Stock Emer 2014
Stock Emer 2014
Stock Emer 2014
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 16 October 2012
Received in revised form 21 October 2013
Accepted 21 October 2013
Available online 16 November 2013
Keywords:
Unconventional political behavior
Individual factors
Macro-level indicators
a b s t r a c t
There is little evidence on the factors that drive peaceful unconventional political participation. This study evaluates the impact of seven individual level constituents age, income,
education, gender, satisfaction with the government, engagement in civil society organizations and voting as well as ve macro-level factors economic development, democratic
experience, income inequalities, a countrys regime type and federalism on citizens participation in boycotts, demonstrations and petition signing activities. Participation in all
three protest activities hinges on education, voting, participation in civil society organizations, and lack of satisfaction with the government. Moreover, the inuence of some
macro-factors, such as democratic experience and economic development, and micro-level
factors, such as gender differs between the three forms of political engagement.
2013 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Civil society provides an especially strong foundation
for a [political system] when it generates opportunities
for participation and inuence at all levels of governance. (Diamond, 1994, p. 9)
A participatory public is a dening feature of a
functioning political system (Tocqueville, 2000). Political
participation provides the link between the citizenry and
the governing process; it allows citizens to directly and
indirectly communicate their interests, concerns and complaints to the government (Tam & Rudolph, 2008). Aware
of the repercussions of citizens involvement in politics
for the well-being of a political system, numerous case,
comparative case, and large-N quantitative studies have
investigated several aspects of political participation (Van
der Meer & van Ingen, 2009). Most analyses focus on voting, the most conventional form of political engagement.
These studies have identied a plethora of macro-level
0362-3319/$ see front matter 2013 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2013.10.012
202
age, income, education, gender, satisfaction with the government, engagement in civil society organizations, and
voting as well as ve macro-level factors: economic
development, democratic experience, income inequalities,
federalism, and macro-level turnout on the three forms
of peaceful unconventional political actions: partaking in
boycotts, participating in demonstrations, and signing petitions. The results are derived from a large sample of more
than 41,000 individuals across 39 countries. By differentiating between the three most common forms of peaceful
political protest, this study also determines whether partaking in a boycott, participating in a demonstration, or
signing a petition can be explained by the same independent variables or not.
The results of this study are quite nuanced. First, an
individuals propensity to engage in peaceful protest activities is mainly driven by individual factors. Second, there
are some commonalities and differences with regard to
the constituents of the three peaceful protest activities. On
the one hand, the four micro-level indicators of education,
engagement in civic organizations, conventional political
participation, and dissatisfaction with the government are
individual drivers for high levels of all three forms of unconventional political engagement. On the other hand, there
are some differences in the effect of other micro-level factors, such as gender and income, as well as macro-level
indicators, such as economic development and democratic
government on the three forms of peaceful protest activities.
2. Dening unconventional political participation
Political participation, largely dened, comprises all
voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to
directly or indirectly inuence political choices at various
levels of the political system (Kaase & Marsh, 1979, p. 42).
One of the most common differentiations between different kinds of political participation is conventional versus
unconventional. Conventional political activities including
voting, party membership and participation in a political rally are actions that intend to inuence the political
process through the electoral arena (Verba & Nie, 1972).
Unconventional political participation aims to inuence
politics through non-institutionalized means. For example, holding a demonstration, participating in a boycott and
signing a petition are all forms of unconventional political
activities (Van der Meer & van Ingen, 2009).
Historically, unconventional political activities were
equated with all kinds of protests and comprised both
peaceful and violent forms of actions. In fact, prior to the
mid 20th century, revolutions, rebellions and revolts such
as the French and American Revolutions constituted a high
amount of contentious actions (Stockemer & Carbonetti,
2010). In the 20th and 21st centuries, deliberately resorting to violent forms of protest, such as wounding or killing
opponents or using weapons by protesters has become
less common, especially in Western countries (Roller &
Wessels, 1996). Rather, these types of protest have been
replaced by peaceful forms of political contention such
as participation in demonstrations, boycotts of products,
deliberate purchase of specic goods, and signing petitions.
Generally, these non-violent political acts are considered legitimate and within the bounds of accepted norms
(Meyer, 2004).
This study adopts the distinction between violent and
non-violent forms of political participation. Unconventional political activities are dened as all sorts of protest
behaviors that do not deliberately involve physical force
and operationalized by data from the World Value Survey. Consistent with the denition above, the concept
includes three measures of peaceful political protest: signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations, and joining
boycotts. However, while these three forms are the most
common forms of peaceful protest activities, they differ in
at least three fundamental ways. First, individuals from the
sample of countries included in this analysis have varying
probabilities to partake in any of the three forms of political
action. For example, 31% of the sample respondents have
signed a petition; 18% have demonstrated; and 10% have
boycotted.
