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TABLE OF CONTENTS
MAPS
The Benelux Countries in Europe.
The Netherlands
Belgium: Regions and Provinces..
Luxembourg .
6
91
109
116
23
23
24
27
GEOGRAPHY 30
EUROPEAN UNION. 33
Participation in EU Institutions... 34
FOREIGN POLICY. 36
NATIONAL and REGIONAL SECURITY 38
Belgium.. 39
The Netherlands. 40
Luxembourg.. 41
Mission of the Armed Forces 41
Defense Spending and Procurement. 41
HISTORY 43
Celt, Roman, and German 43
The Carolingians. 44
The Middle Ages. 44
The Burgundian Period 47
The Age of Charles V.. 49
The Reformation.. 50
The Dutch Revolt. 50
The Golden Age... 53
William III.. 58
The Low Countries in the Eighteenth Century 59
The Napoleonic Era. 61
The United Netherlands... 62
The Netherlands in the Nineteenth Century. 63
Belgium in the Nineteenth Century. 65
Colonial Enterprises. 67
World War I. 69
The Inter-War Years.. 71
World War II... 72
The Postwar Recovery 74
Dutch Politics, 1945-1994.. 76
Belgian Politics, 1945-1999 81
POLITICS and GOVERNMENT 89
The Netherlands. 89
ELECTORAL SYSTEM. 94
POLITICAL PARTIES 94
THE MEANING OF PILLARIZATION 97
THE DUTCH WELFARE STATE. 98
OVERSEAS TERRITORIES . 101
Belgium... 103
POLITICAL PARTIES... 111
ISSUES.. 113
Luxembourg 117
POLITICAL PARTIES.. 117
ISSUES. 119
ECONOMICS. 121
Belgium 121
Luxembourg. 123
The Netherlands.. 124
APPENDICES. 128
Belgium: Legislature and Government 128
Luxembourg: Legislature and Government. 129
The Netherlands: Legislature and Government... 130
Sovereigns of the Low Countries since 1815.. 131
SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY. 132
ADDENDUM. 138
TIMELINE
For the Low Countries
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
59-54 BC
57 BC
431 AD
c. 496
Frankish King Clovis accepted Catholicism for himself and for the
Franks.
c. 675
714
732
751
768
800
814
840
Oaths of Strasbourg.
843
855
870
9th-10th centuries
987
1204
1294
May 1302
Matins of Bruges.
July 1302
1305
1308
1338
1340
1382
1384
13th-early
14th centuries
1348-1349
1385-1477
January 1477
February 1477
April 1477
1500
1511
1515
1516
1519
1522
1523
1543
1555
1545-1563
1559
1560
1566
1567
1568
1572
1577
1578
1579-1586
1581
1584
1586
1588
1588-1598
1598
17th century
1602
1609
1609-1621
1610
1618-1619
1621
10
1621
1628
Frederick Henry succeeded as stadtholder on the death of his halfbrother Maurice; Remonstrants rehabilitated.
1633
1641
1648
1650
November
1650
1650-1672
1652-1654
1653-1672
1664-1672
1667-1668
April 1668
1672-1678
July 1672
August 1672
1674
1677
11
1678
1689
1691-1697
1697
Treaty of Rijswijk.
1701-1713
1702
1702-1747
1713
1722
1740-1780
1740-1748
1747
1751
1756-1763
1780
1781
12
1780-1791
1783
1787
1789
1790
1791
1792
1795
1806
1810
1813
March 1814
1814-1815
Congress of Vienna.
June 1815
August 1815
13
1815-1830
1819
1830
1831
1839
c. 1840
1848-1849
1853
1856
1857
1860s
c. 1860-1899
1868
1870-1871
14
1870s-1880s
1878
1879
1884
Catholic party formed first government in Belgium, retaining oneparty majority until 1914.
1873
1884
1887
1888
1889
1893
1896
1897
1898
1899
1901-1905
1905-1909
1908
15
Belgium.
1914-1918
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1925
1926
1926-1939
1930s
1934
1936
1939
1939-1945
16
1942
1944
September 1944
October-November
1944
Operation Market-Garden
1945
1946-1947
1946-1959
1947
1948
1948-1954
1949
1950
1950-1953
17
1952
1954
1958
1960
1962
1963
1966
Democrats 66 established to challenge pillarization. WilliamAlexander born, first son born to the Dutch royal house since 1851.
1968
1971
1972
1974-1979
Social Christians out of office in Luxembourg for first time since 1919
1977
1978
1980
1984
1991
1993
18
1994
1995
1998
1990
May 2002
July-October
2002
June 2003
19
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this self-study guide is to provide basic background information on Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg for Foreign Service officers and other personnel scheduled
for assignment in those countries. The guide attempts to present information in such a way
that users can obtain a better understanding of each country individually and of the
Benelux region and to have a more productive and pleasant tour of duty. Users are
encouraged to consider the questions and points for discussion at the conclusion of most
sections in the guide and to pursue those of special interest by drawing on resource materials
cited.
THE BENELUX COUNTRIES AT A GLANCE
Kingdom of Belgium
Koninkrijk Belgi
Royaume Belgien
Knigreich Belgien
Capital: Brussels (Dutch, Brussel; French, Bruxelles)
Head of State (since 1993): King Albert II of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha
Population: 10,200,000
Languages: Dutch, French, and German
Area: 11,780 square miles (30,520 sq. km.)
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
Groussherzogtom Ltzebuerg
Grand-Duche du Luxembourg
Grossherzogtum Luxemburg
Capital: Luxembourg
Head of State (since 2000): Grand Duke Henri II of Nassau-Weilbeck
Population: 450,000
Languages: Ltzebuergesch, French, and German
Area: 999 square miles (2,586 sq. km.)
Kingdom of the Netherlands
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden
Capital: Amsterdam
Seat of Government: The Hague (Den Haag)
Head of State (since 1980): Queen Beatrix of Orange-Nassau
Population: 15,800,000
Languages: Dutch and Frisian
Area: 13,250 square miles (41,865 sq.km.)
20
21
22
23
24
England, Italy, and elsewhere attracted by opportunities offered in trade and industry. In later
centuries, the northern Netherlands provided safe refuge for religious dissidents and exiles
German and English sectaries (including the Plymouth Pilgrims), French Huguenots (many
of whom were, in fact, Walloons), and Sephardic Jews from Spain and Portugal and, later,
German Jews, most of whom blended into the Dutch population.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, numbers of workers came from Poland and southern
Europe to find employment in Belgiums burgeoning industrial sector and many stayed to
become Belgians. The names of some well-established Luxembourgish families are Italian,
Spanish, or Portuguese in origin.
The Netherlands accepted large infusions of former colonial subjects from Indonesia and
Surinam. When the latter achieved independence in 1969, nearly half of the Surinamese
people took the option of retaining their Dutch citizenship and passports, and several hundred
thousand returned home to the Netherlands. The Surinamese are Dutch-speaking and have
integrated successfully into Dutch society. Christian Moluccans formed the base of the Dutch
army in the East Indies and fought loyally alongside Dutch troops during the Indonesian
insurgency against restored Dutch colonial rule following Word War II. Tens of thousands
of Moluccans fled to the Netherlands after Indonesian independence in 1949. Although they
are Dutch-speaking and accustomed to generations of service under the Dutch, many have
found it impossible to assimilate. Now, in the third and fourth generation in the Netherlands,
some refuse to accept their exile as permanent and continue to agitate for an independent
state in their home islands. By contrast, there has been no significant migration to Belgium
from former African colonies. Those relatively few Africans who have settled in Belgium
come mainly from professional backgrounds.
In the decades since the 1960s, increasingly large numbers of non-European immigrants
arrived in the Low Countries from North Africa, South Asia, and Turkey and elsewhere the
Middle East. Many came initially as guest workers to supply much needed semi-skilled
industrial and unskilled menial and service labor during a period of rapid economic
expansion, but remained as permanent residents. Others benefited, especially in the
Netherlands, from liberal family-reunion and asylum laws. Immigrants and their descendants
make up more than 10% of the countrys population. Many have taken advantage of
employment and education opportunities to become productive members of society, even
when they have been reluctant to assimilate culturally.
With the introduction of freedom of movement of people across the EU, aliens from these
same regions have taken advantage of porous national frontiers to enter the Low Countries
and to settle there illegally, some in search of better living conditions through employment
and others, according to some Dutch and Belgian observers, to gain access to the benefits of
liberal social welfare programs. The situation was deemed sufficiently critical for Belgium
to withdraw temporarily from the Schengen Agreement in 2001 in order to halt the inflow of
aliens while authorities sought out and expelled those who had already entered the country
illegally. Responsible Dutch and Belgian authorities as well as populist politicians remark on
the high incidence of crime among this population; self-imposed isolation in ghettos, as
evidenced by an absence of effort to learn the language of the host country; and the retention
25
of social customs, particularly regarding women, that are at variance with the norms of the
host countries. The late Pym Fortuyn achieved wide support for his allegations during the
2002 election campaign in the Netherlands that aliens, particularly Muslims, posed a threat to
liberal Dutch social and cultural values and were a drain on resources supporting the social
welfare system. Legislation was subsequently proposed in the Netherlands that imposed
restrictions on asylum rights and limits on further immigration. It also mandated compulsory
courses in Dutch language and culture for applicants for permanent residence.
Belgium and the Netherlands, whose populations grew rapidly in the immediate post-war era,
have birthrates well below replacement level. Maintenance of current population levels, not
to mention population growth, comes from immigration and the offspring of immigrants.
Luxembourg, by contrast, has one of the two highest birthrates among EU countries. With its
impressive economic growth, open borders, and a multi-lingual environment, Luxembourg
has become home to many from neighboring EU countries. About 90,000 people commute
every day from France, Germany, and Belgium to jobs in tiny and accessible Luxembourg.
Nearly 30% of permanent residents, about 125,000 people, are foreigners. Some observers
predict that the grand duchys population will double by mid-century. Steady population
growth is seen as necessary to pay for the social welfare system and to fund pensions.
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Brussels, the capital of Europe, are cosmopolitan
and highly internationalized cities. Non-European migrants comprise an estimated one-third
of the population of Rotterdam and one-fifth of those living in Antwerp. This has caused a
backlash in the voting population of these cities. Pim Fortuyn's political party won one-third
of the votes in local and general elections in Rotterdam in 2002, and the right-wing
nationalist Flemish Bloc carried a quarter of the votes in Antwerp.
Questions/Discussion
Discuss the concept of national identity as it applies to small, open countries like Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
In the past, what have been the most important factors in integrating migrants into society in
those countries?
Suggest and discuss scenarios relating to the impact of non-European immigration on
national identity in the Low Countries.
Predict possible political solutions or reactions to problem posed by non-European
immigration.
Is there a contradiction between assertions that immigrants are a burden on the social welfare
system and the contention that population growth is required to sustain funding for
the system?
26
Suggested Reading
Allison BLAKELY, Blacks in the Dutch World. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
press, 1993.
John GEIPEL. The Europeans. New York: Pegasus, 1968.
RELIGION
Belgians and Luxembourgers traditionally identified themselves as either formally Catholic
or as laque (i.e., secular, non-religious, and often anti-clerical). The Netherlands, by
contrast, was historically a predominantly Protestant country, but one that had a large
Catholic minority that constituted a majority in some parts of the country. Since the 1960s,
these categories of religious practice and non-practice, by which one could even determine
voting patterns, are of greatly diminished importance.
Belgium and Luxembourg were overwhelmingly Catholic countries, but, within Belgium,
Flanders was the more Catholic region, Wallonia the more secular. To be laque in Belgium
is not simply to be secular but to belong to a spiritual family that might be either liberal
(meaning laissez-faire conservative) or socialist. In 1960, at least 80% of the Belgian people
were baptized Catholics. Sixty percent attended Mass regularly in Flanders, 40% in
Wallonia. There were not more than 50,000 active Protestants in Belgium, a number
sustained 40 years later by Protestants from elsewhere in Europe working in Brussels. In
Luxembourg, 97% were baptized Catholics.
Estimates from the same period showed that the Netherlands was 45% Protestant, 35%
Catholic (and growing), and 20% unaffiliated with any religious group. About 75% of
Protestants belonged to the official Netherlands Reformed Church (Nederlands Hervormde
Kerk), Calvinist in doctrine but meant to be inclusive of the largest possible segment of the
Protestant community. Most of the rest of Dutch Protestants adhered to more selfconsciously orthodox Calvinist communions, whose doctrines were more demanding and
restrictive. The largest of these groups was the Reformed Church (De Gereformeerde
Kerken), to which about 10% of the Dutch people adhered. There were also small Lutheran
and Mennonite communities. Catholics in the Netherlands were subject to political and social
discrimination until the late 19th century. The Catholic Church, as represented by its
hierarchy, was, in response, both reactive and insular-- determined to organize every aspect
of the daily life of Catholics in order to maximize their power and protect them from
discrimination. But there co-existed a liberal dimension to Catholic thinking and practice
that manifested itself during the Second Vatican Council and became pervasive within Dutch
Catholicism in the 1960s.
27
Defense of religious identity and community in the Netherlands -- and defense of religion
and language identity in Belgium -- led in each country to the creation of what is known as
the pillar system, or pillarization (Dutch, verzuilen). Members of each religious and
language group formed their own schools, hospitals, labor unions, newspapers, radio and
television programming groups, recreational associations, and so forth. The religious and
language communities of the Netherlands and Belgium lived apart, though they generally
lived peaceably. Political parties were each closely tied to one of the pillars; their role was to
champion the interests of the group in governmental circles. The Dutch and Belgian
governments have responded by funding all religious schools, hospitals and other institutions
on a proportional basis.
Over the last forty years, the Low Countries have become progressively de-Christianized.
Attendance at religious services has declined sharply, in most cases by more half from the
figures cited in the early 1960s. The reduction of religious sentiment has diminished popular
identification with the pillars. In Belgium, devolution of authority to regional government
has also reduced the need for pillarized politics at the federal level.
Questions/Discussion
Discuss the relationship between religious affiliation and identity, and between religion
and political preferences.
Has state recognition of church-based activities had a positive or adverse affect on religious
tolerance in the Low Countries?
Does state recognition compromise the independence and integrity of the churches? In the
Netherlands, has it compromised or encouraged national cohesion? Explain.
How has the development of Dutch and Belgian pillars facilitated the absorption of new
groups in society?
Suggested Reading
Gerard DEKKER and Jan PETERS, Religion and the Vitality of the Netherlands in The
Vitality of the Netherlands, Armand Clesse and Herman van Gundteren, eds. Luxembourg:
Institute for European and International Studies, 1999, 63-72.
Jenny MASUR, The Society and Its Environment in Foreign Area Studies, Belgium: A
Country Study. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985, 100-106.
28
29
GEOGRAPHY
The Low Countries are drained by three river systems: the Rhine, the Meuse (Maas), and the
Scheldt. The three rivers form a delta in the southern Netherlands and northern Flanders,
from which their estuaries empty into the North Sea. The Lek and the Waal divide from the
Lower Rhine between Arnhem and Nijmegen, and flow to the sea, the former to the north
and the latter to the south. Another Rhine tributary, the IJssel, leaves the Lek at Arnhem,
winding north to the IJsselmeer. The Meuse, which rises in the Longres Plateau in France,
flows parallel to the Waal to the north for 80 miles on the way to the sea. The Scheldt and its
numerous tributaries drain the Central Plateau. Formerly, the western and eastern branches of
the Scheldts estuary bracketed the large island of Walcheren, now attached to the mainland
by an isthmus.
The fact that many of Europe's great rivers drain to the sea through the Low Countries has
created both opportunity (trade) and threat (flooding). Most of the Dutch provinces of North
and South Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland, parts of North Brabant and Groningen, and all of
Flevoland lie below sea level. Sixty percent of the population lives on land that would be
submerged during high tides (not to mention seasonal flooding) if nature were allowed to
rule.
A long history of catastrophic floods has created an unparalleled expertise in the Low
Countries in "water engineering," including flood control dikes and the reclamation of land
by draining water. From the year 1200 to the present, the Dutch have added 20 percent to the
area of their country (7,000 square kilometers). Just over one third of that amount was
created in the Lake IJssel project -- a vast reclamation project that turned the Zuider Zee into
a fresh water lake (the IJsselmeer), and created a new province (Flevoland). Even the largest
Dutch cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, exist by virtue of Dutch water engineering.
Rotterdam, the world's busiest cargo port, would not even have access to the North Sea were
it not for the Rotterdam Waterway. Amsterdam, once called the Venice of the North is
built on marshland. The citys buildings are supported by wooden piles driven thirteen to
sixty feet into the ground.
In Belgium, the Central Plateau rises gently from the Flanders Plain to elevations of up to
700 feet in Hainault and Brabant. The region is drained by the Scheldt and its several
tributaries. In the watershed between the Scheldt and the Meuse, the lower Kempenland
Plateau is heathland containing the coal basin that was a principal source of Belgiums
prosperity. South Limburg slopes to the south and east and is cut by alluvial valleys. The
Meuse-Sambre Valley stretches for more than 100 miles along the southern edge of the
Central Plateau in Belgium. It varies in width from three to 10 miles, an area in which about
a quarter of Belgiums population lives.
The Ardennes lies south of the valley, an undulating sandstone and limestone plateau cut by
deep winding valleys formed by small rivers that flow westwards to the Meuse. Summits
reach up to 2000 feet. Half the upland area is heavily wooded by oak and beech, the valleys
30
marked by peat bogs and heathlands. The Ardennes extends eastward to the Grand Duchy
and the Belgian province of Luxembourg.
A line of ironstone hills that have a mean altitude of about 1000 feet crosses the southern
two-thirds of the province and grand duchy. Known as Belgian Lorraine in the former and
Bon-Pays or Gutland in the latter, the area provides lush pastureland in small river valleys
and beech woods on the hillsides.
Coastal and inland plain areas of Belgium and the Netherlands have a typical maritime
climate, damp, cool, and frequently overcast. Climatic conditions in the interior and upland
regions in the south are transitional between maritime and continental norms. Mean average
rainfall in the several geographical regions of the Low Countries ranges between 25 and 32
inches.
The Low Countries have a high population density which is especially concentrated in
several urban areas and conurbations. Throughout the region, however, there is a clear
demarcation between urban and rural environments. The Randstad, or Ring City, is a vast
conurbation, including Amsterdam and The Hague, that houses nearly 40% of the Dutch
population. The area is at a maximum 30 miles in width and stretches 110 miles from
Dordrecht to Haarlem, virtually the entire length of North and South Holland. The Randstad
is polycentric and built-up areas are interspersed with extensive green spaces that allow the
conurbation to breath.
Questions/Discussion
Based on its geography, justify the use of the term Low Countries
to describe the region.
In what ways has geography influenced the political and economic ties of the
Low Countries with neighboring countries in Europe and overseas?
Explain the importance of the polders.
Suggested Reading
Aubrey DIEM. Western Europe: A Geographical Analysis. New York: Wiley, 1979.
Peter HALL. The World Cities. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.
31
FLAGS
The original colors of the Netherlands were horizontal stripes of orange-white-blue derived
from the arms of the Prince of Orange. Because the orange stripe surmounting the white
stripe was prone to fade and could not be easily recognized at a distance at sea, red replaced
orange on the upper stripe on the Dutch maritime ensign already in the 17th century. The redwhite-blue combination was eventually adopted on the national flag, probably at the
insistence of the republican opposition to the House of Orange in the Estates-General. The
horizontal tricolor of Luxembourg is almost identical to that of the Netherlands, from which
it is derived, except for the length of the fly being longer and the shade of blue somewhat
lighter.
The national flag of Belgium is a tricolor composed of vertical stripes of black-gold-red in
the format of the French tricolore. The colors are those of the Duchy of Brabant adopted as
the emblem of the 1830 revolution.
The royal and grand-ducal families fly personal standards, which in the Netherlands and
Luxembourg retain the color orange from the arms of their ruling families. Each province
and most cities and towns in Belgium and the Netherlands have distinctive flags, some of
which have colors and design of great antiquity. The flags of Flanders (sable Lion of
Flanders on a gold field), Wallonia (red Cock of Wallonia on a gold field), Brussels (blue
iris on a white field), and the German-speaking community (lion and blue florettes on a white
field) are displayed in their respective regions alongside or sometimes in place of the national
flag. The EU flag is commonly flown on public buildings in all three countries.
Question
What do national symbols, such as flags, contribute to an understanding of the history of the
Low Countries?
Suggested Reading
E.M.C. BARRACLOUGH, ed. Flags of the World. London and New York: Frederick
Warne, 1969.
32
EUROPEAN UNION
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were signatories of the treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first of the European communities, in
1952, together with France, Germany, and Italy. The same six nations were charter members
of the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market, created by the Treaty of
Rome in 1957, and of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) that came into
force in 1958. Collectively, these institutions, headquartered in Brussels, were the European
Community (EC), which evolved into the European Union (EU). The Benelux Treaty (1960)
anticipated subsequent developments in the EU toward ever closer union.
The Treaty of European Union, usually referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, was formulated
while the Netherlands held the rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers, responsible
for proposing and implementing the ECs agenda. The treaty, adopted in 1992, would
provide a framework for achieving a common foreign and security policy as well as
cooperation in home affairs. It also completed the common market and endorsed monetary
union and adoption of a common currency.
The Maastricht Treaty viewed European union in terms of three pillars. The first pillar
referred to the institutional structures of the EU and set criteria for monetary union. The
second pillar embodied the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third pillar
covered justice and police issues, including immigration, asylum, and the movement of
people across national borders. The Schengen Agreement, named for the town in
Luxembourg where it was signed, sought to harmonize national implementations of thirdpillar objectives. National passports are also recognized as EU passports, and EU citizens
enjoy freedom of movement across the borders of member countries. The first pillar deals
with areas of exclusive EU competency, while the second and third pillars cover areas that
are essentially intergovernmental and are negotiable among member countries. Belgium, for
example, withdrew temporarily from the Schengen Agreement for a three-month period in
2001, effectively closing its borders during that period to migrants and asylum seekers not
authorized by the Belgian government in order to identify aliens residing illegally in the
country.
Citizens of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are also citizens of the EU, sharing
rights guaranteed to nationals of other member countries. EU citizenship does not preempt
responsibilities imposed by member countries on their citizens.
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg participate in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) that provides for a common monetary policy supervised by the European Central
Bank (ECB), based in Frankfurt. The three countries adopted the common currency, the euro,
together with nine other EU members, effective January 1, 1999 with euro notes and coins
introduced in 2002.
33
PARTICIPATION IN EU INSTITUTIONS
Polls over several decades have indicated overwhelming approval by citizens of the Benelux
countries for closer European integration. Brussels is the administrative capital of the EU,
and other EU institutions and agencies are located in Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Within the EU, the Benelux countries were staunch advocates of monetary union and have
supported EU enlargement, social harmonization, and democratization of decision making.
Benelux heads of government and government ministers represent their respective national
policies and exercise executive authority for the EU on the Council of Ministers and the
European Council. Since the last EU enlargement in 1993, each of the three holds the
rotating six-month presidency of the council once every seven and a half years. Belgium, the
last Benelux incumbent, held the presidency during the second half of 2001.
The Netherlands is scheduled for its next presidency in 2004, Luxembourg in 2005.
Luxembourgs prime minister Jean-Claude Juncker is on record contending that the
presidencies of smaller countries are more focused and efficient than those of larger
countries. Reservations run deep in the grand duchy about mooted reforms to the rotating
presidencies that might deprive Luxembourg of its next scheduled presidency.
Votes cast by governments of EU-member countries represented on the Council of Ministers
total 87 and are apportioned according to population. The Netherlands, which has just over
4% of the EUs population, and Belgium, which has just under 3%, are both allotted 5 votes.
Luxembourg, with one-tenth of one percent of the total, casts two votes, approximately tentimes the voting strength per capita of Germany. The support of smaller EU members,
including the Benelux countries, is generally needed for a qualified majority of 62 votes on
issues not requiring unanimity. As a consequence of further devolution of Belgian state
authority, Flanders and Wallonia rather than the national government represent the interests
of their regions on the council. Both are active in the EUs Committee of Regions, Assembly
of European Regions, of which they are founding members.
Each Benelux country appoints one commissioner to the 20-member European Commission,
the administrative body of the EU. Tiny Luxembourg has supplied two presidents of the
commission, nominated by heads of government sitting as the European Council.
Approximately 15,000 European civil servants work out of offices in Brussels and
Luxembourg to administer EU agencies under the direction of the commission.
The European Court of Justice, the EUs highest legal authority, is based in Luxembourg, as
is the European Investment Bank, the EUs concessionary infrastructure-financing arm.
Although the European Parliament (EP) holds plenary sessions in Strasbourg, its secretariat
is headquartered in Luxembourg, while parliamentary committees meet in Brussels. The
current EP, elected for a five-year term in 1999, seats 626 delegates elected from the 15 EUmember countries. Although nationally elected representatives to the EP normally campaign
34
on domestic rather than European issues, they sit in multinational parliamentary party
groups, not in national delegations. Thirty-one representatives are elected from the
Netherlands, 25 from Belgium, and six from Luxembourg.
The Amsterdam Treaty, concluded during the 1997 Dutch presidency, gave the EP
responsibility for holding confirmation hearings for commissioners and, by a vote of twothirds majority, the power to force the resignation of an individual commissioner or the entire
European Commission. In 1999, the commission and its president, former Luxembourg
prime minister Jacques Santer, was compelled to resign following an investigation of charges
of fraud, mismanagement, and cronyism.
Questions/Discussion
Explain the importance of European integration to smaller countries, including
the Benelux Three.
Discuss the special position of these countries in EU institutions.
What are some of the advantages and potential disadvantages of EU enlargement for
the Benelux countries?
