Fiction & Adab
Fiction & Adab
Fiction & Adab
2005
ISSN 0939818X
ISBN 3447051825
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Table of Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xi
1. Abbasid myth and the Human Act: Ibn Abd Rabbih and others
by Julia Bray (Universit de Paris 8-Saint Denis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
50
55
68
69
82
85
108
120
122
125
146
149
171
175
177
225
8. Al-H
. arith ibn Z. alim and the Trope of Baghy
in the Ayyam al-Arab by Walter Oller (Brown) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
233
258
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261
285
287
305
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
309
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Preface
Defining Fiction and Adab in Medieval Arabic Literature was the title of a
workshop held at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies, New York University, on 2122 April 2000, and co-hosted by Princeton Universitys Department
of Near Eastern Studies. Fiction isapparentlythe antonym of truth (whether
in the purely abstract sense, or as manifested in the spoken or written word),
while adab is medieval Arabic for Belles Lettres. No two definitions could be
more elementary. Yet the two subjects, in different spheres (since the theory of fiction has been a subject of interest across literatures),1 are notoriously challenging
and hard to pin down. We cannot in fact fix them to the viewing plate: they are,
as has been said about adabaccurately for some and infelicitously for others
moving targets of inquiry. What is apparent is that definitions cannot be
fixedon one hand because of the complex relationship between history and
narrative and, on the other, because of the vastness of the corpus of adab and the
array of subjects it treats. A definition (singularly and abstractly) inheres and
slides within the shifting boundaries of conversation and debate; at best
perhaps exclusivelyin discourse (in its original English sense): defining adab
becomes, more than a simple tribute to a medieval canon of literature, a contemporary instantiation of adab itself. It becomes an instantiation of the very
nature of the half-veiled fictionthe cerebral pirouetting around the hard facts
that is such a thorn in the side of scholars of Islamic (or indeed any) history.
At the above workshop we may not always have kept our sea legs, but we were
always talkingdefining. A variety of views were expressed, some horns locked
in debate, and stances were adopted according, sometimes, to patterns of
1
Most readers interested in the subject of narrative, fiction, and historiography will be
familiar with the following (not exhaustive) bibliography: in the medieval Arabo-Islamic
sphere: Jacob Lassner, Islamic Revolution and Historical Memory: An Inquiry into the
Art of Abbasid Apologetics (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1986); Stefan
Leder (ed.), Story-Telling in the Framework of Non-Fictional Arabic Literature (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998); Tayeb El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography:
Harun al-Rashd and the Narrative of the Abbasid Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); more generally: Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Gerard Genette, Fiction and Diction
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Frank Ankersmit and Hans Kellner (eds.),
A New Philosophy of History (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1995);
Patrick ONeill, Fictions of Discourse: Reading Narrative Theory (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1994); see also much of the work of Wolfgang Iser and Hayden White.
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discourse (in its contemporary American sense), both ancient and modern, just as
narratives of history can be fashioned using either discreet or conspicuous rhetorical shapes of narrative generally, as well as according to polemical and propagandist agendas. Narrative shapes give us meaning when we are in a position
either to manipulate or detect them (either as readers, medieval or modern, or
authors). Indeed, the creation of meaning (a phrase often bandied about at this
workshop) and the existence of a rhetorical endeavor, emerged rather as the real
subject of our twelve-hour conversation. Meaning may not always be the same
(even when versions of the same story are being told), but the quest for it is rather
easier to pin down as be-ing an impulse and a process, and at leastor perhaps
most importantlyas the very goal of enhanced writing.
