The Honourable James Carr!

Minister of Natural Resources!

21st Floor 580 Booth Street, Room C7-1!
Ottawa Ontario K1A 0E4!

!
September 14, 2016!
!
Dear Minister Carr,!
!

On February 15, 2016, you received a memo1 on the Economic Benefits of Oil Pipelines from
former Deputy Minister, Bob Hamilton. The memo was released under Freedom of Information
(FOI) and posted on CBCs website in July. I have had an opportunity to review the memo.!

You have been dangerously misled about an urgent need for pipeline takeaway capacity from
Western Canada. The memo is riddled with factual and analytical mistakes and displays a lack
of attention to detail. The memos conclusions are unreliable and yet, based on recent public
statements2, you have adopted them to conclude new pipelines, such as Trans Mountains
expansion, are necessary.3!

The fact that these errors made their way to your office undetected suggests a lack of
professional understanding at NRCan of the relationships that drive the need for pipeline
capacity. This is regrettable.!

On the Summary page the memo states that:!

In the Background to the memo it states that, In the National Energy Boards Report on !
Canadas Energy Future 2016, the Boards Reference case forecasts oil production to grow
from 3.9 million barrels per day in 2014 to 4.9 million barrels per day in 2020, 5.8 million barrels
per day in 2030 and just over 6 million barrels per day in 2040To keep up with production,
approximately 1 million barrels per day of new pipeline capacity would be required by 2020 and
2 million barrels per day by 2030. !
1

Memorandum to the Minister, Economic Benefits of Oil Pipelines, CBC, Document.

Bloomberg, Trans Mountain Process Lends Credibility to Final Decision, August 29, 2016

Keynote Speech,The Honourable Jim Carr, Minister of Natural Resources, Energy Mines Ministers Conference,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, August 22, 2016

Page 1 of 10

!
The statements and conclusions are wrong:!
!
a)
b)
c)
d)

not all crude produced in Canada is physically able to be shipped by pipeline for export;!
crude oil produced in Western Canada makes its way to local refineries;!
pipeline infrastructure was not already operating at its fullest potential in 2014; and !
the vast majority of production growth from 2020 - 2040 comes from projects that have not
commenced construction or received regulatory approval.!

I will deal with each of the factual errors and provide correct figures. The facts show that instead
of a requirement for a million barrels a day of new capacity by 2020, there exists sufficient oil
export capacity on existing transportation infrastructure for Western Canadian crude until at
least 2025, and likely beyond.!

First, Alberta and Saskatchewans oil production is significant within the Canadian oil sector, but
these jurisdictions are not the only ones in Canada that produce oil. Canadas crude production
in 2014 included approximately 100 thousand barrels a day in provinces that did not require
pipeline access to foreign markets and about 220 thousand barrels a day of crude produced off
the coast in Atlantic Canada has waterborne access.!

Unless Ottawa has a secret plan to ship Atlantic crude from Edmonton, it is unreasonable to
include Atlantic Canadas crude oil production figures when estimating pipeline capacity need
out of Western Canada. But thats what NRCan staff have done.!

The memo says the numbers are from Canadas Energy Future 2016.4 A quick check of the data
in the appendices reveals the error. Crude oil produced in Alberta, Saskatchewan and the
Northwest Territories shipped through Alberta, was 3.57 million barrels a day in 2014 and is
forecast to grow to 4.5 million by 2020. This is oil that might require pipeline capacity originating
in Alberta.!

Second, the memo fails to acknowledge local refinery demand. Crude oil demand from
refineries in Alberta and Saskatchewan like Suncor, Imperial, Shell, Husky, and Regina Co-op,
located within the region, means the need for pipeline export capacity is further reduced as their
feedstock demand is met. !

