating), forming
the context in which the interactions between categories and their
referents take place. In other words, the problem for a realist social
ontology arises here not because the meanings of all general terms shape ,
the very perception that social scientists have of their referents, creating a
vicious circle, but only in some special cases and in the context of
institutions and practices that are not reducible to meanings. As the
philosopher Ian Hacking writes:
2
I N T R O D UCT I O N
3
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y O F S OC I E T Y
4
I N TR O D U C T I O N
as a mere aggregate, that is, as a whole without properties that are more
than the sum of its parts. For this reason we may refer to these solutions
to the micro-macro problem as 'micro-reductionist'.
The other position that has been historically adopted towards the
micro-macro problem is that social stru(_ture is what really exists,
individual persons being mere products of the society in which they are
born. The young Durkheim, the older Marx, and functionalists such as
Talcott Parsons are examples of this stance. These authors do not deny the
existence of individual persons but assume that once they have been
socialized by the family and the school, they have so internalized the
values of the societies or the social classes to which they belong that their
allegiance to a given social order may be taken for granted. This tends to
make the micro-level a mere epiphenomenon and for this reason this
stance may be labelled 'macro-reductionist'. There are many other
positions taken in social science towards the problem of the articulation of
the micro and the macro, including making an intermediate level, such as
praxis, the true core of social reality, with both individual agency and
social tructure being byproducts of this fundamental level. This seems to
be the stance taken by such prominent contemporary sociologists as
Anthony Giddens, a stance that may be labelled 'meso-reductionist'.5
These three reductionist positions do not, of course, exhaust the
possibilities. There are many social scientists whose work focuses on social
entities that are neither micro nor macro: Erving Goffman's work on
conversations and other social encounters; Max Weber's work on
institutional organizations; Charles Tilly's work on social justice move
ments; not to mention the large number of sociologists working on the
theory of social networks, or the geographers studying cities and regions.
What the work of these authors reveals is a large number of intermediate
levels between the micro and the macro, the ontological status of which
has not been properly conceptualized. Assemblage theory can provide the
framework in which the contributions of these and other authors
(including the work of those holding reductionist stances) may be
properly located and the connections bet ween them fully elucidated. This
is because assemblages, being wholes whose properties emerge from the
inte ractio ns between parts, can be used to model any of these
intermediate entities: interpersonal networks and institutional organiza
tions are assemblages of people; social justice movements are assemblages
of several networked communities; central governments
are assemblages
of several organizations; cities are assemblages
of people, networks,
5
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY
6
I NTRODUCTION
sense, not the geometric one, that I use the expression 'larger-scale'. Two
interpersonal networks, for example, will be compared in scale by the
number of members they contain not by the extent of the geographical
area they occupy, so that a network structuring a local community will be
said to be larger than one linking geographically dispersed friends if it has
more members, regardless of the fact that the latter may span the entire
planet. Also, being larger in only one of the properties differentiating the
social entities to be discussed here. There are many others properties
(such as the density of the connections in a network, or the degree of
centralization of authority in an organization) that are not extensive but
intensive, and that are equally i mportant. Finally, social entities will be
characterized in this book not only by their properties but also by their
capacities, that is, by what they are capable of doing when they interact
with other social entities.
To those readers who may be disappointed by the lack of cross-cultural
comparisons, or the absence of detailed analyses of social mechanisms, or
the poverty of the historical vignettes, l can only say that none of these
worthy tasks can be really carried out within an impoverished ontological
framework. When social scientists pretend to be able to perform these
tasks without ontological foundations, they are typically using an
implicit, and thereby uncritically accepted, ontology. There is simply no
way out of this dilemma. Thus, while philosophers cannot, and should
not, pretend to do the work of social scientists for them, they can greatly
contribute to the job of ontological clarification. This is the task that this
book attempts to perform.
Manuel DeLanda
New York, 2005
7
1
Assemblages against Totalities
8
. ASSEMBLAGES AGAINST TOTALITIES
9
A NEW P H ILOSO P H Y OF SOCIETY
transcend the duality of agency and structure by arguing for their mutu
constitution: agency is constituted by its involvement in practice whic
in turn. reproduces structure. Structure is conceived as consisting
behavioural procedures and routines. and of material and syrnboli
resources, neither one of which possesses a separate existence outside
their instamiation in actual practice. 3 In turn, the practices whic
instantiate rules and mobilize resources are conceived by Giddens as
continuous flow of action 'not composed of an aggregate or series o
separate intentions, reasons, and motives'.4 The end result of this is
seamless whole in which agency and structure mutually constitute on
another dialectically. 5
Following Hegel. other defenders of this approach argue that withou
relations of interiority a whole cannot have emergent propertie
becoming a mere aggregation of the properties of its components.
may be argued, however, that a whole may be both analysable int
separate parts and at the same time have irreducible properties, propertie
that emerge from the interactions between parts. As the philosopher
science Mario Bunge remarks, the 'possibility of analysis does not entai
redu<"tion, and explanation of the me<"hanisms of emergence does no
explain emergen<"e away'.6 Allowing the possibility of complex interac
tions between component parts is crucial to define me<"hanisms o
emergence, but this possibility disappears if the parts are fused togethe
into a seamless web. Thus, what needs to be challenged is the very idea o
relations of interiority. We can distinguish, for example, the propertie
defining a given entity from its capacities to interact with other entities
While its properties are given and may be denumerable as a closed list, i
capacities are not given- they may go unexercised if no entity suitable fo
interaction is around - and form a potentially open list, since there is n
way to tell in advance in what way a given entity may affect or be affecte
by innumerable other entities. In this other view, being part of a who}
involves the exerdse of a part's c apacities but it is not a constitutiv
property of it. And given that an unexercised capacity does not affe
what a component is, a part may be detached from the whole whil
preserving its identity.
Today, the main theoretkal alternative to organic totalities is what th
philosopher Gilles Deleuze calls assemblages, wholes chara<"terized b
relations of exteriority. These relations imply, first of all, that a componen
part of an assemblage may be detached from it and plugged into a
10
ASSEMBLAGES AGAINST TOTA LITIES
11
A N E W P H I L O SO P H Y OF SOCI E T Y
despite the tight integration between its component organs, the relations
between them are not logically necessary but only contingently
obligatory: a historical result of their close coevolution. In this way
assemblage theory deprives organismic theories of their most cherished
exemplar.
In addition to the exteriority of relations, the concept of assemblage is
defined along two dimensions. One dimension or axis defines the variable
roles which an assemblage's components may play, from a purely material
role at one extreme of the axis, to a purely expressive role at the other
extreme. These roles are variable and may occur in mixtures. that is, a
given component may play a mixture of material and expressive roles by
exercising different sets of capacities. The other dimension defines
variable processes in which these components become involved and that
either stabilize the identity of an assemblage, by increasing its degree of
internal homogeneity or the degree of sharpness of its boundaries, or
destabilize it. The former are referred to as processes of territorialization
and the latter as processes of deterritorialization. 10 One and the same
assemblage can have components working to stabilize its identity as well
as components forcing it to change or even transforming it into a different
assemblage. In face one and the same component may participate in both
processes by exercising different sets of capacities. Let me give some
simple social examples of these four variables.
The components of social assemblages playing a material role vary
widely, but at the very least involve a set of human bodies properly
oriented (physically or psychologically) towards each other. The classic
example of these assemblages of bodies is face-to-face conversations, but
the interpersonal networks that structure communities, as well as the
hierarchical organizations that govern cities or nation-states, can also
serve as illustrations. Community networks and institutional organiza
tions are assemblages of bodies, but they also possess a variety of other
material components. from food and physical l abour, to simple tools and
complex machines, to the buildings and neighbourhoods serving as their
physical locales. Illustrating the components playing an expressive role
needs some elaboration because in assemblage theory expressivity cannot
be reduced to language and symbols. A main component of conversations
is, of course, the content of the talk, hut there are also many forms of
bodily expression (posture, dress, facial gestures) that are not linguistic. In
addition, there is what participants express about themselves not by what
they say but by the way they say it or even by their very choice of topic.
12
A S S EMBL AG E S A G A I N S T TOTALI T I E S
These are nonlinguistic social expressions which matter from the point of
view of a person's reputation (or the image he or she tries to project in
conversations) as much as what the person expresses linguistically.
Similarly, an important component of an interpersonal network is the
expr essions of solidarity of its members, but these can be either linguistic
(promises, vows) or behavioural, the solidarity expressed by shared
sacrifice or mutual help even in the absence of words. Hierarchical
organizations, in turn, depend on expressions of legitimacy, which may
be embodied linguistically (in the form of beliefs about the sources of
authority) or in the behaviour of their members, in the sense that the
very act of obeying commands in public, in the absence of physical
1
coercion, expresses acceptance of legitimate authority.l
The concept of territorialization must be first of all understood literally.