Suggested Reading
Desmond DINAN. Ever Closer Union. 2nd edition. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
Eleanor ZEFF and Ellen PIRRO (eds). The European Union and the Member States:
Cooperation, Coordination, and Compromise. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
See chapter 4, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg: Diversity Among the Benelux
Countries, by Jan Beyers; Bart Kerremans and Peter Bursens.
35
FOREIGN POLICY
There is no Benelux foreign policy, despite consultations among the governments of
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Each of the three countries concentrates on
agreements made in a European context, but each conducts its own discreet foreign policy
that shares common commitments to the UN, NATO, and principles of international law.
Each country focuses increasingly on alignment with the foreign and security policy
dimensions of the EU and limits unilateral initiatives. Arms control and especially the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction are high priority considerations.
The three countries have different perceptions of their roles in international affairs,
conditioned by geography, wealth, and history. While the Dutch consider the Netherlands a
medium-sized country (as Swedes, for example, consider Sweden), Belgians unassumingly
refer to Belgium as a small country (much as Danes do Denmark). Luxembourgs
tremendous economic clout locates that country on a level above mini-state status. Both
Belgium and the Netherlands were colonial powers until the mid-20th century, and the latter
was also a great maritime power whose involvement in Asia, Africa, and the Americas dates
back to the 16th century. Foreign relations of the three export-oriented countries have
traditionally been influenced by economic considerations.
For good reason, Belgium was called the cockpit of Europe. For centuries, it was the
frontier between France and Germany and the real estate over which dominant powers fought
for strategic advantage. Belgian and Luxembourg neutrality was violated by Germany in
World War I, though the Dutch successfully remained out of the war. All three countries
were occupied during World War II, and all three definitively abandoned neutrality after the
war. As small- and medium-sized powers, they each emphasize multilateral approaches to
the solution of international problems.
As a matter of principle, Belgium intervenes internationally only when it has something
concrete and constructive to offer. An example of one such initiative was the report
generated by then-foreign minister Pierre Harmel in 1966 recommending increased political
consultation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact over tactical missile deployment in
Europe. The Harmel Report is considered to have been an important element in the process
of dtente during that period. Belgian initiatives under the direction of Foreign Minister
Louis Michel often emphasize ethical considerations, human rights, and greater reliance on
international law in the formulation of foreign policy. Belgium asserts the principle of the
universal jurisdiction of Belgian courts in cases involving war crimes and human rights
violations.
Federal Belgiums regions and communities have played a constitutional role in the
formulation and implementation of foreign policy since the state reform of 1993. They have
full competence in foreign relations in those fields for which they have domestic
responsibility.
36
Dutch foreign policy has been consistently interventionist and has involved itself in a greater
range of issues outside Europe. In the words of Joris Voorhoeve, Dutch foreign policy is
based on overlapping considerations of peace, profits, and principles, with no one
consideration ever excluding the others. The main elements affecting those considerations
have been national security, regional integration, open markets, and support for overseas
development and human rights. The Netherlands has been for many years one of the most
generous per capita contributors to technical assistance and development aid. The
Netherlands supports the imposition of internationally recognized legal norms.
Appropriately, The Hague is the site of the World Court as well as the more recently
established International Criminal Court (ICC).
Questions/Discussion
Why is multilateralism the core principle of foreign policy for all three Benelux countries?
In what ways have political and economic considerations been complementary in the
formulation of Dutch and Belgian foreign policies?
Discuss differences between the foreign policy orientations of Belgium and the Netherlands,
and explain the reasons for them.
To what degree have the Benelux Three surrendered control of foreign policy to the EU?
Suggested Reading
Jonathan E. HELMREICH. Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy. The
Hague: Mouton, 1976.
Joris J.C. VOORHOEVE. Peace, Profits, and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.
37
38
BELGIUM
Belgium abandoned conscription in the 1990s in favor of professional volunteer armed
forces. Prior to the end of eight-month national service, conscripts comprised only one-third
of active duty forces, but they provided the bulk of a large reserve force designed to fill out
unit cadres. Active duty force levels have been cut by half since the abolition of conscription,
reserves by 40%.
Belgian Armed Forces, 2002
Active: 37,600
Army: 26,400
Navy: 2600
Air Force: 8600
Reserves: 100,500
Including 72,000 army reservists and 15,500 medical personnel
Defense budget (2001): $2.2 billion
The armed forces is one of Belgiums few remaining national institutions.
The Belgian army is capable of deploying one mechanized infantry division composed of
three brigades, each deploying one armored battalion, equipped with Leopard MBTs, and
two mechanized infantry battalions backed by assault helicopters. Two brigades are kept at
70% strength to be reinforced by reserves, one at 50% strength. One brigade is stationed in
Germany. Elite troops, including those in airbourne and commando units, are highly rated
for their training and effectiveness.
The navy is trained and equipped for coastal and North Sea missions under joint command
with the Dutch navy. Components include three ASW frigates, 11 fast attack craft equipped
with Exocet SSMs, and minesweepers.
The air forces inventory of combat aircraft consists of 72 F-16s organized in six squadrons.
Flying hours available for Belgian pilots are below the NATO norm. Transport capacity is
limited.
Belgium contributed a battalion-level unit to SFOR-II in Bosnia and UN observer teams in
Kashmir, Western Sahara, and with KFOR in Kosovo.
Implementation began in 2002 of a plan for the gradual restructuring of the armed forces, to
be completed by 2015. The plan is based on the premise that it is unlikely the armed forces
will be mobilized at full strength in any potential future conflict. (See Mission of the Armed
Forces.) Rationalization is the keyword in the plan, which envisions Belgian components
of not more than 5000 personnel and assets deployed as part of a broad coalition in crisismanagement scenarios. The armed forces would be reduced by 10% to under 40,000
39
personnel integrated, together with a medical corps, under a single unified command. Some
activities would be outsourced to the civilian sector.
The NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands also moved to an all-volunteer force in the 1990s, reducing the size of
personnel in the armed forces by half after the end of the Cold War. As in Belgium,
conscripts, who normally accounted for nearly half the active force, were trained in periods
of 14-17 months to provide a standing reserve of more than 150,000 available to complete
units maintained by regular cadre. The army continues to rely on a small reserve component
to reinforce cadre in combat and support units.
Dutch Armed Forces, 2002
Active: 50,430
Army: 23,100
Navy: 12,130
Air Force: 10,000
Constabulary: 5200
Reserves: 32,200, including 22,000 army reservists.
Defense budget (2001): $5.6 billion
In wartime, the Dutch army is capable of fielding one mechanized infantry division,
equipped with Leopard MBTs, several hundred APCs, and self-propelled artillery. Combat
ready units include 12 tank, armored infantry, and air-mobile battalions, supported by six
artillery battalions. Two battalions are stationed in Germany. The army is backed up by
territorial units from a lightly-armed Home Guard.
The Netherlands has a proud and strong naval tradition. Combat assets include two
destroyers and 12 smaller frigates, armed with Harpoon SSMs, plus four submarines and
anti-mine warfare vessels. The naval aviation branch flies ASW and reconnaissance patrol
aircraft and ship-based helicopters, and a single naval patrol plane is regularly on duty with
NATO in Iceland. A corps of 3100 marine infantry is organized in three battalions, one of
which is integrated with the Royal Marines in a joint UK/Netherlands amphibious landing
force. The Dutch navy operates under joint command with the Belgian navy with
headquarters at Den Helder. Units are also periodically assigned to the base at Willemstad in
Curaao. Coast Guard craft combat smugglers and attempt to interdict drug traffic in the
waters of the Netherlands Antilles.
The air force has at its disposal 108 F-16s, deployed in nine squadrons, as well as efficient
reconnaissance and limited transport capability. The Netherlands intends to participate in the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft program. Flying hours for Dutch pilots are in line with the
NATO norm.
The Royal Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechausee) is a paramiltary police corps numbering
5200 personnel and responsible for providing internal security, criminal investigation, border
40
and passport control, highway patrol, transportation (including airport) security, and armed
crisis intervention. Officers of the Marechausee are highly respected and have a reputation
for being tough in the execution of their duties.
The Netherlands retained a mechanized infantry battalion under UN command as part of
SFOR II in Bosnia following the tragedy involving Dutch peacekeepers at Srebrnica. Dutch
observers served in Ethiopia/Eritrea and others were assigned to KFOR in Kosovo.
A joint Dutch-German command was prepared to take charge of the international
peacekeeping force in Afghanistan at the end of 2002.
LUXEMBOURG
Luxembourgs armed forces consists of 900 personnel organized in an infantry battalion and
two reconnaissance companies. One company is normally assigned to the Belgian
mechanized infantry division. A small number serve abroad under UN command as
observers with SFOR II and KFOR.
For legal purposes, NATOs 17 E-3A early-warning aircraft (AEWs) are registered to
Luxembourg and bear Luxembourg roundrels for identification. Luxembourg personnel were
assigned to the flight and maintenance crews of the five AEWs taking part in Operation
Deliberate Forge.
MISSION of the ARMED FORCES
Belgian and Dutch armies, operating under NATO command, were equipped and configured
to defend assigned forward areas in Germany. Mechanized divisions were trained to fight in
conventional and nuclear environments. Although active and reserve forces were drastically
downsized in the 1990s, combat units are still largely composed of heavy metal
components intended to counter threats envisioned during the Cold War. The mission of the
armed forces of the Benelux countries, like those of other NATO countries, has not been
clearly redefined. Nor is there a commonly agreed upon assessment of threats to national and
regional security. While retaining a capability for territorial defense under NATO command,
Belgian and Dutch armed forces are being reconfigured gradually to meet the long-range
demands of peacekeeping and crisis intervention outlined in the Petersburg Tasks.
DEFENSE SPENDING and PROCUREMENT
Belgium and the Netherlands drastically reduced defense expenditures in the 1990s. Belgian
spending was cut by one-third in the five-year period 1997-2001 to a total of $2.2 billion, the
lowest per capita expenditure in NATO after Poland and Luxembourg. The Netherlands
41
outlay for defense was more than double that of Belgium in 2001 ($5.6 billion) but had still
dropped by 25% from the 1997 level.
Belgium has an important arms industry built around Fabrique Nationale (FN) of Liege. The
FN 7.62 automatic rifle is standard NATO issue. Although a less aggressive exporter than in
earlier decades, FN remains a major supplier of small arms throughout the world. The Dutch
produce avionics and have naval shipbuilding and repair facilities. Funds available for R&D,
however, are virtually nil in Belgium in 2001 and are declining in the Netherlands.
The level of equipment procurement by Belgian and Dutch armed forces is constant, but the
latter was spending nearly five times as much on acquisitions in 2001 than the former. F-16s
in the Belgian and Dutch air forces are undergoing extensive mid-life up-grades. The
Netherlands has tentatively agreed to re-equip with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Questions/Discussion
What is NATOs primary mission in the post-Cold War era? Are there important secondary
missions?
Discuss areas of cooperation and possible contradictions in missions assumed by NATO and
those proposed for an EU security force.
What roles are the Benelux countries best able to perform within NATO and ERRF?
Suggested Reading
The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2001-2002 and
Strategic Survey 2001-2002. London: IISS, 2002.
Thomas ROCHON. The Netherlands. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, chapter 8.
42
HISTORY
Although the region is relatively small (about the size of West Virginia), the history of the
Low Countries looms large in world and European history. Both Belgium and the
Netherlands were colonial powers. The Netherlands was for a century the worlds most
important maritime power, and Belgium was one of the homes of the Industrial Revolution.
The influence of the Low Countries on the world economy is far greater than their size might
indicate.
Historical issues in the Low Countries are invariably European issues, and, over the
centuries, many decisive conflicts in European history have been resolved on their soil in
modern history from Waterloo to the Battle of the Bulge. The region, once part of the
Middle Kingdom, was a meeting place of Celtic and Germanic peoples, of Roman order
and barbarian hordes, and a buffer between France and Germany, aptly called the cockpit of
Europe.
The Low Countries shared a common history until the late 16th century, but, as Johan
Huizinga, the distinguished Dutch historian, demonstrated, the line of historical continuity
was broken during the years of the Dutch Revolt and could not be restored. What remains,
however, are the separate and vibrant national histories of three countries.
43
The Carolingians
Succeeding generations of Merovingian kings ruled over several kingdoms. One of them,
Austrasia (the eastern lands) was co-extensive with much of the present-day Benelux
countries. The kings appointed officials, called mayors of the palace, an office usually
hereditary, to administer the kingdoms in their stead. By the late 7th century, Pepin Herstal,
had collected mayoralties of the Merovingian kingdoms under his control. His son, Charles
Martel, who defeated the invading Arabs at Tours in 732, left his name to the dynasty the
Carolingians, and Charles Martels son Pepin III deposed the last of the Merovingian kings,
a puppet whose family, always brutal, had become decadent as well. Pepin was recognized
with papal approval as king of the Franks.
Pepins heir, Charles, known as Charles the Great or Charlemagne, transformed the Frankish
kingdom into a European empire. Charlemagne, who kept court in the old Roman towns at
Nijmegen and Aachen in Austrasia, defeated the Frisians, conquered the Saxons, and
extended Carolingian dominion across Germany. On Christmas Eve 800, Pope Leo III
crowned Charlemagne in Rome as emperor in succession to the western Roman emperors as
a reward for subduing the Lombards in Italy.
Having built a large empire, the Carolingians fell back on the Frankish custom of sharing
family property among legitimate sons. In 843, in the Treaty of Verdun, the Carolingian
Empire was divided among Charlemagnes three grandsons into three separate kingdoms a
West Frankish kingdom in what would become France, an East Frankish kingdom in
Germany, and the Middle Kingdom, left to the eldest, Lothair. Lotharingia, as the kingdom
was called, included Austrasia, the Carolingian heartland, as well as Burgundy, Provence, the
upper Rhineland, and northern Italy, a rich but ungainly piece of real estate lacking in natural
frontiers. In the Verdun treaty is found the remote political origins of France and Germany -and the end of the political unity of western Christendom.
On Lothairs death in 855, the Middle Kingdom was divided three ways. Louis the Fat, the
German king, took Italy and the imperial title; Charles the Bald, the French king, annexed
Provence; and the dead kings son, Lothair II, kept the Low Countries and Alsace-Lorraine.
And, when the younger Lothair died in 870, his uncles met at Mersen to split what had
remained of Lotharingia between them. In doing so, they drew a line through the Low
Countries and through western Europe over which their immediate descendants began
fighting and over which their successors continued to fight until 1945.
The Middle Ages
In order to supply and maintain a ready force of mounted warriors, the Franks had, in the 8th
century, introduced the practice of vassalage by which a warrior commended his service to a
warlord in return for which the lord gave his vassal the use of property for his support in the
field. This was a social and political relationship. The property involved in the arrangement
was a feudum, hence, feudalism. In time, possession of property implied a vassals
obligation to fight at the behest of his lord. The economic system that provided the wealth to
44
support the military obligation was manorialism, derived from a pre-existing Roman model,
in which manors held in feudal tenure were worked, as the system developed, by peasants
bound to the land in premedial serfdom. Manorialism remained the basis for the agricultural
economy in much of the Low Countries into the 18th century, long after vassalage and
feudalism had passed into history.
Under the Carolingians, feudal states had been established whose lords commended
themselves as vassals to the king, who resided at the apex of the feudal pyramid and who, in
turn, had vassals and sub-vassals commended to them. Feudal relationships in the Low
Countries were complex, giving rise to continuing conflicts of interest. There were, in fact,
two overlapping feudal pyramids, one in the south (Flanders and Artois) that had the French
king at its apex and the other where the German emperor was suzerain. Beneath them were
levels of great vassals dukes, counts, and lords, and, beneath them, baronies, lordships,
abbeys, and knightly holdings. There were, in addition, ecclesiastical states, ruled by their
bishops as feudal lords.
Feudal States in the Low Countries
Duchies
Brabant
Gelderland
Limburg
Luxembourg
Counties
Antwerp
Artois
Drenthe
Flanders
Gelderland
Hainault
Holland
Limburg
Namur
Zeeland
Lordships
Ecclesiastical
States
Friesland
Groningen
Overijssel
Cambrai
Liege
Utrecht
The feudal ties to the emperor in the northern Netherlands were not as strong as those to the
king of France in the south, but even those links weakened and the feudal states were
virtually independent of their suzerains after the 12th century. The counts of Flanders, for
45
example, possessed the wealth of kings, married into royal families, and held the title of
Latin Emperor in Constantinople in the 13th century. The ducal house of Luxembourg
produced two German emperors and two kings of Hungary in the 14th-15th centuries. The
great feudal families also often married among themselves and were joined by kinship. The
wars among them, also frequent, had the quality of family feuds.
Duchies and counties were often joined in personal unions, only to split in another generation
and form new combinations that may not have been territorially contiguous. Titles were
bequeathed, purchased, and usurped, given as dowries and, then, divided among the children
of the family. The ruler might wear several crowns, but each state retained its own laws and
customs, flag, coins, and legislature.
External trade began to revive along the river systems in the Low Countries in the 10th
century. Merchants and craftsmen congregating at ports, in old Roman towns, and around
fortresses promoted the rebirth of urban life in the 11th century at, for example, Bruges at the
bridge over the Zijn, at Ghent in the shadow of the castle on the Scheldt, near the dikes on
the Amstel, and at Ypres, Antwerp, Brussels, Utrecht, Doderecht, and other locations, more,
at first, in the south than, later, in the north. Depending on location, trade in the Low
Countries was oriented to England or France, up the Rhine to Germany, or to Scandinavia.
In the 12th century, the southern Netherlands (along with northern Italy) participated in
Europes first industrial revolution. Sheep raising on the lowlands of Flanders, Artois, and
Brabant provided the wool that fed the looms in the towns in those provinces. When demand
for the raw material exceeded domestic supply, the textile industry turned to England for its
wool. Towns in the northern Netherlands imported timber and naval stores from the Baltic to
build ships for fishing and the carrying trade.
The estates the bishops and clergy and the nobility and, only later, citizens of the towns
or communes were represented in the Netherlandish parliaments that met periodically in
each province. Each represented a source of income for the ruler and agreed to tax
themselves in return for the redress of grievances and recognition of liberties.
The communes often presented a problem for the landholding nobility because these urban
democracies existed outside the feudal structure. Often controlled by small oligarchies, they
were governed by councils independent of feudal lords and answered directly to the duke or
count. Troublesome though their demands might often be, the rulers, in turn, were likely to
grant the towns greater liberties because of the wealth that they generated. The towns were
themselves deeply divided by class animosity, the balance of political power differing among
them, however, from town to town. Class struggle was endemic. The urban patricians, who
built their great gabled houses on the market square, were merchants and entrepreneurs
whose fortunes equaled all but greatest of the landed nobility. The craftsmen, well organized
in the gilds, owned the workshops that put out goods on contract to the patricians and vied
with them for political control of the councils. On the lowest rung of the social and economic
ladder was a usually turbulent urban proletariat employed by the gildsmen. In Flanders
particularly, relations with the count and the nobility and among the urban classes were
46
complicated further in the 14th century by the wars between the suzerain, the king of France,
and England, the provinces most important trading partner.
When Philip IV of France tried to bring Flanders under royal control, the French king found
allies among the Flemish patricians, who offered him their direct allegiance. But the old
count of Flanders, Guy Dampierre, had the support of the gildsmen. The Flemish militias,
pikemen and crossbowmen mobilized by the communes, utterly routed over-confident
French knights at the Battle of the Spurs at Courtrai in 1302. As their reward, the communes
exacted greater liberties from the count.
Jacob van Artevelde, a brewer from Ghent and political leader of his commune, negotiated an
alliance of several Flemish towns Bruges, Ypres, Antwerp, and Ghent to proclaim armed
neutrality in the war between France and England that resumed in 1345 but also concluded a
commercial treaty with England to assure the supply of wool and grain. The count, Louis
Nevers, loyal to his obligation to his suzerain, was defeated when he moved against the allied
communes and was forced to recognize their autonomy.
The autonomy movement spread outside Flanders to towns in other parts of the Netherlands,
but, ultimately, neutrality was impossible to sustain and the communes joined in a formal
alliance with England, pledging their allegiance to Edward III who claimed the crown of
France. The struggle of the communes to defend their autonomy became a theatre in the
Hundred Years War. In 1382, the French defeated the communes at the battle of Roosebeke
and restored the authority of the count of Flanders over them.
The Burgundian Period
Two years later, Count Louis de Male, died, leaving as heir his daughter, Margaret, whose
husband Philip the Bold, the Valois duke of Burgundy, was welcomed by the Estates as
count of Flanders, thus uniting two of the richest areas in late medieval Europe. The
Burgundian period gave Flanders a line of four strong rulers who, over nearly a century,
acquired title to other Netherlandish states. Although they never bore a royal title, the countdukes Philip, John the Fearless, Philip the Good, and Charles the Bold -- had wealth,
power, and prestige greater than that of all but a few kings.
The Burgundian period was the golden age of Flemish art. Its patronage was bourgeois, not
aristocratic, and demanded an unrelentingly exact realism that featured bright colors made
possible by the innovative use of oil-based pigments. In a violent world confronted by
plague, war, and doubt that had strained the imagination, the Flemish primitives, so-called,
depended on literalness in order to be seen.
Charles the Bold was killed at Nancy in 1477 in battle with the Swiss. The Estates sanctioned
the marriage of Mary, his daughter and heir to the Netherlands and Burgundy, to Maximilian,
heir to the Habsburg realms Austria, Bohemia, Lombardy, and more --and the title of Holy
Roman Emperor. Their son Philip the Handsome was married to Joana, daughter of Isabella
of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, through whom their son Charles (1500-1558) inherited
47
the Spanish throne and colonial empire. Charles was born in Ghent and raised speaking the
languages of Flanders. As Charles V, he became emperor and claimant to the Burgundian
and Habsburg inheritances. His was a dominion greater even than Charlemagnes.
Succession of the Houses of Flanders-Burgundy-Habsburg in the Low Countries
Louis de Male, Count of Flanders (d. 1384)
:
Margaret of Flanders = Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (d. 1404)
:
John the Fearless (d. 1419)
:
Philip the Good (d. 1467)
:
Charles the Bold (d. 1477)
:
Maximilian of Austria = Mary of Flanders (d. 1482)
:
:
Ferdinand of Aragon=Isabella of Castle
:
:
Philip the Handsome (d. 1506)=Joana of Castile
:
Charles V (abd. 1555)
:
:
Philip II of Spain (d. 1598) Mary
:
:
:
:
:
Isabella=Albert of Austria (d. 1621)
Matthias
Questions/Discussion
Consider the legacy of Romanization in the Low Countries. Did it survive the fall of the
Roman Empire in that region? How?
Relate linguistic differences in the Low Countries to the events of the 4th and 5th centuries.
What effect did Carolingian dynastic practices have on European history in the 9th century
and thereafter?
Describe and compare the political connections in the Middle Ages between the Low
Countries and France, Germany, and England.
How was feudalism responsible for the delineation of distinct political units in the Low
Countries?
48
Discuss the conflict of interests among the nobility and in the towns arising from competing
allegiances to local sovereigns and their suzerains.
Discuss the composition and function of the estates-general in the Netherlandish states. How
representative were they?
Discuss and critique the Pirenne Thesis which argues that the growth of trade was the
exclusive cause for the reinvigoration of urban life in the Low Countries in the Middle Ages.
Describe class divisions in Netherlandish towns.
Cite some reasons for the decline of urban democracies in the Low Countries from the 14th
to 16th century.
Account for the rise and decline of the Valois dukes of Burgundy in the Low Countries.
The Age of Charles V
The 16th century was absolutely decisive in the history of the Low Countries. The total
population of the provinces in the region in 1500 was about two million, one-fourth of which
was in Flanders and another fourth in Brabant. Holland had a population of about 250,000,
more than half of it living in 18 incorporated cities. About 40% of the population of the
southern Netherlands was urban as well.
Charles, who would eventually preside over a world empire, came of age as duke of
Burgundy in 1515 and assumed the various titles of the Netherlandish states. He intended to
bind the 17 states of the Habsburg Netherlands together constitutionally within the
Burgundian Circle. Burghers in Holland wanted strong government to protect their carrying
trade and approved the plan. Cities in Flanders, however, and the landed nobility there were
more jealous of their ancient liberties. When Bruges and Ghent resisted, their privileges were
revoked.
Like the Burgundian dukes who preceded him, Charles relied on stadtholders, appointed in
each state to serve as his viceroy and as military commander. The stadtholders were often
drawn from a corps of professional administrators. Among them were the counts of Breda in
Brabant, who were from a branch of the German house of Nassau.
In 1543, the Netherlandish states were joined formally under a single constitution, called the
Great Privilege. Each retained its own provincial government, directed by a stadtholder, and
provincial estates, but they were under the supervision of a central government in Brussels.
Hereditary succession was confirmed in all of them, so that they could not in future be
divided among heirs.
Then, in 1555, Charles V emperor, king, archduke, duke, count, and holder of many other
titles abdicated them all and retired to a monastery. He divided the vast Habsburg empire
between his brother Ferdinand, who received the dynastys German possessions along with
49
the imperial title, and his son Philip (1527-1598), who became king of Spain as Philip II and
received the Habsburg possessions in Italy and the Burgundian Inheritance, including the
Netherlands.
The Reformation
Despite the decay of religious institutions, there was a tradition of popular piety and
prophetic mysticism in the Netherlands in the late Middle Ages. Netherlandish clerics were
prominent in the Conciliar Movement, intended to reform the administration of the Church
through the regular meeting of general councils of its bishops. The Brethren of the Common
Life, a lay religious order, promoted reform through education. One of their students,
Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536), perhaps the most prominent scholar of his time, sought
to put humanistic studies at the service of the renewal of the Church from within. The
Netherlandish artists Hieronymus Bosch and Pieter Brueghel depict the physical and
psychological turmoil of the period in their paintings.
