2016 Land Titles and Deeds Agcaoili
2016 Land Titles and Deeds Agcaoili
2016 Land Titles and Deeds Agcaoili
II-MANRESA 2016
2016
[LAND TITLES AND DEEDS]
Agcaoili Book; Atty. Panes Lectures; LA Notes
Sec. 1 Title of Decree This decree shall be known as the Property Registration Decree.
SECOND CASE: G.R. No. 173775 a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by PGMA classifying
Regalian Doctrine (Art. 12, Sec. 2 of the 1987 PC)
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
all lands of whatever classification and other natural
During the pendency of the 1st case, PGMA issued Proclamation No.
resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
1064 classifying Boracay Island into
private ownership belong to the State
1.
(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and
Jura Regalia
2.
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (A/D).
private title to a land must be traced to some grant, express
3.
(15m) buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and
or implied, or from its successors
trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of
The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land
the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
titles in the Philippines. This refers to Royal Rights that all
lands were formerly held by the King.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants , owners of beach resorts
(Maam Panes): refers to private ownership and how private
in Boracay filed with this Court an action to nullify PGMAs proclamation
ownership of lands were given by virtue of the royal rights
claiming that it infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of
possessed by the King
Boracay; there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land; and Being classified as neither mineral nor timber
Exceptions to Regalian Doctrine
land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill
1) Native Title (Carino v. Insular) refers to pre-conquest
of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first PLA. Thus, their
rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
by ICCs/Indigenous Peoples, have never been public lands,
and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held the
OSG argued that petitioners-claimants Boracay is an unclassified
same way since before Spanish Conquest
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
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in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.
SPANISH RULE
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.
The Laws Of The
Indies
And
The
Royal Cedulas
Ley Hipotecaria Or
The Mortgage Law
Of 1893.
The Royal Decree
Of 1894 Or The
Maura Law
OCENPO 30 Years
PD No. 1073,
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely:
a)
titulo real or royal grant;
b)
concesion especial or special grant;
c)
composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
PD No. 892
d)
titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
February 16, 1976
e)
informacion posesoria or possessory information title.
Spanish Titles may
no longer be used
as evidence of
ownership due to
the rise of several
AMERICAN RULE
conflicting claims of
Philippine Bill of
1) AGRICULTURAL ( those public lands acquired from Spain which
ownership
1902
are not timber or mineral lands)
US assumed
2) MINERAL
administration of
a.
absolute grant (freehold system)
b.
lease (leasehold system)
the Phil. Is. After the
3) TIMBER OR FOREST LANDS.
1898 Treaty of Paris
Does not create title nor vest one, simply confirms and register
introduced the HOMESTEAD SYSTEM ,
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
Act No. 926
titles
A POSITIVE ACT DECLARING LAND AS ALIENABLE AND
First Public Land
i. OCENPO of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)DISPOSABLE
years
IS REQUIRED. In keeping with the presumption of State
Act
preceding July 26, 1904
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
October 7, 1903
SALE OR LEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS.
be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
inalienable public land into disposable land for
title to public lands
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality ofdeclassifying
persons
agricultural
or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
in the Philippines
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands
of the public
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been
remained in the
domain
officially delimited and classified.
govt and its title
judges of courts have the authority to determine classification of
sprung from Treaty
lands
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF
of Paris
CFIs had power to adjudicate cases relating to land titles
andOWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS
STATE
ON THE PERSON APPLYING FOR REGISTRATION (or claiming
disputes
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
To overcome this presumption,
Cadastral system of registration when in the alienable
opinion of or
the disposable.
incontrovertible
President, the public interest requires that the title to
any lands be evidence must be established that the land subject of
application
settled and adjudicated, he shall order the DoL tothe
make
survey (or claim) is A/D.
Act. No. 2259
Cadastral Act
Feb. 11, 1913
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In this case records bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is A/D.
Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Who may classify lands?
