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En Banc: in The Matter of The Petition For Disqualification of Tess Dumpit-MICHELENA G.R. Nos. 163619-20

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS DUMPITMICHELENA G.R. Nos.

163619-20

EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION


FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF
TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA,

G.R. Nos. 163619-20

Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno,
TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA,
Panganiban,
Petitioner,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
- versus Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
CARLOS BOADO,
Austria-Martinez,
FERNANDO CALONGE,
Corona,
SALVADOR CARRERA,
Carpio Morales,
BENITO CARRERA,
Callejo, Sr.,
DOMINGO CARRERA, and
Azcuna,
ROGELIO DE VERA,
Tinga,
Respondents.
Chico-Nazario, and
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Garcia, JJ.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
TO DENY DUE COURSE OR
TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY FOR MAYOR,
TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA,
Petitioner,

- versus CARLOS BOADO,


FERNANDO CALONGE,
SALVADOR CARRERA,
Promulgated:
BENITO CARRERA,
DOMINGO CARRERA, and
November 17, 2005
ROGELIO DE VERA,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Cases

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the 9 March 2004
Resolution[2] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division and
the 7 May 2004 Resolution[3] of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA 04-015 [4] and SPA
04-016.[5]

The COMELEC Second Division cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Tess

Dumpit-Michelena

(Dumpit-Michelena)

on

the

ground

of

material

misrepresentation. The COMELEC En Banc denied Dumpit-Michelenas motion


for reconsideration for late filing.

The Antecedent Facts

Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of


Agoo, La Union during the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito
Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera (Boado, et al.) sought DumpitMichelenas disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections 74 [6] and
78[7] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).

Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of Congressman


Tomas Dumpit, Sr. (Congressman Dumpit) of the Second District of La Union, is
not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a

resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that DumpitMichelena only transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La
Union on 24 October 2003. Her presence in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union was
noticed only after she filed her certificate of candidacy. Boado, et al. presented,
among other things, a joint affidavit of all barangay officials of San Julian West to
prove that Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of the barangay.

Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San


Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a
residential lot on 19 April 2003. She even designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a
caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and
certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to prove that she actually resides
in the area.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

In a Resolution issued on 9 March 2004, the COMELEC Second Division ruled, as


follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions are hereby


GRANTED. Respondent is hereby adjudged to be a non-resident of Brgy. San
Julian West, Agoo, La Union for purposes of the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. Accordingly, her Certificate of Candidacy is hereby
CANCELLED on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections 78 and
74 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, in relation to Comelec Resolution
No. 6452.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The COMELEC Second Division held that Boado, et al. established by


convincing evidence that Dumpit-Michelena is not a bona fide resident of San
Julian West, Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division found that among
the neighbors of Dumpit-Michelena who executed affidavits in her favor, only one
is a resident of San Julian West. The others are from other barangays of Agoo, La
Union. The COMELEC Second Division noted that several affiants who declared
that Dumpit-Michelena resides in San Julian West later retracted their statements
on the ground that they did not read the contents of the documents when they
signed the affidavits.

Dumpit-Michelena moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution of the


COMELEC Second Division.

In a Resolution issued on 7 May 2004, the COMELEC En Banc denied


Dumpit-Michelenas motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc ruled
that the motion for reconsideration was filed three days after the last day of the
prescribed period for filing the motion.

Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-Michelena.

The Issues

The issues raised in the petition are the following:

1.

Whether Dumpit-Michelenas motion for reconsideration was filed on

2.

Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law; and

time;

3.

Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement

under the Local Government Code of 1991.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

On Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration

We rule that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in


denying Dumpit-Michelenas motion for reconsideration for late filing.

Resolution No. 6452[9] provides:

SECTION 8. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a decision,


resolution, order or ruling of a division shall be filed within three (3) days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution
for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the
Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall, within two
(2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc.

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the
resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification
thereof.