Face-to-face conversations always occur in a particular place (a street
comer. a pub, a church), and once the participants have ratified one
another a conversation acquires well-defined spatial boundaries. Simi
larly, many interpersonal networks define communities inhabiting spatial
territories, whether ethnic neighbourhoods or small towns, with well
defined borders. Organizations, in tum, usually operate in particular
buildings, and the jurisdiction of their legitimate authority usually
coincides with the physical boundaries of those buildings. The exceptions
are governmental organizations, but in this case too their jurisdictional
boundaries tend to be geographical: the borders of a town, a province or a
whole country. So, in the first place, processes of territorialization are
processes that define or sharpen the spatial boundaries of actual
territories. Territorialization, on the other hand, also refers to non-spatial
processes which increase the internal homogeneity of an assemblage,
such as the sorting processes which exclude a certain category of people
from membership of an organization, or the segregation processes which
increase the ethnic or racial homogeneity of a neighbourhood. Any
process which either destabilizes spatial boundaries or increases internal
heterogeneity is considered deterritorializing. A good example is com
munication technology, ranging from writing and a reliable postal
service, to telegraphs, telephones and computers, all of which blur the
spatial boundaries of social entities by eliminating the need for co
presence: they enable conversations to take place at a distance, allow
interpersonal networks to form via regular correspondence, phone calls
or computer communications, and give organizations the means to
operate in different countries at the same time.
13
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY
14
ASSEMBL AGES A G A INST TOTA LITIES
IS
A N EW P H I L O SOPH Y OF S OC I E T Y
16
A S SEMBLA G E S A G A I N S T T OT A LI T I E S
17
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY
18
ASSEMBLAGES AGAINST TOTALITIES
19
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S OCIETY
with the one for logical implication ('If C, then E necessarily') has misled
many philosophers into thinking that the relation between a cause and its
effect is basically that the occurrence of the former implies that of the
latter. But if causality is to provide the basis for objective syntheses causal
relations must be characterized as productive, that is, as a relation in which
one event (the cause) produces another event (the effect), not just
implies it. 22 The events which are productively connected by causality
can be simple or atomistic events such as mechanical collisions. But
causality may also connect complex entities, such as the component parts
that make up a whole. In this case, while the entity itself cannot act as a
cause because it is not an event, a change in its defining properties can be
a cause, since changes, even simple quantitative ones, are events. For the
same reason, actions performed by a complex entity can also be causes.
Linear causality is typically defined in terms of atomistic events, but
once we depart from these we must consider the role that the internal
organization of an entity may play in the way it is affected by an external
cause. This internal organization may, for example, determine that an
external cause of large intensity will produce a low-intensity effect (or no
effect at all) and vice versa, that small causes may have large effects.
These are cases of nonlinear causality, defined by thresholds below or
above which external causes fail to produce an effect. that is, thresholds
determining the capacities of an entity to be causally affected. In some
cases, this capacity to be affected may gain the upper hand to the point
that external causes become mere triggers or cataysts for an effect. As
Bunge puts it, in this case 'extrinsic causes are efficient solely to the
extent to which they take a grip on the proper nature and inner processes
of things'.23 Catalysis deeply violates linearity since it implies that
different causes can lead to one and the same effect - as when a switch
from one internal state to another is triggered by different stimuli - and
that one and the same cause may produce very different effects
dtpending on the part of the whole it acts upon - as when hormones
stimulate growth when applied to the tips of a plant but inhibit it when
applied to its roots.24 It is important to emphasize, however, that to refer
to inner processes (or to an internal organization) does not imply that
nonlinear or catalytic interactions are examples of relations of interiority:
inner processes are simply interactions between the component parts of
an entity and do not imply that these parts arc m utually constituted.
These two depanures from linearity violate the first part of the fonnula
('same cause. same effect'), but the second part ('always') may also be
20
ASSEMBLAGES AGAINST TOTALITIES
A further test of the falsity of the doctrine of the block u n i verse is the
existence of chance (that is, statistically determined ) phenomena;
most of them arise from the comparative independence of different
emities, that is, o u t of their comparative reciprocal contingency or
irrelevancy. The existence of m u t ually independent lines of evolution
21
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
22
ASSEMBLAGES AGAINST TOTALITIES
23
A NEW P H ILOSO P H Y OF SOCIETY
24
ASSEM B LAGES AGAINST TOTA LITIES
25
2
Assemblages against Essences
26
A S S E M B L A G E S AG AI NST E S S E N C ES
27
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
28
AS S E M B L A G ES A G A I N S T E S S E N C E S
e xhi bit a completely different set of metric relations. Therefore only non
m etric o r topological notions, such as the overall connectivity of the
different parts of the body, can be used to specify it. To put this
differently, a body-plan defines a space of possibilities ( th e space of all
possible vertebrate designs, for example) and this space has a topological
st ru cture. The notion of the structure of a space of possibilities is crucial i n
assemblage theory given that, unlike properties, t h e capacities of an
assemblage arc not given, that is, they are merely possible when not
exercised. But the set of possible capacities of an assemblage is not
amorphous. however open-ended it may be. since different assemblages
exhibit different sets of capacities.
The formal study of these possibility spaces is more advanced in
physics and chemistry. where they are referred t o as 'phase spaces' . Their
structure is given by topological invariants called 'attractors', a s well a s by
the dimensions of the space, di mensions that represent the 'degrees of
freedom', or relevant ways of changing, of concrete physical or chemical
dynamical systems.5 C lassical physics, for example, discovered that the
possibilities open to the evolution of many mech anicaL optical and
gravitational phenomena were highly constrained, favouring those
outcomes that minimize the difference between potential and kinetic
energy. In other words, the dynamics of a large variety of classical systems
were attracted to a minimum point in the possibility space, an attractor
defining their long-term tendencies. In the biological and social sciences.
on the other hand, we do not yet have the appropriate formal tools to
investigate the structure of their much more complex possibility spaces.
B ut we may venture the hypothesis that they will also be defined as
phase spaces with a much more complex distribution of topological
invariants ( attractors ) . We may refer to these topological invariants as
universal sin.qularities because they are singular or special topological
features that a re shared by many different systems. It is distributions of
these un iversal singula rities that would replace Aristotle's genera, while
individual singularities replace his species. Moreover. the link from one to
another would not be a process of logical differentiation, but one of
historical dzfferentiation. that is, a process involving the divergent evolution
of all the different vertebrate species that realize the abstract body-plan.
29
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y O F S OC I E T Y
30
A S S E M BLAG E S A G A INST E S S E NC E S
ch arism atic forms - and the degree t o which the activities o f the
organi zation are routinized - the charismatic form would have the least
deg r ee of routinization, while the other two would be highly routinized.
Jn short , individual and universal singu larities, each in its own way,
allow the assemblage approach to operate without essences. They also
define the proper use of analytical techniques in this approach. While in
taxonomic essentialism the role of analysis is purely logical, decomposing
a genus into its component species by the s u ccessive discovery o f
necessary difterences, for example, in assemblage theory analysis must go
beyond logic and involve causal interventions in reality, such as lesions
made to a n organ within an organism, or the poisoning of enzymes
within a cell, followed by observations of the effect on the whole's
behaviour. These interventions are needed because the causal interac
tions among parts may be nonlinear and must, therefore, be carefully
disentangled, and because the entity under study may be composed o f
parts operating a t different spatial scales a n d the correct scale m u s t be
located.9 In short, analysis in assemblage theory is not conceptual but
causal. concerned with the discovery of the actual mechanisms operating at
a given spatial scale. On the other hand. the topological structure defining
the diagram o f a n assemblage is not actual but virtual and mechanism
independent, capable of being realized in a variety of actual mechanisms.
so it demands a different form of analysis. The mathematics of phase
space is but one example of the formal resources that must be mobilized
to reveal the quasi-causal constraints that structure a space of
possibil ities. 10 Ca usal and quasi-causal forms of analysis are used
complementarily in assemblage theory. To return to the example of
classical physics: while this field had by the eighteenth century already
discovered 'least principles' (that is, a universal singularity i n the form of
a minim u m poin t ) this did not make the search for the causal
mechanisms through which actual minimization is achieved in each
separate case redundant. Both the productive causal relations as well as
the quasi-causal topological constraints were part of the overall
explanation of classical phenomena. This insight retains its validity when
approaching the more complex cases of biology and sociology.
Despite the complementarity of causal and quasi-causal forms of
analysis. i n this book I will emphasize the former. Indeed, although I will
try to give examples of the inner workings of roncrete assemblages
whenever possible, no attempt will be made to describe every causal
mechanism i n detail. O n the other han d, it is important to define how
31
A NEW P HILOSO P H Y OF SOCIETY
32
ASSEMBLAGES AGAINST ESSENCES
33
A N E W P H i l O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
35
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A NEW P HILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY
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37
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
38
ASS E M B L A G ES A G A I N ST E S S E N C E S
orga nization would b e able t o keep its identity without the ongoing
interactions among its administrative staff and its employees; no city
could keep it s identity without ongoing exchanges among its political,
economic and religious organizations; and no nation-state would survivt
without constant interactions between its capital city and its other urban
centres. In technical terminology this can be expressed by saying that
territorializing processes are needed not only historically to produce the
identity of assemblages at each spatial scale but also to maintain it in the
presence of destabilizing processes of deterri torialization.
A second qualification is related to the first. I argued in the p revious
chapter that assemblages are always produced by processes that are
recurrent and that this implies that they always exist in populations.