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All is not lost, however. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of
right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as
builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect
their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or
sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from
certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such
bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or
a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may
not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification
of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is
no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to
protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance
between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important
as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of
our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly
observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many
have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often,
about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification.
For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or
ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up;
rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The
fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease
to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile
topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come
the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives.
Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.
REPUBLIC V. NAGUIAT
FACTS: Respondent Celestina Naguiat filed for an application for
registration of 4 parcels of land located in Zambales. She alleges that
she is the owner of the subject lands having acquired them from LID
Corporation. LID Corp. acquired the land from Calderon, Moraga, Monje
and their predecessors in interest who have been in OCENPO for more
than 30 years. She believes that the lots are not mortgaged nor
encumbered.
RP opposed the application alleging
1) No OCENPO since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
2) muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide
acquisition of the lands applied for or of his OCENPO ;
3) applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that
4) parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging
to RP not subject to private appropriation.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Naguiat which was
subsequently affirmed by the CA. Hence, the appeal before the SC. The
Republic faults the CA on its finding which respects the length of
Naguiats occupation of the subject property and for not considering
the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have
been declassified from forest land to A&D property.
ISSUE: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the
status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?
RULING: SC had an opportunity to discuss the concept of Regalian
Doctrine in this case. It states that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State that is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof to overturn the presumption that the land subject
of an application is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. The
SC said that the CA, in this case, assumed that the lands in question
are already A&D. CA ratiocinated that the possession of Naguiat of the
lands created a legal fiction where without judicial declaration, the
same ceases to be a public land and becomes private property ipso
jure.
Respondent Naguiat did not present any incontrovertible proof that
there has been a positive act from the government which reclassified
the land applied for as A&D. The tax receipts cannot be a sufficient
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proof for there is no information about the classification of the property
on it. Instead, the applicant could have obtained a Certificate of Land
Classification from the DENR as a valid proof. Since the land is
unclassified, according to SC, the same cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation. Occupation on such land in the concept of an owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered
title. To this, the application of Naguiat to have the lands registered is
denied.
ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
347 SCRA 128
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the
constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997) together with its implementing rules and
regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous people.
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous people. For this reason, it prays that the
petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa countered the
constitutionality of IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground that
they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources. Also, that the law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands, it might
include private lands found within the said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian
Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to
dismiss the petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the
same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the
same. According to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be
dismissed. The constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371s unconstitutionality:
1.
It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public
Domains. That this is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the
Constitution that only agricultural lands of the public domain can
be considered as alienable and disposable lands.
2.
No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the countrys
natural resources and 1/3 of the countrys land will be
concentrated to 12 Million IPs, and while 60 million other Filipinos
will share the remaining. These figures violates the constitutional
principle of a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth among Filipinos.
3.
It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of
Natural Resources
4.
Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State
and Cannot be Alienated or Ceded
Judicial Proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall
1) be
Publication
2) Mailing
in rem
3) Notice
Based on generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system
CFI shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
Who may apply for registration?
all applications for original registration of title to lands,
A: Sec. 14, p. 1-4 OPAL
including all improvements and interests therein, and
1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
interest have been in OCENPO of AD lands of the public
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
petitions.
1945 or earlier
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thereof by means of publication, mailing and posting. Any
person claiming an interest in the land may appear and file
an opposition, stating all his objections to the application.
The case shall be heard and all conflicting claims of
ownership shall be determined by the court.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the
registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future
litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TITLE AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future
TITLE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who
Source of right
Merely confirms a title already existing
are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, EXCEPT as to
Foundation of ownership
Mere evidence of ownership
rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
Best evidence of ownership
Best evidence of title
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be
defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession.
REGISTERED TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM CAN NOT BE
LEGARDA V. SALEEBY
DEFEATED BY PRESCRIPTION (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
G.R. No. L-8936
October 2, 1915
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one
can plead ignorance of the registration.