Fiction and adab purely and simply have, let us say, a luminosity from which
we tend to avert our gaze; that is, except for those who bravely pen dictionary and
encyclopedia definitions, they become the subject of scrutiny indirectly. In a converse dynamic, these two words exert enough gravity for issues to orbit around
them as satellites. Such are the essays in this volume. No one here pretends to
define fiction or adab (hence the title of the volume: on replacing defining);
rather the way adab and fiction are innately and variously understood exerts its
own gravity on the orbital paththe shape and meaningof each essay. Indeed,
for some, fiction is just one element in a kind of binary star configuration. In such
a composite entity it is one other body at leastrhetoricwhich is seen as the
stronger and more dominant, albeit more concealed, force of writing. There is,
then, rhetoric in adab; it is the same kind of rhetoric that informs the fiction that
we detect in historical and historicized writing. Adab is nothing if it not a form of
historicized writing, and the relationship between the rhetorical and the historical lies quite possibly in adabs mythographic-cum-mythopeic role, as suggested
in Julia Brays stunning opening essay. What emerges as holding all these
elements together is the essential humanism of this literature (adab), a subject
which is hard to grasp when we import our understanding of it from other
cultural traditions. In Brays essay we finally have a view of medieval Arabic literary humanism that emerges from the literature itself: from its fertile, complex,
chronological, generic, and accretion-ist stratigraphy. So important is this essay
in introducing us to a new and sophisticated way of understanding of adab, I have
placed it first, which was editorially eccentric but still seemed appropriate. All
other studies follow in alphabetical order (of author).
No one did define adab at the New York workshop; let us suggest that it had
been defined for us in a very public and helpful way shortly before the meeting in
a Times Literary Supplement article by Tarif Khalidi (reviewing Robert Irwins
anthology of medieval Arabic literature, Night and Horses and the Desert):
Central to the understanding of Arabic literature in the pre-modern period is the concept of Adab, a curriculum of learning and good manners, of courtliness, leading to
the formation of the Adib, the gentleman-scholar, a cultural type of many guises, recognizable over a broad swath of time and from Greece to China. Adab presupposes
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that there can be no true erudition without the polished character that goes with it.
The Adib was an ornament to any salon, holding forth with ease on all branches of
learning but careful to keep himself aloof from the plebs and the contamination of the
mauvais got. He peddled his graces to his own ilk but often under the patronage of
the rich and powerful, who were very fond of staging debates between prominent
Adibs. His scholarly accoutrements would typically have ... consisted of quite a formidable array of arts and sciences of his age: poetry, the network of religious sciences,
history, philology, critical theory, medicine, as well as a pretty solid acquaintance with
the natural sciences, from arithmetic to zoology. Almost by definition [emphasis
added], Adab militated against specialization, opting instead for breadth of cultivation. In a cosmos, the various parts of which were thought to be so intimately linked,
Adab provided an appropriate literary and moral response, its emphasis falling on the
interconnectedness of things. The Adab style was of necessity eclectic, variegated, full
of asides. It was important not only to educate the reader or listener but also to avoid
boring him with pedantry. Clearly, Adab does not correspond to literature in the strict
sense; perhaps the happiest synonym so far suggested is [the] Greek Paideia. (TLS,
No. 5061, March 31, 2000, p. 8).
There is, we notice, no room in this definition for fiction, despite the variety of literatures mentioned; it is at most implicit. But why is it even necessary to address
the issue? Tritely, because of the very fact that we have asked the question. That
is, the answer lies in part in the fact that, when fiction rears its head, it becomes
reified, and as a reified entity it somehow gnaws and eats its way into the realm of
the truth and what is true. No anecdote, or group of anecdotes, illustrates this
fascinating warping of truth and fiction into each other better than the following
material accreted to the cycle of Joseph in Qis.as. al-anbiya. It is characterized by
an almost Borgesian absurdity:
Jacob said to his sons, If you are telling the truth in respect of the wolf who ate
[ Joseph], Where is it then? Bring it to me! So they went to their ropes and their staffs
and set off into the wilderness, hunting down a wolf which they tied up and took to
their father. He said, Loosen its ropes! So they set if loose, upon which Jacob asked
it, Come closer. So it came forward passing among the people present until it stood
before Jacob, inclining its head to the ground. Jacob then indicted, Wolf, you have
eaten my son, the light of my eye ... you have bequeathed me great pain and sorrow.