The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) provides figures for refinery
throughput in their annual Market Outlook. In 2014 CAPP said refinery demand in Western
Canada was 577 thousand barrels a day. The Chevron refinery in Burnaby imports about 47
thousand barrels a day along the existing Trans Mountain pipeline.5 Leaving the volume
destined for Chevron in pipeline export capacity means 530 thousand barrels a day comes off
the Western Canadian production total. !

Thus, according to production figures for Western Canadian crude, and incorporating refinery
demand, 3.0 million barrels a day of Western Canadian oil production was in search of
transportation capacity for export in 2014900 thousand barrels a day less than 3.9 million as
claimed in your briefing memo. !
4
5

National Energy Board, Canadas Energy Future 2016, January 2016

NEB Hearing Order MH-002-2012, Transcripts Volume 1, March 26, 2013, paragraphs 312- 314

Page 2 of 10

CAPP predicts Western Canadian refinery need in 2020 will grow to 671 thousand barrels a
day.6 Assuming the Chevron refinery continues to source 47 thousand barrels a day along Trans
Mountain, crude oil production available for export out of Western Canada in 2020 would be 3.9
million; not 4.9 million as suggested by your officials. !

One million barrels a day of additional pipeline capacity is not required by 2020 as asserted in
the memo. This is consistent with the conclusion arrived at by the Alberta Energy Regulator
(AER) in May 2016. Albertas analysis shows that Alberta exports will begin to reach pipeline
capacity limits by 2021assuming that the four proposed pipeline projects do not advance and
there are no other incremental additions to pipeline capacity. However, current rail capacity is
enough to provide the additional volumes needed within the forecast period (to 2025).7!

AERs findings are consistent with a Federal Department of Finance memo dated December 10,
2015 obtained through FOI and published by the CBC in May.8 That memo states, Moreover,
the low price environment has led to oil production forecasts being revised downward; meaning
that sufficient capacity (from both rail and pipelines) is projected to exist to transport oil until at
least 2025.9!

Moving onto additional factual errors, the first graph provided in the memo is titled Forecast oil
available for export out of Western Canada and pipeline capacity. The graph purports to
support a need for one million barrels a day by 2020 by superimposing three production
forecasts developed through three price scenariosHigh, Reference and Low. But, the graph
does not come from the Energy Future report. It appears to be a hybrid representation of two
sets of data from the Energy Future report that are not comparable. These are Canadian Crude
Oil Production under three price scenarios, Figure 5.6, and Pipeline Capacity from Western
Canada, Figure 10.7.!

The memo states, the graph below illustrates the Boards forecast for Western Canadian oil
production available for export under High, Reference, and Low price cases but the Board
did not develop a forecast of Western Canadian oil production available for export under three
price scenarios. !

The memo incorrectly describes the price scenarios it has superimposed on Western Canadian
pipeline capacity. The superimposed price scenarios represent forecasts of all Canadian
productionnot Western Canadian productionwith no adjustment for regional refinery
demand or supply related to condensate imports. The first graph in the memo to you is
meaningless.!

It is unclear how the graph was generated. I note that unlike the second graph in your memo
where it says Source: National Energy Board, there is no source identified beneath the first
graph.!
6

CAPP, 2016 Crude Oil Forecast, Markets and Transportation, Refinery Data Download.

Alberta Energy Regulator, ST98, May 2016, Pipelines.

CBC, Energy East pipeline benefits questioned in secret government memo, Drew Anderson, May 31, 2016,
Document.
9

Ibid, Energy-East Pipeline and Carbon Price docment, page 1.

Page 3 of 10

Presenting the graph with production figures from all of Canada superimposed on Western
Canadian pipeline capacity is an error, but what is more distressing is that it belies an apparent
lack of understanding at NRCan about the difference between oil production and oil supply
available for export. !

Bitumen is dense and cannot flow through a pipeline unassisted. The diluent of choice is
condensate, but since there is insufficient condensate produced domestically, Canada began
importing condensate in 2005 for diluent blending purposes. The blending ratio is generally
30/70 so for each barrel of oil sands heavy transported by pipeline, 30 percent is condensate.
Therefore, a barrel of bitumen produced and then diluted with imported condensate becomes
1.3 barrels of diluted bitumen (dilbit) supply.!