Second and relatedly, the three proxy variables of
protest activity involve different forms of protest. For
example, signing a petition is a very low risk form of
unconventional political activity; signing a petition takes
minutes, if not seconds, and the act remains largely invisible. In contrast, participation in a demonstration is a more
open act of political engagement that involves a relatively
high amount of time commitment. Third, the three forms
of political engagement might be used for different purposes. For instance, boycotts might be conducted for ethical
reasons, while demonstrations could be more overtly political. Because these three forms of contentious actions cover
different forms of unconventional political engagement,
each of these three forms of peaceful contentious actions
is treated individually in the analysis. Political crimes,
such as terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking,
assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, and armed attacks
are deliberately excluded from the denition of political
engagement.
Contrary to conventional political engagement, peaceful unconventional political involvement has been on the
rise over the past decades (Inglehart, 1999, p. 7). Table 1
presents the increase or decrease in all three forms of
unconventional participation in all 15 countries that participated in the 1981 or 1990 wave and the 2005 wave
of the World Value Survey. The rst number in each eld
presents the change in any of the three forms of political
engagement between 1981 or 1990 and 2005. The numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of citizens in
each country who self-identify as having ever participated
in any of these three forms of political engagement in 1981,
1990, and 2005 respectively. While all forms of unconventional political engagement have generally increased, there
is also some wide-ranging between-country variation. For
example, in Japan, all forms of protest behavior have more
than doubled between 1981 and 2005. However, in other
countries such as Turkey, unconventional engagement has
been stable over the past three decades. Finally, there are
even a few countries, including Chile, where protest actions
have actually declined.
For the remaining 60 countries that are included in any
of the ve waves of the World Value Survey, it is harder
203
Table 1
Unconventional political engagement throughout time.
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Chile
Finland
India
Japan
Mexico
Poland
Russia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Switzerland
Turkey
Average increase
Demonstrations
Petitions
Boycotts
+8.8 (22.631.4)
+7.9 (12.220.1)
.2 (18.518.3)
12.6 (29.516.9)
4.2 (14.510.3)
+4.1 (15.319.4)
+17.6 (8.726.3)
5.1 (8.93.8)
+.1 (10.110.2)
+14.7 (30.615.9)
+ 5.1 (7.712.8)
+ 4.3 (7.111.4)
+13.0 (22.935.9)
+12.9 (15.228.1)
+.6 (5.35.9)
4.5
+.4 (2.63)
+10.5 (4.915.4)
1.8 (9.88)
1.2 (3.92.7)
7.5 (8.516)
.1 (15.215.1)
+3.9 (3.17.0)
+.7 (1.32.0)
+.2 (4.74.9)
1.2 (3.62.8)
+.6 (9.410)
+3.7 (2.36)
+1.5 (5.57)
+8.6 (10.619.2)
+.2 (5.25.4)
2.2
204
3.3. Age
3.6. Satisfaction with the government
While there is strong support in the literature that voting increases monolithically with age, it is not clear if the
same relationship exists for age and unconventional political participation (Franklin, 2004; Pattie, Seyd, & Whitley,
2004). On the one hand, Putnam (2000) indirectly entertains the idea that younger generations are less likely to
participate unconventionally when he reports a decline in
civic awareness and social capital among the younger generations of a society. On the other hand, Marsh, OToole,
and Jones (2007) argue that young generations are political, but in unconventional rather than conventional ways.
According to this second perspective, younger generations
foster the transformation of norms and customs in society through non-electoral forms of political engagement
(Dalton, 2008). The empirical analysis will show if, at all,
which one of the two perspectives bears salience.
3.4. Gender
In the literature, there is some consensus that men are
more politically interested, informed and engaged than
women (Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). In particular,
It is likely that citizens who are satised with their government and politics in general, have no reason to engage
in more radical political activities. Rather, they can vote
to display their support. In contrast, disgruntled or dissatised citizens might feel that conventional actions are
inefcient and thus engage in more radical forms of politics. As Klandermans (1997) puts it, a demand for change
often begins with dissatisfaction, be it in the experience of
mediocre government performance, corruption in the state
apparatus, or feelings of injustice and moral indignation
about some state of affairs in politics or society.
3.7. Membership in civil society organizations
Finally, involvement in civil society organizations
should have a positive inuence on increased peaceful unconventional political engagement (Passy & Giugni,
2001, p. 143). For one, there should be a strong direct link
because unions, environmental or consumer organizations
frequently directly organize petition signing activities, boycotts, and demonstrations. On the other hand, there ought
205
public opinion; in short, direct actions are a way for citizens to ensure that their voices are heard; this applies
even more so if conventional channels of decision-making
are either blocked or non-existent (Molyneux, 2002). In
contrast, non-democracies do not promote the political
maturation of citizens. They ban civil society organizations
that do not conform to the governments agenda, and prohibit many or all forms of contentious politics. Based on
this rationale, I hypothesize that unconventional political
participation should be higher in democracies.
