United States v. Tabari A. Spann, 4th Cir. (1999)
United States v. Tabari A. Spann, 4th Cir. (1999)
United States v. Tabari A. Spann, 4th Cir. (1999)
No. 99-4398
TABARI A. SPANN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
(CR-99-6)
Submitted: September 30, 1999
Decided: October 20, 1999
Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges,
and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
W. James Hoffmeyer, NETTLES, MCBRIDE & HOFFMEYER,
P.A., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United
States Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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addressed the issue raised here have uniformly held that both adjustments may be applied where each is triggered by separate conduct.
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Matos , ___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL
727038, at *11 (11th Cir. Sept. 17, 1999); (assault on officer with
vehicle followed by high speed chase); United States v. Miner, 108
F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Alexander, 48
F.3d 1477, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995) (high-speed chase during which shots
fired at pursuing officers resulting in danger to police and public);
United States v. Swoape, 31 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir. 1994) (high-speed
chase in which three officers shot and public endangered). Cf. United
States v. Hayes, 135 F.3d 435, 438 (6th Cir. 1998) (one incident justifying only one adjustment where defendant rammed several police
cars with his vehicle, injuring a police officer and endangering a child
in his own vehicle).
The Fourth Circuit precedents on which Spann relies are not controlling. Neither United States v. Sloley, 19 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1994),
nor United States v. John, 935 F.2d 644, 646 (4th Cir. 1991),
addressed the precise issue raised here. Moreover, we find no error in
the district court's determination that Spann's assault with a semiautomatic weapon on the police officers near the bank was a separate
occurrence from the flight at high speed, and that the latter created a
separate risk of death or serious injury to both the children and the
public, and warranted an adjustment under 3C1.2.
We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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