The second graph in the memo to you is effectively from the Energy Future report, Figure 10.7.
It is reproduced below. !

Source: Canadas Energy Future 2016!

The graph shows NEB forecast oil supply available for export from Western Canada (black
line) compared to existing capacity and approved system expansions. It also includes
Enbridge's Line 3 expansion which is not yet approved. Enbridges Lines 3 and 67 (Alberta
Clipper) expansions are included in the orange block.10 Line 67 was expanded earlier than
depicted in the graph increasing available pipeline capacity earlier than illustrated therefore
implied need for rail has proven to be lower than suggested on the graph.!

Crude oil supply not transported by pipeline is considered to be implied rail (as represented by
the red boxes). Implied rail is modest for 2020 - 2025 (and given current market conditions will
10

If Line 3 does not proceed, Energy Future data suggests that 370 kb/d of capacity would be removed from the
graph. The existing Line 3 would continue to operate at 390 thousand barrels a day, which is assumed in the light
blue box.

Page 4 of 10

end up being well below the volumes depicted in the graph for 2016 - 2019). In 2020 implied rail
is about 100 thousand barrels a day, which is roughly the volume currently transported by rail for
export.!

What the memo neglects to mention is that the graph contradicts the notion that 1 million barrels
a day of pipeline capacity is required by 2020. !

Investment in rail has generated effective rail loading capacity in excess of 800 thousand barrels
a day in Alberta and Saskatchewan.11 Even if Enbridge's Line 3 Replacement were not
approved by Cabinet in November and/or by Minnesota State authorities in the US, there is still
no new transportation infrastructure needed until at least 2025. This is consistent with AER and
Department of Finance conclusions. But this is not the advice the memo gives.!

The memo suggests that pipeline capacity was operating at its fullest potential in 2014. It was
not. Potential throughput was compromised by pressure restrictions placed on aging pipelines
because of safety concerns.!

The graph illustrates there was sufficient pipeline capacity until 2012 when rail begins to fill the
gap. Between mid-2010 to 2014 the Kalamazoo River tragedy, along with related pipeline
integrity concerns on other aging Enbridge and Kinder Morgan lines, saw the introduction of
pressure restrictions by regulatory authorities. A number of Enbridge lines, including Line 2, 14,
21, and 6A were under capacity limitations at various times because of spill experience.
Enbridge placed Line 3 under pressure restrictions in 2008 removing 390 thousand barrels a
day of capacity from its system which it plans to return to market if Line 3 is replaced.12 During
the entire period from mid-2014 to October 2014, Line 6B was restricted because of Kalamazoo.!

In March 2013 a group of shippers on Enbrdige's Mainline system explained under oath to the
US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) how the Kalamazoo spill had compromised
system capacity. Shippers documented how apportionment constraints on Enbridges Mainline
System (called Lakehead in the US) were due to the shut down of Line 6B following the rupture
at Marshall, Michigan. They confirmed that apportionment continued because pressure
restrictions were imposed once the pipeline was restarted.13 !

Enbridge elected to replace Line 6B with wider pipe. It became operational in October 2014
returning the restricted capacity to market as well as increasing the lines capacity by 200
thousand barrels a day.!

Pressure restrictions on Trans Mountain have also been a factor in reduced pipeline export
capacity. The NEB imposed restrictions in 2011, lifted and reimposed them in 2013 and then
lifted them again in February 2014. About 75 thousand barrels a day of capacity was returned to

11

Environment and Climate Change Canada, Enbridge Pipelines Inc. - Line 3 Replacement Program, Review of
Related Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates, Draft for Public Comments, April 25, 2016, page 17.
12

Enbridge, Line 3 Replacement Summary.

