Notes.

It is necessary that judgments, final orders and

resolutions be served personally or, if not possible, by
registered mail accompanied by a written explanation why
the service was not done personally, in order that the period
for taking an appeal may be computed. (Development Bank
of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, 498 SCRA 537
[2006])
Bare denials cannot outweigh the probative value of the
registry return cards attached to the record. (Yanson vs.
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, 544
SCRA 265 [2008])
o0o
G.R. No. 176019.January 12, 2011.*

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., petitioner, vs.

GOLDEN POWER DIESEL SALES CENTER, INC. and
RENATO C. TAN, respondents.
Foreclosure of Mortgage; Auction Sales; Writs of Possession; The
general rule is that a purchaser in a public auction sale of a
foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of possession and, upon an
ex parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the trial
court to issue the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.In
China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), we
ruled: It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes
the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As
such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can
demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in
his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even
during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
accordance with
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
406

406

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel Sales
Center, Inc.

Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required

after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of
the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application
and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes a ministerial duty of the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser in a public auction sale of
a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of possession and, upon an
ex parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the trial
court to issue the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.
Same; Same; Same; In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third
party holding the same adversely to the judgment obligor, the
issuance by the trial court of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser of said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no
longer be done ex parte, but for the exception to apply, the property
need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the
third party adversely to the judgment obligor.There is, however,
an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of
redemption period; by whom executed or given.x x x Upon the
expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner
shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and
claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the
levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser
or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property, when the foreclosed property is in the
possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the
judgment obligor, the issuance by the trial court of a writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser of said real property ceases to
be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. The procedure is
for the trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of the
adverse possession. For the exception to apply, however, the
property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held
by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.
Same; Same; Same; The exception provided under Section 33 of
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in
which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such
407

VOL. 639, JANUARY 12, 2011

407

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel Sales
Center, Inc.
as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.In China Bank v.
Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), we discussed the meaning of a third

party who is actually holding the property adversely to the

judgment obligor. We stated: The exception provided under Section
33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation
in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right,
such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their
own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of
the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the
property. In this case, respondents cannot claim that their right to
possession over the properties is analogous to any of these.
Respondents cannot assert that their right of possession is adverse
to that of CEDEC when they have no independent right of
possession other than what they acquired from CEDEC. Since
respondents are not holding the properties adversely to CEDEC,
being the latters successors-in-interest, there was no reason for the
trial court to order the suspension of the implementation of the writ
of possession.
Same; Same; Same; It is settled that a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the issuance
of the writ of possession.It is settled that a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the
issuance of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the
application for a writ of possession is filed, does not need to look into
the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. The
purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the
outcome of the pending annulment case.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Clyde L. Asual for respondents.
408

408

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
CARPIO,J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 13 March 2006
Decision2 and 19 December 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78626. In its 13 March 2006
Decision, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc.s (BPI Family) petition for mandamus
and certiorari. In its 19 December 2006 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied BPI Familys motion for

Court of Appeals denied

reconsideration.

BPI

Familys motion

for

The Facts
On 26 October 1994, CEDEC Transport, Inc. (CEDEC)
mortgaged two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 134327 and 134328 situated
in Malibay, Pasay City, including all the improvements
thereon (properties), in favor of BPI Family to secure a loan
of P6,570,000. On the same day, the mortgage was duly
annotated on the titles under Entry No. 94-2878. On 5 April
and 27 November 1995, CEDEC obtained from BPI Family
additional loans of P2,160,000 and P1,140,000, respectively,
and again mortgaged the same properties. These latter
mortgages were duly annotated on the titles under Entry
Nos. 95-6861 and 95-11041, respectively, on the same day
the loans were obtained.
Despite demand, CEDEC defaulted in its mortgage
obligations. On 12 October 1998, BPI Family filed with the
ex-officio sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
(RTC) a veri_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Rollo, pp. 8-17. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with
Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Mariflor P. Punzalan
Castillo, concurring.
3 Id., at p. 19.
409

VOL. 639, JANUARY 12, 2011

409

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
fied petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage over the properties under Act No. 3135, as
amended.4
On 10 December 1998, after due notice and publication,
the sheriff sold the properties at public auction. BPI Family,
as the highest bidder, acquired the properties for
P13,793,705.31. On 14 May 1999, the Certificate of Sheriffs
Sale, dated 24 February 1999, was duly annotated on the
titles covering the properties.
On 15 May 1999, the one-year redemption period expired
without CEDEC redeeming the properties. Thus, the titles
to the properties were consolidated in the name of BPI
Family. On 13 September 2000, the Registry of Deeds of