Given a population of assemblages at any one scale. other processes can
then generate larger-scale as semblages using members of this population
as components. This statement is correct, but only if not taken to imply an
actual historical sequence. Although for the original emergence of the
very first organizations a pre-existing population of persons had to be
available (not, o f course, i n a state of nature, but already linked into
interpersonal network s) most newly born organizations tend to staff
themselves with people from other pre-existing organizations. 1 9 With
very few exceptions, organizations come into being in a world already
populated by other organizations. Furthermore, while some part must
pre-exist th e whole, others may be generated by the maintenance
processes of an already existing whole: while cities are composed of
populations of interpersonal networks and organizations, it is simply not
the case that these populations had to be there prior to the emergence of a
ci ty. In fact. most networks and organizations come into being as parts of
already existing cities.
The third qualification relates to the question of the relevant scale a t
which a particular social process i s t o b e explained. A s I argued above,
sometimes questions of relevance are settled through the concept of
causal redundancy. But this does not imply that explanations will always
involve a single spatial scale. The N apoleonic revolution in warfare a
revolution which transformed war from one conducted through
relatively local battles of attrition to one based on battles of annihilation
in which the entire resources of a nation were mobilized - is a good
example of a process demanding a multiscaled explanation: it involved
causal changes taking place at the urban and national scale (the French
Revolution, which produced the first armies of motivated citizens instead
39
A N E W P H i l O S OPHY O F S O C I E TY
40
ASS E M B L A G E S A G A I N S T E S S E N C E S
i n both the biological and social realms, that seem to operate in a scale-free
way. These are the specialized l ines of expression I mentioned i n the first
chapter, involving genetic and linguistic entities. On the one hand, genes
and words, a re more micro t h a n the bodies and minds of persons. On the
other. they can also affect macro-processes: genes define the h uman
species as a whole, a nd words can define religions commanding belief by
large portions of that species. The second question is: How do these
spe cial assemblages affect the part-to-whole relation?
The first important temporal aspect of social assemblages is the relative
duration of events capable of changing them. Does it take longer to effect
enduring and significant changes in organizations than in people, for
example, or longer in cities than in organizations? Here we must first
distinguish between changes brought about by causal interactions among
social assemblages without any conscious intervention by persons (i.e.
changes produced as collective unintended consequences of intentional
action) from those which are the result of deliberate planning. The former
case involves slow cu mulative processes of the products of repeated
interactions. For example, during the seventeemh a n d eighteenth
centuries in E u rope the a u t hority structure of many organizations
changed from a form based on traditional legitimacy to one based on
rational-legal bureau cratic procedures. The change affected not only
government burea ucracies, but also hospitals, schools and p risons. When
studied in detail, however, no deliberate pla n ca n be discerned, the
change occurring through t h e slow replacement ove r two centuries of
one set of daily routines by another. Although this replacement did
involve decisions by individual persons - persons w h o may have simply
imitated in one organization what was happening in another motivated
by a desire for legitimacy - the details of these decisions are i n most cases
causally redundant to explain the outcome: a n outcome better under
stood a s the result of repeated interactions among the members of an
organizational population. A similar point applies to changes in u rb a n
settlements: the interactions among towns, through trade a n d competi
tion for immigrants and investment. yield results over extended periods
of time in which smal l initial advantages accumulate, or in which self
stimulating dynamics have time t o amplify initial differences.
Thus in changes not explainable by reference to strategic planning,
relatively long time-scales can be expected for significant changes to take
place. B ut what about t h e o t h e r case? Do p l a n n e d changes at
41
A N E W P H i l O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
II!
variety of sources of inertia at any given scale, from tradition and
precedent to the entrenched interests of those that may be affected by a
particular change. This implies that the larger the spatial scale of the
change, the more extensive the a lliances among the people involved have
to be, and the more end u ring their commitment to change has to be. Let
me illu strate this with two examples at different spatial scales: resource
mobilization performed within an organization to change the organiza- J",
tion itself, and resource mobilizations performed in a hierarchy of
organizations to effect change at the scale of neighbourhoods or entire
towns.
The first case, interorganizational change, may be illu strated by the
need for organizations to keep up with rapid technological developments.
Given a correct assessment by people in authority of the opportunities
and risks of new technologies, can an organization change fast enough to
time internal chan_qes to external pressures? Or more simply, can the resources
available to an organization be mobilized at will? ln large, complex
organizations this may not be possible. Changes in the way an
organization operates are bound to affect some departments more than
others, or withdraw resou rces from one department to endow anoth er,
and this will generate internal resistance which m ust be overcome
through negotiation. The possibilities of success in these negotiations, in
turn, will depend on the extent to which the formal roles in an authority
structure overlap with the info rmal roles of the interpersonal networks
formed by employees. If a network property (such as the centrality or
popularity of a node) fails to coincide with formal a uthority, the result
may be conflict and stalemate in the mobilization of resources.20 This
means that even in the case where the decisions to change have been
made by people who can command obedience from subordinates, the
very complexity of joint action implies delays in the implementation of
42
ASSEMBLAGES AG AINST ESSENCES
the centrally decided plans, and thus, longer time-scales for organiza
tion al change.
The effect of time-lags produced by the need to negotiate and secure
43
A N E W P H I LOSOPHY O F S O C I ETY
44
ASSEMBLAGES AGAINST ESSENCES
the present. When the sorting device biases this evolution towards
adaptation, populations of replicators can act as a learning mechanism. a
means to track changes in an environment through their own internal
changes. ln the second place. these specialized assemblages are capable of
operating at multiple spatial scales simultaneously: genes are active within
cells . govern the functioning of organs. influence the behaviour of entire
organisms. and obstacles to their flow define the reproductive isolation of
a species; language shapes the most intimate beliefs of persons, the pu blic
content of conversations. the oral traditions of small comm u n ities. a n d
tht written constitutions of large organizations and entire governments. 2 2
Thanks to the flow of lingu istic replicators. assemblages operating at
di!Ierent spatial scales may also replicate, as when an organization opens
a new branch in a different locality a n d sends part of its staff to transmit
the daily routines defining its activities to the new employees. But the
flow of linguistic replicators need not always be vertical' from one
generation to another of the same community, or from one organization
to a new branch. As with poorly reproductively isolated micro-organisms,
this flow may be ' horizontal', introducing alien routines. p rocedures or
rit u al s which a lter. rather than p reserve, the i d e n t ity of social
assemblages.
These characteristics make genetic and linguistic assemblages not
ordinary assemblages. B u t however speciaL they should never be
considered as any more than component parts entering into relations of
exteriority with other component pa rts. When these relations are
conceived as i n te riority rela tions, constitutive of the very identity of the
related parts, both genes a n d words degenerate into essences. In the case
of language this manceuvre is embodied i n the thesis of the /inguisticality
of experience. that is, the idea that an otherwise u n differentiated
phenomenological field i s cut up into discrete entities by the meanings
of general terms. Since in many cases the meaning of general categories is
highly stereotyped ( particularly when they are categories applying to
groups of people, as in gender or race categories) the thesis o f the
linguisticality of experience implies that perception is socially con
str ucted. 2 3 At the start of this chapter I argued that general categories do
not refer to anything in the real world and that to believe they do ( i.e. to
reify them) leads directly to essentialism. Social constructivism is
supp osed to be an antidote to this. in the sense that by showing that
general categories are mere stereotypes it blocks the move towards their
reification. But by coupling the idea that perception is intrinsically
45
A N E W PHILOSOPHY O F SOCIETY
I,li
1 Il
l
f
46
3
Persons and N etworks
Although persons arc not the smallest analytical unit that social science
can study - actions by persons such as individual economic transactions
can be used a s units o f analysis - they arc the smallest-scale social
assemblage considered here. It i s true that persons emerge from the
i nteraction of subpcrson a l components, and that some of these
components m a y justifiably be called the smallest social entities. Nothing
very important depends on settling this question. All we need is a point of
departure for a bottom-up ontological model. and tpe personal scale will
provide a convenient one. On the other hand, i t must be stated at the
outset that the goal cannot be to settle all the philosophical questions
regarding subjectivity or consciousness: questions that will probably
continue to puzzle philosophers for a long time to come. All that i s
needed is a plausible model of t h e subject which meets t h e constraints o f
assemblage theory, that is, a model i n which t h e subject emerges a s
relations o f exteriority are established among t h e contents o f experience.
A good candidate for such a model. as Dcleuze himself argued long ago,
can be found in the philosophical school known as empiricis m .
T h e empiricist tradition i s mostly remembered f o r its epistemological
claims. in p a rticular, the claim that all knowledge, including verbal
knowledge, can ultimately be reduced to sense impressions. Or what
amounts to the same thing, that sense experience is the foundation o f a ll
knowledge. B u t Deleuze discovered i n the work o f David Hume
something much more interesting than such a dated foundational
epistemology: a model o f the genesis of subjectivity that can serve as an
alternative to the dominant one based on the thesis of the linguisticality
47
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY
I
association of ideas. Can it be modelled via relations of exteriority? I
e c l t f s v s o
:;: : ;:;: : ; : ! ;: : :: ; : ; ; ; '
t i t o t n x r r l s a ti . .
.