The teachings of the French Protestant reformer John Calvin (1509-1564) found an early and
receptive audience in Wallonia and among the burghers of Antwerp, who carried his message
to the northern Netherlands, often as refugees from Spanish persecution. By the end of the
16th century, few towns of any size in Holland were without a Vaalsekerke (Walloon
Church).The clarity, certainty, and absence of ambiguity in Calvins acceptance of
predestination and justification by faith appealed to tough-minded, business-like citizens of
the Netherlandish towns who embraced its spiritual cost-effectiveness.
The Dutch Revolt
The beginnings of the Dutch Revolt, the 80-year War of Independence fought in the
Netherlands against Spain, coincided with the introduction of the Protestant Reformation and
the consequent reaction of the Catholic Counter-Reformation. Philip II stayed in the
Netherlands only a short time after his accession there. He returned Spain in 1559 and never
left it again. He appointed his half-sister Margaret of Parma to be his governor-general in
Brussels, but it was Philip who pronounced the policies from Spain that his viceroy was
expected to enforce in the Netherlands. Whatever he might have imposed on his subjects
there, often from a distant court in Germany or Spain, Charles V was at least recognized as
Netherlandish. Philip II was a Spaniard.
From his court in Spain, Philip II took four initiatives in the Netherlands that alienated most
of his subjects, regardless of class or religion. He laid out a plan for further consolidating the
Netherlands and integrating the region directly into the Spanish imperial system, including
control of its trade. This required a substantial reduction of the autonomy of the town
councils and the provincial estates, followed by the introduction of a system of regular
taxation that would yield revenues without having to seek their advice and consent. Finally,
he introduced the Inquisition into the Netherlands to stamp out Calvinism. Finally, a large
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Spanish army was dispatched to defend the Netherlands from France and to enforce the
kings will.
It was Spanish encroachment on local liberties, not religion, that was the foremost concern of
the Estates-General that met to reject Philip IIs initiatives. The protest was led by the League
of Magnates, including the counts Egmond and Horn, who were Catholics, and William,
called the Silent, the stadtholder of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht.
William the Silent (1533-1584) was the scion of the house of Nassau. Born in Germany, he
was count of Nassau-Dillenburg, inherited the county of Breda from the Netherlandish
branch of the house and the principality of Orange, an imperial enclave in southern France,
from another member of his multi-faceted family. Raised a Lutheran in Germany, he became
a Catholic to accept Charles Vs commission to serve him in the Netherlands. Philip II
conferred the stadtholderships on him in 1559. William the Silent was a successful politique
for whom religious commitment in those fractious times served political expediency.
As Spanish attempts to enforce religious conformity increased, Calvinists in Antwerp and
other towns reacted by sacking churches and religious houses with iconoclastic fury. Town
officials stood by as mobs destroyed stained glass, statues, and paintings. In 1566, the League
of Magnates presented the Request to Philip II to withdraw the Inquisition from the
Netherlands and repeal the edicts against heresy. Philip responded by sending the duke of
Alva as captain-general to reassert by military means both Catholic orthodoxy and his own
authority in the Netherlands. Egmond and Horn were arrested by Alva and executed at the
orders of the Council of Blood. William escaped to Holland and raised support there and in
Zeeland. He recruited initially from two groups: from the Calvinist burghers, who, although
still a minority in Hollands cities, had at their disposal the town militias, and from the gueux,
or sea beggars, fishermen, merchant seamen, and sometime pirates from Zeeland. He
trusted them because they were willing to fight the Spaniards, and they followed him because
they recognized in the stadtholder a soldier who could lead the resistance to Spain. William
the Silent thus became defender of local liberties and the leader of the Calvinist cause in
Holland and the Dutch revolt against Spain that would continue as the Eighty Years War. But
Dutch Calvinists were iconoclasts and the gueux were pirates, and, eventually, because of his
allies, William lost the confidence of Catholic magnates and many of the landed nobles
towns in the south.
For 15 years (1566-1581), terms for peace, not independence, was the issue between William
the Silent and Philip II, who was recognized as legitimate ruler even in Holland and Zeeland.
All attempts at a truce failed until 1577, when an agreement on an armistice and a formal
union of states was reached at the Pacification of Ghent. The armistice set the stage for the
Union of Brussels the following year. Its founding document referred to the Netherlands,
south and north, Catholic and Protestant, as the common fatherland of its people. Spanish
troops, who had caused havoc by their mutinies, were paid off and prepared to return home.
The Estates invited Matthias of Austria to replace his and Philip IIs uncle, Don Juan of
Austria, the victor of Lepanto, as governor. Matthias, who was 20 years old, was a younger
son of the heir to the Habsburg titles in Germany. Styled Defender of the Liberties of the
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Netherlands, the task before him was to mediate the quarrel between the Estates and Spain
and to counteract the influence of William the Silent, but no settlement was possible without
cooperation between the largely Catholic nobility and the now Calvinist stadtholder.
In the settlement, Catholicism was recognized everywhere in the Netherlands. Otherwise, the
issue of religious toleration was left open in the southern provinces. Protestants were not
satisfied with an understanding that restricted Protestantism anywhere. As the religious issue
became more sharply defined, the rift opened more widely between Catholics and
Protestants.
Holland and Zeeland, where William had been reconfirmed as stadtholder and captaingeneral by Matthias, withdrew from the Brussels Union, and, in 1579, two rival leagues were
formed. In the northern Netherlands, both Protestants and Catholics adhered to the Union of
Utrecht, pledging to resist the Habsburgs, while the estates of southern provinces joined the
Catholic Union of Arras, submitting an appeal to Philip II to defend the Church in the
Netherlands. Matthias left the Netherlands. In 1608, he would become Holy Roman Emperor
and the disputed succession to imperial lands after his death, in 1618, provided a motive for
the Thirty Years War.
The formation of the rival unions and the demise of the short-lived Brussels Union, whose
constitution had spoken of a common fatherland, marked the definitive division of the Low
Countries. The southern and northern Netherlands would thereafter develop in different
directions.
In 1581, the States-General of the Utrecht Union repudiated Philip II, creating the United
Provinces. Spanish troops moved to occupy the fortresses they had recently abandoned as a
base for the conquest of the northern Netherlands. It was a task that even the large and
splendid Spanish army could not accomplish. Nor could the Dutch expel the Spaniards from
the south, where they always stumbled on the unwillingness of the Catholic people to rally to
Calvinist rebels.
Finding legitimacy was a problem for the United Provinces too. It was a republic, unable to
secure recognition even from its ally, England. The search to recruit a prince failed to come
up with a suitable candidate. In practice, however, the government of the republic was a
disguised monarchy under the rule of the stadtholder, William the Silent. When William was
assassinated at Delft in 1584, his brother Maurice was elected stadtholder and captaingeneral to succeed him.
Questions/Discussion
Assess the contribution of Charles V to the unity of the Netherlands or his blame for its
disunity.
What was the role of the office of stadtholder? How did it compare with the office of the
Frankish mayors of the palace?
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What religious trends were evident in the Low Countries in the 14th-16th centuries that
anticipated the Protestant Reformation?
Give some reasons why Calvinism might have been popular in the Netherlands. Did the
belief form the temperament of its adherents, or did the temperament of the Netherlanders
encourage its acceptance?
How did the religious climate in the northern Netherlands differ from that in the southern
Netherlands? How important were the differences in preventing the realization of a common
fatherland in the Netherlands?
What were the principal factors contributing to the Dutch Revolt? Did the same factors
determine the progress and resolution of the conflict? To what extent and why did the
southern Netherlands remain loyal?
How did William the Silent select his allies in the struggle against Spain?
Cite some advantages of prolonging the wars with Spain for the United Provinces. What was
the importance of Hugo Grotius to the Dutch war effort?
What were the limits of religious tolerance in the United Provinces? Were they imposed
mostly for theological reasons or were they essentially political in nature?
The Golden Age
The war with Spain continued with periodic English and French interventions, the battle lines
flowing back and forth with repeated campaigns and sieges. The Dutch captured northern
Brabant and Limburg, a largely Catholic area organized as The Generality, an occupied
dependency administered by the States-General of the United Provinces in which they were
not represented. At sea, the long arm of Dutch naval power harried the Spanish merchant
fleet, cut lines of communication, and attacked Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Partly due
to French mediation, a 12-year truce was concluded in 1609 that preserved the status quo in
the Netherlands for its duration.
In 1598, Philip II handed over title to the whole of the Netherlands to his daughter Isabella
and her husband-to-be and cousin the Habsburg archduke Albert of Austria as independent
sovereigns, not as the agents of Spain. An autonomous Netherlands under Habsburg rule was
proposed as a solution by which the south and north could be reconciled and reunited. The
consolidation of Catholicism in the southern Netherlands during the years of the truce,
particularly under the influence of the Jesuits on education and the intellectual life of the
country, discouraged any rapprochement with the Protestant north. Isabella and Albert were
childless, and, on the archdukes death in 1621, the southern Netherlands reverted to Spain.
The truce opened the opportunity for political dissent in the United Provinces that was muted
when the country was threatened by invasion, particularly opposition the ascendancy of the
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House of Orange. The estates of each of the Dutch provinces elected a stadtholder. In
Holland and Zeeland, the office had passed without debate from William to Maurice as head
of the House of Orange. Maurice or another member or supporter of the family -- was
elected in other provinces as well. Each province retained its traditional estates that chose
parliamentary leaders often drawn into conflict with the stadtholder. The constitutional
relationship between stadtholder and estates was not always clear or consistent from
province-to-province.
The estates of Holland that assembled in The Hague was typical. The Noble Great Mighty
Lords Estates of Holland and West Frisia, as it was styled, was composed of 19 delegations,
one representing the estate of the landed nobility and others sent by the 18 cities in Holland.
(Before 1567, a twentieth estate had represented the Catholic bishops and clergy.) Each
estate was led by an elected pensioner, and the collective body of estates was presided over
by the Grand Pensioner chosen from their number, whose job it was to work out the sense of
the estates on an issue before them and devise a resolution that could be approved by a
unanimous vote. The estates of the several provinces might convene periodically in the
States-General of the United Provinces.
After the death of William the Silent, a struggle for supremacy in Holland developed
between the stadtholder, expressing a monarchical tendency, and the pensioners, upholding
the republican principle. The stadtholder was accused of using the resources of Holland to
protect the interests of the United Provinces at the expense of and against the interests of
Holland. Within the Holland Estates, the landed nobility and the city of Amsterdam
supported the prerogatives of the stadtholder and the House of Orange against the opposition
of the other city estates, led by the grand pensioner Jacob van Oldenbarneveldt. In the StatesGeneral, Holland and Zeeland were often aligned against the opposition of the other
provinces. From province to province, the landed classes were opposed by the urban
patricians and Orangists by republicans. These social and political conflicts, in differing
combinations, were fought in every town and province.
The political conflict was further complicated by religious issues. The United Provinces was
unique in its commitment to religious tolerance. Jews and Protestants of many persuasions
found welcome and tolerance there. Catholics were tolerated as well, if they kept a low
profile. But similar open-mindedness was not always present within the Calvinist community
itself. In its quest for doctrinal certitude, Calvinism was uneasy with ambiguity and
contradiction and found many ways to punish dissent within its ranks.
Jacob Hermannzen, a member of the faculty at Leiden University, who was known as
Arminius, attempted to confront the apparent contradiction between the divine sovereignty
that assumed predestination and the human freedom that presumed the existence of free will.
Arminius taught that God wills all to be saved but allows man to exercise free will in
accepting or rejecting the grace necessary for salvation. There were evident political
ramifications to his teaching. Protesting against the overlapping ecclesiastical and political
establishments, Arminius called for a free church in a free republic. His followers, known
as the Remonstrants, appealed to the States-General with the support of van Oldenbarneveldt
to end state oversight of the church.
54
Maurice had no interest in the theological aspects of the debate, but he rejected the
Remonstrants on political grounds and ordered ministers to keep silent in their pulpits on the
issues raised by Arminius. Many Remonstrants fled into exile. Disorder broke out in some
Dutch cities, and van Oldenbarneveldt authorized town councils to mobilize the local
militias. The grand pensioner, who was accused of undermining the authority of the
stadtholder, was arrested and hanged for treason in 1619.
The stadtholder, freed from van Oldenbarneveldts opposition, did not seek to renew the
truce in 1621, and the wars resumed. The conflict had been profitable for the Dutch.
Treasure passed through Spain as if through a sieve to finance the war in the Netherlands,
much of it into Dutch coffers. Piracy against enemy shipping in time of war and the blockade
of rival ports in the southern Netherlands was given legal justification by Hugo Grotius in
The Law of the Sea. Dutch colonial expansion in Asia (Ceylon, Malaya, the East Indies), the
Cape of Good Hope, the West Indies, Brazil and Surinam, and in North America often came
at the expense of European enemies and fuelled the enormous prosperity of the United
Provinces.
On his death in 1628, Maurice was succeeded as stadtholder by his half-brother Frederick
Henry, a tolerant man who allowed the Remonstrants to return to Holland. He ruled clearly
as a monarch from his illustrious court in The Hague, and his family concluded a royal
marriage in England. Also a man of considerable good taste, the stadtholder was a patron of
music, scholarship, architecture, and, especially, art. The art of the Golden Age, however,
was not aristocratic but reflected the bourgeois culture of urban patrician patrons and was
thoroughly secular. By contrast, the high baroque art of the Spanish Netherlands was
ecclesiastical and aristocratic and reflected a Catholic sensibility.
Frederick Henry determined to end the wars. The Dutch were signatories to the Treaties of
Westphalia in 1648 and made peace with Spain in 1656, concluding the Eighty Years War.
Dutch independence was formally recognized, and the United Provinces were confirmed in
the possession of northern Brabant and parts of Limburg. Spain kept Antwerp, but the
Scheldt was closed to traffic to its port. The Treaty of the Pyrennes that ended the war
between Spain and France in 1659 stripped Thionville and Montmedy from Spanish
Luxembourg. Spain also lost the province of Artois to France.
Although a governor was appointed by Madrid to serve as viceroy in the Spanish
Netherlands, the provinces and towns were administered by their traditional estates and
councils with a considerable degree of local autonomy. Members of noble families were in
service to the Habsburgs in Spain. Flemish and Walloon troops fought with distinction in the
Spanish army in the Netherlands and in others theatres. But, in contrast with the prosperity of
the United Provinces, the economy of the Spanish Netherlands was generally depressed
through the 17th century, and the vigor of urban life declined.
Frederick Henry died before the conclusion of the Westphalia treaties. His son William
succeeded to all of his offices as in an hereditary monarchy. The wars concluded, Holland
wanted to reduce the size of the army, which it largely financed. The stadtholder refused to
55
accept the decision of the Holland Estates and undertook a military occupation of the
province. Confrontation between the dynasty and the republic was averted only because of
his death from smallpox before the birth of his son, who would also be named William (later
William III).
Holland and all but two of the other united provinces were without stadtholders from 16501672. (Friesland and Groningen retained the stadtholdership under a cadet branch of the
House of Orange.) Republicanism was ascendant during that period. Political power in the
United Provinces resided with patricians in the States-General whose leading figure was the
grand pensioner of Holland, Jan de Witt.
The basis of political power lay in the governing councils of the Dutch towns. Councilors or
regents were typically elected for life from among the wealthiest individuals in the town on
the theory that men of achievement were best able to govern in the interest of the town as a
whole. They agreed that government must respect local liberties, both as a matter of principle
and because local freedom contributed to the building of a more prosperous society. Rule by
the wealthy led to government that was limited in scope and that sought to create conditions
for the further growth of wealth.
During the 17th century, the Dutch developed a global trading empire that put the United
Provinces in the first rank of European powers and that laid the foundations for a global
economy. The Dutch were quintessential middle men who established multilateral trade
networks in which they were carriers and warehousers for a variety of goods whose origins
and final destinations lay outside the Netherlands. The storehouses of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam were filled with grain from the Baltic, timber from Norway, coals from
Newcastle, copperware from Hamburg, canvas from Russia, Swedish pitch and tar, wines
from France and Germany, soap from Marseilles, English leather and lead, olive oil and
honey from Spain. Pasta was made in Holland from Baltic wheat, brought to Italy in Dutch
ships, and exchanged there for the marble that was used to build the stately homes of
Amsterdam.
These trade relations were solidified by a complex set of commercial arrangements and
political ties. The Dutch controlled trade in the Baltic and, to protect that dominance, used
diplomatic influence and naval power to assure that neither Sweden nor Denmark gained a
decisive advantage over the other in their frequent wars that would upset the balance of
power in the region. Dutch banks made loans to the king of Sweden, who put up Swedish
copper mines as security, and invested in Danish agriculture. Dutch investors purchased
mining and timber concessions in Sweden and Norway. Dutch interests extracted, refined,
and shipped all of the sulfur produced in Iceland. Exports of caviar, tar, hemp, salmon, and
wool from Russia were all Dutch monopolies. In Poland, the Dutch operated the Mint, giving
them control over that countrys currency.
The greatest achievements of the Dutch commercial empire were made, however, by the East
India Company, formed in 1602 as a government-sanctioned monopoly financed by private
investors who traded shares in the company on the bourse (stock market). Directors of the
East India Company quickly understood that there were great profits to be made by
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57
company also set up stations on the West African coast for the embarkation of slaves to work
on its sugar plantations in colonies in the West Indies and Surinam.
The Golden Age was not a peaceful period. After the peace with Spain, France became the
chief threat to the United Provinces. Commercial rivalry drew the Dutch into two naval wars
with England (1652-1654, 1664-1672). The Portuguese drove the Dutch out of Brazil in
1654, and, in 1664, the English took the ill-governed New Netherlands colony, renaming it
New York. More ominously, Louis XIV began a series of wars of devolution in the 1660s
intended to extend the borders of France to a natural frontier on the Rhine. In 1672, the
French took Utrecht and, then, occupied large parts of the country outside Holland and
Zeeland.
William III
Under popular pressure, the States-General surrendered power to the young William of
Orange (1648-1702) and named him stadtholder in 1672. De Witt was murdered in The
Hague by vengeful Orangists. William concluded an alliance with England, Spain, and
Austria that brought a temporary end to the wars and French withdrawal from the
Netherlands.
The stadtholder William, who was the nephew of Charles II, contracted a marriage with his
English cousin Mary. When her father, James II, was deposed by Parliament in the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, the couple became the joint monarchs of England as William III and
Mary II. William defeated James in Ireland with an army that included Dutch troops, but his
main concern as the king of an adopted country was largely to obtain the resources and
manpower from England to defend the Netherlands against France.
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) was the last of Louis XIVs devolution
wars. It was also the last time that the Netherlands would act as a great power in Europe.
The direct line of the counts of Breda beginning with William the Silent and his brother
Maurice ended in the fourth generation when William III died without an heir in 1702. No
successor to the stadtholdership of Holland was elected, and the grand pensioner was again
recognized as chief executive of the United Provinces to conduct the war and to conclude the
Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Louis XIV achieved in war his aim of putting his Bourbon
grandson on the Spanish throne, but the southern Netherlands remained Habsburg, passing to
the Austrian branch of the family.
Questions/Discussion
Characterize the aims of Dutch colonial expansion in the 17th century.
Explain the economic decline of the Spanish Netherlands in the 17th century. Was Spanish
rule there a tyranny?
58
Explain the differences in artistic styles in the United Provinces and the Spanish Netherlands
in the 17th century.
Was/were the United Provinces a republic or a monarchy? Is it more accurate to use the
singular or the plural verb with reference to the United Provinces?
Give reasons for the on-going conflict between the stadtholder and Estates and describe
political alignments in the United Provinces.
Why was the Golden Age golden?
What was Louis XIV attempting to achieve in the wards of devolution? Why was the English
alliance so important to William III?
What were the consequences of the War of Spanish Succession for the Low Countries?
The Low Countries in the Eighteenth Century
The United Provinces successfully defended its independence in the wars with France but
emerged from the last of them exhausted and weakened. The merchant fleet had suffered
huge losses. The treasury was empty and the economy stagnant. In the years following the
war, the army and navy were neglected. The ruling oligarchy in the States-General was
abusive of power. The United Provinces was still a rich country but wealth was poorly
distributed among the provinces. Its commercial influence declined in relation to England
and France, and, in the 18th century, the country lost its status as a first-class power.
The United Provinces had the right under the Utrecht treaty to garrison the barrier
fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands in the event that war there with France threatened its
security. The Dutch succeeded in remaining neutral, however, during the War of Austrian
Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years War (1756-1763) that were fought on Belgian
soil, the cockpit of Europe. Belgian interests, it would be pointed out, were sacrificed to
those of the welfare of Europe.
Austria did not dominate the 18th-century Habsburg provinces in the Low Countries. The
connection between them was that they shared the same sovereign. The Austrian emperorarchduke was represented in Brussels by a governor, while a minister from Brussels,
representing the estates, had a seat on the imperial cabinet in Vienna. The provincial estates
and city councils exercised a large degree of autonomy, and the Austrian Netherlands was, in
practice, a decentralized collection of separate provincial and local jurisdictions operating
independently of one another. It was an untidy but generally popular system.
The archduchess Maria Theresa (1717-1780) shared that popularity among her Belgian
subjects. She patronized the Church and education lavishly. Belgium became a site for the
beginning of the modern Industrial Revolution. Mills and mines in Wallonia, the energy and
59
entrepreneurship of its people, and state subsidies provided the basis for economic growth.
Efforts to open overseas trade were thwarted by the Dutch, however.
Joseph II (1741-1792), who succeeded his mother, was an enlightened despot, a
rationalizer and a centralizer of institutions annoyed by what to his logical mindset was the
medieval chaos of Netherlandish institutions. At one point, he tried to work out a deal to
transfer Belgium to France in exchange for permission to annex Bavaria to Austria. His
empire-wide Patent of Toleration (1781) was deeply offensive to his Belgian subjects, for
some because it granted recognition to Protestants but to others because it infringed on the
liberties of local institutions. Religious houses were suppressed, seminaries closed, and
schools secularized. Traditional institutions, courts, and local administration were reformed
without local consultation. Taxes were imposed from Vienna. Commerce was regulated in
onerous ways. Liberals and traditionalists united against what they saw as the destruction of
their countrys autonomy.
When, in 1789, the Brabant Estates refused to consent to taxation, the Austrian army entered
Brussels, setting off a general uprising that forced an Austrian withdrawal. In 1790, the
rebellious estates produced a constitution for the United States of Belgium. Not all the
provinces were equally enthusiastic, however. The Austrian army returned the following year
and scattered the rebels, but the new emperor, Leopold II (1747-1792), shelved the reforms
they had resisted.
The French occupied the Austrian Netherlands in 1792 after defeating the Austrian army at
the battle of Jamappes. In 1795, the Belgian provinces, including Liege and Luxembourg,
were annexed by France, largely to the indifference of their people. In Luxembourg,
however, there was an uprising, the Kloppelkieg, in protest against the imposition of military
conscription.
In the United Provinces, the stadtholdership, vacant in Holland and Zeeland, had continued
as before in Friesland and Groningen in the hands of a branch of the Orange-Nassau family.
In 1747, William (IV), the heir of that line, was elected stadtholder in all the provinces to
counter a perceived threat from France. He also had a mandate to introduce political reforms.
On Williams death in 1751, his three-year old son, also William (V), was recognized as
hereditary stadtholder and the States-General assigned to act as regent during his minority.
The United Provinces was clearly now a republic that had a royal family.
Traditionally, the Orangists were drawn from all classes except from a patrician oligarchy
that was profoundly republican. Shopkeepers and artisans of the lower middle-class, for
example, had regarded the House of Orange as its protector against the patrician oligarchy.
As institutional paralysis set in, however, even these groups became alienated by the inability
of the stadtholder to secure reforms.
The neo-republican and democratic movement in the United Provinces gained momentum at
the time of the American Revolution. Inspired by the Americans, instructed by English
political ideas, and, later, sympathetic to the French Revolution, the Patriots called for a re-
60
volution, in the Lockean sense, to restore the republican and democratic customs that they
accused the stadtholder of having nullified.
The Napoleonic Era
The Dutch offered no resistance to French occupation in 1795. Delegates to a constitutional
convention divided along political lines between radical unitarians and moderate federalists.
The French settled the debate in favor of the Batavian Republic, modeled on the Directory in
France and presided over by a committee chaired by the dictator-pensioner, Rutger van
Schimmelpennick. It was an efficient government, federal in form but unitary in practice
and centralized to a degree previously unimaginable, that eventually adopted the Napoleonic
Code in Dutch courts. In 1806, Napoleon created the Kingdom of Holland and named his
brother Louis as its king. But, in 1810, when Louis began putting Dutch interests above his
brothers imperial designs, Napoleon annexed the northern Netherlands to France.
The Napoleonic Wars were costly for the Netherlands. Huge resources were expended on
Napoleons war efforts. The British occupied Dutch colonies and trading stations, most of
which were returned in 1815 but some Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope were lost
permanently. Trade was cut off by the British blockade and a large part of the merchant fleet
sunk or seized. After Napoleons defeat at the battle of Leipzig in 1813, Orangists revolted in
Holland. Dutch and Belgian troops, many of them veterans of Napoleons army, fought on
the side of the Allies at Waterloo under the command of William, Prince of Orange.
.
Although the French interlude in the governance of the Netherlands and Belgium was brief, it
left permanent effects in the form of a centralized state. A single legal code applicable to all
the provinces was developed, and the powers of local and provincial authorities were
reduced. Development of a national tax code gave the central state its own resources for the
first time, and also shifted the tax burden more equally among all citizens, away from the
consumption taxes that had weighed heavily on the lower classes while leaving untouched
the accumulated wealth of the privileged few. A system of universal education was adopted
and the state set general standards to be met by public and private schools alike.