Family. On 13 September 2000, the Registry of Deeds of

Pasay City issued new titles, TCT Nos. 142935 and 142936,
in the name of BPI Family.
However, despite several demand letters, CEDEC refused
to vacate the properties and to surrender possession to BPI
Family. On 31 January 2002, BPI Family filed an Ex-Parte
Petition for Writ of Possession over the properties with
Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (trial
court). In its 27 June 2002 Decision, the trial court granted
BPI Familys petition.5 On 12 July 2002, the trial court
issued the Writ of Possession.
On 29 July 2002, respondents Golden Power Diesel Sales
Center, Inc. and Renato C. Tan6 (respondents) filed a
Motion to Hold Implementation of the Writ of Possession.7
Respondents alleged that they are in possession of the
properties which they acquired from CEDEC on 10
September 1998 pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of
_______________
4 An Act To Regulate The Sale Of Property Under Special Powers
Inserted In Or Annexed To The Real Estate Mortgages. Approved on 6
March 1924.
5 Rollo, pp. 58-61.
6 Respondent Renato C. Tan is the President and Chief Executive
Officer of Golden Power.
7 Rollo, pp. 62-64.
410

410

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
Mortgage (Deed of Sale).8 Respondents argued that they are
third persons claiming rights adverse to CEDEC, the
judgment obligor and they cannot be deprived of possession
over the properties. Respondents also disclosed that they
filed a complaint before Branch 111 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0360, for
the cancellation of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale and an
order to direct BPI Family to honor and accept the Deed of
Absolute Sale between CEDEC and respondents.9
On 12 September 2002, the trial court denied
respondents motion.10 Thereafter, the trial court issued an
alias writ of possession which was served upon CEDEC and
all other persons claiming rights under them.
However, the writ of possession expired without being

implemented. On 22 January 2003, BPI Family filed an

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order the Honorable Branch
Clerk of Court to Issue Alias Writ of Possession. In an Order
dated 27 January 2003, the trial court granted BPI
Familys motion.
Before the alias writ could be implemented, respondent
Renato C. Tan filed with the trial court an Affidavit of Third
Party Claim11 on the properties. Instead of implementing
the writ, the sheriff referred the matter to the trial court for
resolution.
On 11 February 2003, BPI Family filed an Urgent
Motion to Compel Honorable Sheriff and/or his Deputy to
Enforce Writ of Possession and to Break Open the
properties. In its 7 March 2003 Resolution, the trial court
denied BPI Familys
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 133-135.
9 Id., at pp. 65-77. Entitled Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc.
and Renato C. Tan v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., Elvira A. Lim,
CEDEC Transport Corporation, Pepito S. Celestino as Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City and as Ex-officio Sheriff, and
Deputy Sheriff Severino DC Balubar, Jr.
10 Id., at pp. 80-83.
11 Id., at pp. 85-88.
411

VOL. 639, JANUARY 12, 2011

411

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
motion and ordered the sheriff to suspend the
implementation of the alias writ of possession.12 According
to the trial court, the order granting the alias writ of
possession should not affect third persons holding adverse
rights to the judgment obligor. The trial court admitted
that in issuing the first writ of possession it failed to take
into consideration respondents complaint before Branch
111 claiming ownership of the property. The trial court also
noted that respondents were in actual possession of the
properties and had been updating the payment of CEDECs
loan balances with BPI Family. Thus, the trial court found
it necessary to amend its 12 September 2002 Order and
suspend the implementation of the writ of possession until
Civil Case No. 99-0360 is resolved.
BPI Family filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 20

June 2003 Resolution, the trial court denied the motion.13

BPI Family then filed a petition for mandamus and
certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. BPI
Family argued that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
ordered the suspension of the implementation of the alias
writ of possession. According to BPI Family, it was the
ministerial duty of the trial court to grant the writ of
possession in its favor considering that it was now the owner
of the properties and that once issued, the writ should be
implemented without delay.
The Court of Appeals dismissed BPI Familys petition.
The dispositive portion of the 13 March 2006 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Writ of Mandamus and
Writ of Certiorari with Application for a TRO and/or Preliminary
Injunction is hereby DENIED. The twin Resolutions dated March 7,
2003 and June 20, 2003, both issued by the public respondent in
LRC Case No. 02-0003, ordering the sheriff to suspend the
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 89-93.
13 Id., at pp. 94-98.
412

412

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel Sales
Center, Inc.
implementation of the Alias Writ of Possession issued in favor of the
petitioner, and denying its Urgent Omnibus Motion thereof,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14