48
PERSONS AND N E TWORKS
49
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y O F S O C I E TY
IJ
9
association s a r e constantly mainta ined. It follows that any process which .
takes the subject back to the state i t had prior to the creation of fixed
associa tions between ideas ( i . e. the state in which ideas a re connected as
in a delirium) ca n destabilize personal identity. Examples of these
deterritorializing processes a re not hard to find. They include madness,
high fever, i n toxication, sensory deprivation a n d even deliberate
interventions aimed at disrupting d a i l y routine, as performed, for
example, on prisoners i n concentra tion camps. These, and other
processes, can cause a loss, o r a t least a severe destabilization, of
0
subjective identity. 1
Personal identity, on the other hand, may be deterritorialized not only
by loss of stability but also by a u gmentation of capacities; here we must
go beyond Hume and add to habit or routine the effects of the acquisition
of new skills. When a young child learns to swim or to ride a bicycle, for
example, a new world suddenly opens u p for experience, filled with new
impressions and ideas. The new skill i s deterri torializing to the extent that
it allows the child to break with past routine by venturing away from
horne in a n e w vehicle, or inhabiting previously forbidden spaces like the
ocean. New skills, in short, increase one's capacities to affect and be
affected, or to put it differently, increase one's capacities to enter into
novel assemblages, the assemblage tha t the h u m a n body forms with a
bicycle, a piece of solid ground and a gravitational field, for example. Of
course, the exercise of a new skill can soon become routine unless one
continues to push the learning process in new directions. In addition,
while rigid habits may be enough to associate linear causes and their
so
P E R S O N S A N D N E TW O R K S
51
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
assemblage theory can hardly be the last word, but it will be enough to
provide us with a point of departure. The subject or person emerging from
the assembly of subpersonal components (impressions. ideas, proposi
tional attitudes, habits, skills) has the right capacities to act pragmatically,
(i.e. to match means to ends) as well as socially, to select ends for a
variety of habitual or customary reasons that need not involve any
conscious decision. On the other hand. given that the processes that
produce assemblages are always iterative (i.e. that they always yield
populations ), we must immediately add those aspects of subjectivity that
emerge from the interactions between persons. Some of these interac
tions may be viewed as taking place within assemblages, albeit ones with
much shorter life-spans. These ephemeral assemblages may be referred to
as ' social encounters', and of the many different types of social
encounters we may single out a particularly relevant one: conversations
between two or more persons.
The most important research in this regard is without doubt
represented by the work of the sociologist Erving Goffman who studied
52
P E R SONS A N D NET W O R KS
53
A N E W PH I L O S OP H Y O F S O C I E T Y
54
P E R S O N S A N O N E TW O R K S
55
A N E W P H i l O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
56
PERSONS AND NETWORKS
57
A NEW PHILOSOPHY O F S O C I ETY
58
P E R S O N S AND NETWORKS
59
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I ETY
Tilly discusses how the means through which political claims are made
underwent a dramatic transformation in Great Britain between 1 7 5 0 and
1 8 50. Claim -makin g moved away from machine-breaking, p h y sical
attacks on t a x collectors, and other forms of direct action, towards the
very d ifferent set of expressive displays characteristic of today's move
ments, i n cluding 'public meetings, demonstrations, marches, petitions,
pamphlets. statements in mass media, posting or wearing of identifying
signs. and deliberate adoption of distinctive s l o ga n s ' .36 Th e new
' repertoires of contention', a s he calls them, play the main expressive
role i n these assemblages. During the Industrial Revolution and after
wards, a n aggrieved community (or coalition of communities) had to
express t h a t it was respectable, unified, numerous and committed, in s hort, 1
that it was a legitimate collective maker of claims in the eyes of both its t
rivals a n d the govern ment.37 Of course, the possession of these properties
may be e x pressed linguistically. Numerousness, for example. may be
expressed by publishing a statement about the quantity of supporting
members, but it will be displayed more convincingly by assembling a very
large crowd in a particular place in town. Respectability may also be
expressed in linguistic form, but it will be displayed more dramatically if a
large crowd manages to stage a peaceful and ordered dem onstration.
Linguistic statements about the degree o f u nity i n a coalition are easy to
ma ke, b ut for the same reason unity will be expressed more forcefully b y
concerted action a n d mutual support.
The cha nge i n contention repertoires during the eighteenth a n d
nineteenth centuries implies t h a t some component parts switched from a
material to an expressive role. B u t there are other material components.
Given that expressing respectability, numerousness, commitment a nd
unity simultaneously is not an easy task - having numerous members
makes presenting a u n i fied front more problematic, for example - a l a rge
investment of e nergy on the pan of organizers to hold the movement
together i s .required. As Tilly writes. the 'actual work o f organizers
consists recurrently o f patching together provisional coalitions, negotiat
i n g which of t h e mulriple agendas participants bring with them will find
public voice i n their collective action, suppressing risky tactics. and above
all hiding backstage struggle from public view' . 38 In addition, given the
fact that a government organization i s always pan of these a s semblages,
60
P E RSONS ANO NETWORKS
61
A N E W P H I LOSOPHY O F SOCI ETY
62
PER SONS AND NETWORKS
63
whol
polspeciitifceis,c varirelmappiigeityon,nofgan).between
hisItorin other
cally words,
differentiwhatatedneedsfieldtos be(su<.a<.::hcounted as economi chs
A N E W P H I LO S O P H Y O F S O C I E T Y
choi Bourdi euthatdoessometi not denymesthat, onmayoccasiengage on. peopl e do make delmat<.:iberate
means to ends. But far from constituting exC"eptions to the automatismhinofg
c es, or they i n consci o usl y
64
PERSONS AND NETWORKS
the habitus, i t i s the latter that determines when and where such
ex ceptions are allowed. The habitus then becomes a master process that
m akes possible the free production of all the thoughts, perceptions, and
actio ns inherent in the particular conditions of its production - and only
tho se' 46 It is not necessary to follow Bourdieu in this regard. His
65
A N E W P H I LO S O P H Y O F S OCI E T Y
are about real boundaries separating groups with differential rights and
obligations, boundaries that. must be enforced through a variety of 1
nonlinguistic physical interventions, from imposed segregation on certain I
neighbourhoods to forced migrations or reallocations of entire commu-
nities. Enforcement of categorical boundaries may also involve a variety
of subtler but nevertheless effective means of selectively including or
forcibly excluding members of certain categories from formal positions in
organizations. An important example of this is the matching of
traditionally defi n e d categories with those created internally by economic
organizations. Thus, a set of stereotyped beliefs about an ethnic group, i
widely dispersed in a population, may be matched to job categories as
defined by a specific commercial or ind ustrial organization, excluding
members of that group from some positions and forcing them into
others.48 This matching of external and internal categories is important
because, as Tilly argues, the durability of the inequality between groups
may be less a matter of racist, sexist or xenophobic categories than about
the way in which these categories affect the very design of a n
organizat.ion's formal structure o f roles a n d positions.49
In conclusion, we may conceptualize social classes as assemblages of
interpersonal networks and institutional organizations. Both the net
worked communities and the organizations in which their common
interests crystallize must be thought as having differential access t o
resources, some playing a material some an expressive role, as well a s
possessing a distinctive life-style composed of both material and
expressive elements. A variety of practices of exclusion and inclusion
66
P E R S O N S A N D N E TW O R K S
67
4
Organizations and Governments
68
ORG ANIZATIONS A N D GOVERN MENTS
69
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
Despite the coexistence of the three authority structures in some
contemporary territoria l states. on the other hand, the last 200 years have
witnessed the propagation of the rational-legal form throughout the
organizational populations inhabiting most modern territorial states, ifl
not in its extreme form then at least in mixtures dominated by this form ]
This makes this assemblage - in which the relations of exteriority
between components are exemplified by a contractual relation through
which some persons transfer rights of control over a subset of their
actions to other persons - particularly important. Moreover, it is only in
this type of authority structure that organizational resources are
associated with a position not with the person occupying it. This strict
separation results in an assemblage with clear-cut emergent properties i n
which an explanation of the behaviour of t h e organization does n o t need
to include a description of the personal characteristics of the leaders, or in
which such a description would be causally red undant. With a full
separation of office from incumbent the organization itself may be
considered a goal-oriented corporate actor. As the sociologist James
Coleman p u ts it, 'these entities. viewed from the outside, may be
regarded as actors. no less than individuals are. Nevertheless, from the
inside, they may be characterized as authority structures:6
As assemblages. hierarchical orga nizations possess a variety of
components playing an expressive role. Some of these are linguistic.
such as beliefs in the legitimacy of authority, but many are not. In the
traditional type, for example, there are man y elements of rituals. like
their choreography i n space and time, that express legitimacy simply by
70
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S A N D G O V E R N ME N T S
71
A N E W P H i lOSO P H Y O F SOC I ETY
.1
state, the foundations of which, as Foucault writes, ;
72
ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS
73
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I ET Y
74
ORG A N I Z A T I O N S A N D G O V ER N M E N T S
75
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
repeated over time. As I a rgued above, a n organization becomes a n actor
lO the extent that its resources (physical. technological. legal. financial)
a re linked to formal positions o r offices, not to their incumbents. Most
authors recognize the key role played by these resources but they tend to
take for granted the actual process of their acquisition, even though this
process is hardly a u tomatic a nd it i s often problematic for any given
organiza t i o n . In particular, orga n i za t i o n s must engage in specific
transactions with one another in order to solve the acquisition problem,
and in so doing they may develop relations of dependence as these
exchanges become more or less regular.