CASE: Land is registered under the name of two persons
FACTS:
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two
o
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GENERAL RULE: "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any
reason, in any court,
EXCEPTION: fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year.
Q: If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason,
except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such
decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a
portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration?
We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be
deprived of his registered title in that way. We have in this jurisdiction a
general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name
of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among
other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two
different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first
inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each
of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real
ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the
opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier
in date shall prevail.
In the present case, the appellee SALEEBY was the first negligent
(granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner
he cannot complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the
appellants. Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the
wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the
name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his
mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no
more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him.
IN CASE OF DOUBLE REGISTRATION UNDER THE LAND
REGISTRATION ACT, THAT THE OWNER OF THE EARLIEST
CERTIFICATE IS THE OWNER OF THE LAND. That is the rule
between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive
vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the
other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original
certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the
vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his
vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.
Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner
as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast
some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the
vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the
vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which
the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of
third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an
"innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or
interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by
virtue of the provisions of said sections.
UNDER THE RULE OF NOTICE, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE PURCHASER
HAS EXAMINED EVERY INSTRUMENT OF RECORD AFFECTING THE TITLE.
Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption
cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original
deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule
requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil
Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .
1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to
be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of
the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead
ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the
land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the
recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea
that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser
of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must
take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon
all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can
plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is
contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows
clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory
and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of
land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent
purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been
registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the
opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to
such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in
the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied
to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the
owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can
be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record
contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a
prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or
his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the
safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser,"
used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under
the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens
system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could
Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land
included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for
example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included
in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his
vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his
vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The
record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the
possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the
rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the
question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that
these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than
the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser
from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be
required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like
the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who
has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original
certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in
their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and
who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of
land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts
contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is
charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first
certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the
difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system
and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to
decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry
upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the
view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system,
supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be
sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once
land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record
alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status
of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have
acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who
acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS Corp. vs.CA
G.R. No. 83383
May 6, 1991
FACTS:
In 1982, Solid State, a domestic corporation, filed an action for
quieting of title on a parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite which was
allegedly registered by Virata in his name by fraudulently obtaining a
title through an administrative reconstitution of a non-existent original
title of the land, and that by reason of said reconstitution, there now
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exists a cloud on the title of Solid State. Solid State alleges that it
bought the land from Julian Pearanda who obtained the same through
the grant of application for the sale of a friar land from the
government. The land was registered in the name of Pearanda in
1969 under CA 32. Pearanda's occupation of the land is derived
through a voluntary assignment of right of the former occupant, Mabini
Legaspi, and that the same is free from claims and conflicts and that
the said applicant has established his rights over the subject land, in
view of which, said investigator recommended that said lot be awarded
to applicant Julian Pearanda according to law.
Virata countered saying that he bought the land from Mabini Legaspi
who obtainedownership in 1957 on the subject land after the Director
of Lands sold the same at public auction. Official Receipts of payment
for the instalments were shown as a proof. The title was reconstituted
since the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned including the ROD
office which holds the title to the subject property. Legaspi also denied
that she sold the land to Julan Pearanda. RTC ruled in favor of Virata
which was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal
before the SC.
..
Issue:
WON CA correctly held that Virata is the true and lawful owner of the
subject property? NO.
Ruling:
Solid State contends that Act No. 1120 or Friar Lands Act provides the
procedure for the sale and disposition of
the friar lands to private persons. The acquisition by Pearanda was in
compliance with all legal requisites laid down by the law for the validity
of the sale. He further contended that the issuance to Mabini Legaspi of
a COT in her favor was a violation of the Friar Lands Act as there was
no required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
The friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual
settlers and occupants at the time said
lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first
issue a certificate stating therein that the
government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant.