Questions/Discussion
In what sense was the mood of the Austrian Netherlands reactionary in the 18th century?
The United Provinces?
Explain the causes of the Brabant rising against the Austrians in 1789. Did it have any
connection with the beginning of the Revolution in France?
Why did the Dutch submit so readily to French domination? What were some of the
consequences of Dutch collaboration?
Discuss and compare the historical status of Napoleon in the histories of Belgium and the
Netherlands.
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62
Smoldering grievances ignited in the streets of Brussels and Liege in 1830, inspired by the
July Revolution in Paris. Elected officials set up a provisional government that cut
Belgiums ties with the United Netherlands. Those leading the movement for separation were
urban, middle-class, and French-speaking but were drawn from both liberal and traditionalist
camps. Dutch troops dispatched to suppress the rebellion were driven out of Brussels by the
local militia, but the Dutch commander of the fortress at Antwerp turned its guns on that city.
France intervened the following year when the Dutch army threatened to invade Belgium.
The National Congress, elected after the proclamation of independence, ratified a
constitution early in 1831, and, in June, elected Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (1790-1865)
to be King of the Belgians. Leopolds candidacy had been strongly promoted by Britain at a
conference of the great powers in London that formally recognized Belgiums independence.
As Lord Palmeston advised the conferees, If Belgium did not exist, we would have to invent
it. An Anglo-Belgian treaty of 1839 guaranteed Belgiums perpetual neutrality.
William I refused to accept Belgiums independence and the break up of the United
Netherlands. His recognition of it in 1839 was accompanied by his abdication. Many in the
Netherlands welcomed both the end of the union and the departure of William I.
Luxembourg sent delegates to the Belgian National Congress in 1830, but the Prussian
garrison held the fortress for the Dutch king. In 1839, the grand-duchy was partitioned, the
French-speaking western portion joining Belgium and the remaining portion of the grandduchy in the east continuing in personal union with the king of the Netherlands. Grand-ducal
Luxembourg was granted a liberal constitution, allowing for a deliberative legislature, in
1848.
Questions/Discussion
What were some of advantages and disadvantages for the Netherlands and for Belgium of the
15-year union?
Comment on Huizingas contention that historical continuity in the Netherlands, north and
south, had been irrevocably broken during the years of the Dutch Revolt and could not be
restored.
Interpret Palmestons dictum: If Belgium did not exist, we would have to create it.
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was prime minister during much of that period. He was also a leading force in adopting the
liberal Constitution of 1849, which remains the Netherlands basic constitutional document.
The constitution provided for the direct election of the Second Chamber, or lower house of
the States-General, which became a deliberative assembly to which government ministers
were responsible. It extended suffrage and lifted disabilities on Catholics that had been in
force since the 17th century. The constitution also spelled out the responsibility of state to
provide education under secular auspices.
The constitutional reform brought a dramatic shift from ministries appointed by the king
without reference to the legislature to ministries that required the confidence of parliamentary
majorities. Thorbeckes governments were opposed by conservatives not reconciled to the
new constitution and by orthodox Calvinists opposed to the extension of political rights to
Catholics as well as by his personal rivals within the Liberal movement. His policies were
supported by the Liberal mainstream, by moderate Calvinists, and by Catholics, who had
very limited representation. The more the Liberals were able to extend suffrage, the greater
were the number of Catholics who appeared on the voter rolls.
Representatives of the four pillars, or zuilen Liberal, Protestant, Catholic, and Socialist,
that dominated Dutch politics by the end of the century were not initially organized as
political parties but as clubs, interest groups or associations of like-minded people.
Thorbekes Liberal constituency was largely urban and middle-class, drawn from business,
professional, and property-owning circles. Within their ranks were both libertarians and
social liberals. Although secular in their political ideology, most Liberals were at least
nominally members of the established Calvinist church. Secularism and liberal Protestantism
were not incompatible.
Protestant political clubs were populist and claimed to represent the small people in the
countryside. They attracted the support of orthodox Calvinists opposed to the secularism of
the Liberals, and they allied themselves with conservatives against such Liberal initiatives as
the re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy. The first genuine political party was the
Protestant Anti-Revolutionary Party founded by Abraham Kuyper in 1878. Kuyper proposed
progressive social programs that prompted the partys right-wing to bolt and form the
Christian Historical Union. Their defection encouraged moderate Protestants to move from
the Liberal to the Anti-Revolutionary Party.
The Catholics had no club or party until late in the 19th century. Although many were
disenfranchised, they were a majority in some parts of the country and made up a large
minority in the big cities. Those who could vote initially supported the Liberals because of
the relief from disabilities they offered them in a Protestant-dominated system.
The trade union movement was established in the 1870-1880s by the separate pillars. The
Catholic union was led by a priest, the Protestant union by a minister, and the socialist union
by a former minister. The first socialist party was set up as the political arm of the socialist
union in the 1890s. The socialist pillar was revolutionary, republican, and anti-clerical. In
time, a struggle between social democrats and communists divided the movement.
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The two biggest issues of the late-19th century were extension of the suffrage and control of
education. The Liberals had sponsored reforms that extended voting rights to Catholics, the
urban working-class, and Kuypers small people, all constituents of rival pillars. In 1887,
the electorate was doubled in size, and, ultimately, the larger electorate worked to the
disadvantage of the Liberals who had sponsored it.
The Constitution guaranteed freedom of education, but it recognized that the state, not the
churches, had responsibility for inculcating all Christian and Social virtues in the schools.
The Liberals wanted non-denominational secular education over which the state exercised a
monopoly. The Protestants could not accept the idea of secular state-run schools teaching
moral values, and the Catholics deserted the Liberals on the issue to support them.
After the 1887 election, the Anti-Revolutionaries and the Catholics formed a new
government that enacted social legislation and provided subsidies to confessional schools, a
system that continues in effect. The confessional parties regarded the Socialists as socially
divisive because of their Marxist emphasis on the class struggle, but both maintained contact
with them through the trade union movement. Socialists did not participate in government
but their parliamentary support was accepted.
In 1896, the franchise was doubled again. Voting patterns were established that prevailed for
the next 25 years. The Catholics regularly won 25-30% of the vote, the Protestant parties 2025%, the Socialists 15-20%, and the Liberals, still the largest single party, 35-40%.
William II of Orange-Nassau, King of the Netherlands and Grand Duke of Luxembourg
died in 1890 without leaving a male heir. Female succession was permitted in the
Netherlands, where his daughter Wilhelmina succeeded to the throne, but not in Luxembourg
at that time. Referring back to an 18th-century family pact, the Nassau Settlement, designed to
meet such a circumstance, the head of another branch of the family, Adolph, Duke of
Nassau-Weilburg and a Catholic, was designated as grand-duke and established a separate
line of succession in Luxembourg.
Belgium in the Nineteenth Century
Political developments in Belgium after independence in 1830 paralleled those in the
Netherlands. Politically effective Belgians identified with one of three pillars, or spiritual
families Liberal, Catholic, and Socialist which also dictated social and professional
associations. The Liberal party, founded in 1846, dominated Belgian politics until 1880s.
Secular and anti-clerical, the Liberals favored a widened suffrage based on property
qualifications and education, and also proposed to expand access to education in an
exclusively state-supported school system. Representing a business-oriented urban middleclass constituency, they advocated an unimpeded market economy and free trade but also
approved subsidies and public investment to support industrial development and
infrastructure.
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Catholic political organizations were approved by the hierarchy in the 1860s to lobby for a
continuing Church role in education. A confessional political party was later established to
promote Catholic education and to push for extension of voting rights, particularly to Dutchspeakers. Catholic politics had a very broad base, including support from all classes and in all
regions of the country, although stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia. Catholic trade unions
and business and agrarian associations supported the party, which, in turn, backed subsidies
to protect smallholders and peasant farmers and public involvement in the economy to
protect jobs and labor rights. The Catholic party was capable of winning parliamentary
majorities from the mid-1880s until 1919 and led most coalition governments until 1999.
The Belgian Workers Party was organized in 1885 as an adjunct to the socialist trade union
movement. It was a party of far left, stronger in Wallonia than in Flanders, radical rather than
reformist, and called for public ownership and state intervention in the economy. The party
proposed legislation for social welfare programs and employment security. The socialists
cooperated with the Catholics in support on social reforms.
As in the Netherlands, extension of suffrage and reconciling the claims of secular and
religious education were major issues. The Liberals were kept in power by middle-class
electorate. Although the liberal constitutional reform of 1848 increased the voter rolls,
smallholders, propertyless workers, and most of the Flemish countryside were largely
excluded from them. Liberals were committed to further reforms that included the gradual
expansion of the franchise in conjunction with the expansion of public education. The
Catholics, who had organized initially to protect the role of the Church in education,
campaigned for speedier enfranchisement to excluded classes. Enlarging the pool of voters
invariably meant more Flemish and rural voters, which meant increased support for the
Catholic party.
In office after 1884, Catholic-led governments extended suffrage to areas that further
increased the partys base of support. Those governments also denied the state a monopoly in
education and guaranteed the Churchs continuing influence. The libertie subsidee (literally,
subsidized liberty) gave state funding to social institutions, including schools and hospitals,
operated by organs of the spiritual families, and entrusted them with responsibility for
social welfare programs. The Church was the principal beneficiary of this policy. During a
period of intense labor unrest and social strife, legislation was enacted regulating work-hours
and child labor. In 1893, compulsory manhood suffrage was introduced, increasing the size
of the electorate from 140,000 voters to 1.4 million in a single act. Plural voting (of up to
three votes per person) was also allowed for those additionally qualified by education,
taxable income and property, and family status. With the enfranchisement of rural and
Flemish working-class masses, socially conscious Christian democrats, or Daenists (after the
priest-politician Adolph Daens) gradually became the dominant faction within the Catholic
spiritual family, although not initially with the support of the Belgian hierarchy. Between
1894 and 1914, the Catholic party held at least two-thirds of the seats in the national
legislature. During the same period, the Socialists overtook the Liberals as the second largest
party and became leader of the opposition. Catholic governments won grudging Socialist
support for social reforms inspired by papal encyclicals on the rights of workers, but the
Catholic party opposed what it considered the divisive class conscious politics espoused by
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the Socialists as well as by middle-class Liberals. The Liberals, despite their anticlericalism, allied themselves with the Catholics on many issues and, with Catholic backing,
were successful in having proportional representation adopted in 1899.
In Belgium, there was another issue language rights that overlapped the others and
became the most persistent concern of successive governments and a recurrent irritant to
relations between French- and Dutch-speakers within each spiritual family. Although
public business was conducted in Dutch in many Flemish cities, including Brussels, French
had been the language of administration and justice in Belgium since the 16th century. The
reintroduction of Dutch as the official language in Flanders in 1823 after an absence of 300
years compromised Walloon allegiance to the United Netherlands. After independence,
Dutch was again downgraded in Flanders, where its use was restricted in education and
prohibited in the courts. The use of French was the vehicle for upward social mobility and
professional advancement. The families of the numerous Flemish migrants to Wallonia
became French-speaking Walloons in the second generation. A nationalist movement, the
Flemish Meeting Party, was formed in 1862 to protest conditions in Flanders and also to
lobby for recognition of the Dutch language in that region. Bilingualism was introduced in
Flanders with limited success in 1873 and Standard Dutch approved as an official language
in Belgium in 1898. In practice, however, French retained primacy of place in the national
government. It was the only language of command in the armed forces until after World War
I, and restrictions on the use of Dutch in courts of law remained in force into the 1920s.
Brussels, seat of the French-speaking Belgian government, had also become by the turn-ofthe-century a predominantly French-speaking city whose administration was conducted in
French.
Not only had Dutch disappeared from council chambers and courts in Belgium, it had also
been abandoned as a vehicle for the expression of higher culture in literature. The revival of
Dutch as a literary language in Flanders was the mission of the Flemish cultural hero Guido
Gezelle (1830-1899). Priest, teacher, and poet from Bruges, Gezelle demonstrated the lyric
qualities of his mother tongue and taught a generation of Flemish writers to take pride
expressing themselves in it.
Colonial Enterprises
The government of the Batavian Republic took over control of the assets of the corrupt and
poorly managed East India Company in 1798. The companys former territories, occupied by
the British during the Napoleonic Wars, reverted to the Netherlands in 1815 as colonial
possessions. The administration of Java, Sumatra, and the numerous island groups that
comprised the Dutch East Indies was harsh and exploitative. (The excesses of Dutch
colonialism in the East Indies were vividly described in the classic novel Max Havelaar
(1860) by Edward Douwes Dekker, who published under the penname Multatuli.) In 1830,
for example, the so-called culture system was imposed in an effort to graft an exportoriented agricultural economy on traditionally self-sufficient village communities. Land and
labor were commandeered to produce commodities coffee, sugar, indigo that were
delivered by farmers to the colonial government as taxes-in-kind for export to the
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Netherlands. The system was successful financially but disrupted social institutions and the
traditional economy. In 1870, it was abolished in favor of leasing large tracts of land to
Dutch and foreign investors. By the end of the 19th century, the Dutch government had
formally adopted an ethical policy that emphasized the Netherlands moral responsibility
of guardianship over the welfare of its colonial subjects. The reforms devised in and directed
from The Hague failed to meet the growing demands of Indonesian nationalists.
It is estimated that more than 300,000 West Africans were transported as slaves to Surinam
and the Netherlands Antilles from the arrival of the West India Company after 1621 until the
trade was ended in 1820. Slavery was not entirely abolished on the large plantations in
Surinam that produced coffee, cocoa, cotton, and sugar until 1863. The plantation economy
later depended on indentured labor brought from India. There was little development in
Surinam, which became a colony directly ruled by the Dutch government in 1815, outside
that which facilitated the production and export of plantation-based commodities. After the
turn of the century, the focus of the economy shifted away from the plantations to ricegrowing smallholders, many of them Javanese whose immigration continued until the onset
of World War II. The Netherlands Antilles comprised six Caribbean islands, the largest of
which, Curacao, had been taken from Spain in 1634. The Dutch islands, which had earlier
prospered from the slave trade, plantation-grown sugar, and smuggling, declined during the
19th century. Economic revival occurred only after 1918 with the opening of large refinery in
Curacao and, subsequently, in Aruba to handle crude from the Venezuelan oil fields.
Leopold II (1835-1909) determined that Belgium needed overseas colonies in order to
compete for raw materials and markets with other major European industrial powers. Unable
to engage the Belgian government in his colonial project, the king took a private initiative by
sponsoring the Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo, an agency for colonialism
cloaked as a scientific and philanthropic venture to explore and study a region that was still
largely a blank space on the map. Between 1879 and 1884, Leopolds agent, the explorer
Henry Stanley, concluded treaties with chiefs on the right bank of the Congo that gave the
committee sovereign status in the region. Congo Free State, established in the region by
another of Leopolds front organizations, the International Association of the Congo,
received international recognition, including from the United States, as an independent
sovereign state, a status confirmed at the Berlin Congress in 1885. Leopold extended the
borders of the Congo Free State to Katanga to block claims made there by Cecil Rhodes, but
he pledged to keep the region open to private traders from all countries. Local resistance was
absent, but Belgian-led mercenaries fought and won military campaigns against Arab slave
traders.
Leopold, who was a largely responsible for subsidizing the Congo Free State, soon appealed
to the Belgian government to assume some of the financial burden. A solution was found in
the regime domanial, a system by which land declared vacant by the free state became its
property and the rubber and ivory collected there by Africans drafted for compulsory labor
service became its property as well. This device netted Leopold and his associates enormous
revenues but ended private trade in the region that the king had agreed to at the Berlin
Congress.
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The excesses committed in Leopolds Congo Free State and the oppression of its people,
extreme even the standards of European colonialism in that day, would within a few years
enrage international opinion and embarrass Belgium. In 1902, an international congress
meeting in The Hague condemned the operation and demanded that the Belgian government
assume responsibility for the Congo, which was formally annexed as a colony of Belgium in
1908 as Belgian Congo. Free trade was reintroduced and the corporation, whose profits had
been available to Leopold to use at his own discretion, suppressed. Economic development
became largely the responsibility of private investment by large enterprises. During the first
quarter of the 20th century, Belgian Congo became one of the worlds leading sources of
copper and diamonds. Belgian colonial policy was characterized by a high degree of
administrative centralization and paternalism in dealing with subject peoples. Control was
entirely in the hands of the Belgian government, exercised through the colonial affairs
ministry in Brussels and responsible to the Belgian parliament.
Questions/Discussion
What were the social, economic, and political aims of liberalism in the Netherlands and
Belgium in the 19th century?
Trace the origins of the spiritual families in Belgium and the pillars in the Netherlands.
What were the effects of expanding suffrage on relative strength of the pillarized political
parties?
Discuss the importance of education as a political issue in the Netherlands and Belgium.
Explain Leopold IIs motives in sponsoring colonialism in Africa.
World War I
At the Hague Conference in 1904, the Dutch government took an initiative to establish a
multilateral regime in the form of an international court of justice capable of preventing a
European war. Both the Netherlands and Belgium were neutrals, the latters neutrality
guaranteed by treaty agreement with Britain and the other European powers. Dutch
neutrality, however, was not guaranteed, and the Dutch recognized that their country could
remain neutral in case of war only if all the great powers agreed to respect it. The
Netherlands had an ambiguous relationship with Germany. On the one hand, the Dutch were
fascinated with Germanys prestige and influenced by its culture. Anti-British sentiment was
also rife in the Netherlands as a result of the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa and sometimes
translated into sympathy for Britains European rival. On the other hand, there existed a
genuine fear of German intentions in the event of a European war. It was known, for
example, that German plans for an attack on France, the so-called Schlieffen Plan, initially
called for a swing through the southern Netherlands. Germany unilaterally proposed
neutral status for the Netherlands, but the Dutch would agree to a German guarantee only if
France ratified the agreement.
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In August 1914, Germany invaded Belgium without a declaration of war. Britain honored its
commitment under the 1839 guarantee of Belgian neutrality, referred to by the German
foreign minister a scrap of paper, and joined its allies, France and Russia, in a declaration
of war against Germany. The Belgian fortresses fell in the German onslaught and most of the
country, including Brussels and Antwerp, was occupied, but the Belgian army remained in
the field, under the command of King Albert I, and fought along side the Allies through the
war.
The German administration of occupied territory was repressive by the standards of the time.
A million Belgians fled as refugees, 700,000 to the Netherlands. Workers were deported and
industrial plants were dismantled and shipped to Germany. The Germans tried to exploit
differences between the Flemish and Walloon populations, largely without success, and
backed down in front of demonstrations in Brussels protesting their proposed division of the
country into separate zones of occupation. The Belgian people rallied behind the moral
leadership of Cardinal Mercier, whose outspoken opposition to German policies made him
the their spokesman. The population, however, was left destitute by the war and stalked by
starvation. The American Commission for Relief in Belgium, expended nearly $1 billion in
aid contributed to provide food and medical supplies in occupied territories, and its director,
Herbert Hoover, concluded agreements with both Britain and Germany to allow their
shipment and distribution to the needy Belgians.
Belgium was at the table with the victorious Allies at the Versailles Conference in 1919 but
was never included in the inner circle with the United States and the other great powers. In
compensation for the destruction inflicted on it during the war, Belgium was awarded
reparations from Germany. Adjustments were made to the Belgo-German border that ceded
Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium, which also received a mandate to Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda
and Burundi), former German colonies. Abandoning neutrality, Belgium entered into a
military cooperation pact with France.
When executed in 1914, the Schleiffen Plan was modified, the sweep of its right flank
tightened to enter Belgium just below the Dutch border. The Netherlands maintained its
neutrality but allowed Germany to use Dutch rail lines in Limburg to transport troops. The
Netherlands also had difficulties with the Allied blockade, which could not discriminate
between goods intended for its domestic market or for Germany on ships headed to Dutch
ports. When the Dutch granted asylum to the German Kaiser, Belgium requested the return of
Dutch Flanders and Limburg lost in the 17th century in compensation. The claim
remained outstanding through the 1930s. A treaty negotiated between Belgium and the
Netherlands in 1925 to open the Scheldt to Belgian traffic was rejected by the Dutch
parliament.
Luxembourg was occupied by the Germans from the opening days of the war until the
Armistice in November 1918. The next year, the grand-duchess Marie Adelaide, accused of
pro-German sentiments during the occupation, was compelled to abdicate in favor of her
sister Charlotte. In a referendum held in 1919 in response to a claim advanced by Belgium to
annex the grand-duchy, however, overwhelmingly expressed their desire to remain an
independent country under the House of Nassau-Weilburg. In 1922, Belgium and
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seemed to make elections irrelevant.. In election after election, the Catholics took 30% of the
vote, the two Protestant parties divided 25%, and the Social Democrats also won 25%, while
the fragmented Liberals and minor parties collected the remainder. The Protestant parties
were split and found it impossible to work with the Social Democrats, and the Catholics were
never comfortable cooperating with the Liberals. The Social Democrats entered the Dutch
government for the first time on the eve of war in August 1939.
The Great Depression hit Belgium and the Netherlands very hard. Unemployment in both
countries in 1934 reached 40%. Social insurance programs introduced during the 1920s acted
as a buffer and provided some relief, but authoritarian solutions found advocates, even within
mainstream democratic parties of the left and right. The Communists had very little support
in Belgium and seldom attracted more than 2% of the vote in Netherlands, in both countries a
testimony to the strength of the democratic socialist and confessional trade union
movements. Flemish nationalists, who, in 1939, won nearly 20% of the vote in Flanders,
flirted with fascism but focused on promoting Flemishness.
Leon Degrelles Rexist party was francophone and fascist but portrayed itself as a Belgian
rather than a regionalist movement. Opposed by the Church, Degrelles attempts at an
alliance with Flemish nationalists failed as did Rexist efforts to win support at the polls. In
the Netherlands, Anton Musserts National Socialists overtly emulated Hitlers Nazis. Its
candidates received 8% of the vote in local elections in 1935, the same result achieved by the
Communists. The Dutch Nazis were thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the electorate,
however, when it became obvious that Germany was rearming and posed a threat to the
Netherlands.
World War II
Belgium and the Netherlands put trust in the efforts of the League of Nations to prevent war.
Both countries cooperated in implementing proposals for disarmament, less enthusiastically
with sanctions imposed by the League. Their democratic governments eyed with suspicion
the challenge to democracy posed by Communists and domestic fascists and with growing
concern rearmament by Nazi Germany. The Netherlands, ruler of an Asian empire, also
confronted a threat posed by Japanese expansionist policies. While the Netherlands clung to a
policy of traditional neutrality, Belgium, in 1936, repudiated its military cooperation pact
with France and returned to neutrality for fear of being dragged in to a new European
conflict. Belgium protested extension of the Maginot Line opposite its border as a
provocation to Germany that would compromise its neutral status.
On May 11, 1940, Germany invaded the three Low Countries. The Netherlands fell after five
days of fighting and the bombing of Rotterdam. The royal family fled into in exile in
England where Queen Wilhelmina appointed a Dutch government-in-exile. Her prime
minister D.J. de Geer was removed from office in September, however, when it became
known that he had attempted to negotiate a truce between Britain and Germany. His
replacement Pieter Gerbrandy served throughout the war as head of the exiled government
and also formed the first postwar Dutch government.
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Belgium held out for 18 days during which its armed forces suffered 20,000 casualties.
Leopold III refused to abandon his troops in the field and, after Belgiums capitulation, was
held in Germany until the end of the war as a hostage for the good behavior of his subjects.
The king successfully negotiated the release of Belgian prisoners-of-war but was accused of
collaborating more than was necessary to accommodate German demands. Socialist leader
Achille van Acker formed a government-in-exile in London. The Allies obtained access to
crucially important supplies of rubber and, eventually, uranium from the Belgian Congo.
The German occupation of the Low Countries during World War II was extremely
repressive. Food shortages were severe and unrelieved. Labor conscription was imposed and
workers transported to Germany. Luxembourg was annexed to the Reich and its citizens
drafted to serve in the German army. Collaboration was significant in some segments of the
population, including Flemish nationalists and the fascist followers of Mussert and Degrelle.
Local Nazis were placed in positions of authority, trade unions dissolved, and the economies
of the three countries integrated with Germanys. Several thousand volunteers were recruited
for Dutch and Belgian SS units. Thousands in the three countries were arrested and sent to
concentration camps, where many died. Nine out of ten Dutch Jews perished in the
Holocaust, and only 20,000 out of 90,000 Belgian Jews survived it.
Resistance movements were active from the start of the Nazi occupation and were
increasingly effective in aiding the Allied war effort as the war continued. Dutch and Belgian
units served with Allied forces throughout the war, and Dutch merchant ships sailed in Allied
convoys. General strikes protesting the deportation of Dutch Jews and the retention of Dutch
prisoners-of-war shut down the Netherlands in 1941 and 1943 were of symbolic value
although ineffective in influencing German actions. A strike made at great risk by Dutch
railway workers in 1944, however, slowed shipment of supplies and reinforcements to
German forces during the Allied offensive in the Netherlands. The Low Countries were the
theatre for heavy fighting in the last nine months of the war. Allied forces crossed into
Belgium in September 1944. Operation Market-Garden, the failed attempt to open an early
bridgehead into Germany, was conducted in the Arnheim-Nijmegen area in November, and
the German offensive in the Ardennes region of Luxembourg and Belgium was halted during
the Battle of Bulge in December 1944-January 1945. The Allies bombed targets in the Low
Countries, and, late in the war, German V-bombs wrecked destruction on Antwerp. The
Allied drive into Germany bypassed part of the Netherlands, which remained under German
occupation until the end of the European war in May.