l
The sociologists Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gera ld Salancik have developed a
u seful approach to resource dependencies and to the capacity that one
organization may have to a ffect the behaviour of another when such
I.
dependencies are asymmetrica l . To define these relations of exteriority,
Pfeffer and Salancik begin by focusing on a given organization and a
given resource a n d determine the relative importance of t h e resource. I
i
Relative importance is measured both by the magnitude of the resou rce I
being exchanged as well as by its criticality. As they write:
76
ORGAN IZATIONS A N D GOVER N M ENTS
77
A NEW P H ILOSOP H Y OF SOCIETY
78
O RG A N I Z A T I O N S A N D G OV E R N M E N TS
79
wimorethindifisrtimsnctandin thibetween firms andrmlocalsysteinrn2stituti6 ons thus remain far
A NEW PHilOSOP H Y OF SOCIETY
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O RG A NIZATIONS A N D G O V E R N M E NTS
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81
A N E W P H I LOSO P H Y O F S O C I ETY
82
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S A N D G O V E R N M E N TS
i n the same country. When considering entire indu stries we are less
co ncerned with the ability of their member organizations to adapt (given
en oug h time all organizations can adapt) tha n their ability to time internal
cha nges to external shocks, particularly when the external shocks become
continuous.32 To the extent that the capacity to track continuous shocks
demands a collective response from a n entire organizational network, the
l ocation of the network in the continuum of fom1s may determine the
co nditions of success or fa ilure. The sharp separation of planning from
doing characteristic of economies of scale limits the number of people in
an orga nization that are involved in adapting to change, while the flatter
hierarchies of smaller organizations a nd their use of skilled labour allows
enrire firms to learn from experience. In addition, the consultative
coordination between firms and suppliers characteristic of economies of
agglomeration may extend the benefits of learning by doing to the entire
network. The faster the rate of i nnovation, the more a given network will
benefit from the collective learning process of the small-firm e xtreme,
a nd the more inadequate the self-sufficient approach of an oligopoly o f
large firms will become.
I have already m e n tioned one lingu istic compon e n t of t hese
assemblages, but a n equally important one i s the written contracts (and
other agreements) which organizations use as a means to mitigate the
effects of interdependencies. As with the making of decisions, the content
of contracts will vary depending on the predictability of the consequences
of organizational action : the more eventful the situation in which a
contract is produced, the more labour will be involved in the anticipation
of consequences. In fact, contracts differ in the extent to which their
wording needs to specify all continge ncies and eventualities in advance.
In nco-institutional economics, for example, a distinction is made
between employment contracts and sales contracts, with the latter
presenting more problems of contingency anticipation than the former.
Indeed, when these problems are too great (due to dependencies created
hy specialized machinery, for example) this branch of economics predicts
that an organization will switch from sales to employment <'Ontracts by,
for example, p u rchasing a firm with which it previously dealt with in the
market .33 In addition to the difficulty presented by incomplete
mntracts (given limited rationality a nd honesty) a decision to use one or
another type o f contractual form may depend on the choice of the locus
of contractual interpretation and enforcement. Whereas an employment
contract can be en forced internally, and conflicts over its interpretation
83
A NEW PHilOSOPHY OF SOCI E T Y
84
O RG A N I ZA T I O N S A N D GOV E R N M E N T S
the 'ability to assess the extent of goal attainment and the distribution of
authority between elected and appointed officials'.38
The second preliminary remark expands on this last point. The
relations between government organizations staffed by elected officials
( t hat is, democratic or representative organizations) and those run b y
non - elected, career bureaucrats are problematic in a deeper sense. In
order for bu reaucracies to be ru n efficiently, a sharp separation between
politics and administration is necessary: that is, the expertise of a
professional body of b u reaucrats must be isolated from the contingencies
of t he electoral process. But the more this separation i s achieved, the
greater the sense that bureaucracies are not responsive to public concerns
85
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
I
dependent on their technical resources, further eroding their already
qu estionable legitimacy. 40
The third and fourth preliminary remarks concern distinctions that are
crucial within assemblage t h eory but that are not necessarily drawn in .
other approaches. First of all. we must distinguish between the hierarchy 1
of organizations forming a federal (or other form of) government from
the territorial entity such as hierarchy controls. The territorial entity l
includes. beside government organizations, an entire population of other 1
organizations; populations of persons and interpersonal n etworks; cities,
regions and provinces; and geopolitical relations of exteriority with other ;
territorial entities. When a political revolution changes one government i
regime by another, an autocratic regime by a de mocratic one, for
example, it typically leaves u n touched the previous unequal relations
between cities, regions and provinces, not to mention the geostrategic
position of the country relative to other cou n t ries. On the other hand,
this distinction should be made carefully since most hierarchies of
organizations are not really separable from the territory they govern, and
part of what defines their identity is exercising actual control over the
borders of that territory. Unlike interpersonal networks or institutional
organizations which, thanks to communications technologies, may exist
without well-defined spatial boundaries (or even in virtual form on the
86
O R G A N I ZATIONS A N D G O V E R N M ENTS
next chapter.
In addition to distinguishing the hierarchical assemblage of organiza
87
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y O F SO C I E T Y
88
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S A N D G O V E R N M E N TS
89
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
90
O R G A N IZATIONS A N D G O V E R N ME NTS
91
A NEW P H i lOSO P H Y O F SOC I E T Y
govern ment a nd the population. The classical example is the effect that i
the French Revolution h a d on the composition of armies, that is, the
1
change from mercenary to loyal citizen armies. The means used to effect s
this change in different countries, however, varied with the existing
sources of legitimacy. Two of the forms of legitimacy discussed by Weber,
traditional and rational-legal, have counterparts at larger scales. In some.
countries the bonds uniting a population a re inherited or come !'rom a
long tradition, so that the 'nation' precedes the 'state'. In others, these
bonds emerge from the sharing of the same laws, that is, the 'state'
precedes the 'nation'. 53 Cou ntries that followed the state-to-nation path
(such as France or England) tended to favour newly invented expressions:
of patriotism: flags, oaths, anthems, national holidays, military parades, .
official celebrations. Those that followed t h e nation-to-state path
(Germany) tended towards more populist expressions, using more or
less coherent syntheses of popular elements created by intellectual elites. 1
However, just as Weber's ideal types rarely exist in pure form, blood a nd
l a w as sources of national unity were never m u t ually exclusive. Most
countries used a mix of these two sources of legitimacy when rallying
their populations for war. And ultimately, regardless of what combination
of expressive means a given government used, the ultimate display of
patriotism has always been the willingness of citizens to die for their
country, a s expressed behaviourally on the battlefield.
The reality or threat of armed conflict is itself a powerful territorializ
ing force, making people rally behind their governments and close ranks
with each other. Much as the solidarity binding a community may be
92
O RG A N I ZAT I O NS A N D G O V E R N M ENTS
93
5
Cities and Nations
94
CITIES AND NATIONS
reasons for using the term 'locale' rather than place i s that the
properties of settings are employed in a chronic way by agents in the
cons titution of encounters across space and rime. !Loca les can be]
'stopping places' i n which the physical mobility of agents' trajectories
is arrested or curtailed for the duration of encounters or social
occasions . . . 'Regionalizat ion ' should be understood not merely as
localization in space but as referring to the zoning of time-space in
relation to routinized social practices. Thus a private house is a locale
which is a 'station' for a large cluster of interactions in the course of a
typical day. Houses in contemporary societies are regionalized into
floors, halls and rooms. B u t the various zones of the house are zoned
differently in time as well as space. The rooms downstairs are
characteristica l l y used mostly i n daylight hours, while bedrooms are
where individuals ' retire to' at night 2
95
A N E W P H I LO S OP H Y O F S O C I E T Y
bearing structures. For buildings that are a few storeys high, the
themselves perform this task, in conj unction with columns
independent beams, but large governmentaL religious and
b u i l dings must make use of more sophisticated techniques as
become taller. As skyscraper designers know well, radical changes in
may be needed once a critical height has been reached, such as the use
an interconnected iron or steel frame which, beginning in the 1
liberated walls from their load-bearing duties transforming them
mere curtains. Other components playing a material role are
determining the connectivity of the regions of a building. I f locales
stations where the daily paths of individual persons converge, the r"'''.-""
A hundred years later, some rooms had become public while others were
strictly private, partly as a result of the fact that the routine circulation
96
CITIES AND NATIONS
97
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
I have always thought that fashion resulted t o a large extent from the
desire of the privileged to distinguish themselves. whatever the cost,
from the masses that followed; to set up a barrier . . . Pressure from
followers and imitators obviously made the pace qu icken. And if this
was the case. it was because prosperity granted privileges t o a certa in
number of nouveaux riches and pushed them to the fore . 1 0
98
C I T I E S A N D N AT I O N S
99
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
100
CITIES AND NATIONS
101
A NEW PH ILOSO P H Y OF S O C I ETY
102
CITIES AND NATIONS
103
A N E W P H I LO S O P H Y O F S O C I E T Y
104
CITIES AND NATIONS
d ynamics can make towns grow much faster than their countryside,
in creasing their influence a n d breaking the symmetry of the resource
depe ndencies.