In this case, the Resolution cancelling Dumpit-Michelenas Certificate of


Candidacy was promulgated in open court on 9 March 2004. Dumpit-Michelenas
counsel was present during the promulgation. Following Section 8 of Resolution
No. 6452, Dumpit-Michelena had until 12 March 2004 within which to file her
motion for reconsideration. However, while Dumpit-Michelena claims to be
familiar with Resolution No. 6452, she filed her motion for reconsideration on 15
March 2004. This is because during the promulgation of the cases on 9 March
2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order[10] which states:

On call of these cases today for promulgation, counsels for the respondent
appeared. There was no appearance for the petitioners. Counsel manifested that
they filed a manifestation and motion and an urgent motion holding in abeyance
the promulgation of the resolution of these cases. The motions to hold in abeyance
the promulgation is hereby denied. However, the respondent may file a motion
for reconsideration within five (5) days from receipt of the decision if the
decision is adverse to their client. (Emphasis supplied)

Apparently, the COMELEC committed an oversight in declaring that DumpitMichelena had five days within which to file her motion for reconsideration. The
COMELEC overlooked Resolution No. 6452. For her part, Dumpit-Michelena
only followed the period provided in the Order. She filed her motion for
reconsideration on 15 March 2004 since 14 March 2004 fell on a Sunday. This
Court can hardly fault her for following the COMELEC Order.

On Denial of Due Process

Dumpit-Michelena asserts that she was denied due process when the COMELEC
summarily resolved the disqualification case against her without giving her a fair
opportunity to submit additional evidence to support her case.

Resolution No. 6452 delegates the reception of evidence in disqualification


cases to field officials designated by the COMELEC. [11] The summary nature of
disqualification proceedings is provided under Section 5(A)(6) of Resolution No.
6452 which states:

6.

The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the

parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other


documentary evidence including their position paper or memorandum
within a period of three (3) inextendible days;

The position paper or memorandum of each party shall contain the


following:

a.

A Statement of the Case, which is a clear and concise statement of the


nature of the action, a summary of the documentary evidence and other
matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy;

b. A Statement of the Issues, which is a clear and concise statement of


the issues;

c.

The Argument which is a clear and concise presentation of the


argument in support of each issue; and

d. The Relief which is a specification of the judgment which the party


seeks to obtain. The issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included
in the Memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Being a
summation of the parties pleadings and documentary evidence, the
Commission may consider the memorandum alone in deciding or
resolving the petition.

In these cases, Dumpit-Michelena filed a motion for the inhibition of Atty.


Marino V. Salas (Atty. Salas), the Provincial Election Supervisor and hearing

officer designated to receive the evidence of the parties. She alleged that Boado, et
al.s counsel was the former Regional Director of the COMELEC Regional Office
and undue influence might be exerted over Atty. Salas. In the meanwhile, she
submitted a semblance of a memorandum if only to insure x x x that she would be
able to convey her opposition to the petitions filed against her.[12] DumpitMichelena alleged that she wanted to submit her evidence to a hearing officer who
would not be biased and would not be inclined to side with Boado, et al.

Without resolving the Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Salas forwarded the records of
the case to COMELEC Manila. However, to obviate suspicion of partiality, Atty.
Salas did not make any recommendation as required under Resolution No. 6452.

We rule that there was no denial of due process in the cases before the Court.

Section 5(A) of Resolution No. 6452 provides:

7.

The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of the answer. The Hearing Officer concerned shall personally or
through his authorized representative submit to the Clerk of the Commission
his Hearing/Case report(s) indicating his findings and recommendations
within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of
evidence together with the complete records of the case;

8.

Upon receipt of the records of the case [indicating] the findings and
recommendations of the Hearing Officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar
the same for raffle to a division;

9. The division to whom the case is raffled shall, after evaluation and
consultation, assign immediately the same to a member who shall pen the
decision within five (5) days from the date of consultation.

Resolution No. 6452 is clear. The hearing officer is only designated to hear and
receive evidence. His conclusions are merely recommendatory upon the
COMELEC. Dumpit-Michelena knew fully well that the entire records of the case
would be forwarded to COMELEC Manila for the resolution of the cases. She had
all the opportunity to present her evidence to support her stand. Instead, she chose
to file a Memorandum which she described as one done in half-hearted compliance
with the rules.[13] She may not claim now that she was denied due process because
she was unable to present all her evidence before the hearing officer.

On Residency Requirement

Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with the residency
requirement.

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the qualifications for

elective provincial, city, municipal and barangay officials shall be those provided
for in the Local Government Code. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code
of 1991[14] states:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or,
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(Emphasis supplied)

The concept of residence in determining a candidates qualification is already


a settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with
domicile.[15] InCo v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[16] this
Court declared:

x x x The term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile not
only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the


meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for congress
continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence


in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the committees concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of


the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87)

xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I


think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that resident
has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than
actual residence.

Mr. Delos Reyes: Domicile.

M[r]s. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention
to reside?