The latter then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the
purchase price so fixed and in the instalments and at the interest
specified in the certificate. Subject to a resolutory condition that nonpayment of price in full may cancel the sale. The court said that the
title Pearanda has the valid acquisition from the government of the
subject friar land since it was in compliance with law and hence, the
sale in favor of Solid State is valid and binding. Contrary to that, the
SC said while the sale of the lot to Legaspi occurred much earlier in
time, the same cannot be considered as a ground to for him to be
considered the true owner of the land. Legaspi did not present an
evidence showing that a certificate of sale was ever issued by the BoL
in his favor. The existence of the official receipts showing payment of
the price of the land by Legaspi does not prove that the land was
legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale. Legaspi also
alleged that he purchased the land in a sale at public auction, which
procedure is nowhere provided in the pertinent laws conveying friar
lands. The law expressly state that an actual occupant of the land shall
purchase the lot occupied by him at a private sale not in a public
auction. There was also absence of a deed of conveyance to Legaspi by
the government after the full payment of the instalments on the
disputed lot.
Time and again, registration does not vest title to the land, but
merely a procedure to establish
evidence over realty. Even if the 1 year period has already lapsed,
the title did not become incontrovertible but it is a null and void for not
complying with the requirements of the law. Therefore, Virata could not
have validly obtained title to the land
FULLTEXT RULING:
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would be well for this
Court to discuss them jointly.
Petitioner does not question the factual findings made by the
respondent appellate court and supported by the records (p. 22, Rollo).
It does not however accept the legal conclusion made by the appellate
court and trial court that the registered title of private respondent to
the land should prevail over its own title.
Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the
Friar Lands Act provides the procedure for the sale and disposition of
the friar lands to private persons; that pursuant thereto, the acquisition
by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Julian Pearanda of the disputed
Lot 7449, which was formerly part of the friar lands estate, was in
compliance with all legal requisites laid down in Act No. 1120, for the
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the name of Pearanda, and when the latter sold the land to petitioner,
TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT No. T-80889 was issued in favor
of the latter.
Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by Pearanda was in
compliance with law. The execution of the sales contract vested the
right of ownership in Pearanda over the land. There is no doubt
whatsoever that the said sale was valid as it was approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the sale made
by Pearanda in favor of the petitioner transferred the ownership of the
land in favor of the latter resulting in the proper issuance of TCT No. T80889 in its name.
On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the acquisition of title
by respondent VIRATA are clearly shown in the records. The latter's
predecessor, Mabini Legaspi bought Lot 7449 in a sale by public
auction held on May 5, 1943 conducted by the Bureau of Lands and
friar lands agent Severino Rivera, and paid the purchase price thereof
in installments in 1943; that on December 12, 1944, the Bureau of
Lands sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting the
issuance of certificates of title to several persons including Mabini
Legaspi, in whose favor TCT A-2188 was issued; that subsequently on
December 6, 1957, she sold the disputed land to respondent Virata,
which was evidenced by a deed of sale registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite on December 10, 1957; that on the same date, TCT
No. 11520 was issued in the name of Virata. Due to the fire which
gutted the building housing the Registry of Cavite on June 7, 1959, the
latter administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No. 11520 on
September 1, 1959, based on the owner's duplicate certificate and
renumbered the same as TCT No. 1120 RT 1660.
Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi occurred much earlier
than the date of acquisition of same lot by petitioner's predecessor,
and the evidence presented by respondent Virata indicates that the
latter's predecessor paid the purchase price of Lot No. 7449 on
installments. Nowhere in the evidence for the respondent or in
the records of this case however, would show that a certificate
of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of Lands, which would
vest ownership and title over the land in favor of Mabini
Legaspi. The existence of the official receipts showing payment of the
price of the land by Legaspi does not prove that the land was legally
conveyed to her without any contract of sale having been executed by
the government in her favor. Viewed from all angles, the acquisition
of the lot by Legaspi was highly irregular and void, and not in
compliance with the procedure mandated by law for the sale of
friar lands. For one thing, Mabini Legaspi allegedly purchased the
land in a sale at public auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in
Act No. 1120 or in C.A. 32, as amended by C.A. 316. The laws expressly
state that an actual occupant of the land shall purchase the lot
occupied by him at a private sale and not in a sale at public auction
(Sec. 2, C.A. 32 as amended). Further, neither was there any deed of
conveyance issued to Legaspi by the government after the full
payment of the installments on the disputed lot.
