Economist Milton Friedman once said, There's no such thing as a free lunch.

As we
will see, theres also no such thing as effective humanitarian aid without political conditions.
Because both Mr. Friedman and I recognize that nothing beneficial comes without a cost,
that I negate the resolution that states Resolved: Placing political conditions on
humanitarian aid to foreign countries is unjust.

In order to clarify the resolution, I offer the following definitions:

Political Conditions: strategic, diplomatic and ideological considerations
that relate aid
provision to actions ranging from improved human rights performance to
constitutional change. (Overseas Development Institute)
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6774.pdf

Humanitarian Aid: aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering
and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of
emergencies. (Global Humanitarian Assistance)
Since, humanitarian aid is defined as existing only as a direct result of a
particular crisis, therefore on-going work does not count.
Unjust: not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.
(Oxford)

The following must be observed:

Observation 1: Because governments are more likely to place political
conditions on humanitarian aid rather than non-governmental organizations,
it is more realistic to frame the resolution in terms of governments giving aid
to foreign countries.
Observation 2: The resolution states the Placing of political conditions,
which means the act of saying that there are conditions. Note that this does
not mean actually implementing or enforcing these political conditions.

Because the resolution poses the question what a government should do to

ensure that their citizens wellbeing is prioritized , the value that must be upheld
in this round is government legitimacy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/outlines (First published Fri Feb 4, 2000; substantive
revision Thu Jul 28, 2005) outlines the criteria of a legitimate government,

Based on international law (see Roth), it seems like there are three basic criteria for a legitimate government. If
these conditions are met, the state in question has rights to govern and to be left in peace. They are as follows.

First, the state is recognized as legitimate by its own people and by the
international community. There is an un-coerced general peace and order within that society, and the
state is not shunned as a pariah by the rest of the world. Second, the state avoids violating the
rights of other legitimate states. In particular, legitimate governments don't commit aggression
against other societies. Finally, legitimate states make every reasonable effort to
satisfy the human rights of their own citizens, notably those to life, liberty and
subsistence. States failing any of these criteria have no right to govern or to go to war. We can speak of states
satisfying these criteria as legitimate, or minimally just, political communities.

Therefore, in order to achieve government legitimacy, the criterion is upholding

the general will.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Bertram, Christopher. "Jean Jacques

Rousseau." Stanford University. Stanford University, 27 Sept. 2010. Web. 12 Feb. 2014.

furthers,

Rousseau favors a procedural story according to which the individual

contemplation of self interest (subject to the constraints of generality and universality and
under propitious sociological background conditions such as rough equality and cultural similarity) will result
in the emergence of the general will from the assembly of citizens.
Sometimes

Rousseau's account of the general will is marked by unclarities and ambiguities that have attracted the interest of

the
general will is simply what the citizens of the state have decided
together in their sovereign assembly, and an alternative interpretation where the general will is the
commentators since its first publication. The principal tension is between a democratic conception, where

transcendent incarnation of the citizens' common interest that exists in abstraction from what any of them actually wants. Both views find some support in
Rousseau's texts, and both have been influential. Contemporary epistemic conceptions of democracy often make reference to Rousseau's discussion in
Book 2 chapter 3 of of The Social Contract. These accounts typically take Condorcet's jury theorem as a starting point, where democratic procedures are

interpret[ed] the general will as a

deliberative means of seeking outcomes that satisfy the preferences
of individuals and render the authority of the state legitimate. The tension
conceived of as a method for discovering the truth about the public interest; they then