In December 1941, Japanese forces attacked the Dutch East Indies, which had been an
important supplier of oil to Japan until an embargo was imposed earlier that year, defeated
the Dutch naval units in the Java Sea, and completed their conquest of the islands by early
spring 1942. No significant local resistance was made to the occupation, and Indonesian
nationalists cooperated with the Japanese. Dutch civilians in the East Indies were imprisoned
under harsh conditions for the duration of the war.
Questions/Discussion
Argue the case for and against the return of Leopold III after World War II.
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In 1952, they joined France, Germany, and Italy in the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), the first of the European Communities intended to eliminate all barriers to trade in
those products. The foreign ministers of ECSC member countries met under Spaaks
chairmanship in Messina in 1955 to consider an extension of economic integration. Their
negotiations resulted in the Rome Treaties establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC, commonly referred to as the Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) that entered into force in 1958. Spaak is regarded as having been
instrumental in locating the headquarters for the several communities in his countrys capital,
Brussels. (See European Union)
Although the pillars remained in tact, Dutch political parties realigned after the war and
postwar politics became more fluid than had been the case in the interwar period. The Labor
Party (PvdA) replaced the prewar Social Democratic party. More moderate than its
predecessor, the PvdA, won recruits from the ranks of left-wing social liberals and some
Protestant and Catholic progressives, while retraining its base in the socialist trade union
movement. The defection of the social liberals allowed the competing prewar Liberal State
and Liberal Democratic parties to merge in the center-right Peoples Party for Freedom and
Democracy (VVD).
Postwar politics in Luxembourg returned to its prewar three-party pattern liberals to the
right, socialists to the left, and broadly based Christian democrats occupying the center of the
spectrum similar to that in Belgium and typical of the Low Countries. The Communists,
however, had a relatively larger base of support in Luxembourg than in either Belgium or the
Netherlands. Governments were formed either by the Christian Social Peoples Party alone
or by the Social Christians in coalition with the liberal Democratic Party. The pattern was
broken only in 1974 when the Social Christians were defeated in elections and, for the first
time since 1919, were out of government. The Social Christians regained power in 1979 and
have led every government since that date. Pierre Werner was prime minister from 1959 to
1984, except for that four-year interval. When Werner stepped down, he was succeeded by
Jacques Santer, who remained prime minister, leading a Social Christian-Socialist coalition
government, until his appointment as president of the European Commission in 1995.
In Belgium, the Catholic party, dominant since 1884, was re-founded in 1945 as the Social
Christian Party, which described itself as a conservative party in the Christian democratic
tradition rather than as a specifically Catholic party that maintained formal ties to the
Church. The Social Christians also enlisted individual members rather than, as the old party
had, counting any member of a Catholic organization as automatically a party member. The
Belgian Workers Party was reorganized as the Socialist Party, still strongly anticlerical and
having its strongest backing in Wallonia. The Freedom and Progress Party succeeded the
prewar Liberal Party. In the late 1940s, the three spiritual families commanded the support
of 90% of the electorate. The Flemish nationalist movement, discredited by real and alleged
collaboration with the Nazis, was revived only in 1960s by the moderate Peoples Union
(VU).
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In all three countries, measures were taken after 1945 to prosecute collaborators and war
profiteers. In Belgium, it was calculated that a bare 2% of the population had been active
collaborators, but 75% of the 77,000 brought to trial were Flemish. Arthur Seyss-Inquart,
Hitlers notorious Reichskommissar in the Netherlands, was arrested, found guilty by a Dutch
court of war crimes, and executed. It took some time to disarm former resistance fighters,
many of whom were Communists who had joined the resistance after Germany invaded the
Soviet Union in 1941 and who kept their weapons after the liberation.
Compulsory military service was reestablished to build up armed forces that were reequipped
in large part by the United States after 1949 to fulfill their NATO responsibilities. Dutch and
Belgian units served under UN command during Korean War. Dutch troops were also
deployed to suppress the nationalists and to reassert Dutch rule in Indonesia, where the
nationalists, led by Sukarno, had proclaimed independence for Indonesia in 1945 and
established effective control in Java and Sumatra. The Dutch government proposed creation
of a decentralized United States of Indonesia, comprised of 15 states, in partnership with
the Netherlands. The nationalists conducted partisan warfare that Dutch forces were unable
to contain on the main islands. Under pressure from the UN and the United States, the Dutch,
in 1949, conceded sovereignty to a federal Indonesia in union with the Netherlands and
withdrew Dutch and colonial troops. In 1954, Sukarno absorbed the federated states into the
unitary Republic of Indonesia and unilaterally dissolved the union.
Questions/Discussion
Assess the importance of the U.S. role in the economic reconstruction of Belgium and the
Netherlands in the immediate postwar period. Compare the economic situations of the two
countries.
The Benelux Three took leading roles in the process of European integration. Explain why
they were ideally suited to that task.
Dutch Politics, 1945-2002
The socialist PvdA and the Catholic Peoples Party (KVP) won the largest share of the vote,
about 30% each, in the four general elections held in the Netherlands between 1946 and
1956. Although together the three major confessional parties, Catholic and Protestant,
received half the vote, governments formed during the period were either left-center PvdAKVP coalitions led by a Labor prime minister, Willem Drees, or center-left KVP-PvdA
coalitions headed by a Catholic prime minister, Louis Beel. These governments gradually
expanded the welfare state and the role of the public sector in the economy.
A shift in coalition alignment occurred in 1959 when the KVP and PvdA broke on the issue
of wage policy. While Labor backed higher pay hikes to meet inflation, the KVP argued that
the increases themselves would spur inflation. Between 1959 and 1965, Catholic prime
ministers led broad center-right coalition governments that included KVP together with the
Protestant Anti-Revolutionaries (ARP) and Christian Historicals (CHU), sometimes joined
by the VVD. The Catholic-Labor coalition was revived in 1965, but the government it
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produced was short-lived, collapsing the following year when the KVP rejected PvdA
demands for budget-busting increases in public expenditures.
The late 1960s was a watershed in Dutch politics. Typical of the political environment in
much of Europe in that era, its center of gravity shifted to the left, and the PvdA, in
particular, was radicalized in keeping with the times. Hans van Mierlo founded a new party,
Democrats 66 (D66), that appealed immediately to a young and better-educated, social liberal
constituency. Van Mierlo argued persuasively that the traditional pillars no longer
represented social, economic, and political realities in the country. At the same time, the
decline in support for the confessional parties that claimed to represent the Catholic and
Protestant pillars mirrored the sharp decline in church attendance and formal affiliation with
the churches. Likewise, the secular parties seemed no longer hostile or posed a threat to
religious institutions, and they made gains at the expense of the confessional parties as
Catholics and Protestants voted their various social and economic interests rather than
support their pillars.
Twenty-four parties presented lists in the 1967 general election, 12 of which won seats in the
Second Chamber under the Netherlands no-threshold system of proportional representation.
Although both parties lost seats, the KVP and PvdA, retaining 79 seats out of 150 between
them, remained, by far, the largest parties. Catholic Piet de Jong formed a center-right
coalition government that included his party, ARP, CHU, and VVD. As support for the three
main confessional parties continued to diminish, they formed an electoral alliance, the
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), that presented candidates on a common list in the 1972
election. The alliance parties joined the PvdA, D66, and small leftist parties under Labor
prime minister Joop den Uyl in a left-center coalition government. CDA cooperation with the
left floundered in 1977 over the issue of land ownership and property taxes. CDA leader
Andries van Agt would have preferred to continue in coalition with the PvdA but was
rebuffed and agreed instead to lead a center-right coalition with the VVD. The relationship
was a rocky one. The VVD demanded spending cuts opposed by the CDA, and the CDA
resisted tax cuts proposed by the VVD.
The parties of the CDA formally merged as a united party in 1980 in anticipation of elections
the next year. Despite or, perhaps, because of gains made by the VVD in 1981, the CDA
and PvdA put aside deep differences between their leaders to form the next government. But
disagreement between the coalition partners on economic policy, employment schemes,
taxation, defense spending, and cruise missile deployment quickly eroded any spirit of
cooperation that may have existed, and the government fell within six weeks of its formation.
It was succeeded by a CDA-VVD coalition, led by Rudd Lubbers, that governed the
Netherlands ably for next eight years. Lubbers was a young and attractive political leader, the
Jesuit-educated son of a wealthy Rotterdam family, who had risen quickly through the
hierarchy of the old KVP. His center-right government introduced tax reforms and marketoriented economic programs that were tune with the Reagan-Thatcher decade, but
compromises made in these areas by factions within the governing parties and divided
personal loyalties placed strains on the coalition.
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In 1988, after long and difficult negotiations between the two government parties and
between the government and the two parliamentary parties that required trade-offs by all
sides, the government introduced a budget that made drastic reductions in spending for social
entitlements to compensate for lowering taxes. However, the government significantly
altered the enabling legislation in deference to opposition from the opposition PvdA, which,
as the largest single party in the Second Chamber, held the largest number of seats on
parliamentary committees. VVD members of parliament, who had been elected on a platform
of welfare-state and tax reform, were outraged and felt betrayed by the government that they
had supported and, especially, by the VVD members of that government.
The plot thickened the next year when environmental legislation that had been initiated by
the VVD and had been a long time in preparation was introduced. The bill, consented to by
VVD ministers in the government, included increased tax-at-pump on fuel. The VVD had
carefully cultivated a green image, but VVD members of parliament had also campaigned
on a platform in the last election that committed them not to agree to any new taxes. Finding
the bills revenue provisions unacceptable, they voted as a bloc against the bill and, in effect,
brought down the government in which their party participated.
In the general election that followed in 1990, the VVD gained seats but was left out of the
next government. Lubbers succeeded in forming a CDA-PvdA coalition government,
although both parties had lost seats. The CDA and PvdA suffered severe losses in local
elections and, in the 1994 general election, were both clearly the losers, dropping 20 and 12
seats respectively. The PvdA slumped to 25% of the vote, the CDA to only 23%, together a
loss of 40% of the votes received in the previous election. The CDA, reduced to 34 seats in
the Second Chamber, was disregarded as a candidate for participation in the next
government. Wim Kok, the moderate and very pragmatic leader of the PvdA, whose party
was the second biggest loser in election, cobbled together, after three-months negotiations, a
new government together with the two winners, the VVD and D66. The former had gained
nine additional seats with 20% of the vote, the latter had picked up 12 with 16%. Hans van
Mierlo, the founder of D66 who had campaigned to move Dutch politics beyond
pillarization, was appointed foreign minister, entering the first government in more than 75
years to be formed without participation by a confessional party.
The CDA was tired, and the electorate was tired of the CDA. Lubbers had stepped down
before the election from the leadership of the party that had been considered indispensable to
forming any government, replaced by Eeclo Brinkman, who was colorless and not well
known. Many of the partys traditional constituency shifted their support in 1994 to the
VVD, D66, or to the small, conservative Protestant parties. Among them, many elderly
voters were lost when the CDA proposed reductions in pensions. Enthusiasm for its issues
for example, advocacy of family values -- had faded, and the party conceded to legislation
further legitimizing euthanasia, drug use, abortion, gay rights, and different interpretations of
family. To some observers, it appeared that the idea of Christian democracy as distinct
from the socialist left and the liberal right was dead in the water.
The Lubbers government had decided to send Dutch troops to take part in the UNs
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Perceived as a commitment to defend human rights in a
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war-torn corner of Europe, the decision was backed by very broad parliamentary approval.
The Dutch military command was, at the time, reluctant to undertake the mission, but, in
September 1994, on the Kok governments watch, a 400-man battalion was deployed to
Srebrenica, a UN-designated safe area. The unit was poorly trained and equipped to
maintain a peace that did not, in fact, exist. Later the next year, shortly before it was
scheduled to pull out, the Dutch garrison tasked to protect the citys Muslim population was,
in effect, taken hostage by the large, well-armed Serb force besieging Srebrenica that then
proceeded to massacre more than 7000 of those who had sought refuge there. Amidst
recriminations within the defense ministry and armed forces, investigations were
immediately launched to determine responsibility for the tragedy. A parliamentary
commission concluded subsequently that the Netherlands bore responsibility for the events
surrounding the fall of Srebrenica. Dutch politicians, it found, had failed in their
responsibilities by dispatching a force inadequately prepared and supported for the mission
assigned to it in Bosnia. Dutch military commanders were also signaled out for criticism of
their conduct of the operation. No blame was attached to the soldiers of the Dutch battalion.
The two larger coalition partners, the PvdA and VVD, gained eight and seven seats
respectively in the 1998 general election, more than off-setting D66 losses. Koks
government coalition had a comfortable parliamentary majority and won a clear mandate to
continue in office. The Green Left doubled its share of the vote, but the VVD, which had a
strong green plank in its own platform, vetoed its suggested participation in the
government. It was clear during the campaign that the CDA did not want to take part in
government, and its leader Jaap de Hoop Scheffer admitted that the party was not ready to
return to office. The CDA managed to win only 18% of the vote, the total vote for
confessional parties barely reaching 25%. The secular center-right received 35%, the socialist
and green left 40%.
Kok formed a new PvdA-VVD-D66 government in only three days of bargaining. Frits
Bolkestein, always considered too Anglo-Saxon and insufficiently European, was
gradually eased out as VVD leader into active exile as an EU commissioner and was
replaced by Hans Dijkstal, a less argumentative figure who enjoyed better relations with Kok
than his predecessor. Van Mierlo resigned from the government and party leadership because
of ill-health and was succeeded by Thom de Graaf. Kok II won high marks for its skillful
handling of the economy.
D66, which had attracted under 10% of the vote in the last election, introduced legislation to
adopt direct democracy in the form of initiatives, compulsory referenda, and recalls to veto
acts of parliament, a long-standing objective of the party that van Mierlo had founded to
decentralize authority in the Netherlands. The VVD had also signed on to the project in the
two parties joint platform in 1998. The measure was accepted in the Second Chamber, but it
was resisted in the First Chamber by a handful of VVD members and was defeated there by a
single vote that deprived it of the two-thirds required for passage of a constitutional
amendment. As a result, in May 1999, D66 withdrew from the government. Kok remained in
office at the head of a PvdA-VVD caretaker government, planned for a new election in the
autumn, but also kept open consultations with D66. A compromise was worked out that
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allowed for enactment of legislation providing for non-binding consultative referenda, and
D66 reentered the government.
In April 2002, only a month before the scheduled general election, the Kok government
suddenly resigned. The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, an academic research
organization that it had tasked seven years earlier to investigate the conduct of the Srebrenica
operation, had issued a report running into several thousand pages that detailed the flawed
political decisions and military planning that had contributed to the disaster in Bosnia. The
report sparked an acrimonious argument among ministers, many of whom were also in the
cabinet in 1995, who denied or allocated blame. Jan Pronk, PvdA environment minister who
had been minister for overseas development in 1995 and not directly involved in decisions
bearing on Srebrenica, assumed a share of the blame as having been part of the government,
and he resigned. Kok argued that the resignation of one minister unilaterally implicated the
whole government collectively. The Kok government remained as a caretaker until a new
government could be named after the May 2002 general election, but Kok himself stepped
down as party leader and PvdA standard-bearer in the election in favor of Ad Melkert.
The 2002 election campaign focused on immigration and the integration of immigrants into
Dutch society, questions of growing concern to the public that Dutch politicians had been
reluctant to confront in the past. In a few months, Pym Fortuyn, a journalist and media
personality, played on that concern to transform the local populist party, Liveable Rotterdam,
that he founded to contest city elections into a national personalist party, List Pym Fortuyn
(LPF), arguing that non-European immigrants threatened the liberal Dutch social values and
cultural norms. Other parties scrambled to pick up on an issue that had struck a sensitive
nerve in the country. Little more than a week before the May 15 vote, Fortuyn was
assassinated ( the first political assassination in the Netherlands since Johan de Witt was
lynched by a mob in 1672.) To Fortuyns popular appeal across the country was now added a
sympathy factor for the LPF after his death.
What followed on election day was a veritable earthquake in Dutch political history. With
nearly 80% of the potential electorate voting, the LPF emerged as the second largest party,
coming from nowhere to capture 17% of the vote and 26 seats in the Second Chamber. The
CDA bounced back remarkably to reclaim by a large margin its position, lost in 1994, as the
largest party, winning 28% of the vote that gave the party 43 seats. The government parties
were devastated: The PvdA, VVD, and D66 lost half of the vote they had received in 1998,
together garnering less than a 36% share. The LPF carried constituencies as diverse as the
Rotterdam-Schiedam area, The Hague, Dordrecht, the Amsterdam-Haarlem area, Breda,
Zwolle, and Flevoland. The PvdA kept constituencies in Amsertdam, Utrecht, and in
Friesland and Groningen. Otherwise, the CDA prevailed most other constituencies across the
Netherlands. Part of the CDAs success was attributed to a conservative backlash against the
previous governments permissive social policies. The CDA won back voters lost earlier to
the VVD, while the LPF profited from defections among traditional PvdA voters, especially
in working-class sections of Rotterdam.
CDA leader Jan Peter Balkenende was tapped to form a new government, coalition crafted
through quiet consensus with the VVD to include the leaderless LPF that took office in
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July. While the government ignored most of the LPFs more radical legislative proposals, it
quickly introduced popular measures to restrict immigration and to require Dutch language
training for those applying for residence in the country. Balkenende, a Protestant who had
worked earlier in his career for a Christian radio network, had opposed legislation loosening
regulations on euthanasia and drug use and, during the campaign, had adopted a tough line
on immigration. Dijkstal and Gerrit Zalm, the highly regarded finance minister in the
previous government, retained positions in the new government. The LPF was a one-man
band now led by incompetent nonentities who began to quarrel among themselves and with
other members of the government no sooner than it had been formed. There was no certainty
that the LPFs parliamentary party would be disciplined enough to vote as a bloc, and some
wondered if Fortuyn himself, a maverick by nature, would have wanted to be in government
if he had lived. The spirit of a dead man, it was remarked, was hardly a sound manifesto
for a political party. Peter Langendam, an LPF minister, embarrassed the government when
he accused the left of being responsible for Fortuyns murder. Another LPF minister left
office. The antics of the LPF in government cost it dearly in public opinion polls. Most
analysts had given the unlikely three-party coalition no more than two years in office. That
estimate proved to be optimistic. By October, Balkenende had reached the limits of his
tolerance for the LPF. Regarding it as no longer workable, and tendered his governments
resignation to Queen Beatrix. A general election was set for January 22, 2003.
Belgian Politics, 1945-2002
In the first five years after the end of World War II, Belgium was governed by a grand
coalition of the parties of the spiritual families, Socialist-led under Achille van Acker. The
state assumed close oversight of the economy, and the groundwork was laid for the welfare
state with enactment of the Social Pact. Voting rights were extended in 1948 to women to the
evident advantage of the Social Christians, who governed alone from 1950 to 1954. With the
exception of the years 1954-1958 and one brief period in the 1960s, leadership of Belgian
governments, formed in varying coalitions with Liberals, Socialists, and linguistic parties
would remain in the hands Social Christians until 1999 under a succession of Flemish prime
ministers among them Leo Tindemans, Gaston and Marc Eyskens, Wilfrid Martens, and
Jean-Luc Dehaene. In election after election, the Social Christians and Socialists each
received over 30% of the vote, the Liberals averaging 20%.
Belgium experienced a reorientation of its economy as postwar industrial growth was
focused on Flanders. Easy access to the reopened port of Antwerp and a willing work force
attracted private investment from abroad for new industries. Meanwhile, traditional heavy
industry in Wallonia was becoming increasingly redundant, the victim of worn-out plant
facilities, mines that were too expensive to operate profitably, and labor unrest. Flanders soon
outstripped Wallonia in output and tax revenue produced as the region already had in
population. For the Flemish, the policy of equalization of public investment in the two
regions meant throwing taxes raised in Flanders down a dark hole to subsidize inefficient
industries in Wallonia. For Walloons, selfish Flemish arguments about efficiency and cost
effectiveness meant the destruction of Wallonias industrial job base. The debate split the
spiritual families along linguistic lines.
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Divisions between the two regions and their respective linguistic communities were also
reflected in the debate over the royal question. Leopold III, who had chosen to remain with
his troops rather than flee into exile in 1940, had been kept by the Germans first under house
arrest at Laeken, the royal residence, then to the castle at Sigmaringen, where he spent of the
war years, and, finally, to Austria, where the king was liberated by American forces. Not
allowed by Prime Minister van Acker to return home, Leopold stayed an exile in
Switzerland. His brother, Prince Charles, was named regent in Belgium. Those opposing
Leopolds return, including Socialist leaders van Acker and Paul-Henri Spaak, charged that
the kings authority had been compromised by his alleged collaboration with the Germans.
The Socialists were joined in their opposition by the Liberals and the Communists, who had
won 10% of the vote in first postwar election, and by a majority of public opinion in
Wallonia and Brussels. The Social Christians and a majority of Flemish public opinion
favored the kings return. It was not uncommon for Walloons to denounce the Flemish
generally as well as the king as collaborators. The debate was limited, however, to discussion
of Leopolds personal qualifications to be king and not at least, by most of his opponents -of the future of the monarchy.
A referendum was held in 1949 on the issue whether or not Leopold would return to Belgium
and continue to reign as King of the Belgians. Leopold, whose cause was not helped by his
abrasive personality, claimed he would feel justified in returning if the yes vote was 55%.
Spaak set the figure acceptable for receiving him back at 67%. The results showed 57.68% of
the country favoring the kings return, but there was a great and telling disparity between the
vote in the two regions and in Brussels that underscored divisions between Walloons and the
Flemish that were even more striking that the division among the spiritual families. While
72% of voters in Flanders called for Leopolds reinstatement, it was opposed by 58% in
Wallonia and 52% in Brussels. Admitting that it was the mission of the monarchy to provide
the symbol behind which the nation could unite, Leopold left it to the parliament to interpret
the will of the Belgian as expressed in the referendum. In 1950, he abdicated, making way
for his son Baudouin (Boudewijn) succeed him when he came of age the following year.
In 1952, parliament enacted an education reform proposed by the Social Christian
government that formally recognized a system of Church-run free schools that received
state support with few restrictions attached and operated parallel to the secularized state
school system in which religious education was prohibited. In 1954, the new SocialistLiberal government overturned the reform. The Socialists argued bluntly that the working
class was not sufficiently sophisticated to be conscious of its socio-economic status because
of the primacy of religion in the lives of many of them and that Church-run schools had been
the principal means of pulling the working class into the Catholic pillar. Revocation of the
education reform was, therefore, a means of attacking the oppositions political base.
Catholics protested the move in massive, well-organized rallies across the country that drew
hundreds of thousands participants. In 1958, the Social Christian-Liberal government won
passage of the compromise School Pact that introduced a market solution to funding
education. Schools, whether secular or religious, were thereafter funded according to the
number of students enrolled in them. The School Pact was a clear victory for Catholics over
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the secular parties and demonstrated the tremendous ability of the Church and its political
allies to mobilize public support.
The Belgian Congo was ruled by a highly centralized administration directed from Brussels.
Despite the introduction of elected municipal councils in 1957, demands for a greater
measure of local self-government were largely ignored. Protest against the slow pace of
change by political groups, based on ethnic ties, exploded when French colonies were
granted independence in 1958. In January 1959, Patrice Lumumba, leader of one of those
groups, the National Congolese Movement, openly called for independence amid violence
that broke out in Leopoldville. One year passed before the Belgian government called a
conference of leaders of rival groups in Brussels later to consider the future direction of the
colony. Under pressure from Congolese leaders, the government and conferees agreed to set
June 30, 1960 as the date for independence. The Independent Congo Republic was
proclaimed as scheduled, but conditions there rapidly disintegrated as rival leaders and
regional separatists struggled for control. A multilateral peacekeeping force was dispatched
by the UN Security Council as Belgian armed forces and settlers were withdrawn. The
colonial episode in Belgian history ended finally in 1962 when Ruanda-Urundi became
independent as the countries of Rwanda and Burundi.
In 1960, Gaston Eyskens center-right Social Christian-Liberal government introduced an
austerity budget package, or loi unique (single law), authorizing tax increases and decreased
public expenditures for social programs, as well as cuts in subsidies to the coal mines in
Wallonia. The package also included a five-year plan for industrial expansion that called for
greater labor flexibility. The Socialist trade union in Wallonia called a general strike to
protest the loi inique (evil law), and appealed to the Flemish unions to support the
action. The Catholic trade union, which accounted for more than half the union membership
in Flanders, refused to cooperate, and the strike failed, after a two-month work stoppage, to
win concessions from the government.
Walloon trade unionists saw the Flemish refusal as a betrayal of working-class interests, but
the issue developed into one less concerned with labor policy or the class struggle than with
rival regionalisms. Socialist labor leaders demanded the division of Belgium and autonomy
for their region, arguing that francophone Belgians could no longer trust an existing political
system in which clerical, conservative Flanders can impose its will on socialist, progressive
Wallonia. Their protests contributed directly to the creation of regionalist political parties in
Wallonia and in the Brussels area committed to protect and to promote francophone interests.
The francophone parties picked up the argument for a federal Belgium that had already been
advanced from the Flemish side by the Peoples Union.
In 1961, a Social Christian-Socialist coalition government came to office committed to
reconciling differences between the two language communities and to solving the riddle of
Brussels a predominantly French-speaking city whose suburbs were expanding into the
Dutch-speaking areas that surrounded it. In 1963, a revised language border and a bilingual
solution for Brussels and its suburbs was presented for parliamentary approval. One purpose
of both moves was to limit the further spread of francophone Brussels. The fixing of a
linguistic frontier brought complaints from both French- and Dutch-speaking localities that
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now found themselves of the wrong side of the border. Much publicized among these was
the French-speaking town of Fourons (Flemish, Voerens) that was transferred from the
Walloon province of Liege to the Flemish province of Limburg when the border was
adjusted. The political response to these efforts was the defeat of the government parties in
the 1965 general election and substantial gains for the regionalist parties that indicated the
radicalization of voters in both regions on the language issue.
