This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a petition filed by the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) seeking to nullify certain Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) administrative orders and memorandums related to the conversion of agricultural lands. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for two key reasons: 1) CREBA did not establish sufficient justification for directly filing with the Supreme Court instead of first filing with the Court of Appeals; and 2) the petition was essentially one for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction. The Court found that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not exceed his jurisdiction or authority in issuing the administrative issuances in question.
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a petition filed by the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) seeking to nullify certain Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) administrative orders and memorandums related to the conversion of agricultural lands. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for two key reasons: 1) CREBA did not establish sufficient justification for directly filing with the Supreme Court instead of first filing with the Court of Appeals; and 2) the petition was essentially one for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction. The Court found that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not exceed his jurisdiction or authority in issuing the administrative issuances in question.
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a petition filed by the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) seeking to nullify certain Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) administrative orders and memorandums related to the conversion of agricultural lands. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for two key reasons: 1) CREBA did not establish sufficient justification for directly filing with the Supreme Court instead of first filing with the Court of Appeals; and 2) the petition was essentially one for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction. The Court found that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not exceed his jurisdiction or authority in issuing the administrative issuances in question.
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a petition filed by the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations (CREBA) seeking to nullify certain Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) administrative orders and memorandums related to the conversion of agricultural lands. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for two key reasons: 1) CREBA did not establish sufficient justification for directly filing with the Supreme Court instead of first filing with the Court of Appeals; and 2) the petition was essentially one for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction. The Court found that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not exceed his jurisdiction or authority in issuing the administrative issuances in question.
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Rule 65 #10
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA),Petitioner, versus -THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent. PEREZ, J.: Facts This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, [1] and DAR Memorandum No. 88,[2] for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional. Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses. Subsequently, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99,[4] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 0102 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural uses or to another agricultural use. Thereafter, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions[8] of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 0507, particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. Issue: WON the PETITION for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 filed by herein respondents is proper. Held: This petition must be dismissed. Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[15] In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[16] citing People v. Cuaresma,[17] this Court made the following pronouncements: This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.[18] (Emphasis supplied.) The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[19] This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.[27] The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition. Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. [28] Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied.) With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are involved. Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this Petition is still dismissible. The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[30] Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.[31] Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.[32] Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[33] In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer. A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which
applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[34] Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.[35] The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasilegislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasijudicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions. The adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefore is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.[36] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.