In fact. an assemblage analysis of urban centres must take into account
not o nly town and countryside, but also the geographical region they
bo th occupy. This region is an important source of components playing a
ma terial role in the assemblage. The geographical site and situation of a
given urban settlement provides it with a range of objective opportunities
an d risks, the exploitation and avoidance of whi ch depends on
interactions between social entities (persons, networks, organizations)
and physical and chemical ones (rivers, oceans, topsoiL mineral deposits ) .
I n addition t o ecological components there are those making u p t h e
infrastructure o f a city, that is, its physical form a n d its connectivity.
While the physical form of some towns may result from a mere
aggregation of its neighbourhoods, some aspects of its connectivity (those
related to citywide mechanical transportation ) tend to have properties of
their own, and are capable of affecting the form of the neighbourhoods
themselves. The best example i s perhaps that of locomotives. Their large
mass made them hard to stop as well as to accelerate again, and this
demanded the construction of elevated or underground tracks whenever
they had to intermesh with pedestrian traffic. The same physical
constrai n ts determined an interval of two or three miles between train
stops, directly infl uencing the spatial distribution of the suburbs which
grew around railroad stations, giving this distribution its characteristic
beadlike shape.27
The components playing a n expressive role in an urban assemblage
may also be a mere aggregation of those of its neighbourhoods, or go
beyond these. Let's take for e xample the silhouette which the mass of a
town's residential houses and b u ildings, as well as the decorated tops of
its churches and public buildings, cut against the sky. In some cases, this
skyline is a mere aggregate effect but the rhythmic repetition of
architectural motifs belfries and steeples, minarets, domes and spires,
even smokestacks, water-towers and furnace cones a n d the way these
rnotifs play in counterpoint with the surrounding features of the
landscape, may result in a whole that is more than a simple sum.28
Eith er way, skylines, however humble, greeted for centuries the eyes of
incoming people at the different approaches to a city, constituting a kind
of visual signature of its territorial identity. This was particularly true
before the blurring of city boundaries by suburbs and industrial
105
A N E W P H i l OS O P H Y O F S O C I E T Y
106
CITIES A N D NATIONS
107
A N EW P H I LO S O P H Y O F S O C I ETY
resource dependencies. cJ
In formal models of urban dynamics, assemblages of cities of differe n '
.
.
109
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y O F SOC IETY
dominant position b u t the gathering of expressions from all over the world.
The core cities, in particular, always had the highest cost of living and the
highest rate of inflation. so every commodity from around the world,
however exotic. tended to flow towards their high prices. 'These world- .
cities put all their delights on display', writes B raudeL becoming universal
warehouses. inventories of th e possible. veritable Noah's A rks.40
110
CITIES AND NATIONS
111
A N E W PH I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
The historical period that sealed the fate of a utonomous cities can be
framed by two critical da tes. 1 494 and 1 648, a period t h a t witnessed
warfare increasing enormously in both intensity and geographical scope.
The first date marks the year when t h e Italian city-states were first
invaded and brought to their knees by a rmies from beyond the Alps: the
French armies u nder Ch arles Vlll whose goal was to enforce territorial
claims on the kingdom of Naples. The second date celebrates t h e signing
of the peace trea t y of Westpha l ia, ending the Thirty Years War between
the largest territorial entity at the time, the Catholic Habsburg empire,
and an alliance between France, Sweden a n d a host of Protes tant-aligned
states. When the peace treaty was fi nally signed b y the exhausted
112
C I T I E S A N D N ATIONS
cr eat ed at the centre of Europe, and the frontiers that defined the
id e ntity of territori a l states, as well a s the balance of power between
th em, were consol i d a t e d . Although the crucial legal concept of
'so vereignty' had been formalized prior to the war (by Jean Bodin in
1 576) it was d u ring the peace conference that it was first used in practice
113
A N E W P H I L O SO P H Y O F S O C I E T Y
the long run 4 6 For this reason, h owever, it is hard to consider the peop
making mercantilist policy decisions the relevant social actors in this ca
Another reason to consider the activities of organizations the main sour
of temporal structure for territorial states is that many of the capaciti
necessary to cond uct a sound fiscal policy were the product of slo
organizational learning, a feat first achieved i n England between the yea
of 1 688 and 1 7 5 6 . As Braude! writ.es:
114
C I TI E S A N D N A T I O N S
n atio nal market in the eighteenth century, a process in which its n a tional
capi ta l played a key centralizing role. And, as Braude! argues, without the
nation a l market 'the modern state would be a p u re fiction'.48
Other countries ( France. Germany, the USA) accomplished this feat in
th(' following cen t u ry through the use of locomotives a n d telegraphs. The
advent of steam endowed land transportation with the speed i t h ad
Jacked for so long, changing the balance of power between landlocked
an d coastal regions and th eir cities, and giving national capitals a
dominant position. With the rise of railroads. as Hohenberg a n d Lees
write. although
On the expressive side. the most i mportant example was the use of
national capitals as a means to display central control. This was achieved
through the so-called 'Grand Manner' of u rban design pioneered in
Europe by the absolutist governments of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centu ries. Italian cities created the basic elements of the Grand Manner.
but it was in France after 1 6 5 0 that these elements became codified into a
style: residential blocks with uniform facades acting as frames for
sweeping vistas which culminated wit h an obelisk. triumphal arch. or
stat u e , acting a s a visual marker; long and wide tree-lined aven ues; a use
of the existing or modified topography for dramatic effect; and the
coordination of all these elements into grand geometric configu rations. 5 0
Al though the use of symbols a n d visual representations was also part of
this global approach to urban design, it can b e argued that the overall
th eatricality of the Grand Manner, and its carefully planned manipulation
of a city's visual experience. physically expressed the concentration of
power. To quote Spiro Kostoff:
115
A N E W P H I L O SO P H Y O F S OC I ET Y
we can readlly see why. The very expansiveness it calls for, and
abstraction of its patterns, presuppose an untangled decision
process and the wherewithal to accomplish what has been laid
When such clearcut a u thority cannot be had the Grand '"'"w"_.,
regimes of the Thirties - for the likes of M u ssolinL Hitler and Stalin.
116
C I T I E S A N D N AT I O N S
117
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
stein's view, for example, only one valid unit of sodal analysis h a s existed
since the end of the Thirty Years War, the entire 'world- system'.
Explanations at the level of nation-states are viewed as illegitimate since ,
118
CITIES AND NATIONS
l l9
Notes '
Introduction
Chapter l
I . Howard Becker and Harry l:llmer Barnes, Social Thought from Lore to Science
(New York: Dover, 1 96 1 ), pp. 677-8.
2. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Lo,qic (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1 999),
Volume 2. Book 2. p. 7 1 L (Emphasis in the origina l ) .
3 . 'Structure i s not "external" t o individuals: as memory traces, a n d as
120
N OTES
121
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
122
NOTES
123
A N E W PH ILOSO PHY O F SOCI ETY
identity change: indeed, a loss o f identity altogether, but without falling into ::
'
an undifferentiated chaos. Assemblages exist as auual entities, but t he
structure of the processes of assembly (what gives these processes their
recurrent nature, or what explains that they ran be repeated in the first
place) is not actual but virtual. When deterritorialization is absolute it means
that the process has departed from acwal reality to reafh the virtual
dimension. In this sense, the term is synonymous with 'counter-actuali?.a
tion' as the limit process whkh creates the plane of immanent multiplkities
which define the virtual structure of assemblages. The two limits referred to
in the quote above are, o n the one hand, a highly territorialized and coded
assemblage and, on the other, the plane of immanence mntaining the
virtual stru cture of all assemblages linked by relations of exteriority. In
Chapter 2 I discuss the question of the virtual structure of assemblages using
the concept of the 'diagram' of an assemblage.
2 2 . B u nge, Causa lity and Modern Science, p. 47.
2 3 . Ibid., p. 1 7 8. B u nge credits both Spi noza and Leibniz with the introduction
of efficient inner causation. Gilles Dele uze continues t.his tradition when he
gives equal importance to capacities to affect and capaci ties to be affected.
24. Ibid., 49.
2 5 . Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World
( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, I 984), pp. 30-34.
26. Bu nge, Causality and Modern Science, pp. 1 00- l .
2 7 . R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation ( London: Rou tledge & Kegan Paul,
1 960), p. 2 9 .
2 8 . Max Weber, The Theory of Social a n d Economic Organization (New York: Free
Press of Glencoe, I 964) . p. 99.
29. The concept o f culture I espouse . . . is essentially a semiotic one.
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is a n animal suspended in webs of
s(qnijlcance he himself has spun, I take cu lt.ure to be those webs, and the
analysis of it to be therefore not a n experimental science in search of law
but an interpretive one in search of meaning (C lifford Geertz, 'Thick
description: toward an interpretive theory of culture'. in The Interpretation
of Culture [New York: Basic Books, I 9 7 3 ] , p . .5 [my emphasis] )
Geertz goes on to speak of 'structures of signification', as if t.his expression
meant the same thing as 'webs of significance', a manceuvre which
illu strates the error I am discussing here. On t.he other hand, it must be
admitted that Geertz's ' thick descriptions' of cultural practices are indeed
invaluable as a starting point in any social explanation, and this regardless of
his rejection of explanat.ory strategies in favou r of descriptive ones.
30. Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 9 ! .