At which the wolf spoke, By your gray locks, O prophet of God, I have eaten no son
of yours, for the flesh and blood of prophets is forbidden to us; I have been unjustly
accused; I am a foreign wolf from Egypt. Jacob then asked it what it was doing in
Canaan, to which it replied that it had come to visit relatives.(!)2
This anecdote brings to life an animal that never fundamentally existed! Indeed, it
puts one in mind of another lie and another imposture (which may in part allude to
this popular exegetical flourish); cf. Goldziher Muslim Studies ii, 157: A qad. ...
2
Al-Thalab (Ibn Ish.aq Ah.mad b. Muh.ammad Ibrahm ... al-), Qis.as. al-anbiya (Arais
al- majalis) (Egypt: Maktabat al-jumhuriyya al-arabiyya, n.d.), 118.
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was able to give the name of the golden calf, and when asked from what source he
had gathered his knowledge he gave the book of Amr b. al-As as source of his
learning. Another knew exactly the name of the wolf which had eaten Joseph.
When it was pointed out to him that Joseph had not been eaten by a wolf, he
escaped from his predicament with the answer: Well, then it was the name of the
wolf who did not eat Joseph. (Ibn al-Jawz, fol. 129).
In mostoften seriousliterature of this kind, one should take the same view
that one can take about dreams: it is not important that they be true or false, or
that the facts related be true or false; what is important is what they mean. Here
a wolf, the very existence of which had been lied about, comes to life in order to
divulge the lie; the subject or theme of these anecdotes certainly comes through
nicely: mendacity.
As the paralogism of the above material shows, one runs the risk of sliding into
sophistry with this subject in general. We are at times philosophizing when we discuss the nature of fiction in medieval Arabic literature, or any literature, especially
when we detect it in historiographical and quasi-historiographical writing. We do
this according to a modern (post-modern or contemporary) epistemic drive. Oscar
Wilde, culturally and historically a far cry from the essays in this volume, provides
for examples sake a hub around which to group some ideas of the kinds of ways
that we, as a culture, in the West particularly, now tend to think and analyze:
... when not quoting Wilde, many of his critics end up trying to write like him.
Authors such as Peter Ackroyd, in The Last Testament of Oscar Wilde (1983), not to
mention Terry Eagleton and C. Robert Holloway take this a stage further by writing
criticism that takes the form of plays and novels in which they parody his style. As
Wilde was a man who existed in words and who created an inherently unstable and
paradoxical language that perfectly embodies his multiplicity, this proves to be an
extremely effective way of approaching him. In The Man Who Was Dorian Gray, a
semi-fictional biography of Wildes disciple and lover, the 1890s poet John Gray,
Jerusha Hull McCormack attempts a similar feat. She reperforms Wildes language
by blending quotations from his letters and works with convincing imitations of his
conversations. Her book is a collection of poems, letters and stories by or relating to
Gray, linked together by a series of novelistic scenes, scenes which include reconstructed conversations between Wilde and Gray at the Caf Royal. These scenes are
authentic in the sense that they are based on surviving evidence, but false in so
far as they use it as a starting point for vivid and dramatic re-creations. This approach
is, she suggests, appropriate for Gray, partly because his vision of the world was one
in which reality and fiction were blended. The same, of course, is true of Wilde. Her
endeavor is also consistent with Wildes own revolt against the despotism of fact
and his fondness for calling into question the very status of fact and fiction and
truth and falsehood in his writings. And it is this Nietzschean Wilde with whom
McCormack is concerned. (TLS February 9, 2001 pp. 34)
Reality and fiction inevitably blend into each other, in literature as in other
spheresand certainly in the (?separate) spheres of both fiction and reality.
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There is little point in revisiting and rehearsing here all the studies and arguments explored in Stefan Leders milestone volume, Story-Telling in the Framework of Non-Fictional Arabic Literature (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998). The
concerns of Professor Leders book are shared with many, if not all, the essays in
the present tome. (Professor Leders presence at the New York conference was
indeed most gratifying.) Suffice it to say that the general subject of interest to studies in both volumes is that the way narrativesboth those that are consciously historical and those that are consciously a- or un-historicalare forged according to
shared and/or similar narrative techniques; techniques that are either structural,
thematic, or rhetorical. These are the tropes that interest so-called narratologists. The narrative process is, to reiterate, rhetorical, and a given narrative may
either convey or enhance meaning. What is of interest here generally is that narratives that convey perceived historical fact are, or may be, fashioned according to
narrative tropes that they share with literary texts (including texts outside the
Arabo-Islamic tradition) that do not pretend to be historical at all.
