Torts Part II
Torts Part II
Torts Part II
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed a case for Damages based on QD
arising from vehicular accident between a motorcycle and bus of Phil Hawk. The accident
resulted in the death of respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent
physical injuries. Before the answer, respondent filed an amended complaint, adding
additional damages and reliefs.
FACTS:
This petition for review arose from a case for damages filed by FF Cruz against PNB.
Plaintiff FF Cruz has open an account at PNB-Timog Ave. Branch, wherein its president
and its secretary-treasurer were the named signatories. Plaintiff FF Cruz, avers that PNB
has been negligent to deduct the cashiers and managers checks amounting to
Php9,950,000.00 and Php3,260,000.00, respectively, as the same were unauthorized and
fraudulently made by the company accountant Aurea Caparas as both the president and
the secretary were out of the country at that time. The plaintiff seeks to credit back and
restore to its account the value of the checks, to which the defendant bank refused as the
defendant bank alleged that it exercised due diligence in handling the account of FF Cruz,
as the application of said checks have passed a through standard bank procedures and it
was only after finding that it has no infirmity that the checks were given due course. The
trial court rendered a Decision against defendant bank for not calling or personally
verifying from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the subject withdrawals
considering that they were huge amounts. For this reason, defendant PNB had the last
clear chance to prevent the unauthorized debits from the FF Cruz account. And thus, PNB
should bear the whole loss. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, affirmed the Decision of the
trial court with modification on the award for damages that PNB should only pay 60% of
the actual damage and the Plaintiff FF Cruz should bear the remaining 40% for its
contributory negligence by giving authority to its company accountant to transact with
defendant bank PNB. Petitioner PNB appealed the Court of Appeals Decision.
The trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed to
sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification in
the award of damages.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioners driver, and whether
negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of
Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent;
(2) Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and
HELD:
In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already
saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not
take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle,
and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was
negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger
jeep.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability
for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having
failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed,
petitioners tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It
also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the principle of last clear chance principle is applicable to held the
defendant bank liable for damages.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the finding of the appellate court that PNB failed to make a proper
verification as the managers check do not bear the signature of the bank verifier, thus
casting doubt as whether the signatures were indeed underwent the proper verification. In
view of the foregoing, the Court ruled that PNB was negligent in handling the FF Cruz
account specifically with respect to PNBs failure to detect the forgeries in subject
application for managers check which could have prevented the loss. It further states, that
PNB failed to meet the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent
the fraud, where the banks negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the
depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, the damage between the bank and the
depositor, a 60-40 ratio applies. Wherefore, the petition was denied and the CAs Decision
is affirmed.
[G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005] LAMBERT, vs. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON
In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel
and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited Sergio Labang, to roam. Ray drove the
motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.[2]
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a
bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching
Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by
petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same
direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of
Ray and injuries to Sergio.[3]
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer
for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert.
The RTC favored herein private respondents but reduced petitioners liability by 20%
in view of the contributory negligence of Ray.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON the act of tailgating, at high speed, constitutes contributory negligence
Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his
unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages.
To the mind of the court, this is exactly what happened. When Reynaldo Gamot was
approaching the side road, he slightly veered to the right for his allowance. Ray Castillon,
who was following closely behind, instinctively veered to the left but it was also the
moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left towards the side road. At this
juncture both were moving obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of
the jeepney throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left
front door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered
back to the right and sped away.
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right
of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured
Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[11] The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent
act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.[12]
While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of contributory
negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we find it equitable to increase
the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victims negligence.
Article 2179 reads as follows:
When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable
only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. [15] The determination of the
mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was
driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has
imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. [21] These
circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to
Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all
considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant
to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of
the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents;
the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
resulting physical injuries was filed against the petitioners for the alleged
misconduct in the handling of the illness of Roy.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners failed to exercise the degree of care expected of
them as doctors and are liable for negligence to the private respondent.
Held:
Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligencce may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a
mere procedural convenience the rule when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the
plaintiff in proving a breach of duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absolute and not
readily available.
The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:
1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge; and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.
private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu
truck.
Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement therein
that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is deemed
established. While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the foregoing pieces
of evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means
the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may
establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to
substitute for specific proof of negligence permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of
the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an
inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of
proving that there was no negligence on his par based on the theory that defendant in
charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon
the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence can be invoked
only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence; - No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of
course unless someone is negligent
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants - Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it
(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated
(4) defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by
his or her want of due care (Based on American Jurisprudence) - defendant fails to offer
any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care
Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead.
Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the
event since they were not present at the crucial moment evidence as to the true cause of
the accident is, for all intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to
petitioners two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is
not only Sebastians previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as well.
Philippine Realty and Holding Corp. vs. Ley Const. and Dev.
Corp./Ley Cons. and Dev. Corp. vs. Philippine Realty and
Holding Corp., G.R. No. 165548/G.R. No. 167879. June 13,
2011
Post under Civil Law at Sunday, October 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
2 [a]lthough an officer or agent acts without, or in excess of, his actual authority if he acts within the scope
of an apparent authority with which the corporation has clothed him by holding him out or permitting him to
appear as having such authority, the corporation is bound thereby in favor of a person who deals with him in
good faith in reliance on such apparent authority, as where an officer is allowed to exercise a particular
authority with respect to the business, or a particular branch of it, continuously and publicly, for a
considerable time. Also, if a private corporation intentionally or negligently clothes its officers or agents
with apparent power to perform acts for it, the corporation will be estopped to deny that such apparent
authority is real, as to innocent third persons dealing in good faith with such officers or agents. (Yao Ka Sin
Trading v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 53820, 15 June 1992, 209 SCRA 763)