Col Cases
Col Cases
Col Cases
NLRC et al
G.R. No. 120077
October 13, 2000
FACTS: private respondent Santos was an overseas worker employed as a
printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently he was
directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, Peoples Republic of China and later
terminated due to retrenchment.
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and the Manila Hotel
International Company, Limited (MHICL).
When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still a government-owned and
controlled corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Hong Kong. MHC is an incorporator of MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock.
By virtue of a management agreement with the Palace Hotel, MHICL trained
the personnel and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.
Now the facts.
During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press, respondent Santos
received a letter from Mr. Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China.
Mr. Schmidt informed respondent Santos that he was recommended by one
Buenio, a friend of his. Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the same position
as printer, but with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits. Respondent
Santos wrote to Mr. Shmidt and signified his acceptance of the offer.
The Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Henk mailed a ready to sign employment
contract to respondent Santos. Santos resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press.
Santos wrote the Palace Hotel and acknowledged Mr. Henks letter. The
employment contract stated that his employment would be for a period of two
years. He then started to work at the Palace Hotel.
recommendation had no basis in law and in fact, however it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Is the NLRC a proper forum to decide this case?
HELD: petition granted; the orders and resolutions of the NLRC are annulled.
NO
Forum Non-Conveniens
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.
We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions
and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines
has with the case is that Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL
are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. Respondent Santos was hired directly by the
Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate
of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without
the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the
government.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the
Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that
the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that
all the incidents of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to
dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by
the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not
nationals of the Philippines. Neither .are they doing business in the Philippines.
Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the
Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent decision be
made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected
in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made).
The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Santos signified
his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This
letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the Peoples Republic of China.
No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts
surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in
Beijing, Peoples Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine
whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of
the Palace Hotel as to justify Santos retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assuming that a
proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding
effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons.
Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve
controversies involving foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we do not
have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If
Santos were an overseas contract worker, a Philippine forum, specifically the
POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an overseas contract worker
a fact which he admits with conviction.
__
Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the merits, the
NLRCs decision cannot be sustained.
II. MHC Not Liable
Even if we assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case,
and (2) that MHICL was liable for Santos retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate
and distinct juridical entity cannot be held liable.
True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns 50% of its capital stock.
However, this is not enough to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between
MHICL and MHC. In Traders Royal Bank v. CA, we held that the mere ownership
by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding
the fiction of separate corporate personalities.
It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Clear and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction. In this case, we find no evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one
and the same entity.
III. MHICL not Liable
Santos predicates MHICLs liability on the fact that MHICL signed his
employment contract with the Palace Hotel. This fact fails to persuade us.
First, we note that the Vice President (Operations and Development) of MHICL,
Cergueda signed the employment contract as a mere witness. He merely signed
under the word noted.
When one notes a contract, one is not expressing his agreement or approval,
as a party would. In Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the
Court recognized that the term noted means that the person so noting has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without
exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter.
Second, and more importantly, there was no existing employer-employee
relationship between Santos and MHICL. In determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power to dismiss; and
(4) the power to control employees conduct.
MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the aforementioned powers. It
did not select respondent Santos as an employee for the Palace Hotel. He was
referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend, Buenio. MHICL did not engage
respondent Santos to work. The terms of employment were negotiated and
finalized through correspondence between Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Henk,
who were officers and representatives of the Palace Hotel and not MHICL.
Neither did Santos adduce any proof that MHICL had the power to control his
conduct. Finally, it was the Palace Hotel, through Mr. Schmidt and not MHICL that
terminated respondent Santos services.
Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace Hotel and MHICL are one
and the same entity. The fact that the Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila
Hotel Group is not enough to pierce the corporate veil between MHICL and the
Palace Hotel.
Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens and considering further
that no employer-employee relationship existed between MHICL, MHC and
Santos, the LA clearly had no jurisdiction over respondents claim in the NLRC
case. In all the cases under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the LA, an
employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requirement.
The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a
MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is
simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of
the principle of forum non conveniens. The MTD was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR
denied, hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of non-registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non convenience?
HELD: petition dismissed.
1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been engaged in or
doing business in the Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable
result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered into by
ITEC with its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements, with
these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in business in
the country.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine
Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen
or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in
another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation
after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the
doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as
to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin
as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.
In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this
commonly used scheme of defaulting local companies which are being sued by
unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to
invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign companies. Obviously, the
same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC
to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of
fiduciary arrangements between the parties.
2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the
application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum non
conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the
Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance
or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to
sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing
the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at
liberty to question plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded to the
same by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on
the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to
assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the
court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that
the following requisites are met:
1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort
to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the courts
disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the
present forum not being the most convenient as a ground for the suits
dismissal, deserves scant consideration.