As a general and very broadly applicable subject of narrative poetics, recognition (or Aristotles anagnorisis) provides an excellent instance of the above. The
recognition scene (where veiled identities are unveiled at a turning moment of a
narrative) is one quintessential feature of fictional narrative (e.g., The Odyssey)
and drama (e.g., Oedipus Rex). But recognition scenes are not exclusive to narratives that are blatantly fictional; they also exist in a great deal of literature that
pretends to be historical: the Bible, both the Old and New Testaments, provide us
with perhaps the most prestigious examples.
Now, in the medieval Arabo-Islamic sphere, recognition scenes are, as it happens, coincidentally or not, one of the most determining features of the fictional
form of narrative par excellencethe Maqama. The authors of these fine
picaresque narratives must surely have been attuned to the fact that the dramatic
augmentation and tension of such moments smacked more of fiction than reality;
that is to say, they must have shared William Shakespeares own sense of this
essential point: The oracle is fulfilled; the kings daughter is found ... this news
which is called true is so like an old tale, that the veracity of it is in strong suspicion. The Maqamat are avowedly fictional, but texts such as Quranic narratives, Hadith anecdotes, the memoirs of Ismal das, tales from al-Tanukhs
Faraj bad al-Shidda, are not, and yet they feature some of the most powerful
recognition scenes in the whole of Arabic literature. The recognition scene in alTanukhs F 158 (ed. Abud al-Shalj, ii, 29 ff ), in which a Christian grandfather
is taken prisoner-of-war, recognizes his Muslim grandson and orchestrates a
moving recognition scene between daughter and grandson, may have some
residual link with an actual event; such reunions must have taken place during the
course of history. But the form the story takes in Tanukhs Faraj is so like an old
tale that ... Such stories and such reunions developed fictionally over time, and
are, one can conjecture, at their most marvelous in the Arabian Nights family
saga of Umar ibn al-Numan, with its final and cascading recognition scenes.
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complex modes in which textual activities model reality and provide people with
paradigms of conduct and perception. The most relevant part of Models and
Contacts to the concerns of the present volume lies in its research [into] the
semantic dimensions of literature and the production of meaning; [that is,] the
first section of the volume (chapters one to three). Dedicated to the problem of fictionality in classical Arabic literature, chapters one and three explore the fictional
modes which developed, while chapters one and two investigate the status and
legitimation of fiction. While still working with a corpus of texts considered literary in the narrow sense (adab and maqamat), my actual concern in this section
is with the classical Arabic repertoire of models for representing, or rather, constructing, reality. Since fiction does not reside solely in literary texts, it seemed
necessary to explore its role in other domains of classical Arabic literature, such
as h.adth and historical writings.
In these early sections, Models and Contacts thus develops the important
work published previously in Rinas article entitled, Three Attempts to Legitimize Fiction in Classical Arabic Literature (in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and
Islam, 18, 1994, 14664)a study well-known to the contributors to this volume and frequently quoted by them. The latter study contains analysis divided
broadly into three sections: (1) H
. adth Khurafa; (2) Animal Fables (amthal); and,
(3) Love Poetry (Tashbb). It is in her treatment of the latter that Rina was the
most innovative in the discussion of medieval Arabic fictionality. The barest gist
of her argument can be gleaned from the following statement: (Three
Attempts, p. 160)
Verses of tashbb were supposed to pretend to account for real life events, and at the
same time to be accepted as disclaiming any commitment to reality, as can be discerned from the following anecdote:
Al-H
. arith b. Khalid, who was famous for his love poems about Aisha bint T.alh.a, a
married woman, when asked why he did not propose to her after her husband was
killed, answered: I dont want people to think that I really meant what I said about
dab:1, 243)
her [in my poems]! (Al-H
. us.r, Zahr al-A
(We will return to these observations in their fuller context below.) It is this subject that Rina Drory sought to develop in her presentation at the New York workshop, and we can only regret that this ongoing work should have been forestalled
by her death. The subject held great promise, spawned much interest and discussion at our meeting, and would inevitably have led to further significant publications. Below I offerwith diffidence and as much real self-effacement as
possiblemere minutes of Rinas paper. She delivered it orally from notes
despite the great physical fatigue and pain she was suffering. Justice cannot be
done here to the nuances and complexities of her research, deliberation, and
exposition. But it is desirable at least to record here in the most general terms the
path which she had plotted and acknowledge her courage in the face of an illness
that she had been battling with for a number of years.