between the democratic and the transcendental conceptions can be reduced if we take Rousseau to be arguing for the view that, under the right
conditions and subject to the right procedures, citizen legislators will be led to converge on on laws that correspond to their common interest; however,
where those conditions and procedures are absent, the state necessarily lacks legitimacy. On such a reading, Rousseau may be committed to something
like an a posteriori philosophical anarchism. Such a view holds that it is be possible, in principle, for a state to exercise legitimate authority over its
citizens, but all actual statesand indeed all states that we are likely to see in the modern erawill fail to meet the conditions for legitimacy. In a wellordered society, there is no tension between private and general will, as individuals accept that both justice and their individual self-interest require their
submission to a law which safeguards their freedom by protecting them from the private violence and personal domination that would otherwise hold
sway. In practice, however, Rousseau believes that many societies will fail to have this well-ordered character. One way in which they can fail is if private
individuals are insufficiently enlightened or virtuous and therefore refuse to accept the restrictions on their own conduct which the collective interest
requires. Another mode of political failure arises where the political community is differentiated into factions (perhaps based on a class division between
rich and poor) and where one faction can impose its collective will on the state as a whole. The Social Contract harbors a further tension between two
accounts of how the general will emerges and its relation to the private wills of citizens. In this account of the emergence of the general will, there seems
to be no special need for citizens to have any specifically moral qualities: the constraints on their choice should be enough. However, Rousseau also
clearly believes that the mere contemplation of self interest would be inadequate to generate a general will. This may partly concern issues of compliance,
since selfish citizens who can will the general will might still not be moved to obey it. But Rousseau also seems to believe that citizen virtue is a necessary
condition for the emergence of the general will in the first place. This presents him with a problem for which his figure of the legislator is one attempted
solution. As a believer in the plasticity of human nature, Rousseau holds that good laws make for good citizens. However, he also believes both that good
laws can only be willed by good citizens and that, in order to be legitimate, they must be agreed upon by the assembly. This puts him in some difficulty, as
it is unlikely that the citizens who come together to form a new state will have the moral qualities required to will good laws, shaped as those citizens will
have been by unjust institutions.

Therefore, in order to ensure government legitimacy, the government must

look to the general will and consider what is best for their people before
anything else. This justifies the purpose of political conditions, because

political conditions can be used to further the interests of the donor country,
before giving aid to another country. This is all supported under the general
will and therefore upholds government legitimacy.
Contention 1: There is no inherent right to aid.
Heike Spieker, The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance 2011

the Geneva Convention merely confirms the

possibility that an impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Common Article 3 para. 2 of

Committee of the Red Cross,

may

offer its services to the Parties to the

conflict.

The provision identifies not only the governmental, but also the non-state party to the conflict as a
potential receiver of such offer and thus of humanitarian assistance. Even an offer or provision of assistance to a
non-governmental party to the armed conflict is not to be considered an interference with the domestic affairs of a

Common Article 3 GC does not provide for any further rights and
duties related to humanitarian assistance neither with regard to the
operation nor to personnel involved.
State.

The Geneva Convention shows us that there is no inherent right to

humanitarian aid, but only that it MAY be offered between a donor and
recipient. Since there is no inherent right, then the government still upholds
the general will of its people, and will still keep its legitimacy.
Contention 2: Political Conditions are necessary to make humanitarian aid
more effective.

Www.odi.org.uk. Overseas Development Institute, Apr. 2001. Web. 8

Feb. 2014. <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/295.pdf>.
Nonetheless, the relationship between humanitarian aid and politics is
changing. The key theme of the conference was how humanitarian action
appears to be increasingly tied to new political objectives, and to the
overall political response of donor countries to complex emergencies.
Humanitarian aid is becoming an integral part of donors
comprehensive strategy to transform conflicts, decrease violence

and set the stage for liberal development. This changing role of
humanitarian aid is frequently called the new humanitarianism. It has
characterised international responses to many recent conflicts, including in
Afghanistan, Serbia and Sierra Leone. Examples of the closer integration
with political objectives include the forced repatriation of refugees,
attempts at conflict resolution in conjunction with humanitarian aid,
and the withholding of aid to meet political objectives.
Political conditions are a necessary part of humanitarian aid because it
promotes the general will of the donor country and the recipient, in that it
will make sure that aid is not only going to right place, but will have a more
far-reaching impact on both countries. The better choice is vote negative
because, it is fair to the donor and the recipient, thus the result is just.
Contention 3: Humanitarian aid without political conditions is counterproductive.
A. Humanitarian aid without political conditions has been proven to be
ineffective.
(Harvey, Nick [ Member of Parliament for North Devon]. Haiti: Where did all
the money go? New Internationalist 1/1/12. 7/29/13.
http://newint.org/features/2012/01/01/haiti-money-ngoun/#sthash.KE8ZEyrg.dpuf)
The NGOs frittered most of the money away because they had to,
says Haiti expert
Tim Schwartz, author of Travesty in Haiti. None of them were in the
position to
spend that kind of cash but there was an awful lot of pressure for
them to use it.
Much of it went on salaries, accommodation and transport for the
NGO workers
themselves. One of the biggest problems was that much of the
money failed to reach Haiti. Only 40 per cent of the $5.6 billion
pledged by foreign governments to be used in the first 18 months
had been dispersed by September 2011.
Not only has political conditions made the donor and recipient countries
benefit, but as this evidence shows, there is a negative implication if there is

unrestricted aid given to recipient countries. The money did not go where it
was most needed, so through this we see that it is more fair to place political
conditions.
B. Aid without political conditions has devastating effects on the people it
claims to help.
Helen Epstein 3/14/13