Simmering tensions between French-speaking and Dutch-speaking faculties and students at
the Catholic University of Louvain (Leuven), located in the Flemish part of Brabant, boiled
over in 1968 in acrimonious campus demonstrations that turned to violence. (A pontifical
university established in 1425, it was the oldest institution of higher learning in the Low
Countries.) In effect, the francophone faculties were expelled from the university by their
Flemish colleagues. A decision was made reluctantly by the Church hierarchy and approved
by the government to recognize the separation, to divide the universitys assets, including is
million-volume library, and to establish two new and distinct universities, Leuven, a Flemish
university that retained the facilities in that city, and New Louvain, a francophone
university located nearby but across the linguistic frontier in the Walloon part of Brabant.
Both claimed 1425 as their date of founding.
Nineteen sixty-eight was a turning point in Belgian politics. Bad feeling between French- and
Dutch-speakers within the ruling Social Christian Party over the Louvain/Leuven affair
forced the resignation of the government. The regionalist parties were further strengthened in
the election that followed. A four-month cabinet crisis ensued before Gaston Esykens was
able to patch together a new government composed of divided Social Christians and the
Socialists. Seven more governments would be formed in the next 12 years, and all fell as a
direct result of disagreements over the language question. Provoked by the university crisis
as well as differences over the platform in the general election, the Social Christian Party also
split in two in 1968, and there would be thereafter two entirely separate Christian democratic
parties, the Flemish CVP and the Walloon PSC. In 1972, the Liberals similarly shattered in
three, separate parties being formed in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels, and the Socialists in
1978 broke along linguistic lines. The constellation of parties representing the spiritual
families Catholic, liberal, and socialist now numbered seven, each of which would
bargain separately for inclusion in government. The possibilities for including parties outside
the spiritual families broadened to include regionalist parties, and the Communists were
left as Belgiums only bilingual party. The cabinet was divided equally between Walloons
and Flemish, overlapping party affiliations, and dual ministries established, a practice
formalized in the constitution in 1971.
That same year a giant step was taken toward devolution of responsibilities from the national
government to sub-national authorities. A constitutional reform recognized three cultural
communities -- French, Dutch, and German each of which had executive and legislative
councils (elective after 1984) responsible for education, culture, and other language-related
policies. The revisions to the constitution were a statement of intent indicating the direction
that future reforms would take.
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collapsed after four days in September 1991. Walloon ministers threatened to block a
telecommunication contract for Flemish companies unless Flemish ministers approved use of
proceeds from television licenses to increase pay for francophone teachers in Wallonia, who
were out on strike and whose pay raise had been blocked in parliament by the Flemish parties
because an equivalent raise had not been asked for teachers in Flanders. Such was the state of
relations between Flemish and Walloon ministers that the one would not talk to Walloon
journalists and the other refused to appear on television with Flemish colleagues. The king
refused to accept Martens resignation because of the impossibility of forming a new
government and asked him to carry on as a caretaker until the next general election.
The total Social Christian share of the vote in 1992 dropped six points to 25% nationally, the
lowest since the modern party system based on the spiritual families had developed.
Martens was personally discredited in the CVP because he conceded too much to the PSC,
which won less than 7% of the vote. The Walloon Socialists were secure in their region
despite the reaction to corruption in the party leadership, but both socialist parties
campaigned on platforms that were more nationalistic and, therefore, more divergent than in
earlier elections. The salient issue was neither devolution nor unemployment but concern
about immigration by non-Europeans to Belgium. The xenophobic Flemish Bloc (VB),
whose motto was Fight Back, overtook the moderate VU in Flanders, while even the
Walloon Liberals campaigned to Stop the Invasion. But the election campaign was marked
by indifference and disenchantment with the established parties. Twenty-five percent of
voters were undecided only three days before the election. One consequence of voter
apathy and, perhaps, a vote-for-Mickey-Mouse reaction to compulsory voting was the
election of four candidates from the Van Rossem List, a personalist slate put up by a wealthy
heroin addict, seeking parliamentary immunity from conviction on a narcotics indictment,
who campaigned to abolish marriage and the monarchy and to legalize drugs.
Jean-Luc Dehaene succeeded Martens, whose protg he had been, as leader of the CVP. He
was credited with having held the party together in 1987 but had stepped aside then for
Martens. Dehaene had risen through the ranks of the Catholic trade union movement in
Flanders and was regarded, depending on the task, as the CVPs carthorse or its
bulldozer. With reluctance, Dehaene agreed to form a four-party government of losers
with the Social Christian and Socialists that was short of the two-thirds majority required to
initiate constitutional reform. Supported by the Liberals and Greens, Dehaene pushed
through approval of revisions to the constitution in 1993 based on the St Michel Agreement
that provided for reform of the national legislature and the five-tier solution to the questions
of devolution and language policy envisioned earlier in the Egmont Pact. Equalization of
funding to the regions was ended. Regional debt was absorbed for one time by the national
government, allowing regional governments to start business with a clean slate. Subsequent
funding would be on the basis of tax revenues received from the regions and of outstanding
need.
In 1993, King Baudouin died suddenly while on holiday in Spain. Often called the only
Belgian and whose image transcended regional and linguistic differences in his realm, the
passing of a beloved king was deeply mourned by his subjects. Baudouin was succeeded by
his brother Albert.
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Approval of the state reform as far as it went was confirmed in the 1995 general election.
Dehaene formed a multi-party coalition that included Social Christians and Liberals. Guy
Verhofstadt, leader of the Flemish Liberals who had been budget minister in the last Martens
government, was named deputy prime minister. The government was forced to confront a
public debt equal to 135% of GDP and demands from the regions, which started with a clean
slate but were running up their own debt, and, particularly, from Wallonia for assistance for
health and education.
Debt reduction was impressive but failed to lower ratio below 100%. Efforts were made to
fine tune the state reform and, especially, to clarify relationships among the five tiers of
government.
The 1999 general election was viewed as a turning point in Belgian political history. The
results were close, but, for the first time in the 20th century, the Liberals outpolled the party
representing the Christian pillar in Flanders, the former winning 14.3% of the vote and CVP
14.1%. The Socialist and regionalist parties lost votes as well as did the Social Christians,
who were excluded both from the national and the regional governments, all now led by
Liberals. Verhofstadt formed a six-party government that included Flemish and Walloon
Liberals, Socialists, and Greens and provided a comfortable parliamentary majority.
Political allegiances were seen as being in transition, and adherence to a spiritual family
could no longer be taken granted. Voters had become pragmatic and unpredictable. A large
floating vote had emerged, and observers anticipated that voting patterns were likely to
change from election to election in future. Furthermore, the leadership of the CVP, longer
regarded as the natural party of government in Belgium, was exhausted. In the months
following the elections, political parties splintered, merged, attempted to rearrange profiles,
and changed their names.
The Verhofstadt government unveiled an economic stability program intended to balance the
federal budget in 2002 and create a surplus by 2005. Rising regional debt complicated the
calculations. The Lamberton Accords, meant to be the capstone on the process of devolution,
were approved in 2001 for implementation in 2002. Appeals by the regions pending in court
stalled imposition of the accords, which were certain to be an issue in the 2003 general
election.
Questions/Discussion
Explain the importance of Christian democratic or confessional parties in the Benelux
countries since 1945. Account for their apparent decline in the 1990s. What is likely to be
their role in the current decade?
Outline the background to the language question in Belgium. Why is devolution regarded
as an appropriate answer?
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Give the rationale for pillarization. In what ways did it contribute to national unity? In what
ways may it have detracted from national solidarity.
Account for the relative volatility of Dutch and Belgian politics in the 1990s.
What are the most important social and economic issues confronting the Benelux countries at
the turn-of-the-century? Do they have political solutions?
Suggested Reading
See Selective Bibliography.
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89
Legislation passed in the Second Chamber must also receive approval in the First Chamber,
which is composed of 75 members elected to 4-year terms by the members of the Provincial
States (state assemblies). Bicameralism came to the Netherlands in 1815 with establishment
of the First Chamber as a body appointed by the monarch. The original purpose of the
chamber was to guarantee the Belgian aristocracy a voice in government, when their
provinces in the south were merged into the Kingdom of the United Netherlands. The
composition of the First Chamber was transformed in 1848 when royal appointment was
replaced with election of members by the Provincial States. The number of representatives
allotted to each province is proportionate to their share of the national population.
Consequently, the composition of the First Chamber does not differ in regional balance from
that of the Second Chamber. The balance among parties, however, reflects the compositions
of the states assemblies and may differ from that the Second Chamber. (See Figure, The
Netherlands: Legislature and Government.)
Provinces of the Netherlands
Provincial Capitals
Assen
Lelystad
Leeuwarden
Arnhem
Groningen
Maastricht
s-Hertogenbosch
Haarlem
Zwolle
The Hague
Utrecht
Middelburg
Drenthe
Flevoland
Friesland
Gelderland
Groningen
Limburg
North Brabant
North Holland
Overijssel
South Holland
Utrecht
Zeeland
The First Chamber does not have the right either to initiate legislative proposals or to amend
them. Consequently, the choices faced by the First Chamber are essentially either to accept
the bill as it stands or to reject it entirely. As a result of its limited powers, the First Chamber
does not subject legislation to the same exhaustive technical and partisan analysis that goes
on in the Second Chamber. The First Chamber normally meets just one day per week, and
80 percent of its members pursue a career outside politics while serving as Senator. The
upper chamber may be accused of unnecessary duplication of legislative scrutiny when it
accepts a law as proposed and of undemocratic interference with the directly elected Second
Chamber when it rejects a law. Even so, the First Chamber does on occasion reject major
pieces of proposed legislation, such as a bill to liberalize abortion in 1976 and a bill to
establish referenda in 1998.
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The Dutch government (regering) is formally composed of the monarch and the ministers.
In practice, the ministers alone exercise the prerogatives of government; they are known
collectively as the ministerial council, or cabinet. The ministerial council is composed of
fourteen members, including the minister-president ( prime minister), twelve ministers who
each head one of the bureaucratic departments, and one minister without portfolio whose task
is to press for interdepartmental cooperation on assistance to third world countries. Postwar
ministries attest to the issues of a densely populated and increasingly affluent country; for
example, Housing and Space Planning (1945); Culture, Recreation, and Social Work (1952);
and Public Health and Environmental Protection (1971).
The ministers were originally advisers to the monarch, who consulted them as seen fit.
Today, the responsibilities of the ministerial council include negotiating treaties and naming
judges, provincial governors and mayors. Most importantly, the ministerial council develops
draft legislation to submit to the First and Second Chambers of the States General.
The ministerial council is led by the minister-president, who is head of government and
usually the leader of the dominant party in the governing coalition The minister-president
chairs the ministerial council, sets its agenda, and determines its schedule of meetings. He
also concludes the councils deliberations on a given issue by formulating a resolution that
will achieve consensus agreement among the ministers. The powers of the ministerpresident have grown by virtue of his role on the European Council, a body composed of EU
heads of state that meets twice per year and sets the basic direction of EU policy. (See
Participation in EU Institutions.)
Even so, the powers of the minister-president remain modest in comparison with the British
prime minister or the German chancellor. As head of a coalition government, the Dutch
minister-president cannot shuffle ministers with the impunity of a British prime minister, nor
can he command a minister to follow a particular policy, as the German chancellor often can.
The Dutch ministerial council meets in advance of European Council summits to determine
what the minister-president may and may not agree to during the discussions. The power of
the minister-president derives not from ability to command or to decide, but it stems rather
from the ability to find policy formulations acceptable to all parties in the coalition and,
ideally, all ministers in the cabinet. The successful minister-president must above all be
skilled in the art of identifying compromise positions. As Ruud Lubbers, who served as
minister-president in three governments between 1982 and 1994, described the job, People
often argue in order to get their way; I argue primarily to find solutions that others can agree
with. Unlike heads of government in most other parliamentary systems, the Dutch ministerpresident is still a first among equals.
Nearly all draft laws examined in the Second Chamber are developed in the bureaucratic
departments and reviewed in the ministerial council before being formally submitted to the
Second Chamber. Although the Second Chamber has the right to initiate legislative
proposals on most topics, it does so only about a half dozen times per year. Fewer than one
hundred chamber-initiated bills have passed since 1813, though the majority of that number
has been passed in the last 30 years. Ninety-eight percent of all legislative proposals in the
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Netherlands are initiated by the ministerial council, compared to an average of under 60% in
other European parliamentary democracies. About 95% of the 250 to 300 bills submitted
annually by ministers are ultimately passed, though many of them only after being amended.
Given the dominance of the ministerial council in developing legislation, the high point of
Second Chamber influence on the government comes during negotiations leading to the
cabinet formation. After an election for the Second Chamber, a specially appointed
negotiator, the informateur, makes the rounds of party leaders to determine which parties
might participate in the next ministerial council. The informateur gathers information about
likely coalition prospects and drafts elements of a possible coalition policy platform. As
soon as the informateur develops a sense of the desired composition of a majority cabinet
and the main areas of policy agreement within that coalition, he submits his report to the
monarch. Perhaps the most important part of that report is the nomination of a formateur,
who will complete the government formation and, most likely, become its minister-president.
Among the immediate tasks of the formateur are to develop further the governing program,
to achieve agreement on the specific division of ministries between governing parties, and to
develop a list of the individuals who will occupy those seats.
The division of ministerial portfolios among the governing parties is often a contentious
point. Ministries must be fairly divided between coalition partners, taking account of those
that are more and less powerful. Sometimes a party will insist on controlling a specific
ministry, or insist that a rival party not control a particular ministry. The major economic
portfolios of Finance, Economic Affairs, and Social Affairs are usually divided among
coalition partners, as are the major international departments of Defense and Foreign Affairs.
It is typical for the entire process of identifying a coalition that developing a governing
program (regeerakkoord) and assigning specific ministries to the coalition parties to requires
two to three months after an election.
The Dutch civil service is organized into departments, each led by a cabinet minister and, in
the case of the larger departments, one or two state secretaries (junior ministers). Given that
ministers and state secretaries cannot know all that goes on within the department, they must
rely upon senior civil servants to anticipate decisions that are important or that may become
politically sensitive, and to bring these to the minister for a final decision. Civil servants
draft regulations and legislation for review by the ministerial council and approval by the
Second and First Chambers.
Senior civil servants are nearly always careerists who have worked their way up the
organizational ladder of their departments. There is relatively little recruitment from
industry, political and social organizations, or academia. By the time they reach the highest
levels of a department, then, it is typical for civil servants to have spent their entire careers
immersed in the departments work and perspectives. This is an effective strategy for
maintaining an autonomous organizational culture within each department.
The Netherlands does not grant to its courts the power of judicial review. Statute law is, in
effect, constitutional law. There is, however, an extensive consultation process before
submission of a draft law to the Second Chamber, in which the Council of State (Raad van
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State, established in 1531) offers advice on the constitutionality, technical legal quality, and
likely effectiveness of proposed laws. Moreover, although statutes enacted by the legislature
are not subject to judicial review, regulations promulgated by the civil service may be taken
to court. Administrative courts hear over 50,000 cases per year.
The power of the courts to scrutinize governmental action is expanded still further by the
constitutional provision that the judiciary may test laws against international treaties into
which the country has entered, including the Treaty of Rome and the UN Human Rights
Treaty. The courts may not declare a law invalid due to incompatibility with the Dutch
constitution but they may do so on the grounds of incompatibility with international treaty
obligations. Since the basic civil and political rights guaranteed in the Dutch constitution are
all restated in similar terms in treaties to which the Netherlands is signatory, the power of
testing laws against treaty obligations is a significant one. The Treaty of Rome and
subsequent commitments to the EU have successfully been used as a means of attacking a
number of laws and regulations related to equal pay for men and women, as well as equal
benefits from the social insurance system.
Electoral System
Election campaigns are relatively short and inexpensive in the Netherlands. The official
electoral campaign lasts for just 43 days and consists primarily of sending parliamentary
candidates to contact voters in workplaces and shopping areas, while the party leader
(lijsttrekker, or head of the party list) makes one major appearance designed to produce a
daily sound-bite for the evening news. Each party receives an hour of radio time every week
and seven hours of television time per year, more time being given during the six weeks of an
election campaign. Recent elections have also featured debates among the leaders of the
different parties.
Political Parties
Dutch political parties were traditionally categorized as being either secular or confessional
(i.e., identified with a religious confession, or church) and represented one of the four
pillars (zuilen): Socialist and Liberal in the secular camp, Protestant and Catholic in the
confessional bloc. Although the pillars have lost most of their relevance, three major
political parties trace their descent from this configuration.
Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appel CDA) is a result of the 1980
merger of the Catholic Peoples Party and two Protestant parties, the Anti-Revolutionary
Party and the more conservative Christian Historical Union. The CDA occupies the broad
center of the Dutch political spectrum and emerged, by far, as the largest party in the 2002
general election, attracting nearly 28% of the vote. That result, however, was considerably
smaller than that which the three confessional parties, standing separately at the polls, could
expect to receive 40 years ago. Party leader and Harry Potter look-alike Jan Peter
Balkenende, a Protestant and a former economics professor, is largely credited with having
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reversed the partys decline in the polls. Two small conservative Protestant parties well to the
right of the CDA commanded less than 5% of the vote.
The Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
VVD), established in 1948, assimilated the members of older liberal parties. It espouses
traditional European liberal values favoring free enterprise and individual initiative but also
promotes social liberalism and supports the welfare state. Hans Dijkstal, who had led the
VVD since 1998, was admired by some for his ability to broker compromises. For others,
however, the VVD in government compromised principle with its PvdA partners more than
was necessary and lost ground in 2002 as a consequence. Dijkstal was replaced as party
leader by Gerrit Zalm, the popular finance minister credited with managing an unpopular
governments successful economic policy.
The Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid PvdA) is a social democratic party that was the
product of a post-war merger of the old Socialist Party with left-wing confessional and social
liberal groups. The PvdA, which led governments in the 1990s, was the biggest loser in the
2002 election that reduced its share of the vote to only 15%. Following the election, Wim
Koks successor Ad Melkert, an unlikely leader acknowledged to be low on charisma,
stepped down in favor of the telegenic, thirty-something Wouter Bos.
The program of Green Left (Groen Links GL), led by Paul Rosenmller, combines a mix of
environmentalism and socialism. The Socialist Party (Socialische Partij SP) competes for
support on the far left of the political spectrum under the dynamic leadership of Jan
Marijnisson.. Together, in 2002, the three socialist parties received the votes of 28% of the
electorate.
Democrats 66 (Democraten 66 D66) was founded (in 1966) with the distinct aim of
supplanting obsolete pillar politics with programs addressing relevant issues. The party
called for devolution of power from the highly centralized national government to local
governments and backed enactment of legislation through popular referenda. It has been a
party beloved of intellectuals and civil servants. Admitted to government in the 1990s, D66
seemed itself to become less relevant and declined steadily at the polls as some of its
objectives were accepted into the political mainstream. Party head Thom de Graaf is widely
respected as a measured and rational politician has failed to reverse his partys decline in
popularity.
Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland LN) came on the national scene in 2000 as a
right-wing populist protest movement that entered candidates successfully in local elections.
LN focused on crime and the growing presence of unassimilated immigrants as issues
ignored by the mainline parties. Pym Fortuyn split from the LN in 2001 to form the
Liveable Rotterdam in his native city, where his personalist movement won a quarter of the
vote in local elections. Fortuyn won support throughout the country and fielded a list of
candidates nation-wide under the label List Pym Fortuyn (Lijst Pym Fortuyn LPF) in the
2002 general election. Although Fortuyn was assassinated before the election, his personalist
list emerged from it as the second largest party in the Second Chamber with 17% of the
vote, pulling voters from the mainline parties and overshadowing the LN. Personal
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secularization, de-confessionalization, and the decline of class conflict. Each of these trends
weakened the responsiveness of the electorate to party appeals based on religion and class.
Even as religious belief and social class were declining in their power to structure the vote,
other issues were becoming more important to the Dutch electorate. Among the most
important new issues are democratization of the political system, environmental protection,
womens rights, and control of immigration and reduction of crime. New political parties
sought, in some cases with considerable success, to redirect peoples attention to issues that
had tended to be neglected in a political system oriented to the defense of religious and class
interests. The most dramatic recent example of this phenomenon is the List Pim Fortuyn,
which won 17% of the votes and 26 seats in the Second Chamber in the elections of May
2002.
The Meaning of Pillarization
The Liberal reforms of the 19th century set the stage for the main lines of Dutch politics in
the 20th century. (See The Netherlands in the 19th Century.) Threatened by Liberal policy
to secularize education and by the rise of Catholic influence, Calvinist leaders began a
campaign to organize popular support to protect Protestant privileges. The Calvinists
mobilized as a means of revitalizing traditions of doctrinal strictness and religious fervor and
also to restore the central role of Protestant belief in the nations governance. Catholic
mobilization followed in a defensive vein, drawing on a history of discrimination to persuade
Dutch Catholics, who constituted a large minority in the overall population of the
Netherlands, of the necessity of retreating to a collectively organized isolation from the
Protestant and secular majority. Socialist mobilization followed the same pattern, since, by
the early part of the 20th century, it was obvious that a well-organized movement of the
working class was seen as the only means of stemming the loss of its loyalty to the Catholic
and Protestant trade unions.
By the end of the 19th century, Protestant, Catholic, liberal, and socialist associations had
coalesced into four broad but ideologically integrated networks of social, professional, and
political organizations. Referred to as the pillars of Dutch society, each was intended to
replicate an entire sub-national society for adherents of a particular set of beliefs. Each group
sponsored its own organizations that enabled members to conduct their lives separately from
those in the other pillars. The Dutch people were, in effect, compartmentalized by choice into
a series of parallel societies offered each group their own hospitals, schools, newspapers,
labor unions, social insurance, business and professional associations, and political parties as
well as scouts, hobby clubs, and sports teams and, eventually, radio and television
programming. These organizations were legally recognized and received public financial
support on an equal footing.
The most remarkable area of growth in pillarized organizations was in the mass media. By
the 1950s, for example, the Catholic population of five million was served by the Roman
Catholic Press Service that provided readers with 22 daily newspapers (two of them
distributed nationally), another 22 weekly newspapers published in small towns, 270 weekly
and monthly magazines, and 42 scholarly journals. Catholic, Protestant, and secular
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journalists were each trained in their own schools. Pillarization of the print media made
possible the classic Dutch story of the greengrocer who asks a customer if she prefers her
vegetables wrapped in a Catholic, Protestant, or socialist newspaper. The tradition of
pillarized control of the print media was extended to other mass media as they developed.
Airtime on the radio frequencies was divided among associations created to produce and
broadcast Catholic, Protestant, socialist, and liberal (or general) programming. After
World War II, political leaders representing the pillars were able to squelch the demand for
commercial television stations and, instead, extended the authority of the pillar radio
associations to television as well.
The pillars completely structured social and political life in the Netherlands for the first twothirds of the 20th century, but beginning in the 1960s their relevance began to wane. One
reason for that was the pervasive secularization of Dutch society as a whole that leveled
differences between the secular and confessional pillars and reduced the importance of
projecting a religious identity outside of church. Democracy 66 was founded on the idea that
the pillars were anachronisms. Middle-class and working-class Catholics and Protestants
might more readily identify politically, for example, with the VVD or PvdA and support their
economic or social policies without seeming to compromise their religious beliefs. Church
affiliations also declined sharply. Secular institutions and political parties were no longer
threatening, and, by the late 1960s, Dutch Catholic bishops, for example, no longer
pronounced that a good Catholic had to join the Association of Catholic Unions or vote for
the Catholic Peoples Party.
The revolution in telecommunications also contributed to the erosion of the pillars. Cable and
satellite dishes made the monopoly on broadcast time held by the pillars unfeasible. EU
directives mandated that that national television markets could not be protected by
governments of member countries. These changes made it impossible to continue the
isolation of pillarized communities or, for that matter, to keep viewers from watching
Dutch television in preference to programming from other countries.
Even so, for most of the 20th century, political party loyalties in each pillar were so strong
that election results varied little over the decades, other than the glacial shifts that occurred as
Catholics, for example, became an increasingly larger part of the Dutch population. Arend
Lijphart, the Dutch social scientist, has pointed out that the pillars brought a large measure of
peace to a Dutch society whose deep religious, class, and ideological cleavages might
otherwise have led to instability.
The Dutch Welfare State
The Netherlands has become widely known for being one of those countries that has a
particularly extensive and generous welfare state. Although the economy is decidedly
capitalist on the production side, with full rights of private property, the welfare system gives
the distribution of incomes something of a socialist tinge. All people are expected to work
to their capabilities, but incomes have been made partially independent of the job one does
or indeed whether one works at all.
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Until the 1960s, the Netherlands was a welfare-state laggard in comparison with most
western European countries. Rapid growth of the welfare state began only in the late 1950s.
Once begun in earnest, though, it grew rapidly. By the mid-1960s the proportion of GDP
spent on social welfare transfers in the Netherlands had outdistanced other European
countries. Financing for new welfare state programs after World War II came primarily from
payroll deductions paid into a series of social funds dedicated to each of the insurance
programssickness, disability, retirement, unemployment, widows and orphans, and so
forth. In the thirty years from 1946 to 1976, the Dutch welfare state expanded from the
provision of minimum income relief to the poor to the guarantee of a minimum income as
well as insurance against income loss due to sickness, disability, unemployment, death of the
head of household, or retirement. At its peak, the welfare state sought to give all citizens the
opportunity to participate fully in the society, regardless of the job they work at or whether
they work at all.