13

144 FERC 61,035 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,Order
Following Technical Conference, July 18, 2013, footnote 2, page 1 and United States of America Before the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. IS13-1700, Post-Technical Conference Comments of Flint Hills
Resources Canada, LP, and Affidavit Joseph Beattie, March 7, 2013 accessed on FERC website.

Page 5 of 10

market. ExxonMobiles Pegasus Line sprung a leak in March 2013 taking 95 thousand barrels a
day of heavy oil capacity offline.!

With the majority of pressure restrictions removed, Line 6B replaced in late 2014, and other
capacity expansion initiatives completed on the Enbridge Mainline system, demand for rail
began to fall. Exports of Canadian crude by rail averaged 111 thousand barrels a day for 2015
compared with 161 thousand barrels a day in 2014.14 Year to date, rail export has averaged 95
thousand barrels a day. It is important to recognize that since rail infrastructure has been built,
when excess pipeline capacity exists, reliance on some rail volumes will continue for sound
business reasons.!

In the memo you should have been advised by NRCan staff why the Energy Future 2016 Oil
Available for Export projections are overly ambitious. !

The Energy Future report was released in January 2016 with stale-dated projections. Energy
Future 2016 is based on forecasts finalized in the summer of 2015 under the policies of the
previous federal government. Historically, this biennial Energy Future publication is released in
early November. For unexplained reasons the release of the report was delayed by more than
two months.!

The NEB production figures do not take into account delayed or cancelled projects announced
within the past year. Some notable announcements have taken place since then. Shells
Carmon Creek Phase 1- 4 was abandoned when it was announced in October 2015 that
construction on Phase 1 would stop. This means 160 thousand barrels a day has been removed
from the forecast time horizon. When Energy Future 2016 was prepared, 40 thousand barrels a
day of that production (52 thousand barrels a day of supply) was expected in 2017. !

PetroChinas Brion Energy placed Dover and MacKay River projects on hold this spring due to
low commodity prices. Combined, these projects represent 365 thousand barrels a day of
deferred productionwhen diluted with imported condensate this represents 475 thousand
barrels a day of supply. !

Since the Energy Future outlook was developed more than a year ago it does not sufficiently
reflect expectations that oil prices will be lower for longer. Apporximately 2.7 million barrels a
day oil sands production has been deferred or cancelled over the past two years. Production
intentions are sensitive to a low oil price environment. Energy Futures Constrained Case is
based on the notion that crude oil prices are higher than they have been. Any supply
constrained in the outlook is due to a low price environment, not a lack of pipeline capacity.!

Appendix 1 provides a detailed list of the 2.7 million barrels a day in deferred or cancelled
projects announced between January 2014 and September 2016. !

The second major reason the Energy Future 2016 projections are overly aggressive is that they
do not acknowledge the Liberal governments commitment to the Paris Agreement entered into
at COP21 last December, other policy directions related to a sustainable future, or the Alberta
governments climate change initiatives including its cap on GHG emissions in the oil sands. !

!
14

NEB, Canadian Crude Oil Exports by RailMonthly Data

Page 6 of 10

The Energy Future report explains that, Only policies and programs that are law at the time of
writing are included in the projections. As a result, any policies under consideration, or new
policies developed after the projections were completed in the summer of 2015, are not included
in this analysis.!

The NEB is currently undertaking a redo of its report. NRCan staff failed to mention to you that
in the introduction to the Energy Future report Board Chair, Peter Watson, says that the Board
will complete an update to EF 2016 this coming autumn to incorporate recent developments.!

Having erroneously claimed that 1 million barrels of new pipeline capacity is needed by 2020,
the memo moves on to discuss economic benefits from new pipeline infrastructure projects. A
table purports to represent results from studies prepared by the Conference Board on Trans
Mountain and Energy East. There are numerous errors of fact in this table. Without correct
facts, conclusions arising from the discussion are without merit. !