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The title of her paper was Modeling Reality through Fiction in Classical Arabic
Culture. Her concern was to examine fiction not as a purely or exclusively literary issue; rather, she wished to consider in some preliminary remarks its sociocultural angle: to probe how fiction was employed by early Islamic society to
model reality.
Fiction or fictionality is usually taken to be a subject that concerns literature. The different ways, whether fictional or non-fictional, used to relate to reality are considered part and parcel of literary expression and are therefore
discussed within the realms of literary theory. In classical Islam, fictionality was
discussed, albeit quite marginally, within a theological framework in terms of
truthfulness versus falsehood as qualities bearing upon the canonicity of texts.
These were the traditional terms of conceptualization, and whenever discussion
arose, it had to do with whether or not a given text should be received into the
canon. That is, fictionality adhered to a straightforward dichotomy: texts either
conveyed truthful or false information, and the subject was of great importance
in the realm of Hadith criticism and in the establishment of the traditional corpus
of prophetic sayings, where false statements were filtered away from true
according to established criteriaof transmission more than content. Because
there was a tendency, in varying degrees, for the false to adopt, consciously or
otherwise, the guise of the true in the form of loose and contaminated chains of
transmission, openly declared fiction in Arabic literature was almost totally
absent up until the 20th century. In the medieval period, discussions of the
Maqama genre, in the 12th century CE particularly, was the sole exception in this
respect (cf. Contacts and Models and Three Attempts to Legitimize Fiction).
One way to consider fictionality in classical Arabic literature is to appreciate its
relevance to our conventional definition of genres. Since we are traditionally used
to distinguishing poetry from prose according to formal features (constraints even)
such as metre and rhyme, we seem to disregard the fact that the major difference
between these two modes of expression in classical Arabic literature lies mainly in
the conveying of reality in either fictional or non-fictional ways. While Hadith prose
pretends to present historical reality, poetry seems to declare that it is in no way
committed to conveying reality faithfully and realistically. The poetry versus prose
dichotomy, if considered at all in the context of an assessment of fiction, is thus generally viewed too complacently along the lines of a division and separating distinction between fiction and non-fiction without concern for the more symbiotic
relationship between fiction and reality. Hadith prose literature (re-)presents reality, whereas poetry does notcannot, evenpretend to convey reality realistically: it is patently far too stylized and formulaic. Now, this may be a convenient way
of understanding the distinction between poetry and prose, but poetry should not
in fact be excluded from the picture of how reality was modeled.
Rinas paper, as well as her ongoing work at the time, was concerned with cultural research; it looked at texts to inquire into the cultural models that allowed
people to form their perception of the world. In classical Arabic literature two
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modes competed for the role of modeling reality, involved in the creation and
cultivation of authoritative paradigms of past and present: (1) An Historical/
Reporting Mode; and (2) A Creative Mode.