Mr. Delos Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially


considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987

Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to


the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was a resident and registered voter


of Ambaracao North, Naguilian, La Union. She claims that she has already
acquired a new domicile in San Julian West and is thus qualified to run for the
position of mayor. She transferred her registration as a voter of San Julian West on
24 October 2003.

Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing


her acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she eventually built a
house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted for an office.[17] Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost.[18] To
successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the
following requirements:

(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.[19]

Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three


requirements, the domicile of origin continues. [20] To effect change, there must
be animus manendicoupled with animus non revertendi.[21] The intent to remain in
the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of
residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.[22]

The Court agrees with the COMELEC Second Division that DumpitMichelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. Among
the documents submitted by Dumpit-Michelena is a Special Power of
Attorney[23] authorizing Clyde Crispino (Crispino) to apply, facilitate and follow up
the issuance of a building permit of the beach house she intended to put up in her
lot. She also authorized Crispino to help her caretaker oversee the lot and the
construction of the beach house. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC
Second Division, a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can
hardly be considered a place of residence.

In addition, the designation of caretaker with monthly compensation


of P2,500[24] only shows that Dumpit-Michelena does not regularly reside in the
place. The Deed of Absolute Sale states that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident of
Naguilian, La Union[25] while the Special Power of Attorney states that she is a
resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union and No. 6 Butterfly St. Valle Verde 6,
Pasig, Metro Manila. Dumpit-Michelena obviously has a number of residences and
the acquisition of another one does not automatically make the most recently
acquired residence her new domicile.

We considered the affidavits submitted by Dumpit-Michelena where the


affiants retracted their previous affidavits stating that Dumpit-Michelena was not a
resident of San Julian West. The affiants alleged that they signed the first affidavits
without knowing their contents. However, the COMELEC Second Division
pointed out that Boado, et al. also submitted affidavits with the affiants repudiating
their previous affidavits that Dumpit-Michelena was a resident of San Julian West.
The Court is inclined to give more weight to the joint affidavit of all
the barangay officials of San Julian West attesting that Dumpit-Michelena is not a
resident of their barangay.

Hence, the COMELEC Second Division did not commit grave abuse of

discretion in cancelling Dumpit-Michelenas Certificate of Candidacy.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution


dated 9 March 2004 of the COMELEC Second Division and the Resolution dated 7
May 2004 of the COMELEC En Banc with MODIFICATION that Tess DumpitMichelenas motion for reconsideration was not filed late.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Pundaodaya v. COMELEC

EN BANC

MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, G.R. No. 179313


Petitioner,

Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo, and
Abad, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 17, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition[1] for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the August 3, 2007
Resolution[2] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No.
07-202, which declared private respondent Arsenio Densing Noble (Noble)
qualified to run for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May
14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

The facts are as follows:


Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith Pundaodaya,
who ran against Noble for the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental in the 2007 elections.
On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating therein
that he has been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental for 15 years.
On April 3, 2007, Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification [3] against
Noble docketed as SPA No. 07-202, alleging that the latter lacks the residency
qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local officials; that he never
resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not appear to have the
intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact
a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business
called OBERT Construction Supply.
In his Answer,[4] Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of
Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that on January 18, 1992, he
married Bernadith Go, the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental; that he has been engaged in electoral activities since his
marriage; and that he voted in the said municipality in the 1998, 2001 and 2004
elections.
In a resolution dated May 13, 2007,[5] the Second Division of the
COMELEC ruled in favor of Pundaodaya and disqualified Noble from running as
mayor, thus:
Respondent Nobles claim that he is a registered voter and has
actually voted in the past three (3) elections in the said municipality does
not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency at
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does campaigning in previous
elections sufficiently establish residence.

Respondent Noble failed to show that he has indeed acquired


domicile at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. He failed to prove not only
his bodily presence in the new locality but has likewise failed to show
that he intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and abandon
his residency at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition to
Disqualify Aresnio Densing Noble is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. In the meantime,
he garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate
on May 15, 2007. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation.
[7]

