38.de Guzman v. People 119 SCRA 337 PDF
38.de Guzman v. People 119 SCRA 337 PDF
38.de Guzman v. People 119 SCRA 337 PDF
OF
THE
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SANDIGANBAYAN; RULE-MAKING POWER
THEREOF UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606; THE "RULES OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN" ARE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE SUPREME COURT. It is
true that Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, the law creating the
Sandiganbayan, vests it with rule-making power. However, since the
Sandiganbayan is a Court, its rule-making power must be construed, out of
"constitutional necessity" as being subject to the approval of the Rules by the
Supreme Court. (Citing Justice Antonio Barredo's concurring opinion in Nuez vs.
Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433, 455 [January 30, 1982]). The "Rules of the
Sandiganbayan" were promulgated on January 10, 1979, and Rule XV111
thereof expressly provides that they "shall take eect upon approval." The
approval referred to can only refer to approval by the Supreme Court. In the
absence of any action of approval or disapprobation from this Court, the
Sandiganbayan has to be guided by the Rules of Court. (Sec. 9, P.D. 1606). We
have reviewed the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and we have not
found any indication therein of contravention of the Rules of Court.
2.
ID.; ID.; DIVISIONS THEREOF; PRONOUNCEMENTS OF EACH
DIVISION ARE BINDING AS JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT. Although the
Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices, it
does not mean that it cannot validly function without all of the Divisions
constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that "the Sandiganbayan shall sit in
three divisions of three Justices each." While Section 5 thereof provides that "the
unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment." Thus, the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions
of three Justices each and each Division functions independently of the other. As
long as a Division has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose
pronouncements are binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan. The judgment
convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division duly
constituted. It thus met the requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment
as required by Section 5 of P.D. 1606.
3.
ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS; EXCLUSIVE REVIEW THEREOF BY THE
SUPREME COURT ONLY BY CERTIORARI; NOT A DILUTION OF ACCUSED'S RIGHT
TO APPEAL; REASONS GIVEN IN NUEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (111 SCRA 433)
REITERATED IN CASE AT BAR. Petitioner's contention that there is a dilution of
his right to appeal inasmuch as Decisions of the Sandiganbayan are subject to
review by the Supreme Court only by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and, consequently, he is deprived of his right to appeal on questions of fact,
is not meritorious, because "In the rst place, his innocence or guilt is passed
upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which 'the Presiding Justice shall designate
two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with
them, forming a division of ve justices and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. Then if convicted, this Court
has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed
to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J :
p
unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment."
Thus, the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each
and each Division functions independently of the other. As long as a Division
has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are
binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan.
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the
First Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the
pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of PD 1606 supra.
We nd no substance to the argument that no member could be
expected to dissent because no special Division of ve Justices could then be
formed, considering that the Decision was a unanimous one and there was
no indication that any one of the three Justices had intended to dissent.
3.
Petitioner's contention that there is a dilution of his right to
appeal inasmuch as Decisions of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review by
this Court only by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 4 and,
consequently, he is deprived of his right to appeal on questions of fact, is
neither meritorious. On this point, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, stressed in the Nuez case:
"Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied
upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there is a dilution of the
right to appeal. Admittedly, under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is
no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this
Court. . . . Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an
intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection
of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the rst place, his
innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division
of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing
which `the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from
among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming
a division of ve justices and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. Then if convicted,
tins Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of
law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner
makes much, perhaps excessively so as to the wont of advocates, of
the fact that there is no review of the facts. What cannot be suciently
stressed is that tins Court in determining whether or not to give due
course to the petition for review must be convinced that the
constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In that
sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of
scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a nding of
guilt has been satised. The standard as to when there is proof of such
weight to justify a conviction is set forth People vs. Dramayo." 5
4.
Petitioner's argument that he was deprived of his right to a
preliminary investigation as the same was conducted ex parte has much less
to recommend it. Petitioner failed to appear at said investigation despite
notice thereof received by a member of his family, in the same way that the
formal administrative investigation against him for dishonesty, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and for violation of civil service
rules and regulations was similarly conducted ex parte because of
petitioner's failure to appear despite due notice served upon and received by
his wife, where he was found guilty as charged and dismissed from the
service eective on the day immediately following his last day of service,
with pay (Exhibit "C").
Besides, an ex parte preliminary investigation is authorized under
section 1(b) of PD 911, reading:
". . . If respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed be
does not appear before the investigating scal or state prosecutor, the
preliminary investigation shall proceed without him. . . ."
It must be emphasized that petitioner did not report for work anymore
beginning June 9, 1978, despite a demand from Pielago for the production of
his accountabilities (Exhibit "M"), a reminder of his criminal liability, and the
fact that administrative charges had been led against him for violation of
civil service rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best
interests of the service (Exhibit "F"). Pielago thus proceeded with the audit
examination of petitioner's accountability from the ocial records available
namely:
". . . Ocial Receipts issued by him to collection agents from
whom he received public funds (Exhibits H-1-a to H-1-n); Daily
Statements of Collections Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7) and Ocial Receipts
(Exhibits L, L-1 to L-8) covering remittances made by him of his
collection to the General Teller, the Ledger reecting entries of
collections made by him from the Veterinary Inspection Board (Exhibits
Q, Q-1, Q-1-a to Q-1-f, Q-2, Q-2-a to Q-2-e); and the Cashbooks also
recording his remittances of his collections to the General Teller
(Exhibits J, J-1, J-1-a, J-2, J-2-a, K, K-1, K-1-a, K-2-a, and K-2-b)" 8
which had not yet been submitted, were not yet accounted for. Hence,
the only meaning that the term `preliminary' had in the premises was
that the amount of shortage could still be increased if all said receipts
are eventually found and taken into account. But, on the basis of the
records available to the auditor, the amount of shortage established
could not but be considered final.
2.
3.
Sec. 1 PD 1606.
4.
Sec. 7, ibid.
5.
6.
7.
8.
p. 42, ibid.
9.
10.
Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, 1976 Edition U.S. vs. Melencio, 4
Phil. 331, (1905); U.S. vs. Javier, 6 Phil. 334 (1906); and People vs. Mingoa,
92 Phil. 856 (1953).