Highly significant at this point is the fact that there was neither
allegation nor proof that the sale was with the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. The absence of such
approval made the supposed sale null and void ab initio.
Without the certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the ownership of
the land from the government Mabini Legaspi and without the required
approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, We
find that Mabini Legaspi did not in any manner acquire
ownership over the land in 1943. The ownership or title over the
friar land, specifically Lot No. 7449 remained in the government
until Pearanda, petitioners predecessor, lawfully acquired
ownership over the same lot on February 28, 1969 by virtue of
a sales contract executed in his favor.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not
vest ownership upon her over the land nor did it validate the alleged
purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it has been
held that registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence
of such title over a particular property. Our land registration
laws do not give the holder any better title than that what he
actually has (De man et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L- 46935
December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232, June
22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656).
Although a period of one year has already expired from the
time the certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi
pursuant to the alleged sale from the government, said title
does not become incontrovertible but is null and void since the
acquisition of the property was in violation of law.
possession thereof for a long period of time is not barred from bringing
an action for reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title which
was illegally or wrongfully acquired. In actions for reconveyance of
property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was
void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing.
Being null and void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi and the
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced no legal effects
whatsoever. Quod nullum est nullum producit affectum. There being no
title to the land that Mabini Legaspi acquired from the government, it
follows that no title to the same land could be conveyed by the former
to respondent Virata. Even assuming that respondent Virata was a
purchaser in good faith and for value, the law is, as between two
persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any
negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of
registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights . Further if a person happened to obtain property
by mistake or to the prejudice of another with or without bad faith, the
certificate of title which may have been issued to him under the
circumstances may and should be cancelled or corrected. Our
unavoidable conclusion in this case is that the title of petitioner
under the Torrens land system should be upheld considering
that no previous valid title to the same land existed.
Petition granted.
GREY ALBA VS. DE LA CRUZ
17 SCRA 49
Facts:
Petitioners are heirs of Segunda Alba Clemente. They, as co-owners
sought for the registration of a parcel of
land located in Baliuag, Bulacan. The land is said to be an agricultural
one used for the raising of rice and sugar cane. This petition for
registration was granted by the court. Subsequently, Anacleto Dela
Cruz objected before the court asking for the revision of the case. Dela
Cruz alleged that the decree of registration was fraudulently obtained
by the petitioners and that included in the parcels of land Albas sought
to register is the two parcels of land he inherited from his father which
was a state grant. To this the court revised its decision which excludes
the two parcels of land claimed by Dela Cruz.
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Anacleto
De La Cruz? YES.
Ruling:
It is admitted that Dela cruz was occupying the two parcels of land at
the time the appellants presented their petition for registration. That
Dela Cruz did not appear in the petition as an occupant and also that
he is alleged to be a tenant for the Albas the reason why the latter did
not include his name in the petition as occupant. It is proved that the
Uncle of the petitioners, who took care of them after their parents died,
have leased the property to Anacletos Father. Anacleto agreed that
there was a lease but the two parcels of land he is claiming were not
included in the lease contract. The fact that the petitioners were able
to have the subject land registered will tell us that such registration is
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government,
whether their names are mentioned in the application or included in
the general description to all who it may concern. By express
provision of the law, such as the Land Registration Act, the world are
made parties-defendant by the description in the notice to all
whom it may concern.Though, Anacleto De la Cruz was not
served with notice, he was already made a party defendant by
publication and the entering of the decree in 1908 must be
held conclusive against all persons including him. The SC said it
was error for the lower court to have opened the decree and
modified the judgment on account of absence, infancy, or other
disability. It could have been opened only on the ground that
the decree was obtained through fraud.