Column 1, row 2, reads Trans Mountain Expansion (Combined construction, 20 years

operations). Combined construction, 20 years operations is only for GDP and Employment,
not for Government Revenues, Taxes, as suggested. !

When you reviewed the brief you may have wondered how government revenues from
construction and operations could be higher than the impact on GDP$28,229 compared to
$22,126. They cannot. The government revenues figure is overstated by more than 500 percent
from what is reported in the Conference Board document.15!

The second column incorrectly cites the capital investment at $6,800 (2012$millions). The
Conference Board did not rely on a capital cost of $6,800 (2012$millions) as input into its InputOutput model. It relied on $4.6 (2012$billion).16 !

What is also important for you to know is that although it is common knowledge that the capital
cost of Trans Mountains expansion is currently $6.8 billion, the NEB Report on Trans
Mountains Expansion submitted to you in May erroneously indicates that the capital cost of the

15

Conference Board, The Trans Mountain Expansion Project: Understanding the Economic Benefits for Canada and
its Regions, Table 1, Page 8.
16

Ibid., page 6. Kinder Morgans earlier budget was $5.4 billion because it excludes the Firm Service Fee approved
by the Board during the Firm 50 Application. The Boards $5.5 billion figure does not exclude the Firm Service Fee.

Page 7 of 10

project is $5.5 billion.17 This is because the Board never asked Trans Mountain to file an
updated capital cost even though Kinder Morgan told its shareholders in October 2015 that the
budget had been revised upwards to $6.8 billion.18 !

Intervenors at the Hearing alerted the Board to the revised capital cost, but the Board ignored
them. Thus the Board in its report draws conclusions about the need for, and economic viability
of, the project that are false.!

I am sure you are aware that capital cost drives toll rates, and higher toll rates reduce producer
netbacks by the same amount. The Board relied on the toll rates imbedded in a $5.5 billion
project budget. The Board did not consider much higher rates related to a capital cost of $6.8
billion. The Boards claim that Trans Mountains expansion will lead to a reduction in Canadian
discounts is compromised accordingly. When more accurate transportation costs by pipeline
and marine are considered, there are no reduction in crude discounts to be found. However, the
Boards report tells you a reduction in crude discounts is a major reason for recommending
approval of the project. !

Finally, the memo suggests that a lack of infrastructure to access global markets led to a
significant differential between North American and global prices from 2011-2013. The memo
references a Department of Finance estimate of $7.3 billion as the annual loss in value over this
period. I have not seen the Department of Finance memo and would welcome the opportunity to
review it. However, to suggest there was a lack of infrastructure to access global markets from
2011 - 2013 is not consistent with the facts.!

Crude oil production in Atlantic Canada has marine access to global markets. Western
Canadian crude oil has access to global markets by way of Trans Mountain to the Westridge
marine terminal. This access has existed since 1956. !

There was nothing stopping Trans Mountain or its shippers from securing significant access to
Westridge to reach global markets in 2011 - 2013. In fact, in 2010 Trans Mountain submitted an
application to the NEB to secure 79 thousand barrels a day of guaranteed access to the dock.19
The application is referred to as the Firm 50 because it not only guaranteed 79 thousand barrels
a day of dock access, 50 thousand barrels a day was granted to shippers under a ten year take
or pay contract. The Board approved the application in late 2011.!

If there was a so-called lack of infrastructure to access to global markets (that) led to a
significant differential between North American and global prices from 2011 - 2013 you would
expect that the increased access the Board afforded crude oil shippers when it approved the
Firm 50 application would have been fully utilized. It was not. !

In fact, fewer barrels of heavy crude oil were delivered to global markets in each year between
2011 - 2013 than in 2010 when a so-called significant differential did not exist. The NEB
guaranteed oil sands shippers waterborne access for oil sands crude but they barely used it.
17

NEB Report, Trans Mountain Expansion Project, May 2016, page 305.