3 ! . Ibid., p . l l 6.
3 2 . Ibid., p. 1 1 5 . Weber discusses four ideal types of social action: ( ! ) action
124
NOTES
Chapter 2
I . Aristotle, The Metaphysics ( B u ffalo, NY:, Prometheus Books, 1 9 9 1 ), p. 1 5 5.
2. O n e i s called that which subsists a s such according to accident i n one
way, and in anot her, that which subsists essentially. A thing i s called one
according to accident, for instance Coriscus and what is m u sical, and the
musical Coriscus; for it is one and the same thing to say, Coriscus and
what is musicaL as to say, Coriscus the musician; also, to say the m usical
and the just is one with saying the j ust m u sician Coriscus. For all these
are called one according to accident. ( 1bid . p. 9 7 )
3 . 'The very nature o f a thing will not, accordingly, be found i n a n y of those
things that are not the species of a genus. but in these only, for these seem to
be predicated not according t o participation or passion, nor as a n accident'
(ibid., p. 1 36 ) .
4. Michael T . Ghiselin, Metaphysics and the Or(qin of Species (Albany, N Y : State
University of New Y ork. 1 99 7 ) , p . 78.
5. For a full discussion of the ontological and epistemological aspects of phase
space, see Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London:
Continu um. 2002). Ch. l .
6. For Deleuze's most extende d discussion of diagrams, see Gilles Deleuze,
Foucault (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1 988). pp. 34-4 1
and 7 1 -2 .
The structure of a space of possibilities is someti mes referred to as a
'multiplicity', a term tha t in French is equivalent to 'manifold', the
differential geomet ry spaces u sed in the construction of phase space.
Deleuze sometimes uses the terms 'multiplicity' and 'diagram' as synonyms.
Thus, he says that 'every diagram is a spatio-temporal multiplicity' (ibid.,
p. 3 4 ) . But he also uses alternative formulations that do not involve the
mathematics of phase space. Thus he defines a diagram as a display of
relations of Io ree, or of a distribution of capacities to affect and be affected
125
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY
(ibid., pp. 7 1 -2 ) . Since capacities may exist without being exercised (i. e.
'
since they may exist as possibilities) they form a possibility space, an d a
diagram would display whatever structure this space has. E lsewhere, his
definition departs from this spatial form. He argues that unlike an
assemblage where the material and expressive roles (or the content and
the expression) are clearly distinguished, the diagram of an assembl age
involves unformalized functions and unfonned matter. This means that diagrams
have an abst.ract structure in which the expressive and the material are not
differentiated, a differentiation that emerges only when the diagram is
divergently actualized in concrete assemblages. One way of thinking about
the status of diagrams is. therefore, as the product of a full deterritorializa
tion of a concrete assemblage, since it is the opposite process ( territ.orializa
tion or actualization) that differentiates the material from the expressive.
See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guat.tari, A Thousand Plateaus (Minneapolis,
MN: Uni versity of Minnesota Press, 1 98 7 ) , p. 1 42 .
Finally, while 'multiplicity' and 'diagram' a r e sometimes used inter
changeably, at other times they refer to separate entities: the structure of a
possibility space, on the one hand, and the agency responsible for the
absolute deterritorialization, the abstract machine or qu asi-causal operator,
on the other. For a detailed explanation of these notions and their relations,
see DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, Chs 2 and 3.
7. Because Oeleuze does not subscribe to the multiscale social ontology that I
am elaborating here, he never says that each of these entities {interpersonal
networks, institutional organizations, cities, etc . ) have their own diagram.
On the con trary, he asserts that the diagram 'is coextensive with the social
field' (Deleuze, Foucault p. 34). Deleuze gives as examples of 'social fields'
contemporary 'disciplinary societies', the 'sovereign societies' that came
before them, 'primitive societies', 'feudal societies', etc. (ibid., pp. 34-5 ) . In
the social ontology I am presenting there is no such thing as 'society as a
whole' or an overall 'social field', so I am breaking in a rather drastic way
with Deleuze here.
This implies that the terms 'micro' and 'macro' a s used in this book d o not
correspond to Deleuze's 'molecular' and 'molar'. But some correspondence
may still be achieved: at every level of scale we may have, on the one hand,
populations of micro-entities, populations characterized by intensive
properties such as rates of growth, or the rate a t which some components
propagate within them; and, o n the other hand, some of the members of
these populations may be caught into larger macro-entities, regularized and
routinized. The entities belonging to the populations could be seen as
'molecular', while the entities caught in the larger aggregates would be
'molar', particularly if the macro-entity is highly territorialized. These
remarks soften the differences but do not completely eliminate them. For
126
NOTES
127
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E TY
'
micro relative to the ideological spirit o f the age. ( Dean R. Gerstein, 'To
unpack micro a n d macro: link small with large and part with whole',
ibid., p. 88)
1 2 . Roy Bhaskar. A Realist Theory of Science (London : Verso, 1 99 7 ) , p . 1 1 4 . While
Bhaskar's realism comes very dose to Deleuze's in some aspects it is
incompatible with it because Bhaskar is a self-declared essentialist. As he
writes:
In general to classify a group of things together in science, to call them by
the same name, presupposes that they possess a real essence or nature in
common, though it does not presuppose that the real essence or nature is
known . . . A chemist will classify diamonds, graphite and black carbon
together because he believes that they possess a real essence in common,
which may be identified as the atomic (or electronic) structure of carbon.
( Ibid .. p. 2 1 0 )
1 3. Peter Hedstriim and Richard Swedberg, ' Social mechanisms: an introduc
tory essay', in Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to Social Th eory,
(eds) Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg ( C a mbridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1 998 ) , pp. 22-3. The authors propose t h ree different t ypes
of mechanism: macro-micro, micro-micro and micro-macro. The first type
would figure in explanations of the relations between a social situation
involving large sociological phenomena (such as the distribut ion of income
or power in a popu lation) and i ndividual social actors. The large-scale
process may, for example. create different opportunities and risks for
different actors, who must include these opportunities and risks as part of
their reasons to act. The second type refers mainly to social-psychological
mechanisms, that is, to the mental processes explaining t h e making of
particular decisions (in the case of motives) or to the processes behind the
lormation of habits, the production of emotions or the acquisition of beliefs
(in the case of reaso n s ) . Finally, the third type refers to mechanisms
governing the interactions among individual actors which generate
collective outcomes.
The problem i s that t he terms 'micro' and 'macro' are used in their absolute
sense, with 'micro' referring to individual persons and 'macro' designating
society as a whole. But in assemblage theory the distinction between micro
and macro-levels is relative to scale. Relativizing the distinction implies that
their third type of mechanism, micro-micro, can be eliminated since a t any
given scale it reduces to the micro-macro one at the immediately smaller scale.
And similarly for what we may term macro-macro mechanisms. When
'macro' refers to 'total society' there is no need to consider the interactions
between wholes. But once the distinction is relativized we do need to consider
that wholes made out of individual persons, such as interpersonal networks or
institutional organizations, ma y interact with one another a s wholes. The
128
NOTES
129
A N E W P H i l O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
produte more complex relations between the micro and the macro. See
Deleuze and Guatta ri, A Thousand Plateaus. p. 5 9 .
2 3 . Peter L. Berger a n d Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New
York: Anchor Books. I 967 ) .
Chapter 3
I . 'All t h e perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two kinds,
which I shall call IMPRE SSIONS and I D E A S . The difference betwixt them
consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon
the mind, and make their way into our thought and consciousness. Those
perceptions, which enter with the most force and violence, we may name
impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions
and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I
mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning . . .' ( David Hume,
A Treatise of Human Nature [London: Penguin, 1 969], p. 49. [emphasis in the
original] )
2. Ibid,. p. 462.
3. Hume, in fact, makes a distinction between relations which may change
without changing the related ideas (contiguity, identity, causality) and those
in which this is not the case ( resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality
and p roportions of quantity) (ibid., pp. I l 7- l 8 ) . This would seem to
contradict the statement that all links between ideas are relations of
exteriority. Yet. as Deleuze argues, this is not so. The four relations which do
seem to depend on ideas imply a comparison, that is, an operation which is
exterior to the ideas being compared. See Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and
Subjectivity (New York: Columbia University Press. 1 9 9 1 ) , pp. 99- l O I .
4 . Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p . 60.
5 . A s Deleuzc puts it:
. . . if the principles of association explain that ideas are associated, only
the principles of the passions can explain that a particular idea, rather
than another, is associated at a given moment . . . Everything takes place
as l f the principles of association provided the subject with its ne(essary
form, whereas the principles of the passions provided it with i t s singular
content. (Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, pp. 1 0 3-4)
6. Ibid., p. 9 8 . Deleuze is here contrasting an ' assemblage or collection' with a
'system'. This is similar to the contrast he draws in his latter work between
'assemblages' and 'strata'. As I argued in Chapter I , I prefer to deal with this
contrast not as a dichotomy between two types but as a third dimension
characterizing assemblages, with highly coded assemblages being 'strata'
7 . Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 3 2 7 .
8. Ibid., p . 5 1 .
130
NOTES
9 . Ibid., p . 308.
1 0. On the effects of madness see ibid., p. 1 7 2.
1 1 . Ibid., p. 308.
