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Marguerita Dillard v. Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster General of The United States, 108 F.3d 1369, 2d Cir. (1997)

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108 F.

3d 1369

NOTICE: THIS SUMMARY ORDER MAY NOT BE CITED


AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY, BUT MAY BE CALLED
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT
STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY
CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR
RES JUDICATA. SEE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE 0.23.
Marguerita DILLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General of the United States,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 96-6230.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.


March 21, 1997.

FOR APPELLANT: STEPHEN J. ELLIOT, New York, N.Y. (Stuart W.


Gold, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, of counsel).
FOR APPELLEE: NEIL M. CORWIN, Assistant United States Attorney,
New York, N.Y. (Mary Jo White, United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, Steven M. Haber, Assistant United States Attorney,
of counsel).
Present JACOBS, LEVAL CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York and was argued.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,


ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant, Marguerita Dillard, appeals from a June 28, 1996 judgment


of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Mukasey, J.), dismissing her discrimination action against the United State
Postal Service. Dillard contends that the district court erred (1) in dismissing
her claims for failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies and (2) in
denying her request to obtain discovery supposedly relevant to her defense of
the Postal Service's motion to dismiss.
4

The district court dismissed Dillard's complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), or alternatively, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The
district court's 12(b)(1) dismissal and its 12(b)(6) dismissal were both based on
the same rationale--that Dillard did not timely exhaust her administrative
remedies and was not entitled to a tolling of those deadlines on either equitable
grounds or on the basis of the applicable regulatory tolling provision.

The analysis under 12(b)(1), however, implicates issues of sovereign immunity


and jurisdiction that are apparently undecided by this Court. We need not
address these potentially novel issues because black-letter principles, applicable
both to the analysis under 12(b)(1) and that under 12(b)(6), are fully sufficient
to justify affirmance for the reasons stated in the district court's thorough and
well-reasoned opinion. See Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155
(2d Cir.1996) ("On some occasions ... considerations of judicial economy and
restraint may persuade the court to avoid a difficult question of subject-matter
jurisdiction when the case may be disposed of on a simpler ground.");
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 154-60 (2d Cir.1990). In
short, we agree entirely with Judge Mukasey that there is no basis for tolling
the filing deadlines; we therefore affirm the dismissal of Dillard's complaint for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6); and do not reach the issue of
whether the 12(b)(1) dismissal was proper.

The district court's decision to deny Dillard's discovery request was also proper
and we affirm that decision also for the reasons stated in Judge Mukasey's
opinion.

We have considered all of Dillard's contentions on this appeal and have found
them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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