While it was alleged that there was fraud, the SC did not consider such
allegation. It ruled that the petitioners
honestly believed that Anacleto was occupying the lands as their
tenant. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive another
of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and
proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud.To this, the
SC said that the Lower Courts decision be reinstated and the decision
of the Appellate Court be reversed.
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RTCs Exclusive Jurisdiction (Sec. 2 (2) of PD 1529)
JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT
1) All applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements
and
MATTER
interests therein
of an action is conferred only by law. It
2) All petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear nature
and determine
may not be conferred by consent or waiver
all question arising upon such applications or petition
upon a court which otherwise would have no
MTCs delegated jurisdiction
MTCs may hear and determine land registration cases in the following instances: jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
1) Lot sought to be registered is not subject to controversy or opposition action
Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to
2) Lot is contested, but the value thereof does not exceed 100, 000
a.
Such value is ascertained by
the consent or agreement of the parties.
by the affidavit of the claimant
jurisdictional
by the agreement of the respective claimants (if there be more than one), or
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property
VENUE OF AN ACTI
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title to lands, including improvements and interest therein, and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
The COURT through its CLERK OF COURT shall
1.
furnish the Land Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and
decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration,
2.
WITH THE EXCEPTION of stenographic notes,
3.
within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on
the faces of the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition
in the place where the lands are situated, pursuant to the following
rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved,
or a portion thereof, is situated.[19]
VDA. DE ARCEO VS. CA
185 SCRA 489
Facts:
Spouses Arceo are owners of four parcels of unregistered lands located
in Bulacan. They had one Son named Esteban who had 5 children.
Estebans children and their children are the parties involved in this
case. In 1941, Spouses Arceo executed a donation inter vivos in favor
of Jose, one of Estebans children. Since 1942, Jose paid the taxes, took
personal possession of the land and claimed it as his own. In 1941,
also, Arceos supposedly
signed a deed of donation mortis causa to give away the subject
properties in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose. However, the
said document was notarized in 1944 only after Mrs. Arceo died.
Subsequently, the wife of Jose, together with their children, filed with
the cadastral court an application for
registration in their names the subject lands. This was contested by
Pedro and Lorenzo, Joses siblings contending that they are entitled to
a part of the subject parcels of land. The cadastral court rejected the
registration and distributed the properties according to law on intestate
succession instead. The CA affirmed its decision.
Issue: WON the cadastral court has jurisdiction in determining the
ownership of lands?
Ruling:
As to the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of PD 1529 provides that RTC,
sitting as a land registration court, is no
longer circumscribed as it is in the previous law. PD 1529 eliminated
the general jurisdiction of RTC and the limited jurisdiction of RTC acting
merely as a cadastral court; the purpose of this is to avoid multiplicity
of suits.
In this case, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming
jurisdiction in the determination of issues on
ownership, which at the same time involves the issue on the right of
registration. There would be a multiplicity of suits or the registration
will be prolonged if not impossible should the cadastral court decide
not to pass upon the issue of ownership.
As to the issue of co-ownership:
Joses wife contends that they acquired the lot through acquisitive
prescription. This was rejected by the SC. The Civil Code provides that
prescription does not lie against co-owners, unless the following
requisites concur.
a.
There is a clear showing that the claimant has
repudiated the co-ownership.
b.
He has made known to the co-owners that he is
assuming exclusive ownership over the property.
c.
Clear and convincing evidence thereof.
d.
His possession is OCEN.
This circumstances were not present in the case at bar. The fact of
paying taxes cannot defeat the right of coowners to their right to enjoy
the use of their property, the same does not confer title upon a
claimant.
Nonetheless, the SC granted the petition and have the lands registered
under the name of Jose and his heirs by
virtue of the valid deed of donation inter vivos. The Supreme Court
further ruled that the donation mortis causa did not revoke the first
donation. The weight of authority is that a valid donation, once
accepted, becomes irrevocable subject to few exceptions. Finally, the
court said that the disposition in favor of Jose of the subject properties
should be respected.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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The inscription under Act No. 3344 of a transaction relating to
unregistered land was held not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of
the Civil Code, the law on double sale of the same property. The
registration should be made in the property registry to be binding upon
third persons; mere registration of a sale in ones favour does not give
him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of
the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the
earlier sale was unrecorded.