The most consequential of the universal programs was the Workers Disability Act in 1967,
which replaced existing accident and disability insurance for on-the-job injuries with a
general guarantee of income replacement in the event of partial or full disability. Benefits
were related to earnings, and for workers deemed completely disabled (i.e. unable to work at
all), the benefit was equal to ones last wage. The duration of the benefits was indefinite
until one reached retirement age, at which point the benefit shifted from disability to the
retirement program. The high water mark of the Dutch welfare state was reached when the
Workers Disability Act was generalized from the labor force to the entire population. This
1976 extension in effect gave all individuals the right to an income for life if they were
disabled, whether or not they had ever been part of the workforce.
Although the Dutch welfare state is quite extensive, its primary emphasis is on income
maintenance rather than income redistribution. As a result of this emphasis on income
replacement and minimum income guarantees, the percentage of people living in poverty in
the Netherlands was in 1979 the lowest in the European Union. At the same time, the
Netherlands has had a relatively small decline in income inequality during the postwar
period.
By the mid-1970s, the Dutch welfare state was the largest in the world if measured by the
yardstick of spending as a proportion of the national economic product. At its peak, over
one-half of the Dutch GDP traveled through the public sector, and about half of that amount
was collected for redistribution by social welfare agencies to the sick, the disabled, the
elderly, or the unemployed. This is a far higher percentage than that found, for example, in
Sweden and Denmark (45% of GDP), or the United States (25% of GDP).
In the process of implementing universal social insurance programs, however, the very logic
of the welfare state began to change. During the 1970s, the idea spread that government
should no longer provide simply for an economic minimum income, but rather for a social
minimum income. The idea of the social minimum entered the Dutch welfare-state
vocabulary, creating a gradual shift from the original concept of the welfare state to a new
concept that might be called the social welfare state.
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In the area of general income assistance, for example, there was an increasing concern that
public assistance recipients should live in a way that mirrors broader social patterns, even if
on a modest scale. For example, public assistance benefits were augmented in 1964 to
include a vacation allowance; if the normal Dutch family took a vacation every year, then the
logic of full social participation demanded that those on public assistance also have the
means to take a vacation. Local governments also decided to offer a daily newspaper to
those on public assistance, again with an eye to the conditions necessary for full social
participation.
In 1970, this logic was carried still further by coupling public assistance to the net minimum
wage. The minimum wage itself was set at 80 percent of the net average wage. This had the
effect of maintaining a constant (and relatively modest) gap between public assistance and
the lowest paid jobs, and between the lowest paid jobs and the average job. A further step in
development of the social welfare state came in 1976, when sickness, disability,
unemployment and retirement benefits were all tied both to the price index and to changes in
the wages of private sector workers. As wages rose, so would social insurance payments. As
prices rose, both wages and social insurance payments would be adjusted. In 1979, this
automatic indexation was extended to those receiving public assistance benefits, completing
the guarantee that all citizens would share in the increasing levels of prosperity. The
minimum subsistence goals of poor relief under the welfare state were now completely
abandoned in favor of the far more ambitious goal of making public assistance
indistinguishable from a modest working wage.
The social welfare state rests not just on guarantees of a minimum income, but also on access
to education, health care, cultural events, and quality options for leisure. This has led to an
extensive policy of subsidizing social and cultural organizations ranging from ballet
companies, theater groups, and orchestras to stamp collecting clubs, sport associations, and
youth groups. Over 80% of the price of a theater ticket is paid by the government, as is 10%
of the price of a movie ticket.
One of the most striking perspectives of the social welfare-state philosophy is its redefinition
of the meaning of work. With a guaranteed right to a level of public assistance not far below
the minimum wage (and a minimum wage that is itself pegged to remain not far below the
average wage), the monetary incentive to work is significantly diminished. Under the social
welfare state, work is a form of economic and social participation as well as a means of
earning money. The quality of the work experience becomes more important; the monetary
rewards of work less so. The social welfare state does not imply that work is an option one
may or may not choose. But it does embody the belief that a person should have the
opportunity to work at a job suitable to his or her own tastes and skills.
More recently, the Dutch government has pulled back from the welfare state programs
designed in the 1960s and 1970s. Retrenchment of the welfare state began in 1981 with the
installation of a center-right government determined to restore budgetary balance. The
previous emphasis on citizen entitlements gave way to a new focus on economic efficiency.
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Under the governments of Wim Kok (1994-2002), the language of welfare- state solidarity
was supplemented by an emphasis on the need to maintain incentives for work.
Overseas Territories
The Netherlands Antilles (Curacao, Bonnaire, Saba, St Maarten, and St Eustatius) and Aruba
are self-governing overseas territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Dutch
government retains responsibility for foreign affairs and defense. Queen Beatrix is
represented in both territories by a governor-general who exercises executive authority in
external affairs in consultation with the respective elected territorial governments. Executive
authority in internal affairs, including control of police, communications, and fiscal and
monetary affairs, in each territory is conducted a council of ministers, or government,
responsible to the territorial legislature. The Netherlands Antilles has a 22-member
legislature, the Estates (Staten), in which each of the five constituent islands in the territory is
represented. Self government was achieved in 1954. Since 1977, each island has had a
separate constitution for local affairs in addition to subscribing to the territorial constitution.
Aruba separated from the Netherlands Antilles in 1980 out of concern for what its leaders
considered the political dominance of Curacao. The Estates of Aruba consists of 21 members
elected from constituencies on that island. A minister-plenipotentiary appointed by each
government takes part in deliberations of the Dutch government when it discusses external
affairs pertaining to the territories.
Questions/Discussion
Give some reasons why government formation requires many weeks of negotiations while
usually no more than six weeks is needed for staging a general election.
The Netherlands is a unitary state. Describe the representational base for the First Chamber.
Explain in party strengths in the First and Second Chambers.
Why are relations between ministers from a party in government and its parliamentary party
in the fractie sometimes strained?
The traditional pillars are said to be in decline as frameworks for political participation.
Speculate on the possibility of new pillars developing that reflect contemporary concerns,
new ideologies, or emerging divisions in Dutch society. What might some of those pillars
be?
Suggested Reading
Armand CLESSE and Herman van GUNSTEREN, eds. The Vitality of the Netherlands.
Luxembourg: LIEIS, 1999.
101
Robert H. COX. The Development of the Dutch Welfare State: From Workers Insurance to
Universal Entitlement. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
Arend LIJPHART. The Politics of Accommodation. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1976.
Thomas ROCHON. The Netherlands. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, chapters 4-7.
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BELGIUM
Between 1970 and 2001, Belgium moved through a series of constitutional reforms from
being a highly centralized unitary state to a decentralized federal state in which
responsibilities have devolved from the national government to three regions and three
linguistic communities. Government functions are delineated on five levels and carried out
by five tiers of government:
n
n
n
n
n
National
Communities
Regions
Provinces
Communes
The monarch is the head of state, in whom the countrys constitution vests executive
authority. However, he does not properly represent the State, which is an apparatus of
power, but the Country and its People, hence the title: King of the Belgians. He is not
crowned but, on acceding to the throne, takes an oath before both houses of the legislature
to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Belgian people... The king is nominally
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He is responsible for appointing the government on
the advice of the parliamentary majority and legitimizing legislation with his signature. Of
the kings two roles, political and representative, the latter symbolic role is the more
important. It is sometimes pointed out that the king is the only Belgian.
Belgium: Tiers of Government
Level
Agencies of Government
NATIONAL
Foreign Affairs
Defense
Fiscal Policy (including
tax collection)
Post Office
Pensions
Judicial Appeals
COMMUNITIES
Education
Cultural Affairs
Language Rights
Radio and TV
Science Research
International relations
in above areas
Competence
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REGIONS
Social Assistance
Health
Housing
Economic Development
Agriculture
Trade Promotion
Environment
Water
International relations
in above areas
PROVINCES
COMMUNES
Social Services
Roads
Fire Departments
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The upper chamber, the Senate, has 71 members (reduced from 184). Forty Senators are
chosen by electoral colleges elected by proportional representation from constituencies that
combine several of those used to elect members to the lower chamber; 21 are appointed by
the Community councils; and 10 are appointed by the Senate itself. Members of the royal
family are ex officio senators.
Passage by the Chamber of Representatives alone is sufficient to enact legislation. The
Senate, however, can intervene to demand a second reading in that body or can return bills to
the lower chamber for amendment or clarification. It also exercises suspensory powers over
legislation and can initiate legislation. The Senate has no role in government formation.
Constitutional changes have been proposed under the 2001Lambermont Accords that would
again restructure the legislative branch. Under these proposals, the 10 provinces, plus
Brussels, will constitute 11 electoral constituencies, and the Chamber of Representatives will
be increased in size to 200 members to accommodate 50 elected by the three cultural
communities. A 5% threshold will be imposed to discourage fragmentation of parties. The
Senate will become a Chamber of Communities and Regions, whose members will
represent the regional governments and the cultural communities. The second reading of
legislation, now conducted by the Senate, will be transferred to a committee of the lower
chamber. The two-thirds majority needed in both chambers to alter the constitution in this
way is not presently available. Introduction of the proposal will therefore be deferred until
the next parliament, seated in 2003. If approved, the constitutional revision will not be
effective until the election of the following parliament in 2007.
The first article of the Belgian constitution as amended in 1993 states that: Belgium is
a federal state that consists of communities and regions. Belgian federalism is underlaid by
the principle of subsidiarity, which dictates that anything that can be dealt with at a lower
level must not be passed on to a higher political or administrative level.
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The national or Federal Government, retains responsibility in those areas that come within
the sphere of national interest as well as over everything that does not fall within the express
powers of the Communities and the Regions. Federal ministers are required to put their
ministries at the service of the regions when requested. Constitutionally, federal, community,
and regional authorities have equal status but exercise different competencies. The
Lambermont Accords, approved by the Chamber of Representatives in 2001, are intended to
fine-tune these relationships among the several tiers of government.
As introduced, three elected cultural councils were responsible for the administration of
education and cultural affairs and oversight of language rights in Dutch-speaking Flanders,
French-speaking Wallonia, and for the German-speaking population in the Walloon region.
The Flemish Community Council and French Community Council also had representatives
elected from bi-lingual Brussels.
Regional authorities were subsequently established for Flanders and Wallonia and in the
Brussels-Capital Region, each of which elects a regional legislature. Regional governments,
responsible to those legislatures, are composed of a council headed by a minister-president
(prime minister). Responsibility for most areas generally defined as domestic was
devolved from the national to the regional governments.
Belgian federalism is asymmetric. After creation of the regional authorities, the Flemish
Community Council merged with the Flanders Region, and today both are administered by a
single government and legislature. However, the French Community and the Walloon
Region remain separate. Following the reforms of 1993, however, the French Community
handed over a wide range of competencies to the Walloon and Brussels-Capital regions,
retaining culture, education, and the media.
The Brussels-Capital Region and French-speaking Brussels suburbs in the province of
Flemish Brabant present particularly complex and challenging situations. Language is the
defining characteristic of the Flemish and Walloon regions, and those regions are not bilingual. French-speaking residents of the Flemish Region must specifically request
documents in French from the regional or municipal governments, which are required by law
to hold meetings and issue documents only in Dutch. Similar requirements pertain in
Wallonia for the exclusive use of French. The Flemish Region has designated Language
Facility Municipalities in six suburban communes on the language frontier outside the
capital region, where the French-speaking deputy governor of Flemish Brabant is responsible
for dealing with language disputes. Flemish authorities contend that that this arrangement
serves to facilitate French-speakers learning Dutch while retaining their own cultural identity.
All 19 communes in Brussels have a French-speaking majority, but each is required to
appoint a Dutch-speaking alderman to its executive. The Flemish Region and Community
handles Dutch-language education and cultural affairs in the Brussels Region. Members of
the Brussels-Capital legislature sit on the French Community Council in Wavre, provincial
capital of Walloon Brabant.
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The ten provinces of Belgium are autonomous administrative institutions, but they are
subordinate to the jurisdiction of federal, community, and regional authorities. Provincial
legislative councils are directly elected and approve measures related to provincial
competencies. Councils in each province elect a permanent delegation, chaired by a royalappointed governor and responsible for day-to-day administration. In 1993, the bi-lingual
province of Brabant was divided into Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant.
Provinces of Belgium
Region
Province
Provincial Capital
Antwerp
East Flanders
Flemish Brabant
Limburg
West Flanders
Antwerp
Ghent
Vilvoorde
Hasselt
Bruges
Hainault
Lige
Luxembourg
Namur
Walloon Brabant
Mons
Lige
Arlon
Namur
Wavre
Flanders
Wallonia
There are nearly 600 municipalities or communes in Belgium, compared to almost 3000
before their consolidation in 1975. Each commune elects a municipal council that, in turn,
nominates the royal-appointed mayor and elects aldermen who serve as the municipal
executive. The choice of the mayor typically reflects the political orientation of the council
majority. The Flemish Region has proposed direct election of mayors in Flanders after
ratification of the Lambermont Accords. Critics are concerned that this plan would usher in
debilitating cohabitation situations in local government. Appeals have been launched by both
the French and Flemish communities challenging the constitutionality of the Lambermont
Accords. Decisions on their appeals will not be made until after the next election in 2003. If
the appeals are upheld, observers believe that prospects for stable regional government,
especially in Brussels, could be adversely affected.
The Belgian judiciary is independent of the government and legislature, and enjoys a
reputation for integrity and professionalism. The Court of Cassation is the highest court in
the judicial system. It is the final court of appeal and decides constitutional questions.
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Political Parties
For most of the 20th century, Belgians identified themselves with one of three spiritual
families Catholic, socialist, or liberal that determined political affiliation expressed in
Christian democratic, social democratic, and liberal parties. The first was confessional,
maintaining close ties to the Church and supporting its role in social affairs, especially
education. It was broadly based, appealing from the center of the political spectrum to active
Catholics of all classes, particularly in Flanders, with platforms that were socially
progressive, culturally conservative, and politically democratic. Socialist and liberal parties
were secular and often anti-clerical. The former considered itself a workers movement of the
left and had its strongest support in the socialist trade unions in competition with Catholic
unions. It sanctioned state intervention in the economy and advocated the introduction of the
social welfare state. On these issues and others, the socialist left was closer to the Catholic
center than to the liberals, who occupied the right side of the political spectrum. Liberal
support was based in an urban, middle-class constituency that favored democratic reforms in
a context unfettered by confessional privilege or socialist ideology. Although supporting
social reforms as well, liberals would limit state intervention in the market economy. Both
secular families supported state control of education and both were far stronger in
Wallonia than in Flanders.
The spiritual families overlapped the language divide and, to some extent, were able to
contain nationalist and regionalists movements within their established parties. Affiliation
with a family often dictated social institutions and professional associations to which one
belonged, similar to the Dutch pillars. Distinctly nationalist or regionalist parties never
achieved family status despite their electoral successes nor have the environmentalist
parties.
In the late 1960s and the1970s, each of the three parties Social Christian, Socialist, and
Liberal -- divided along language lines. In place of three large parties, there were thereafter
seven political parties (the Liberals split in three Walloon, Flemish, and Bruxellois). These
were not language-designated wings of the same party, but entirely separate political parties.
Since 1994, a further realignment of political parties has occurred, and the process appears to
be on-going. Existing parties have splintered and merged, been re-named or become extinct.
On major social and economic issues, there is general, if sometimes qualified, agreement
among political parties. (This condition does not extend, however, to regional and language
issues.) The secular parties are no longer hostile to the Church, and practicing Catholics are
confident that the role of Church, for example in education, is secure. Rather than referring to
a spiritual family for direction, voters are likely to consider pocketbook issues, personality
of the leadership, alienation from parties in office, and regional interests. Region is the most
important determinant of political affiliation. But the parties identified with spiritual
families still polled nearly two-thirds of the vote in the 1999 election.
The Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten VLD) emerged
from the 1999 general election the largest of 11 parties winning seats in Chamber of
Representatives by two-tenths of one percent and one seat over the Flemish Christian
Peoples Party. Only rarely since the 19th century had a liberal party outpolled a Catholic
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party. Party leader, now Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, took control of the Flemish Liberal
party while still in his 20s, changed its name, and refurbished its image. He was an admirer
of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. In office, he has spoken approvingly of Tony
Blairs Third Way position. Adopting the strategy of the francophone liberals, the VLD
has reached out to confessional and nationalist voters. A Christian democratic faction
formally merged with the VLD in 2002.
Verhostadts liberal counterpart in Wallonia, Foreign Minister Louis Michel, leads the newly
amalgated Reform Movement (Mouvement Reformateur MR) in succession to the Liberal
Reform Party and its common-slate electoral allies, the Democratic Front, the Brussels liberal
party, and the Christian democratic Citizens Movement.
The Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste PS) concentrated on regional politics in Wallonia,
where it traditionally was the largest party, during long periods of Catholic-Liberal coalition
government. The party is led by the popular Elio Di Rupo. Although never
in a leading position in the region, the Socialist Party, subsequently renamed the Socialist
Party-Another Way ( Socialistische Partij-Anders SP.A), in Flanders held its own in
successive elections and increased its share of the Flemish vote in 1999.
The Christian democratic parties suffered defeat at the polls and loss of prestige in the 1999.
The Christian Peoples Party came second to the VLD in Flanders and surrendered the
leadership position in national politics that it had maintained for decades. In an effort to
sharpen its regionalist credentials, the party has changed its name to Christian Democratic
and Flemish (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams CDV), following the general election. A
faction left the CDV to form a new party, New Christian Democrats, which, in turn, joined
the VLD. More radical changes occurred within the ranks of the francophone Christian
democrats. The Christian Social Party in Wallonia morphed into the Humanist Democratic
Center (Centre Democratique Humaniste CDH), allowing that the party was no longer
exclusively Christian. The Citizens Movement, a Christian democratic party centered in
Brussels, merged formally with francophone liberals in the Reform Movement.
Belgium has some of the most comprehensive laws in Europe to protect the environment.
These laws lay responsibility on producers instead of consumers, and impose prohibition
rather than regulation. Green parties have had a major impact on national legislation but
are divided along linguistic lines, Ecolo from Wallonia and Agalev from Flanders.
The Peoples Union (Volksunie VU) was a moderate Flemish nationalist party and an early
standard-bearer for separatism that contributed to setting up a federal system in Belgium.
However, the VUs moderation and the accommodations that the party made in government
weakened its nationalist profile and eroded its voter base. Nationalist support passed in
successive elections to the Flemish Bloc (Vlaams Blok VB), a pugnacious right-wing
separatist party that has pronounced xenophobic tendencies. Party leader Philip Dewinter
claims that the VB is no longer concerned with state reform to increase regional autonomy
within a federal Belgium. The VB instead calls for an independent Flanders within a federal
Europe and has preempted the use of many of the symbols of Flemish identity. It opposes
further in-migration to Flanders and proposes repatriation of foreigners already residing
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there. Other Flemish parties have tried to isolate the VB and have adopted stronger
regionalist profiles, but have failed to win back voters lost to it. The VB has been particularly
successful in local elections, winning more than a quarter of the vote in Antwerp. The partys
region-wide approval rating approaches 20%.
The VU, which shared electoral slates with the social liberal ID21, broke apart following its
poor showing in the 1999 general election. The conservative wing of the VU re-formed as
the New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie NVA), which took over VU seats in
the Chamber of Representatives. The NVA, led by Geert Bourgeois, stands to attract some
voters from the VLD who are fed up with Verhofstadt for selling out Flanders in the
Lambermont Accords, but who are unwilling to vote for an extremist VB. A left-wing faction
of the VU, together with the remnants of ID21, formed a new social liberal party, Spirit,
whose leadership expressed solidarity with the SP.A and suggested running on a common
slate with the Flemish Socialists..
The National Front (Front National FN) is the xenophobic francophone counterpart of the
VB and claims an affinity with the French party of the same name.
Issues
The six parties that formed a coalition government in 1999 under Guy Verhofstadt had won
collectively 57% of the total vote in the general election that year and enjoyed a 19-seat
majority in the Chamber of Representatives. Political debate since then has involved not so
much opposition from the opposition CDV and its francophone counterpart as it has conflicts
of interest among the coalition partners.
The Lambermont Accords, approved in 2001 and intended for implementation before the
2003 election, have been challenged in court by both the Flemish and Walloon communities,
which, in turn, put pressure on government parties from both sides of the linguistic frontier to
modify the agreement. Tension within the coalition on this issue increases the prospect of
destabilizing it prior to the next election.
The government proposes tougher measures on crime and immigration. In 2000, for example,
Belgium dropped out of the Schengen Agreement temporarily in order to close its borders to
stop further immigration while measures were being taken to round up illegals already in the
country. The government acted under pressure to take action to head off extreme right-wing
exploitation of those issues.
The governments Stabilization Program, introduced in 2000, which aimed at balancing the
budget by 2002 and creating surpluses thereafter, fell behind schedule. The government must
also deal with high public debt and regional demands for additional expenditure on health
care and education. Difficulties in balancing the need to increase revenue and to attract
investment have also divided government parties. Liberals are committed to hard-nosed fiscal
consolidation. The Socialist and Green parties proposed introduction of new capital gains
taxes, while the Liberal parties point out that the absence of these taxes has attracted direct
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investment to Belgium. The parties recognize the necessity of action to increase labor force
participation, which in Belgium is well below the EU average. They also agree generally on
various means of attack reduction of employer contributions to social benefits, corporate
tax reform to favor small business, and, more contentiously, modification of wage
indexation.
The coalition turned down proposals by Ecolo transport minister Isabelle Durant for farreaching restructuring of the Belgian railway system, including greatly reduced fares to
encourage ridership and double-decker cars to improve capacity. The Green parties were
isolated in support of her proposals.
Controversial legislation that also split the coalition was introduced in 2002 to extend voting
privileges in local elections to resident non-EU citizens. The measure was proposed by the
Socialist and Green parties, with the support of opposition CDH. It was opposed, however,
by the VLD with support from the CDV, neither party being willing to risk tarnishing its
nationalist image. The MR was also opposed, as party leader Louis Michel sought to avoid a
split that might endanger government stability in the run-up to the 2003 election.
Public approval of the Verhofstadt government declined from 47% in 2001 to 40% in mid2002. Approval was markedly lower in Flanders that in Wallonia and Brussels. Meanwhile,
support for the six government parties remained collectively above 50% in Flanders, and
75% in Wallonia and Brussels.
Questions/Discussion
Discuss and evaluate Belgiums devolved five-tier system of government. What is the
relevance of the federal government?
In the light of the discussion suggested above, comment on the assertion that Belgium is an
example of extreme federalism.
Why is the growth of the Brussels suburbs such a problem?
How typically are government ministers, including the prime minister, selected?
Demonstrate the rationale for bicameralism in Belgian legislature.
What are some of the positive and negative aspects of compulsory voting?
Account for the rise of the Flemish Liberals and the decline of the Flemish Social Christians
in the late 1990s.
On a case by case basis, what is the relevance in the changes in the names of political parties
and the internal realignment of parties across spiritual families after the 1998 general
election?
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Suggested Reading
Michel BOUDART, eds. et al. Modern Belgium. Palo Alto: SPSS, 1990.
Els WITTE and Harry van VELTHOVEN. Language and Politics: The situation in Belgium
in an historical perspective. Brussels: VUB UP, 1999.
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LUXEMBOURG
Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy in which effective political power is exercised by
three branches of government. The Government, including the prime minister and cabinet, is
responsible to the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourgs unicameral
legislature. The 60-member Chamber is elected to a maximum five-year term by proportional
representation within four electoral districts, and exercises an independence of action rare in
European parliamentary systems. Both the Government and the Chamber propose legislative
initiatives. The third source of authority is the Council of State, which fulfils some of the
functions of an upper chamber. It is composed of 21 councilors appointed by the Grand Duke
on the recommendation of the Government and Chamber. The Council is called upon to
offer an opinion on the constitutionality of all legislation before it is submitted to the
Chamber for a vote.
The Grand Duke exercises executive authority within limits imposed by the constitution.
The monarchs responsibilities include representing Luxembourg as head of state, appointing
the Government on the advice of the Chamber, and signing legislation into law.
Luxembourg is a unitary state in which jurisdiction for local administration is vested in 118
communes, each of which has an elected council that in turn elects the mayor.
Political Parties
Luxembourgs three largest political parties follow the pattern of the Belgian spiritual
families Christian democratic, social democratic, and liberal democratic. Two parties of
the center-right are regarded as bourgeois, and one party of the center-left is traditionally
regarded as a workers party. Two are secular parties, one is confessional.
The Christian Social Peoples Party (Chrschtlich Sozial Vollekspartei CSV) is
Luxembourgs Christian democratic party. It is the largest political party and is regarded as
the natural party of government. No government can be formed without its participation, and
most twentieth-century governments were led by it. The CSV retained the support of 30% of
the electorate in the June 1999 general election.
Identified traditionally as a confessional party, the CSV has a close though informal
relationship with the Roman Catholic Church in Luxembourg and has a long history of
protecting the prerogatives of the Church in education and social affairs. Situated in the
broad center of the political spectrum, the CSV attracts votes from all classes and can govern
with either the social democratic left or the liberal right.
The CSV favors a strong market economy capable of supporting an extensive social welfare
state. It is supported by the Catholic trade union movement as well as by professional and
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business associations. In office continuously for many years, the CSV exercises patronage,
for example, in public utilities employment.
The CSV benefits from a large and well-articulated party organization. Advancement within
the spiritual family is, in fact, often a family affair. The CSV is led by Jean-Claude
Juncker, who became prime minister in 1995 at the age of 40 in succession to Jacques Santer.