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/mar/14/why-are-we-funding-

abuse-ethiopia/

In 2010, the Ethiopian government began moving thousands of

people out of the rural villages where they had lived for centuries to
other areas several hours walk away. The Ethiopian government
calls this program the Commune Center Development Plan and
Livelihood Strategy and claims it is designed to bring scattered
rural populations closer to schools, health clinics, roads, and other
public services. But the Commune Center program has been marked by a string
of human rights abuses linked to government attempts to clear
huge tracts of land for foreign investors. According to testimony collected by Human
Rights Watch and other groups over the past two years, the relocations have involved
beatings, imprisonment, torture, rape, and even murder. In many of the
new villages the program has created, the promised services do
not exist. Deprived of the farms, rivers, and forests that once
provided their livelihoods, many people fear starvation, and thousands have
fled to refugee camps in Kenya and South Sudan.

The Ethiopian government is just one of the many governments out there
who are exposing their people to human rights abuses simply in an effort to
receive this unconditional aid. This unconditional aid is thus giving rise to
oppressive regimes by creating in them a sense of prolonged dependency.
Thus, political aid will not only stop these human rights abuses and prevent
the misuse of aid but will also allow for the needy governments to be selfsufficient.
Hence, The affirmative sides unconditional aid is basically fueling the fire
that we are trying to put out.
For these reasons, we must vote negative in todays debate.
Political aid has a good potential to serve as an impediment to the
status quo effect of misused financial aid, since it cannot be
easily diverted.

UNCONDITIONAL AID SUPPORTS OPPRESIVE REGIMES

The serious point, which I'm winding toward, is that humanitarian aid isn't delivered in a vacuum. By
changing the cost of inaction, aid can potentially forestall political solutions. This point is argued by Tamer
Qarmout and Daniel Beland in "The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza Strip," found in The Journal of
Palestine Studies, Summer 2012.
Within the context of the Israeli occupation, international aid to the [Palestinian Authority] has allowed
Israel to sustain its occupation without bearing the expenses of providing for the basic humanitarian
needs of the people under occupation. In this environment, donors play an integral and direct role in the
conflict by alleviating any sense of urgency to end the occupation.
Even if you're inclined to balk at the loaded terms in their analysis (I don't intend to wade into a debate
about the legitimacy of Israeli and Palestinian territorial disputes), the analysis raises the troubling
prospect that aid perpetuates a problematic status quo.
Mark E. Manyin makes a similar argument in "Assessing U.S. Assistance to North Korea," from Asian
Review's Fall 2003 issue.
From a humanitarian perspective, sending food to North Korea arguably diverts limited supplies of food
aid from other needy, and more accountable, countries. Furthermore, as discussed above, the volume
and consistency of international aid has allowed the North Korean government to institutionalize
emergency food assistance as part of its annual budget needed to feed its people and remain in power.
Therefore, although international food aid has saved thousands of lives, it also has indirectly subsidized
Kim Jong Il's regime and allowed the government to avoid making much-needed economic reforms.
The age of the evidence--11 years and counting--only bolsters the claim that continuing aid has potentially
contributed to the perpetuation of Jong Il's repressive dynasty.
Berhanu Nega and Geoffrey Schneider, in "International Financial Institutions and Democracy in Africa:
The Case for Political Conditionality and Economic Unconditionality," found in The Journal of Economic
Issues, June 2011, note that
..there is evidence that foreign aid is used by dictatorships for political purposes and that humanitarian aid
is frequently denied to families that are considered opponents of the regime (Human Rights Watch 2010),
which argues for the denial of all forms of aid to the worst-behaving dictatorships. Properly structured aid
programs may be able to exert pro-democracy pressure while preserving aid for the poor, but this may not
always be possible.
The upshot is that, in a consequentialist framework, the equation isn't simply aid saves lives, therefore aid
good. Political conditions, long term, may be necessary to prevent suffering.