On August 3, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the


Second Division and declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position.
The COMELEC En Banc held that when Noble married Bernadith Go on January
18, 1992, the couple has since resided in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he
was a registered voter and that he participated in the last three elections; and
although he is engaged in business in Cagayan de Oro City, the fact that he resides
in Kinoguitan and is a registered voter and owns property thereat, sufficiently meet
the residency requirement.[8] Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant Motion
for Reconsideration and to REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Resolution
promulgated on May 13, 2007 issued by the Commission (Second
Division).
ACCORDINGLY, respondent ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE is
QUALIFIED to run for the local elective position of Municipal Mayor of
the Municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the
COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared Noble
qualified to run; when it did not annul Nobles proclamation; and when it failed to
proclaim the true winning candidate, Judith Pundaodaya.
In a resolution dated November 13, 2007,[10] the Court required the respondents to
comment on the petition.
Public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Manifestation and Motion[11] praying that it be excused from filing a separate
comment and that the said pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the
November 13, 2007 Resolution.
Meanwhile, for Nobles failure to comply, the Court issued Resolutions [12] dated
July 15, 2008 and December 9, 2008 requiring him to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt, imposing a fine ofP1,000.00,
and requiring him to file a comment. On June 2, 2009, the Court deemed Noble to
have waived the filing of the comment.[13]
The issues for resolution are: whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its
discretion: 1) in declaring Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position; and 2)
in failing to order the annulment of Nobles proclamation and refusing to proclaim
Judith Pundaodaya as the winning candidate.
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, requires that an elective local official must be a resident in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he intends to serve for at least one year
immediately preceding the election.[14]
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[15] it was held that the term residence is to
be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation,
but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be

found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi).
In Domino v. Commission on Elections,[16] the Court explained that domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention
and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne
in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can
have but one residence or domicile at a time.
If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.[17] Without clear and
positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of
origin continues.[18]
Records show that Nobles domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City. However, he claims to have chosen Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental as his new
domicile. To substantiate this, he presented before the COMELEC his voter
registration records;[19] a Certification dated April 25, 2007 from Election Officer II
Clavel Z. Tabada;[20] his Marriage Certificate;[21] and affidavits of residents of
Kinoguitan[22] attesting that he established residence in the municipality after his
marriage to Bernadith Go. In addition, he presented receipts[23] from the Provincial
Treasurer for payment of his water bills, and Certifications from the Municipal
Treasurer and Municipal Engineer that he has been a consumer of the Municipal
Water System since June 2003. To prove ownership of property, he also presented a
Deed of Sale[24] over a real property dated June 3, 1996.
The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us that
Noble successfully effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the
COMELEC Second Division, private respondents claim that he is a registered
voter and has actually voted in the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental
do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency in the said
municipality. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a

strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. [25] Thus,


in Perez v. Commission on Elections,[26] we held that a persons registration as voter
in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient
to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.[27]
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must
be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it
ones fixed and permanent place of abode.[28]
In this case, Nobles marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual
physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an
intention to make it his permanent place of residence. We are also not persuaded by
his alleged payment of water bills in the absence of evidence showing to which
specific properties they pertain. And while Noble presented a Deed of Sale for real
property, the veracity of this document is belied by his own admission that he does
not own property in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.[29]
On the contrary, we find that Noble has not abandoned his original domicile
as shown by the following: a) Certification dated April 12, 2007 of the Barangay
Kagawad of Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City stating that Noble is a
resident of the barangay;[30] b) Affidavit[31] of the Barangay Kagawad of Esperanza,
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental dated April 14, 2007, attesting that Noble has not
resided in Barangay Esperanza in Kinoguitan; c) photos[32] and official
receipts[33] showing that Noble and his wife maintain their residence and businesses
in Lapasan; d) tax declarations[34] of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City under
the name of Noble; and e) the Household Record of Barangay Inhabitants [35] of
Mayor Narciso Go, which did not include Noble or his wife, Bernadith Go, which
disproves Nobles claim that he resides with his father-in-law.
From the foregoing, we find that Nobles alleged change of domicile was effected
solely for the purpose of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007 elections. This we
cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, [36] we heldthat the oneyear residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders from taking advantage
of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.

Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement


defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community.[37] Thus, we find
Noble disqualified from running as municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Notwithstanding Nobles disqualification, we find no basis for the
proclamation of Judith Pundaodaya, as mayor. The rules on succession under the
Local Government Code, explicitly provides:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,
Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs
in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall
become the xxx mayor.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an
elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or
is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Thus, considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of


Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental occasioned by Nobles disqualification, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.[38]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 3, 2007 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 07-202 declaring respondent Arsenio Densing
Noble qualified to run as Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, isREVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor
of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to
succeed as Mayor.
SO ORDERED.

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