4.3. Income inequalities
The relative deprivation approach posits that the likelihood of protest increases with individuals feelings of
dissatisfaction with empirical realities (Seidman, 1994). A
persons level of frustration hinges by and large on how
that person sees the situation with regard to other individuals, either in the same country or in another state
or compared with the individuals own or collective past.
Income inequalities can be one major cause why people
feel deprived. Disparities in peoples disposable income
exacerbate material hardship for those at the bottom rung
of the income ladder; not only is their material situation
worsening over time, even more importantly, they are also
witnessing an increasing gap between what they have and
what others, who are at the top level of society, possess
(Choi, 1999). In particular, in situations where the regime
in power allies with the interests of those at the top rung of
society and does nothing to smooth existing inequalities,
popular anger might be considerable. In such a scenario,
citizens propensity to protest might be very high (Bellin,
2002). Given that income inequalities have been on the rise
in basically every country in the world in the past two or
three decades, I assume this factor to be directly related to
increased contentious actions.1
4.4. Federalism
A federation, a political system which divides power
between the central government and its subunits regions,
districts, municipalities has several advantages which
ought to be conducive to political engagement of all types.
First, federal arrangements can protect the preferences of
territorially-based groups, so that they are not subject to
decisions of the majority (Lijphart, 1999). Second, local
decision-makers have more information than centralized
bodies about the preferences and needs of their constituencies, which will most likely allow for better government
services (Olson, 1969). Third, federalism allows for local
variation in taxation, the provisions of goods and services,
and regulations variations that might be well-justied
based on different needs.
However, beyond protecting minority interests from
abuse by the majority and providing for an adequate
1
For example, Wade (2004) shows that between 1988 and 1993 alone
the ratio between the 10th richest percentile of the world population to
the 10th poorest percentile of the population has increased from 7.28 to
9.28.
206
2
According to the Polity IV guidelines a state is considered democratic
if it is ranked 6 or above on the Polity IV scale.
3
The data refer to 2009.
207
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
N
Mean
SD
Level 1 indicators
Signing petitions
Boycotting
Demonstrating
Income
Education
Age
Gender
Condence in the government
Voting
Membership in civil society organizations
41,890
41,890
41,890
41,890
41,890
41,890
41,890
41,890
41,890
41,890
.31
.10
.18
4.83
5.48
41.96
.49
2.57
.77
1.39
.46
.30
.38
2.31
2.39
16.45
.50
.90
.42
2.25
0
0
0
1
1
15
0
1
0
0
Level 2 indicators
Log GDP per capita
Years democracy
Gini coefcient
Macro-level turnout
Federalism
39
39
39
39
39
8.58
31.96
36.07
70.07
.28
1.61
45.1
9.05
15.51
.46
5.11
0
23.70
32.20
0
4
The countries included in this analysis are: Italy, USA, Canada, Japan,
Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, South Korea,
Poland, Switzerland, Brazil, Chile, India, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania,
Turkey, Ukraine, Peru, Ghana, Moldova, Georgia, Thailand, Indonesia, Viet
Nam, Serbia, New Zealand, Morocco, Cyprus, Trinidad Tobacco, Andorra,
Malaysia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Zambia, and Germany.
Min
Max
1
1
1
10
9
94
1
4
1
12
11.88
196
67.76
99.64
1
5
For this probability transformation, as well as all other probability
transformations that ensue, all other variables are held constant at their
mean.
208
Table 3
Result of the binary logistic HLM model featuring signing petitions as the dependent variable.
Fixed effects
SE
df
Coefcient
(1.10)
(.092)
(.004)
(.013)
(.007)
(.36)
5.62
4.13
2.59
1.20
.52
1.34
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
<.001
<.001
.014
.240
.605
.189
.039
(.011)
3.68
(41,844)
<.001
.18
(.016)
11.06
(41,844)
<.001
.0028
(.0027)
1.03
(41,844)
.303
.031
(.051)
(41,844)
.545
.606
.46
(.066)
6.97
(41,844)
<.001
(.039)
3.68
(41,844)
<.001
(.016)
9.74
(41,844)
<.001
Table 4
Result of the binary logistic HLM model featuring participating in boycotts as the dependent variable.
Fixed effects
Coefcient
SE
df
(1.20)
(.11)
(.0029)
(.016)
(.009)
(.28)
4.03
.76
2.46
.25
1.28
.49
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
<.001
.450
.019
.804
.211
.630
.008
(.016)
.48
(41,844)
.632
.18
(.016)
11.40
(41,844)
<.001
.0001
(.002)
.05
(41,844)
.959
.23
(.007)
3.46
(41,844)
<.001
.46
(.09)
5.28
(41,844)
<.001
(.054)
3.09
(41,844)
.002
(.013)
12.72
(41,844)
<.001
209
Table 5
Result of the binary logistic HLM model featuring partaking in demonstrations as the dependent variable.