It is the latter that is discernible principally, though not exclusively, in texts of
poetry. Historically, the function of shaping the collective memory and experience of the pre-Islamic community and crafting it into binding modes of conduct
had been undertaken by the poets. They did this by referring to the great deeds of
ancestral figures. They did this, however, not by reporting what could be construed to have actually happened in feats of combat, but by phrasing and
rephrasing capsules of values according to which it was deemed that the community at large should be instructed and educated. Sometimes this involved the
iteration and reiteration of concrete instances of right and wrong values; but, as
intimated, the poetry was mostly threadbare of concrete facts according to which
an historical narrative could be read or reconstructed. A good example of all this
can be seen in the pre-Islamic Muallaqa of Zuhayr ibn Ab Sulma, which treats
the S.ulh.a (peace treaty) that marked the end of the forty year war of Dah.is and
Ghabra. Zuhayr is addressing each of the parties involved in this s.ulh.a, but
does not tell us how the peace was concluded. He speaks of an historical event
without delineating historical, chronological, and narrative details of the war
itself and how, more importantly, the peace was effected. Such details are to be
found in complementary akhbar (historical anecdotes).
The poetic stance of Arabic, and certainly jahil (pre-Islamic) verse, was never
to relate things as they actually happened; rather poets boasted of the fact that
they were in no way committed to realism and were indeed able to create, so to
speak, reality in the way they pleased and perhaps even for the good of the world.
This is discernible ironically in Quranic exegesis pertaining to the criticism of
them (al-Shuara 226): [Have you not seen the poets] ... that they say that which
they do not do. They talk a good game but do little of what they say. Most of
their expression, in short, was overtly fictional. (Here we are ignoring the ritual
function the poetry may or may not have had.)
With the coming of Islam, a different group of cultural agents assumed
authority over the past. Poets did this in their own way and according to their
own tactics, for there had been an essential rupture with the advent of Islam.
Scholars of Quran and Hadith introduced different paradigms derived from a
different view of the past; the scholars basic model of reality resided, as is well
known, in a full commitment to what were perceived to be faithful reports of past
and historical events (represented in the practices of Hadith scholarship). As far
as the authoritative view of the past (and the present values of the community) is
concerned, the scholars won out over the poets. In short, authority over the past
was detached from poetry and taken away from its authors. We can trace this
development by reading anecdotes from Umayyad times relating to the first
scholars of poetry, the rawiyas, such as H
. ammad al-Rawiya. When the caliphs
consulted men on the correct and authentic versions of a verse, or the correct
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usage of language more generally, they came to rely more and more on scholars
and less and less on poets (such as Dhu al-Rumma) who had been the traditional
experts of Arabic language. The poets role as repositories of the poetic tradition
was being wrested from them and coming to be handled increasingly by scholars.
But poetry still retained the power to employ fictionality for other purposes.
The fictional creative mode was used in poetry to model the private and
personal, rather than public, sphere of life. Tashbb, courtly erotic poetrya poetry
composed for elite women in the mainprovides perhaps the best example.
The social function of this kind of courtly poetry required it to include pseudoautobiographical descriptions of love. Apparently faithful details of reality were
incorporated into these compositions, such as the name of the beloved and allusions to (actual) encounters between lovers. The poet might depict a mole on the
beloved in a place where only heas lovercould possibly have seen it: he really did then see his beloved naked, one might conclude. These may be termed
tokens of realism or reality items, and they were meant to suggest the fact that
these amatory encounters might actually have taken place (according to a realistic imaginary). But while there was this tendency to cultivate a descriptive and
anecdotal realism, according to identifiable conventions, there was also a contrarycontradictory evenneed to disclaim the fact that the events alluded to
had actually taken place! This can be discerned, for example, from anecdotes
about al-H
. arith ibn Khalid al-Makhzum, who was appreciated as one of the
most accomplished poets of tashbb. He indulged in it taz.arrufan wa-takhalluan,
i.e., he was both graceful and indecent. When asked why he didnt propose to
Aisha bint T.alh.a after her husband had been killed, he replied, for example that
he didnt want people to think that he really meant what he had said in poems
about her. We can sense overall a contrary dynamic: these poems came as close to
reality as possible and yet were ultimately meant to disclaim it.
