United States v. Douglas W. Pleasants, 4th Cir. (1999)
United States v. Douglas W. Pleasants, 4th Cir. (1999)
United States v. Douglas W. Pleasants, 4th Cir. (1999)
No. 98-4506
DOUGLAS W. PLEASANTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, District Judge.
(CR-96-21-F)
Submitted: April 30, 1999
Decided: June 18, 1999
Before MURNAGHAN and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Joseph E. Zeszotarski, Jr., POYNER & SPRUILL, L.L.P., Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States
Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Christine
Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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sey concerning the contents of the letter and to explore the issue of
bias by eliciting testimony that both witnesses were eager to receive
a reduction in their sentences by testifying.
Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
the Government to read the prior testimony of a witness into evidence. Although the witness testified at Pleasants' first trial, he
refused to testify at the second, and the district court properly found
him "unavailable" pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(2). We find Pleasants' conclusory allegation that the Government created the witness'
unavailability to be unsupported by the record. We further reject
Pleasants' claim that the reading of the witness' prior testimony
deprived him of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Pleasants' attorney's cross-examination in the prior proceeding was read
into evidence, and we find that this satisfied the requirements of Rule
804(b)(1).
The district court's factual determination concerning the amount of
drugs attributable to Pleasants should be upheld absent clear error.3
See United States v. Lamarr, 75 F.3d 964, 972 (4th Cir. 1996). In
addition, Pleasants bore the burden of showing that the drug amounts
contained in the presentence report were inaccurate, and his conclusory allegations failed to satisfy this burden. See United States v.
Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (mere objections alone are
insufficient). As a member of the conspiracy, Pleasants was accountable for all of the drugs reasonably foreseeable to him. See United
States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 78 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gilliam,
987 F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (4th Cir. 1993). Since the amount of drugs
seized (none) did not reflect the scale of the offense, the district court
was allowed to estimate the amount attributable to Pleasants. See
United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 887 (4th Cir. 1994).
The evidence in this case showed that the Pleasants family operated
a major drug distribution conspiracy over a period of approximately
fifteen years. Several witnesses provided testimony and information
concerning the amount of drugs they purchased from the Pleasants.
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3 The district court held Pleasants liable for all of the drugs distributed
to the four "customers" he regularly delivered to, even though he did not
personally make all of the deliveries.
4