Fixed effects
Coefcient
SE
df
(1.07)
(.12)
(.004)
(.015)
(.004)
(.40)
3.33
.77
.23
.588
.23
.24
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
(33)
.002
.448
.821
.561
.370
.813
(.013)
1.76
(41,844)
.079
(.015)
11.58
(41,844)
<.001
(.002)
.597
(41,844)
.551
(.038)
7.203
(41,844)
<.001
(.075)
4.74
(41,844)
<.001
(.044)
2.99
(41,844)
.003
(.011)
16.81
(41,844)
<.001
an individuals propensity to sign petitions.6 Model 3 predicts that somebody in the lowest income bracket is 9% less
likely to have ever signed a petition than someone in the
highest income bracket in his or her respective country.
However, personal income is unrelated to the two other
forms of peaceful protest activities.
Pertaining to the salience of macro-level indicators, the
three models provide a nuanced picture. First, none of the
macro-level factors impacts an individuals likelihood to
participate in a demonstration (Table 5). Hence, it seems
that context does not matter in an individuals decisions to
turn to the street for political reasons. Moreover, there is
only one contextual factor democratic experience that
positively inuences an individuals likelihood to partake
in boycotts (Table 4). The indicators inuence is rather
moderate. An average individuals likelihood to have ever
participated in a boycott increases from 6% in an autocracy to 10% in a country that has been democratic for
100 years. For the third form of unconventional political
engagement, an individuals likelihood to sign a petition,
macro-level indicators have a larger inuence. Petition
signing activities increase with the democratic experience
of a country, as well as its level of economic development
(Table 3). For example, an average individuals likelihood
to have ever signed a petition increases from 28% in a
non-democracy to 71% in a country with 100 years of democratic experience. Similarly, there is a more than 30 point
gap in citizens likelihood to sign a petition between poor
countries, such as Ghana with a GDP per capita of $1000,
and rich countries, such as Norway with a GDP per capita
of $50,000.
6
Running a correlation matrix between education and income reveals
that the two concepts are only weakly correlated (the Pearson Correlation
Coefcient is .335). Thus, the two concepts are rather distinct: the effects
of income on political participation are not captured by education.
8. Conclusion
The conclusions to draw from this study are threefold.
First, this research discovers that the individual factors
responsible for high protest activities are very stable for
all three forms of unconventional political participation,
especially education and to a somewhat lesser extent
membership in civil society organizations boosts citizens
likelihood to partake in demonstrations, boycotts, and
petition signing activities. The same applies, albeit less
pronounced, to dissatisfaction with the government and
conventional political participation in the form of voting.
Furthermore, younger individuals engage more strongly in
the three forms of protest politics than older individuals.
Second, and relatedly, the results indicate some differences
in the salience of other micro-level factors; that is, (1) men
are somewhat more likely than women to demonstrate and
partake in boycotts, but not so in signing petitions, and (2)
individual personal income only carries some weight in the
decision to sign petitions, but is unrelated to participation
in demonstrations and boycotts.
Third, this article brings to the fore some very interesting patterns pertaining to the importance of macro-level
indicators. I nd that economic development, as well as
democratic experience strongly inuences an individuals
decision to sign a petition. The latter of the two indicators,
democratic experience, also inuences citizens propensity
to participate in a boycott. However, none of these indicators impacts citizens likelihood to demonstrate. These
ndings allow me to draw some tentative conclusions. Long
lasting democratic experience and, to a lesser degree, economic modernization, strengthen citizens propensity to
participate in some, but not all forms of protest politics.
This also implies that petition signing becomes the more
widespread the longer a country is democratic and the
more highly it is developed.
The study at hand also allows for the formulation
of some predictions concerning the development of
210
unconventional political activities in countries where contentious actions have not yet become the norm: further
democratization and to a lesser degree, economic development, should further weaken traditional values that are still
dominant in many African and Eastern European countries
such as Burkina Faso and Bulgaria, enticing populaces there
to display higher degrees of contentious action, especially
in the forms of petition signing activities. However, based
on the results here, only a small increase in the number of
demonstrations can be expected as countries democratize
and develop.
While this article provides a rst snapshot of the
salience of potentially relevant independent variables on
unconventional political participation, it could be further
rened. As more waves of the World Value Survey become
available, the study at hand could be replicated with more
countries and time periods. Future research could also try
to replicate this study with other data sources such as the
Afro- or Eurobarometer. In particular, the varying inuence of assorted macro-level indicators on an individuals
likelihood to protest should be further explored.
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