The Democratic Party (Demokratesch Partei DP) is a secular, liberal party, associated in
Luxembourg with the moderate political right. It combines concern for social liberalism with
fiscal conservatism. Traditionally a strong advocate of the market as a directing force in the
economy, it is cautious about state intervention and seeks to restrain public expenditures.
Based on the support of an urban middle-class constituency, the DP averages 20% of the vote
in general elections but often commands a larger share in local elections. It is a businessfriendly party that has the confidence of employers associations and of professionals. The
party has also gained increasing support from public-sector employees. The DP is led by
Lydie Polfer, who was for 18 years mayor of the city of Luxembourg and who is more
popular in public opinion than is her party as a whole.
The Socialist Workers Party (Ltzebergesch Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei LSAP) is a
moderate, reformist social democratic party. It has formal ties to the socialist trade union
movement, with whose support it can normally expect to win a quarter of the vote in general
elections. The LSAP also receives significant electoral support from the middle-class. The
party has been seen lacking in leadership since the retirement of its long-time chief, Jacques
Poos, in 1999.
The LSAP was the junior partner in a governing coalition with the CSV for 15 years (19841999), and this has cost the party an independent identity and profile. Before the last
election, the only distinction between it and the confessional CSV was the secular LSAPs
demand for a formal separation between the Church and state. This issue was of minor
interest to most voters, and the result was a loss of four parliamentary seats that drove the
LSAP into opposition.
The Left (Dei Lenk/La Gauche DL) is a democratic socialist movement that has assimilated
former communists and other leftist currents. It sometimes poaches on the left wing of the
LSAP. Although its electoral strength is minimal, the DL exercises some influence in
socialist labor unions.
The Green (Dei Greng DG) is Luxembourgs environmentalist party. It is also committed
to a broad range of liberal social and life-style issues. The DG platform appeals to many
young voters and to those disenchanted with the established spiritual families. However,
support for the party seems to have peaked at under 10% of the electorate.
Symptomatic of the rise of single-issue politics, the Action Committee for Democracy and
Pension Justice (Aktiounskomitee fir Demokratie an Rentengerechtigkeet ADR) polled
more than 10% of the vote in 1999. The Committee began life as a pressure group
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Questions/Discussion
What are some of the likely factors contributing to tension between the coalition partners in
the sitting Luxembourg government?
Are there advantages to having an appointed upper chamber responsible for reviewing
legislation approved by an elected lower chamber?
Suggested Reading
James NEWCOMER. The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg: The Evolution of Nationhood.
Lanham: University Press of America, 1984.
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ECONOMICS
BELGIUM
Belgium is Europes most intensively industrialized country, although today the service
sector is over twice as large as manufacturing in share of GDP (services, 67.1% of GDP,
industry 24.7%, and agriculture 1.3%). Belgium's social market economy is advanced and
is regarded as the most open in Europe. Belgium, with a GDP in 2000 of 244 billion euro
(2.9% of EU GDP) and a population of 10.2 million (2.7% of EU population) is also one of
Europes wealthiest countries. With a per capita GDP of 23,921 Euro in 2000, the Belgium
figure amounts to about 80% of the United States level, a figure exceeding the EU average of
70%.
Following a period of steady growth in the late 1990s, the Belgian economy in 2001
experienced its sharpest downturn since the oil shock of 1973-1974. Growth dipped that year
to less than 1%. Only a slight improvement was registered in 2002, as private consumption
remained sluggish. Inflation fluctuated between 2 and 3%.
Exports comprise over 75% of GDP (import ca.73%), a figure standing in contrast to its
principal trading partners -- The Netherlands at 50% and Germany and France at 25%.
Services comprise an increasing portion, but trade related to goods still amounts to ca. 70%
of exports. Chemicals, machinery (including armaments), and transport equipment each
account for about 20% of total exports, 75% of which is directed to EU countries. Belgium
remains an important producer of steel. Food items and beverages also constitute a small but
important niche sector for domestic and export markets.
Belgium is blessed with excellent infrastructure that links it to trade partners and to world
markets beyond Europe. The ports of Antwerp, which is one of the three largest ports in the
EU in terms of volume handled, and also Zeebrugge and Ostend and the river port of Ghent
utilize state of the art facilities. Antwerp is a general cargo port but also handles bulk goods
such as ore and oil. The petrochemical industry and automotive companies are among its best
customers. Zeebrugge specializes in container transport and is an unloading berth for
shipments of natural gas. It is also an important fishing port. Ferries to England and other
passenger ships operate out of Ostend. Ghent connects to the North Sea from the West
Scheldt by way of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal and can accommodate ocean-going vessels.
Inland navigation on an intricate system of canals connected to river routes helps Belgium
retain its position in freight transport.
Belgium is also the core of a European rail and road transport system that consists of a
diversified network of high-quality connections with France and beyond to Britain in the
west, the Dutch Randstad to the east, and the Ruhrgebiet in Germany. The rail network is one
of the densest in Europe. Although Sabena, the national flag carrier, has gone out of
business, the international airport at Brussels still serves an estimated 15 million passengers
annually. Traffic intensity on highways has almost doubled since 1980.
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Belgian interest rates are low, both short- and long-term. The continuing fall of long-term
interest rates in the late 1990s helped stimulate private investment, particularly in the
construction industry.
Belgiums debt ratio reached of 135% of GDP in 1993. Fulfilling the fiscal convergence
criterion for monetary union set out in the Maastricht Treaty became an overriding priority
for the Belgian government, which also determined to eliminate the snowball effect of
interest charges on public debt. An immediate goal was set to reduce annual budget deficits
to a maximum 3% of GDP. A medium-term goal was also adopted of achieving a balanced
budget targeted by means of rigorous economies in public spending and tax reform. Belgium
succeeded in meeting this convergence criterion in 2001 and the progressive reduction of the
budget deficit continued in 2002. The debt ratio remains over 100% of GDP.
Given the very high level of public debt, fiscal consolidation remains a major priority of the
Belgian government. The Stability Program for 2002-2005 aims at creating a budget surplus
while improving critical services such as rail transportation. Tax reforms and the opening of
previously protected markets, included in the program, are touted as incentives for attracting
greater foreign investment in Belgium.
Responsibility for the countrys economy, outside that part of it managed by the EU, has
devolved, like most other aspects of Belgian society, to the regions. Flanders is one of the
most prosperous regions in Europe. Prominent economic sectors are technology intensive,
including the electronic, metallurgical, chemical, and textile industries. Three major
automotive companies Ford, General Motors, and Volvo have assembly plants in
Flanders, taking advantage of the port of Antwerp. Trade, including diamonds and services,
supplies two-thirds of Flanders GDP. Despite large corporate investment, the backbone of
the Flemish economy is located in small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Historically, Wallonias economy has relied on the exploitation and processing of its natural
resources iron and coal, stone and timber, and water. The steel industry, the manufacture of
metallic, textile, and glass products, and ore extraction remain the economic bedrock of the
major industrial centers of Liege and Charleroi. Converted and modernized production
facilities have found opportunities for development in electronics -- including computers,
telecommunications, and aeronautical equipment -- as well as chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
and ceramics. Some older Wallonian industries have become redundant. Two-thirds of
Wallonia is eligible for EU aid for the revitalization of those areas.
Regional budgets, which began with a clean slate at the time of devolution in 1993, have
tended to generate deficits. Education and health services in Wallonia were under-funded as a
result of lower than anticipated revenues. The revenue short fall was even more acute in
Flanders, where the budget was kept in balance by reducing services rather than by raising
regional taxes.
Unemployment was apparently stuck at an intractable rate of 7% in 2002. The salient cause
has been the economys inability to create new jobs over the long-term.
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Labor costs, a large part of which consist of benefits, are high. Even mild inflationary
pressure triggers indexed wage increases. The working-age population, including an
increasingly larger proportion of women and young people, increased in size in the 1990s,
leading to an increased discrepancy between supply and demand on the labor market.
Generous unemployment compensation rather than under-demand for labor may also
contribute to protracted joblessness. Worker productivity is among the highest in the
industrialized countries, due in part to the continued prominence of industry. However, the
rate of labor force participation in Belgium is one of the lowest in the EU.
Collective bargaining is mandated by law. Trade unions and the employers organization
conduct industry-wide negotiations or social consultations on wage and benefit packages.
Agreements are automatically modified in accordance with wage indexation.
LUXEMBOURG
At ca. $44,000 (Purchasing Power Parity) in 2002, Luxembourg has the highest per capita
income among EU member countries. Indeed, according to OECD figures for 2002, the
country had the highest GDP per capita in the world. Per capita GDP at 125% of the United
States level. The Luxembourg economy averaged 5% annual growth in the late 1990s,
peaking at 7.5% in 2000. Growth dipped sharply in 2001 but rebounded to a projected rate in
excess of 4% in 2002. The recovery was credited to the short-term impact of tax reductions
on private consumption.
A liberal tax framework, encouraging private domestic and foreign investment, and large
public investment in infrastructure, education, and services are credited with fueling dynamic
growth. Recent budgets have succeeded in providing for expansionary public spending
combined with tax reduction while maintaining budget surpluses. Expenditures increased in
the late 1990s at a rate of 10% annually. Revenues from buoyant domestic demand and high
growth have been sufficient to sustain the social welfare system, including substantial
pension increases.
Heavy industry is of paramount importance to the economy, and, despite the faster growth of
service industries, still accounts for the largest portion of GDP. Steel provides 25% of export
income, and all manufactured goods close to 65%. Plant utilization is greater than 90%.
Financial services are responsible for 40% of GDP, and companies supplying business
services report growth rates of more than 20% annually, the highest of any sector of the
economy. Funds managed by Luxembourg financial institutions account for 20% of the
EUs market share. This sector grew from virtually nil after the then-EC allowed funds based
in one country to be sold throughout the Community in 1985. The number of funds domiciled
in Luxembourg by 1987 had doubled to 800 by 1990 and doubled again to over 1600 by
2000, listing more than $700 billion in assets and annual profits of $3 billion.
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goods, adds value to them, and then re-exports the products. The country tends to have a
trade deficit with exporters of raw materials, including the United States.
The Dutch reliance on trade goes back to antiquity, but was particularly pronounced in the
golden age, when the country was the world's leading maritime power. The 17th century
economy was founded on trade, shipping, finance, and agriculture. The lack of raw materials
in the country meant that Dutch investors who became involved in industrial production sent
their capital abroad. By 1850, Belgium, which had been industrialized earlier, had five times
as many railroad lines and steam-powered industrial enterprises as the Netherlands.
Late in the 19th century, however, the Netherlands did enter a period of rapid
industrialization, centered on shipbuilding, the manufacture of engines and vehicles, food
processing, and chemicals. An international butter dealer, Antoon Jrgens, bought the patent
in 1871 for a product he named margarine, and was soon employing thousands of workers.
A bit later, in 1890, the Philips brothers began to make light bulbs in the town of Eindhoven.
Because of its reliance on international trade, the depression of the 1930s hit the Netherlands
even harder than it did most other countries. Unemployment averaged 25% between 1932
and 1939, with as much as one-third of the labor force out of work. The Dutch economy was
also hard hit in the 1970s when its industrial base became non-competitive on international
markets. In 1970, 5% of all Dutch industrial jobs were in shipbuilding. By the mid-1980s,
the last of the major shipbuilding yards collapsed, unable to compete with costs that were
50% lower in Japan. Similarly, the number of textile and clothing manufacturing jobs was
reduced from 60,000 to 20,000 between 1968 and 1978. The coalmining sector was
completely eliminated.
The fastest growth sectors in the Dutch economy in the 1960s and 1970s were
technologically advanced, capital intensive, and relatively light in the use of labor to produce
value. These include such industries as chemicals, metallurgy, electronics, and oil refining.
At the same time, between 1963 and 1980, the share of the labor force in traditional
industries declined substantially as firms responded to escalating labor costs by moving their
low-skilled industrial jobs abroad. By 1980, there were only 40% as many jobs in lowtechnology industrial sectors as in high-technology sectors. The industrial share of the labor
force fell from 36% in the early 1970s to 27% in 1987.
This structural transformation has moved the Dutch economy into the services sector, with
the remaining manufacturing activities becoming ever more capital-intensive and high valueadded. Services now make up over 70% of the Dutch economy. Traditional economic
activities, such as dairy farming, have increased in scale and become significantly more
capital-intensive. The largest half dozen Dutch firms, which together account for over a
quarter of all employment, have more employees outside of the Netherlands as they do
within the country.
Although the strategy of rapidly escalating minimum and median wages is good for
economic transformation and productivity, those with less education and those who work in
declining industries pay the price with high rates of unemployment. Since 46% of the
125
unemployed in the early 1980s had only an elementary school education, the strategy of
forcing high-technology industrial growth was bound to create a significant problem of
structural unemployment due to the mismatch between the needs of the economy and the
training of the unemployed.
Unemployment, both official and disguised, became an increasing burden on the Dutch
economy through the 1970s and 1980s. The generous Dutch welfare state could be paid for
when the number of income earners exceeded the number of benefit recipients by a factor of
eight to one, as was the case in 1960. By 1983, there were only 2.2 workers paying into the
social funds for each benefit recipient. As the earner/recipient ratio became less favorable, a
financial crunch loomed on the horizon. Nearly one-sixth of the labor force claimed
disability benefits in the early 1990s, a rate nearly three times that of the United States.
Unemployment peaked at 16% in the early 1980s, and a growing army of workers over the
age of fifty took early retirement. As a consequence, the government deficit ballooned,
resulting in a doubling of public debt between 1970 and 1987. In the mid-1980s, only 52% of
the population between 15 and 64 was employed.
The fight against unemployment (and against abuse of disability benefits) became the
centerpiece of Dutch economic policy in the 1990s. Doctors have been required since 1993
not only to indicate the extent of disability but also whether the individual is capable of
seeking alternative work. All disability beneficiaries are now reexamined periodically to
ascertain that they remain unable to work; when the program was originally designed it was
assumed that one remained disabled indefinitely. The maximum benefit has also been
reduced from 80% to 70% of the last earned wage, making disability benefits equivalent to
unemployment benefits. The duration of disability benefits has also been limited.
Even more important than reform of the disability program have been efforts to make the
labor market more flexible. Since the early 1980s, unions and employer organizations have
agreed to couple wage moderation with employment growth aided by increased flexibility in
labor markets and an aggressive strategy of publicly funded job training. The success of
these agreements has become known as the Dutch model" or the polder model. Real wages
grew in the Netherlands at a rate of just 1.5% per year between 1984 and 1990, and, during
the 1990s, real wages grew at a rate less than 1%. Between 1982 and 1996, the Netherlands
experienced 1.6% job growth per year, the same as the American rate of job creation and four
times the rate elsewhere in Europe. In 1994, there were still 500,000 unemployed in the
Netherlands; by 2002, however, that number was down to 170,000. This was less than half
the average unemployment rate elsewhere in the European Union.
Job growth in the Netherlands during the 1990s was largely in the services sector. Moreover,
a startling number of the new jobs are part-time or temporary. By 1996, 37% of all jobs in
the Netherlands were part-time, more than double the rate of part-time work in neighboring
economies. About three-quarters of Dutch women in the labor force work part-time, the
highest rate of part-time work in the OECD countries. An additional 3.5% of the labor force
works in temp jobs, also a rate substantially higher than neighboring countries. This
changing profile of the labor force represents a fundamental break from the previous
emphasis on high skill/high wage jobs in the Dutch economy. The average real wage in the
126
Netherlands compared to that of France, Germany, and Italy peaked in 1976 and has been
declining since then.
In 2002, the Dutch job-creation machine began to run out of steam, and unemployment
increased for the first time in a decade. Economic growth, which had run at 3.5 to 4% for a
decade, slipped back to 1%. Under wage pressure from a labor force at full employment,
inflation doubled in 1991 to four percent from the two percent levels that had been
maintained during the 1990s. Having put so many Dutch people into the labor force over the
last decade, the current challenge is to find ways to increase productivity in order to meet
rising aspirations without increasing unemployment and inflation.
Questions/Discussion
Define and discuss the Polder Model.
How has geography affected economic development in the Benelux countries?
Discuss the historical differences in the Belgian and Dutch economies and explain
divergence in their development.
Account for the growth of the Flemish economy in the latter half of the 20th century and
differentiate economic priorities in Flanders and Wallonia.
What are the outstanding effects of labor policy on employment in each of the Benelux
Three?
Assess the importance of the financial service sector to the Luxembourg economy.
Comment of the proposition: The Benelux countries were historically preconditioned for
globalization.
Suggested Reading
Andre MOMMEN. The Belgian Economy in the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge,
1994.
Jelle VISSER and Anton HEMERIJCK. A Dutch Miracle: Job Growth, Welfare Reform and
Corporatism in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 1997.
Joris VOORHOEVE. Peace, Profits and Principles. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974.
127
APPENDICES
BELGIUM: Legislature and Government
Chamber of Representatives (150 seats, elected to 4 year term in June 1999)
Party
% Vote
Seats
14.3
14.1
10.1
10.1
9.9
9.6
7.3
7.0
5.9
5.6
1.5
2.1
23
22
19
18
15
14
11
9
10
8
1
0
Senate (40 seats, elected to 4 year term, 31 indirectly elected in June 1999)
Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Christian-Democratic and Flemish
Reform Movement
Socialist Party (Francophone)
Flemish Bloc
Socialist Party Another Way
Ecolo
Agalev
Humanist Democratic Center
New Flemish Alliance
Indirectly Elected
15.4
14.8
10.6
9.7
9.4
8.9
7.4
7.1
6.1
5.1
6
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
31
Coalition Government formed 1999: Flemish Liberals and Democrats, Liberal Reformist,
Socialist Party (Francophone), Socialist Party (Flemish), Ecolo, and Agalev. Election
scheduled for May 18, 2003.
Head of Government since 1999: Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt (Flemish Liberal and
Democrat)
128
% Vote
Seats
30.2
24.2
22.0
10.5
7.5
3.8
1.1
19
13
15
7
5
1
0
Coalition Government formed 1999: Christian Social Peoples Party and Democratic Party.
Head of Government since 1994: Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker (Christian Social)
129
% Vote
Seats
27.9
17.0
15.4
15.1
7.0
5.9
5.1
2.5
1.7
1.6
0.4
43
26
24
23
10
9
7
4
2
2
0
First Chamber (75 seats, elected to 4-year term by provincial councilors in March 1999)
Party
% Vote
Seats
26.0
25.2
19.9
10.4
5.5
4.7
3.1
2.7
2.5
20
19
15
8
4
4
2
2
1
Coalition government formed July 2002: Christian Democratic Appeal, Peoples Party of
Freedom and Democracy, and List Pym Fortuyn. Resigned October 2002. Caretaker
government until new government is formed following elections on January 22, 2003.
Head of Government: Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende (Christian Democratic Appeal)
130
131
SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
General
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Science and Scholarship, 1990.
Carson, Patricia. The Fair Face of Flanders. Tielt, Belgium: Lannoo, 1997.
Clesse, Armand and Herman van Gunsteren, eds. The Vitality of the Netherlands.
Luxembourg: Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies, 1999.
Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Esner, Rachel. Blue Guide: The Netherlands. New York: Norton,
Flemish-Netherlands Foundation. The Low Countries: Arts and Society in Flanders and the
Netherlands. A Yearbook. Vols. 1-10. Rekkem, Belgium: Stichting Ons Erfdeel,1993-2002.
Foreign Area Studies. Belgium: A Country Study. Area Handbook Series. Edited by Stephen
B. Wickman. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985.
Foreign Service Institute. Eurojargon. A Guide to the History, Institutions, Policies, and
Buzzwords of the European Union. FSI/SPAS/AS, regularly up-dated.
_____. A Readers Guide to Benelux. FSI/SPAS/AS, 2nd ed. 1997.
Horst, Han van der. The Low Sky: Understanding the Dutch. Schiedam: Scriptum Books for
NUFFIC, 1996.
Kirsner, Robert S., ed. The Low Countries and Beyond. Lanham MD: University Press of
America, 1993.
Kossman, E.H. The Low Countries: 1780-1940. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
Kossmann-Putto, J.A. and E.H. Kossmann. The Low Countries: History of the Northern and
Southern Netherlands. Rekkem, Belgium: Stichting Ons Erfdeel, 1993.
Lyon, Margot. Belgium. New York: Walker, 1970.
de Meeus, Adrien. The History of the Belgians. New York: Praeger, 1962.
132
Newcomer, James. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: The Evolution of Nationhood. Lanham
MD: University Press of America, 1984.
Post, Harry. Pillarization: An Analysis of Dutch and Belgian Society. Aldershot: Gower,
1989.
Tomes, John. Blue Guide to Belgium and Luxembourg. New York: Norton, 1989.
Verdoost, Albert, ed. Belgium. New York: Mouton, 1978.
History
The Medieval Period
Blockmans, Willem Pieter, et al. The Promised Lands: The Low Countries under Burgundian
Rule, 1369-1530. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
Dawson, Christopher. The Making of Europe. New York: World Publishing, 1968.
Lasko, Peter. The Kingdom of the Franks. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.
Pirenne, Henri. Early Democracies in the Low Countries: Urban Society and Political
Conflict in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
The Golden Age
Barbour, Violet. Capitalism in Amsterdam in the 17th Century. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1963.
Boxer, C.R. The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800. New York: Viking Penguin, 1989.
Geyl, Pieter. The History of the Dutch-Speaking Peoples, 1555-1640. London: Phoenix Press,
2001.
____. The Revolt in the Netherlands. London: Ernest Benn, 1966.
t Hart, Marjolein C. The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics and Finance during the
Dutch Revolt. Manchester: St. Martins, 1993.
Huizinga, Johan H. Dutch Civilisation in the 17th Century and other essays. London:
Collins/The Fontana Library, 1968.
_____. Erasmus and the Age of the Reformation. New York: Harper, 1957.
133
Israel, Jonathan. Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990.
______. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
Nierop, H.F.K. van. The Nobility of Holland: From Knights to Regents, 1500-1650. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Parker, Geoffrey. The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
______. The Dutch Revolt. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
Price, J.L. Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Politics of
Particularism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Schama, Simon. The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the
Golden Age. New York: Alfred J. Knopf, 1987.
Modern History
Aronson, Theo. Defiant Dynasty: The Coburgs of Belgium. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968.
Hochschild, Adam. King Leopolds Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in
Colonial Africa. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999.
Jacob, Margaret C. and Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, eds. The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth
Century: Decline, Enlightenment, and Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
Newton, Gerald. The Netherlands: An Historical and Cultural Survey, 1795-1977. Boulder
CO: Westview, 1978.
Thomas, Daniel. The Guarantee of Belgian Independence and Neutrality in European
Diplomacy. Kingston RI: D.H. Thomas, 1984.
Witte, Els, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen. The Political History of Belgium from 1830
Onwards. Brussels: Standaard Uitgeverij/VBU UP, 2000.
Politics and Foreign Policy
Andeweg, Ruby B. and Galen A. Irwin. Dutch Politics and Government. New York: St
Martins Press, 1993.
Dinan, Desmond. Ever Closer Union. 2nd edition. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
134
Fitzmaurice, John. The Politics of Belgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society.
New York: St. Martins Press, 1983.
Gladdish, Kenneth. Governing from the Center: Politics and Policy-Making in the
Netherlands. DeKalb IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991.
Helmreich, Jonathan E. Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy. The
Hague: Mouton, 1976.
Lijphart, Arend. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the
Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
Rochon, Thomas. The Netherlands: Negotiating Sovereignty in an Interdependent World.
Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1999.
Voorhoeve, Joris J.C. Peace, Profits and Principles. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974.
Witte, Els and Harry van Velthoven. Language and Politics: The situation in Belgium in an
historical perspective. Brussels: VUB University Press, 1999.
Geography
Diem, Aubrey. Western Europe: A Geographical Analysis. New York: Wiley, 1979.
Hall, Peter. The World Cities. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.
Economics
Cox, Robert H. The Development of the Dutch Welfare State: From Workers Insurance to
Universal Entitlement. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
Mommen, Andre. The Belgian Economy in the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, 1996.
Visser, Jelle and Anton Hemerijck, A Dutch Miracle: Job Growth, Welfare Reform and
Corporatism in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 1997.
Language and Literature
Irving, R.E.M. The Flemings and Walloons of Belgium. Report No. 46. London: Minority
Rights Group, 1980.
Meijer, Reinder P. Literature of the Low Countries. Cheltenham: Stanley Thornes, 1978.
135
Luxembourg
www.resttena.lu/luxembourg/lux_welcome.html
The Netherlands
www.bz.minbuza.nl
www.nbt.nl
European Union
http://europa.eu.int
www.eurunion.org
United States Department of State
www.state.gov for Background Notes
136
Newspapers
www.FT.com (Financial Times)
www.yahoo.com/news/newspapers
Videos
Antonias Line (Dutch: Netherlands/Flanders)
Ciske the Rat (Dutch: Netherlands)
Daens (Dutch and French: Belgium)
The Discovery of Heaven (Dutch: Netherlands)
For a Lost Soldier (Dutch: Netherlands)
Rembrandt 1659 (Dutch: Netherlands)
Soldier of Orange (Dutch: Netherlands)
The Vanishing (Dutch: Netherlands)
The Wall (French and Dutch: Belgium)
137
ADDENDUM
Seats/150
+/-2002
28.6
44
+ 2
Labor Party
27.3
42
+19
28
+ 4
Socialist Party
6.3
5.7
-18
Green Left
5.1
- 2
Democrats 66
4.1
- 1
Christian Union
2.1
- 1
1.6
0.5
Liveable Netherlands
0.4
138
- 2