CHAPTER II
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF
DEEDS
SEC. 7. Office of the Register of Deeds. There shall be at least one Registe
each province and one for each city.
Every Registry with a
The Secretary of Justice shall define the official station and territorial jurisd
Registry upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registra
Section 4. Land Registration Commission. In order to have a more efficient execution
of the
end in view
of making every registry easily accessible to the people of th
laws relative to the registration of lands, geared to the massive and accelerated land
reform andThe province or city shall furnish a suitable space or building for th
municipalities.
social justice program of the government, there is created a commission to beRegister
known of
as Deeds
the until such time as the same could be furnished out of national fu
Land Registration Commission under the executive supervision of the Department of Justice.
Section 5. Officials and employees of the Commission. The Land Registration
Commission
Registry
of Property
shall have the same rank, compensation and privileges as those of a Judge ofinnocent
the
3rd persons.
Court of First Instance.
shall receive compensation which shall be three thousand pesos per annum less registered
than
under the Torrens System, the law gives
ownership priority to
that of the Commissioner.
He shall act as Commissioner of Land Registration during the absence or disability of 1) First registrant in good faith
2) First possessor in good faith
the Commissioner and
when there is a vacancy in the position until another person shall have been 3) Buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title
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It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
SEC. 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of
vacancy,
etc.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and
scienceof the absence, illness, suspension, or inability of the
Register of Deeds to discharge his duties, said duties shall be
stamps and that
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LABURADA V. LRA
FACTS: Spouses Laburada were the applicants for registration of a
parcel of land located in Mandaluyong City, RTC, acting as land
registration court, granted such application. After the finality of the
decision, the Sps filed a motion before the RTC requiring LRA to issue
the corresponding decree of registration, which was then granted by
RTC. However, the LRA refused to do so. To this, the Sps Laburada filed
an action for mandamus.
LRA contends that such refusal is grounded on the fact that a portion of
the subject property was a subject of a land decree in court of land
registration, that if it will be pursued, it will result to double titling
which destroys the policy and purpose of the Torrens System. The SG
sought to have the petition of the Sps Laburada dismissed after it
found out on its investigation that the title issued for the subject lot
cannot be located.
ISSUE: w/n the LRA can be compelled to issue the decree of
registration through an action for mandamus (for ministerial duties)?
NO
HELD:
There are three reasons why Mandamus is not the right remedy
1) JUDGMENT IS NOT YET EXECUTORY
The judgment Sps Laburada seek to enforce is not yet
executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration
Law. They do not have any clear legal right to implement it.
It was ruled previously that a judgment of registration does
not become incontrovertible until after the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
2) A VOID JUDGMENT IS POSSIBLE
LRAs refusal to issue a decree is based on documents which,
if verified, may render the judgment of the TC void. To this,
LRAs hesitation to issue a decree is understandable, even
imperative. If it issues the decree, it will destroy the integrity
of the Torrens System. LRA is mandated to refer to the courts
any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the
issuance of a decree of registration. They are specifically
called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings. Since in this case,
the subject property has already been decreed by the court
for registration. Hence, LRA is divested of jurisdiction.
3) ISSUANCE OF A DECREE IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT
It is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act, which may be compelled thorough
mandamus. This is because it is a judicial act involving the
exercise of discretion. Writ of mandamus can only be had
when the plaintiffs legal right to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete. But where the right sought to be enforced is in
substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus
cannot issue.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of
documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and
damages against Villafania.
