Philcomsat v. Alcuaz, 180 Scra 218 (1989)
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz, 180 Scra 218 (1989)
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz, 180 Scra 218 (1989)
reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its
service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still
has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on
which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as
the requirement of reasonableness. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory
provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
"Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and
hearing. - The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice
and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and
saving provisions to the contrary:
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, x x x which shall
be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public
service; x x x."
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to
respondent NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the
contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make
such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary
or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present
case. While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have
other sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent
NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge
or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even
if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effecive on a specified
date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to
remain in force pending the final determination of the case. An order of respondent
NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust,
unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low,
since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In
fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by
the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a
reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable
return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes indubitable, which
brings us to the issue on substantive due process.