There was an ambiguity about whether or not these compositions were
intended to be taken seriously. They were and simultaneously were not meant to
be taken seriously. Who then did take these poems seriously? Guardians, husbands, brothersof course. In this respect consider the story about Muawiya
related in Kitab al-Aghan. His daughter, Atika, was celebrated in such scandalous poetry by Abu Dhahbal that Muawiya was disconcerted, not knowing
what to do about the situation, as these verses were on everybodys tongue. Was
she to be blamed for real moral misconduct? In a quandary as to what to do, he
devised a scheme; he decided to go to Mecca to perform the Hajj and meet the
poet. He told the poet that while he was certain the contents of the verses were
entirely fictional, his son by contrast was fuming with anger. He could not guarantee the poets safety. Abu Dhahbal was duly scared and thus disclaimed all connection to the poems attributed to him. This, it is said, was the only reason
Muawiya undertook the Hajj.
So poems of this ilk were considered real threats to dignified women and their
men-folk could never approve of them. Women, on the other hand, liked them very
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much and there is ample evidence to this effect. In certain instances, elite and wellto-do women went on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina in order to make contacts
with tashbb poets and secretly to commission love poems. When love poems were
leaked into the public sphere and disseminated, dealing with the situation was a
delicate issue. The story of Umm al-Bann illustrates this well. Her lover Wad.d.ah.
al-Yaman, was, to be sure, killed on her account, but not publicly and overtly since
that would have suggested that what he wrote was true. Everyone knew that these
poems were not completely truthful; on the other hand, they were as realistic as
they dared to be; and if it was possible for marriages to suffer on account of such
verses, they must have contained more than mere grains of truth.
In a later period, Abbasid poetry and culture testifies to the emergence of
models of conduct in the Abbasid court, where everyone had to be in love. There
was a very strong social basis for this: love facilitated the acquisition of the quality of z.arf. A relevant anecdote that can illustrate this concerns Harun al-Rashd
(d. 809), told in the Kitab al-Aghan: al-As.ma relates: I have only once seen the
effects of wine [nabdh] on Harun al-Rashds face; I came to him with Abu H
. afs.
Al-Shitranj, a singer in the court, and I recognized the telltale torpor on his face.
He said to us, Compete among yourselves in composing verses, and he who hits
upon what is in my soul will be rewarded with ten thousand dirhams. I was
apprehensive and the dread that he espied in me paralyzed me. Abu H
. afs., on the
other hand, immediately composed a verse:
Kullama darati l-zujajatu zadat-hu shtiyaqan wa-h.ubbatan fa-bakaki
Each time the cup was passed around it increased his longing and passion and he wept
for you.
Al-Rashd said you have done well and you will be rewarded with ten thousand
dirhams. Al-As.ma said, My fear and apprehension disappeared and I said:
Lam yanalki raja an tah.d.urn wa-tajafat umniyat an siwaki
My hope that you would come to me has not reached you yet my desire for anyone
but you has vanished.
Harun al-Rashd said, Well done! You will be rewarded twenty thousand
dirhams. Then he lowered his head and remained silent for a while; he then raised
his head and looked at us, saying, By God! I am a better poet than both of you:
Fa-tamannaytu an yughshiyan llahu nuasan laalla ayn taraki
I wish that God would grant me sleep so that I might see you in my dreams.
Two points of interest emerge from the anecdote: first, the poets know what the
caliph feelsor should, according to courtly convention, be feelingand thus
they are able to express this in poetry; secondly, the experience is not a real
experiencethere is no kind of ontological value until it is expressed in poetry: if
these emotions are not put into words, and in particular poetry, they have no real
existence in the world ....
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Rina Drorys research was more measured, detailed and sophisticated than I
have been able to reflect. The above truncated minutes provide the merest blueprint of her work; she would have developed and amplified parts, no doubt, and
rescinded, altered, and emended others. One cannot second guess which. To represent someone elses scholarly ideas is indeed difficult, but the effort is worth it
in the end in order to avoid forgetting. I cannot represent Rinas work in its full
bloom (and wince from the thought that I may have misrepresented some of it).
But as she herself remarked of Abbasid court poetry, it is as if an experience is
not a real experience until it is expressed in words. We can now only regret the
absence of more of Rinas words.
Philip F. Kennedy
July, 2003