BPI Family filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 19

December 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
implementation of the alias writ of possession because
respondents were in actual possession of the properties and
are claiming rights adverse to CEDEC, the judgment
obligor. According to the Court of Appeals, the principle that
the implementation of the writ of possession is a mere

the implementation of the writ of possession is a mere

ministerial function of the trial court is not without
exception. The Court of Appeals held that the obligation of
the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of
the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to
be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to
that of the debtor or mortgagor.
The Issues
BPI Family raises the following issues:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MERELY STEPPED INTO THE
SHOES OF MORTGAGOR CEDEC, BEING THE VENDEE OF
THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION, THEY ARE CATEGORIZED
AS
_______________
14 Id., at p. 17.
413

VOL. 639, JANUARY 12, 2011

413

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel Sales
Center, Inc.
THIRD PERSONS IN POSSESSION THEREOF WHO ARE
CLAIMING A RIGHT ADVERSE TO THAT OF THE
DEBTOR/MORTGAGOR CEDEC.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN SUSTAINING THE AFOREMENTIONED TWIN ORDERS
SUSPENDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION ON THE GROUND THAT THE ANNULMENT
CASE FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS STILL PENDING
DESPITE THE ESTABLISHED RULING THAT PENDENCY OF A
CASE QUESTIONING THE LEGALITY OF A MORTGAGE OR
AUCTION SALE CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR THE NONISSUANCE AND/OR NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF A WRIT OF
POSSESSION.15

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.
BPI Family argues that

respondents

cannot

be

BPI

Family

argues

that

respondents

cannot

be

considered a third party who is claiming a right adverse to

that of the debtor or mortgagor because respondents, as
vendee, merely stepped into the shoes of CEDEC, the
vendor and judgment obligor. According to BPI Family,
respondents are mere extensions or successors-in-interest of
CEDEC. BPI Family also argues that the pendency of an
action questioning the validity of a mortgage or auction sale
cannot be a ground to oppose the implementation of a writ of
possession.
On the other hand, respondents insist that they are third
persons who claim rights over the properties adverse to
CEDEC. Respondents argue that the obligation of the court
to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to
that of the judgment obligor.
_______________
15 Id., at p. 32.
414

414

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
In extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the
issuance of a writ of possession is governed by Section 7 of
Act No. 3135, as amended, which provides:
SECTION7.In any sale made under the provisions of this Act,
the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance (Regional
Trial Court) of the province or place where the property or any part
thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the
use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating
the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this
Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an
ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the
property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of
property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one
hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any
other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in
the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing
law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of

such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of

section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred
and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight
hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the
bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff
of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute
said order immediately.

This procedure may also be availed of by the purchaser

seeking possession of the foreclosed property bought at the
public auction sale after the redemption period has expired
without redemption having been made.16
In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada,17 we ruled:
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed
_______________
16 China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, G.R. No. 164919, 4 July 2008, 557
SCRA 177, citing IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, 125
Phil. 595; 19 SCRA 181 (1967).
17 Id.
415

VOL. 639, JANUARY 12, 2011

415

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel Sales
Center, Inc.
during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As
such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can
demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in
his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even
during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such
bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not
redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute
right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper
application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.18
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser in a public

auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of
possession and, upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser, it
is ministerial upon the trial court to issue the writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser.
There is, however, an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court provides:

the Rules of Court provides:

Section33.Deed and possession to be given at expiration of
redemption period; by whom executed or given.x x x
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the
time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third
party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property,

when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third
party holding the same adversely to the judgment obligor,
the issuance by the trial court of a writ of possession in favor
of the purchaser of said real property ceases to be
ministerial
_______________
18 Id., at p. 196.
416

416

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
and may no longer be done ex parte.19 The procedure is for
the trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of
the adverse possession.20 For the exception to apply,
however, the property need not only be possessed by a third
party, but also held by the third party adversely to the
judgment obligor.
In this case, BPI Family invokes the general rule that
they are entitled to a writ of possession because respondents
are mere successors-in-interest of CEDEC and do not
possess the properties adversely to CEDEC. Respondents,
on the other hand, assert the exception and insist that they
hold the properties adversely to CEDEC and that their
possession is a sufficient obstacle to the ex parte issuance of
a writ of possession in favor of BPI Family.
Respondents argument fails to persuade the Court. It is
clear that respondents acquired possession over the
properties pursuant to the Deed of Sale which provides that
for P15,000,000 CEDEC will sell, transfer and convey to
respondents the properties free from all liens and
encumbrances excepting the mortgage as may be subsisting
in favor of the BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK.21 Moreover,