PHILSEC VS. CA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a
complaint For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint
reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the
Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private
respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent
more than its true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1)
litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens,
and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements
of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis
pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum
non conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the
principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic
on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S.
court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata
or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial
court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even
furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence
presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then
being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such
that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable
under the principle of forum non conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not
include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered
a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and
inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint
for collection of a sum of money against private respondents Sherman and Reloj
before RTC of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The trial court denied the motion. They then filed before the
respondent IAC a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
prayer for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC
Quezon City from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same
for filing with the proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the
Guarantee stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam.
To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts
that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less
prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble,
damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner
BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.
**
In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation
was [i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao
City. We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to
say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the
AZNAR VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT
and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its
own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its
citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed
out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of
the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article
16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned
in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question
to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;
such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case
will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict
of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California,
not by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to
no other than the private law of the State of California.
INGENOHL VS OLSEN
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT
FACTS: In 1919, the acting Alien Property Custodian of the United States, by
virtue of the Trading with the Enemy Act as amended, required and caused to be
conveyed to him the property and business then belonging to the company
known as Syndicat Oriente, formed under the laws of Belgium, of which the
plaintiff was the gestor, and an enemy as defined in said Act. The primary
purpose of the proceeding was to seize, sell and convey any and all of the
property owned and held by the company within the jurisdiction of the United
States, as a war measure, upon the ground that they were alien enemies of the
United States.
During the public sale, defendant corporation was the highest bidder. The said
Alien Property Custodian of the United States having thereafter accepted said
bid and received from the defendant corporation in cash the amount of said bid,
did execute in favor of the defendant corporation a deed of conveyance. The
defendant paid in good faith, and took over the property and assets of the
company, including its trade-marks and trade names and its business as a going
concern
After obtaining the proceeds from the sale, the plaintiff in violation of the
conveyance, wrongfully instituted an action in the Supreme Court of Hongkong
against the defendant in which the plaintiff claimed to be the sole owner of the
trade-marks for the exports of the business. The Supreme Court of Hongkong
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, allegedly through misrepresentation, ordering
defendant to pay the former for costs and AF. The Court ruled that the deed of
conveyance limited the sale of the business to the trademarks within the
Philippines, implying that the plaintiff is still entitled to the sell the cigars under
the same trademarks through exporting, which accounts to 95% of the total
sales of the company. (This means that the plaintiff paid the cash equivalent of
the whole of the business but only entitled to 5% of the such, the sales within
the Philippines)- UNFAIR TALAGA!
The CFI rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of his claim, with
interest, from which the defendant appeals. Defendant company alleges that
when he purchased the property and business, all trademarks are included; that
the subject of the sale is not only those trademarks for sales within the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Should the judgment rendered by the Hongkong court be enforced by
Philippine courts?
HELD: NO; we do not hesitate to say that the judgment rendered in the
Hongkong court was a clear mistake of both law and fact, and that it ought not
to be enforced in the Philippine Islands.
The business of the plaintiff is almost exclusively an export business, and that
the transfer of the goodwill thereof necessarily carried with it the transfer of said
export business and of the trade-marks and trade names which could not be
disconnected therefrom
- It is conceded that the Hongkong court had jurisdiction and that the
defendant appeared in the action and contested the case on its merits. Hence,
there was no collusion. Neither is it claimed that there was any fraud, but it is
vigorously contended that the Hongkong judgment was a clear mistake of both
law and fact. Exclusive of the provisions of section 311 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is very doubtful whether it could be sustained upon the ground of
comity or the Law of Nations. As between allied nations and under the law of
comity, their mutual policy should be to sustain and enforce the spirit and
intention with which the seizure and sale of any property of an alien enemy was
made rather than to minimize, destroy or defeat them.
We are construing a deed of conveyance from the United States to the
defendant. The primary purpose of the whole proceeding was to seize and
convey all of the property of the plaintiff or his company within the jurisdiction
of the United States, including trade names and trade-marks as those of an alien
enemy. To now give the defendant the use and benefit of only 5 per cent of such
trade names and trade-marks, and to permit the plaintiff to have and retain the
other 95 per cent to his own use and benefit after he has ratified and confirmed
the sale, would impugn the honor and good name of the United States in the
whole proceeding and defeat the very purpose for which it seized and sold the
property of an alien enemy, to wipe Ingenohl and his company out of existence
and put them out of business in so far as the United States had the power to do
so
Be that as it may, this court is bound be section 311 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. That law was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands, and
as to the Philippine Islands, it is the law of the land. In the absence of that
statute, no matter how wrongful the judgment of the Hongkong court may be,
there would be strong reasons for holding that it should be enforced by this
court.
PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ LEAVE A COMMENT
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the
respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with
a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint
for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since
been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is
a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In,
the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He
won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of
the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of
the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction
over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm
of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further
compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the
sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the
period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80
and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his
special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No.
224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore
not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff
for the sum of 265. 90 dollars
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224
by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of
the contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative
department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of
Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right
which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not
been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended.
These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said
contract and were enforceable in favor of the Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and
therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses
that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an
adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank
claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine Islands
at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach
their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable
under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the time
and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full
capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters
bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined b the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place
of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.
FACTS:
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA), foreign airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines and may be
served summons in agent in Makati, hired Milagros P. Morada as a flight attendant for its airlines based in
latter as an accomplice.
When Morada returned to Jeddah, SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident and
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA
Legal Officers negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not
succeed. Afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect, Morado refused to cooperate and declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed Morada to return to Jeddah but barred
Jeddah.
June 16, 1993: Morada, while in Riyadh Saudi Arabia, was not allowed to board the plane to Manila and
instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy. Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her
to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was
necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah but it was actually a notice for her to appear before
the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
June 27, 1993: SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, assured Morada that the investigation was
routinary and that it posed no danger to her so she reported to Miniewy in Jeddah for further
further orders.
July 3, 1993: She was brought to court again and to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision,
translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. The court tried
her, together with Thamer and Allah, and found her guilty of (1) adultery (2) going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
Failing to seek the assistance of her employer, SAUDIA, she asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to
help her while her case is on appeal. She continued to workon the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer
and Allah continued to serve in the international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed
her to leave Saudi Arabia. Before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA,
country manager.
January 19, 1994: SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss on following grounds: (1) that the Complaint
states no cause of action against SAUDIA (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest (3) that
the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished and
(4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
After opposition to the motion to dismiss by Morada and reply by SAUDIA, Morada filed an Amended
Complaint dropping Al-Balawi. SAUDIA filed its Manifestation, Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint,
should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order:
Morada: Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code which is a matter of domestic
law
ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case and it is the proper forum for
recovery of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code which should govern.
HELD: YES. petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. REMANDED to RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89
for further proceedings
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the problem could
o Simple: one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State
o Complex
Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal
forum. RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC
Quezon City assuming jurisdiction:
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines.
Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the case in
the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
Trial court possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
o By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court
o SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of
the forum is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not
going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given
case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and
of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of
o Morada was made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws
and tradition
o SAUDIA may have acted beyond its duties as employer by handing over the person of Morada to Jeddah
officials which contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery
and suffering. It also took advantage of the trust, confidence and faith in the guise of authority as
employer.
o Conviction and imprisonment was wrongful but injury or harm was inflicted upon her person and
reputation which must be compensated or redress for the wrong doing
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" - place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred = Philippines where SAUDIA deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and working here.
"State of the most significant relationship" applied
o taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered
v private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working here
v a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage
Labels: 199
13 October 1986, private respondent also filed criminal case against petitioner for concubinage. On 14
November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the
action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The
respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente
lite.
ISSUES:
1. Does conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can
prosper or succeed?
2. Did the respondent judge gravely abuse his discretion on the alleged partiality in ordering the payment of
support to his wife pendente lite. ?
RULING:
1. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance
of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,
based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
2.
Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and
jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of
bias and manifest partiality. No proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in
ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation,
and granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered
as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine
law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be
intervenor in Tristans petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?
RULING:
No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a
citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to
his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a
Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute
divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioners claim that
she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus,
petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is
based.
FACTS:
October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November
16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
1.
2.
1.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times
but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mere abandonment by the husband of his family and his insensitivity to them automatically
constitute psychological incapacity?
Whether or not requirements of psychological incapacity apply to mixed marriages?
RULING:
No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. We cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. In Molina, it is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
2.
The husband being a Japanese national is immaterial in proving psychological incapacity, no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, "where the plaintiff fails to go to the Court within
the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, but not because the defendant had acquired
ownership by adverse possession over his name but because the plaintiffs cause of
action had lapsed thru the statute of limitations."
2. Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws
and consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. It is
significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370 of the
Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband's
surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others
from using it."
The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legal
injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname
and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for illegal
purposes.
In Silva, et al. v. Peralta (110 Phil. 57) cited by the petitioner, it was not the mere use of
the surname that was enjoined but the defendant's representation that she was the wife
of Saturnino Silva. There was, therefore, a usurpation of the wife's status which is
absent in the case at bar.