1 2 . The most famous critique of the combi natorial poverty of associationism is
Jerry A . Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, 'Connectionism and cognitive
architecture: a critical analysis', in John Haugeland (ed . ), Mind Des(qn II.
Philosophy, Psychology and Artijidal Intelligence (Ca mbridge, MA: MIT Press,
1 997), pp. 309-50.
For a discussion of recent associationist extensions that may compensate
for this poverty see William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism
and the Mind. An Introduction to Parallel Distributed Processing in Networks
( Cambridge, MA, and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1 99 1 ), pp. 1 0 1-2; Andy
Clark, Microcognition . Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed
Processing (Ca mbridge, MA: MIT Press, 1 990), pp. 1 4 3-5 1 .
1 3 . A theory of grammar that meets both the combinatorial productivity
requirement as well as the evolutionary one is Zellig Harris, A Theory of
LanHuage and lnformation: A Mathematical Approach ( Oxford: Clarendon Press.
! 98 ! }. 1 give a fully evolutionary h istory of real languages and diale<.:ts.
based on Zellig Harris's ideas, in Manuel DcLanda, A Thousand Years of
Nonlinear History (New York: Zone Books, 1 99 7 ) , Ch. 3.
1 4 . Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 1 44. A belief 'can only bestow on our
ideas an additional force or vivacity'.
I 5. Ibid., p. 1 46 .
1 6 . Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual. Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1 9 67), p. l (my italics).
1 7 . Ibid .. p. 1 9 .
1 8 . 1bid., p . 1 0 3 .
1 9 . Ibid., p . 34.
20. Ibid., p. 1 03 .
2 1 . Analytical philosophers, for decades infatuated with syntax and semantics,
are beginning to turn around and include this pragmatic dimension. Thus,
Ian Hacking, in his an alysis of the term 'social ronstruction', deliberately
resists asking the question 'what is its seman tic content? ' and asks instead
'what is its point?' ( i .e. what is its significanre?) Sec Ian Hacking, The Soda/
Construction of What? (Ca mbridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2000), p. 5.
An argument that questions o f significance are not the same a s questions
of signification can be found in Denis C . Phillips, Philosophy, Science, and Social
lnquiry (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1 987), p. 1 09 .
2 2 . Goffman, lnteraction Ritual, pp. 1 6 2-4.
2 3 . Ibid., pp. 2 1 8- 1 9 .
24. John Scott, Social Network Ana(vsi1 (London: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. I I .
3 1 and 7 5 .
131
A N E W P H I L O S O P H Y OF S O C I E T Y
132
NOTES
Chapter 4
I . Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free
Press of Glencoe, 1 964), p. B I.
2. Ibid., pp. 328-36.
>. Ibid., p. 348.
4. Ibid., p. 3 5 9 .
5. A s Weber puts it, e v e n i n t h e most rational bureau cracy t h e very 'belief i n
legality comes t o be established a n d habitual and t h i s means it is partly
traditional' (ibid., p . 382 ) .
133
A NEW PHILOSOPHY O F SOCIETY
134
NOTES
135
A N E W P H I L O S OP H Y O F S OCI E T Y
136
N OT E S
Chapter 5
I . Robert E. Park, 'The city: suggestions for investigation of h uman behaviour
i n the urban environment', i n Robert E . Park and Ernest W . B u rgess (eds),
The City ( Chicago, I L : University of Chicago Press, 1 984) . pp. 4--{).
2. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society ( B e rkeley, C A : University of
C alifornia Press, 1 986), pp. 1 1 8-- 1 9. Giddens' treatment of region alized
locales i s similar to De leuze and Guattari's concept of a territory: a concept
they develop in rel a t ion to animal territories but that is not confined to this
example. To see the paralleL we must a dd to Giddens' definition in terms of
rhythmic or periodic routines the expressive marking of boundaries. A
territory is, in this sense, 'an act of rhythm that has become expressive'
CL Gilles Dcleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1 987), p. 3 1 5 . Actually, there are three
elements i n the definition of a territorial assemblage. One needs ' a block of
space-time constituted b y the periodic repetition of [a] component' (ibid., p.
3 B ) made into a territory b y marking its boundaries, drawing 'a circle
around tha t uncertain a n d fragile centre. to organize a limited space' ( ibid.,
p . 3 ! 1 ) . And, i n addition to rhythm and bounda ry, there must be the
possibility of opening u p the circle, of venturing a w a y from home through a
137
A N E W P H I LOSO P H Y OF SOCI E T Y
138
NOT E S
Economy. Cities, Re_qions, and International Trade ( C a mbridge, MA: MIT Press,
1 9 9 9 ) , p. 4. See also Peter M. Allen, Cities and Regions as Self- Or_qanizing
Systems (Amsterd am: Gordon & Breach, 1 99 7 ) , p. 27.
27. Vance Jr. The Continuin_q City, p. 3 7 3 .
2 8 . Deleuze a n d Guattari view rhythmically repeated motifs a n d the counter
points they create with the external milieu a s the two w a ys in which
expressive components self-organize in territorial assemblages, including
animal assemblages, transforming what was mere signature into a style. See
Deleuze and G uattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p . 3 1 7 .
2 9 . Spiro Kostoff, The City Shaped. Urban Patterns and Meanings throughout History
(London: Bullfinch Press. 1 99 1 ), pp. 284-5.
30. Vance Jr, The Conlinuin_q City, p. 56.
3 1 . B ra u del. The Structures of Everyday Life, p. 5 1 2 .
3 2 . Vance Jr, The Continuin_q City, pp. 502-4.
3 3 . Hohenberg and Hollen Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, pp. 20-23 ( fo r the
period between the years 1 000 a nd 1 300 ) ; pp. 1 06--7 ( 1 500- 1 80 0 ) ; a nd pp.
2 1 7-220 ( 1 800- 1 90 0 ) .
34. Fujita e t al., The Spatial Economy. p . 3 4 .
3 5 . Allen, Cities a n d Regions a s Self- Organizing Systems, p. 5 3.
36. Hollenberg and Hollen Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, pp. 5 1-4 .
3 7 . Ibid., p. 240.
3 8 . Fernand Braude!, The Perspective of the World (New York: H a rper & Row,
1 97 9 ) , pp. 27-3 1 .
3 9 . Hohenberg and Hollen Lees, The MakinH of Urban Europe, p . 66.
40. Braude!, The Perspective of the World, pp. 30-3 1 .
4 1 . Hohenberg and Hollen Lees, The Making of Urba n Europe, p. 6 .
42. Ibid" p . 2 8 I .
4 3 . Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and
Military Conflictfrom 1 500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1 98 7 ) , pp. 70-
71.
44. J. Craig Barker, Intemational Law and International Relations ( London:
Continuum, 2000), pp. 5-8. For the five-year negotiation period see
Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years ' War ( London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1 987), pp. 1 70-78.
4 5 . Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 86 ( e mphasis in the
original ) .
4 6 . Fernand B ra u dcl, The Wheels of Commerce (New York: Harper & Row, I 97 9 ) ,
p p . 544-5.
47. Ibid., p . 525 (my emphasis).
48. B raU(Iel, The Structures of Everyday Life, p . 5 2 7 .
49. Hohenberg and Hollen Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, p. 242.
50. Kostoff. The City Shaped. pp. 2 1 1 - 1 5 .
139
A N E W PH ILOSO P H Y O F SOCI ETY
5 1 . Ibid . . p . 2 I 7 .
5 2 . I attempted to synthesize a l l available materials on the political history of
l a nguages a n d d i alects in Manuel DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear
History (New York: Zone Books, 1 997), C h . 3 .
5 3 . Christopher Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great
( London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 98 5 ) , p . 87.
54. Peter J . Taylor. Polilical Geography ( New York: Longman, 1 98 5 ) , pp. 1 1 3- 1 5 .
5 5 . Bra u dt> l i n t roduced the term 'world-economy' to discuss t h e Mediterranean
as a coherent economic area i n Femand Braude!, The Mediterranean. And the
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vol. I . ( B erkeley. CA: University of
California Press. 1 99 5 ) , p. 4 1 9 . Braude! attributes t h e original concept to two
German scholars in Brau de!. The Perspective of the World. p . 6 3 4, n. 4.
5 6 . Immanuel W a llerstein, World-Systems Analysis. An int roduction ( Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 1 1 - 1 7 .
5 7 . Ibid . . p . 1 6 . Wallerstein's macro-red uctionism derives directly from h is use
of Hege l i a n totalities to concep t u alize l a rge-scale social entities. See
Immanuel Wal lerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy ( Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 1 99 3 ) , p . 4.
58. Braudel. The Wheels of Commerce, p . 4 5 8 .
140
In dex
141
INDEX
Intensity 7, 48, 5 2 , 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 6 , 1 07
Interpersonal Networks 5-6, 1 2-1 3, 33-5, Resources 34-6, 42, 63-5, 70, 76-.S, I 04,
43--4, 56-9, 6 6 1 08
(f 1 4 ) Universal 29-3 1 . 40
(f I I ) . 1 2 8 (f 13 ) Solidarity 1 3, 57, 8 0
Temporality 40-4
Relations
of Exteriority ! 0- 1 1, 1 6, 1 8, 45, 47-8, Weber. Max 5, 22--4, 30, 68-9, 74, 88,
142