in favor of the BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK.21 Moreover,

the Deed of Sale provides that respondents bind themselves
to assume the payment of the unpaid balance of the
mortgage indebtedness of the VENDOR (CEDEC)
amounting to P7,889,472.48, as of July 31, 1998, in favor of
the aforementioned mortgagee (BPI Family) by the
mortgage instruments and does hereby further agree to be
bound by the precise terms and conditions therein
contained.22
In Roxas v. Buan,23 we ruled:
_______________
19 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 757; 374
SCRA 22 (2002), citing Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 245
Phil. 316; 162 SCRA 358 (1988).
20 Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, 244 Phil. 733; 161 SCRA 710 (1988).
21 Rollo, p. 135.
22 Id.
23 249 Phil. 41; 167 SCRA 43 (1988).
417

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417

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
It will be recalled that Roxas possession of the property was
premised on its alleged sale to him by Valentin for the amount of
P100,000.00. Assuming this to be true, it is readily apparent that
Roxas holds title to and possesses the property as Valentins
transferee. Any right he has to the property is necessarily derived
from that of Valentin. As transferee, he steps into the latters shoes.
Thus, in the instant case, considering that the property had already
been sold at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure,
the only interest that may be transferred by Valentin to Roxas is
the right to redeem it within the period prescribed by law. Roxas is
therefore the successor-in-interest of Valentin, to whom the latter
had conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of
redemption. Consequently, Roxas occupancy of the property cannot
be considered adverse to Valentin.24

In this case, respondents possession of the properties was

premised on the sale to them by CEDEC for the amount of
P15,000,000. Therefore, respondents hold title to and
possess the properties as CEDECs transferees and any
right they have over the properties is derived from CEDEC.
As transferees of CEDEC, respondents merely stepped into
CEDECs shoes and are necessarily bound to acknowledge
and respect the mortgage CEDEC had earlier executed in

and respect the mortgage CEDEC had earlier executed in

favor of BPI Family.25 Respondents are the successors-ininterest of CEDEC and thus, respondents occupancy over
the properties cannot be considered adverse to CEDEC.
Moreover, in China Bank v. Lozada,26 we discussed the
meaning of a third party who is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor. We stated:
The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third
party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a
co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural
tenant,
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 47-48; pp. 49-50. Citations omitted.
25 Spouses Paderes v. Court of Appeals, 502 Phil. 76; 463 SCRA 504 (2005).
26 Supra note 16.
418

418

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel Sales
Center, Inc.
and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they
are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession
of another co-owner or the owner of the property.27

In this case, respondents cannot claim that their right to

possession over the properties is analogous to any of these.
Respondents cannot assert that their right of possession is
adverse to that of CEDEC when they have no independent
right of possession other than what they acquired from
CEDEC. Since respondents are not holding the properties
adversely to CEDEC, being the latters successors-ininterest, there was no reason for the trial court to order the
suspension of the implementation of the writ of possession.
Furthermore, it is settled that a pending action for
annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the
issuance of the writ of possession.28 The trial court, where
the application for a writ of possession is filed, does not need
to look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure.29 The purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
annulment case.30
In this case, the trial court erred in issuing its 7 March
2003 Order suspending the implementation of the alias writ
of possession. Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 990360, the trial court should not have ordered the sheriff to

0360, the trial court should not have ordered the sheriff to
suspend the implementation of the writ of possession. BPI
Family, as purchaser in the foreclosure sale, is entitled to a
writ of pos_______________
27 Id., at pp. 202-204. Citations omitted.
28 Fernandez v. Espinoza, G.R. No. 156421, 14 April 2008, 551 SCRA
136; Idolor v. Court of Appeals, 490 Phil. 808; 450 SCRA 396 (2005);
Samson v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 759.
29 Idolor v. Court of Appeals, supra.
30 Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 857; 333 SCRA 189
(2000).
419

VOL. 639, JANUARY 12, 2011

419

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Golden Power Diesel

Sales Center, Inc.
session without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No.
99-0360.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE
the 13 March 2006 Decision and the 19 December 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78626.
We SET ASIDE the 7 March and 20 June 2003 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City. We
ORDER the sheriff to proceed with the implementation of
the writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of
Civil Case No. 99-0360.
SO ORDERED.
Nachura, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.
Note.Any question regarding the validity of the
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of possessionregardless of
whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled
to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the
eventual outcome of the said case. (Jetri Construction
Corporation vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 524 SCRA
522 [2007])
o0o

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