18

Robyn Allan, National Observer, Cost of Kinder Morgans Trans Mountain Expansion quietly rises to $6.8 billion,
November 17, 2015.
19

NEB, Reasons For Decision, RH-2-2011, Firm Service to Westridge Marine Terminal, December 2011.

Page 8 of 10

According to NEB commodity statistics of crude oil exports, an average of 9.5 thousand barrels
a day of diluted bitumen was exported to non-US markets in 2012 and an average of 7.5
thousand barrels a day in 2013.20 In 2010, 9.6 thousand barrels a day of diluted bitumen was
exported to non-US markets.!

It should be noted that Kinder Morgan testified before the Board that if guaranteed access to
Westridge were granted, selling into a global market would have a material impact on narrowing
crude discounts for all Canadian producers. Clearly that did not occur.!

The notion that the differential between Brent and Canadian crude prices would have narrowed
with access to global markets is without merit as proven by actual events and yet huge
estimates of lost value continue to be generated. There is no evidence that if wider price
discounts were to return, pipeline capacity to waterborne access on the west or east coast
would narrow them. !

NRCan staff should have been aware of the issues to provide you with a much more sober
assessment of the impact of Trans Mountains expansion on the Canadian economy. Instead,
you were given egregiously overstated conclusions that there is an urgent need for 1 million
barrels a day of new pipeline capacity.!

The memo confirms that your actions since you were elected are not focussed on getting the
facts right or ensuring that Cabinet makes an informed decision in December. You are focussed
on facilitating (pipeline) development. !

A decision on Trans Mountains expansion does not need to be made for at least five years.
Plenty of time to deliver on Mr. Trudeaus promised do-over of Trans Mountains review and
make sure Cabinet has the facts it needs in order to make an informed decision.!

I am willing to make myself available to discuss any of the points raised in this letter or the
related documents.!

!
Sincerely,!
!
(original signed by Robyn Allan)!
!
Robyn Allan!
Independent Economist!
9294 Emerald Drive!
Whistler BC V0N 1B9!

cc Prime Minister Trudeau!

Minister Environment and Climate Change Catherine McKenna!

Attachments: Appendix 1

20

NEB, Commodity Statistics, Crude Oil Exports - Summary by Type and Destination 2010 - 2013.

Page 9 of 10

Appendix 1 Oil Sands Projects Cancelled or Deferred Announced 2014 - 2016!

Company

Project

Capacity (thousand b/d)

Shell

Carmon Creek Phase 1-4

160

Shell

Pierre River Phase 1-2

200

Statoil

Corner

Total

Joslyn Phase 1

100

Cenovus

Christina Lake G&H

100

Cenovus

Foster Creek H, J & Future

130

Cenovus

Telephone Lake Phase A&B

Cenovus

Grand Rapids Phase A-C

180

Cenovus

Narrows Lake Phase A-C

130

Husky

Sunrise 2A&B and future

140

Suncor

Mackay River MR2

20

Pengrowth

Lindberg Phase 2&3

37

CNRL

Kirby North 1-2

100

Imperial

Kearl North 3-4

125

Harvest Operations

BlackGold Phase 1&2

30

Grizzly

Algar Lake, May River, Thickwood

36

Devon (JV with BP)

Pike Phase C

35

Ivanhoe

Tamarack Phase 1-2

40

Koch Exploration

Dunkirk

62

Japan Canada

Hangingstone Pilot

11

Laricina

Germain, Saleski

435

Brion Energy

Dover North 1-2 & South 3-5

250

Brion Energy

MacKay River Phase 2-4

115

Marathon

Birchwood

12

Southern Pacific

STP MacKay Phase 1, 2A & 2B

36

Total

80

90

2,654

Source: NEB Market Snapshots, Alberta Oil Sands Quarterly, Company Reports, News Reports, Compiled R. Allan

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