ABRIGO V. DE VERA
Between two buyers of the same immovable property
registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership
priority to
the first registrant in good faith
then, the first possessor in good faith; and
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered
under the Torrens system.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property
FACTS:
Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan to Tigno-Salazar
and Cave-Go covered by a tax declaration. Unknown, however to
Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over the
parcel of land involved. The said free patent was later on cancelled by
a TCT.
On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and
lot to the Spouses Abrigo.
On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera .
De Vera registered the sale and as a consequence a TCT was issued in
her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against
Spouses Abrigo before the MTC.
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throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers
rights) - from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to
him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of
possession.34 (Italics supplied)
NOTES:
The principle in Article 1544 of the Civil Code is in full accord with
Section 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or
other voluntary instrument except a will purporting to convey or
affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the
land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding
only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent
third persons.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the
rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens
system in this wise:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better
right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean
that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give
him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the
owner of the land having previously sold the same to
somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was
held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application
to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar,
Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The
first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while
the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a
sum of money filed against the said original owners. Applying [Section
33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court held that Article
1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at
the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even
if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is
because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment
debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in
favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged
to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.
3. Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer
to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith.
Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the
registration.We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,
which we quote:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by
the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right
over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration
must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that
(t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second
sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the second
buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as
provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not
bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to
register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in
converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale
defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since
such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the
price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer
being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can
obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith
CHAPTER III
(ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS)
SECTION 14
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file
the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a
retro may file an application for the original registration of the
land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the
latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the
proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by
the instrument creating the trust.
Registration the entry of instruments or deeds in book or public
registry. To register, means to enter in a register, to record formally or
distinctly, to enroll; to enter in a list.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) The first title issued in the name
of a registered owner by the ROD over a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens System by virtue of
a) Judicial or
b) Administrative proceedings.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Subsequent issuance of ROD
pursuant to any voluntary and involuntary instrument relating to the
same land.
Note: Registration proceedings may be in rem or in personam. The
following are its distinctions.
In rem Binds the whole world
In personam To enforce a personal right against a person
Quasi in rem Deals with status, ownership or liability of a particular
property. It only operates on the question between the parties.This is
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants.
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(1) Land applied for is an agricultural public land classified as
alienable and disposable land at the time;
(2) Application for registration is filed with the proper court;
(3) Applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has
been in OCENPO thereof, under bona fide claim of ownership;
(4) Such possession and occupation has been effected since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
SECTION 14 (2) PRESCRIPTION
PRESCRIPTION
an
extraordinary
mode
of
acquiring or losing of ownership
and other real rights through the
lapse of time in the manner and
under the conditions laid down by
law.
A matter of time
It is statutory
It is based on law
based on a fixed time
LACHES
the unreasonable delay in the
bringing of a cause of action
before the courts of justice. It is
also referred to as sleeping on
your rights
A question of equity
not statutory
based on equity
the period varies
on a case-to-case basis
The basis for Sec. 14 (2) is found in Article 1113 of the Civil Code
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men
are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.
Maam: You have to be specific, because not all lands of public domain
are inalienable. Patrimonial properties of the State are still considered
public domain.
Patrimonial property Property owned by the State but which is not
devoted to public use, public service, or the development of national
wealth. It is wealth owned by the State in its private capacity.
For private lands, which are patrimonial properties of the
State, to be acquired via prescription, the following must
concur:
1) Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription, 10 years possession in good
faith and with just title; or
2) Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription, uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least 30 years,
regardless of good faith and just title; and There must be an
express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth
MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC
Facts:
In 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land located in Silang Cavity. Malabanan claimed
that he purchased the land from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in OCENPO of the land for more
than 30 years.
Aristedes Velazco, Malabanans witness, testified before the court
that the property originally belonged to a 22- hectare property owned
by Lino Velazco, her great-grandfather. Lino had 4 sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban. Esteban is Aristedes grandfather. The
property was divided among the 4 of them.
In 1996, Magdalena, Estebans wife, became the administrator of all
the properties of the Velazco sons. After Esteban and Magdalena died,
their son Virgilio succeded them in administering the properties,
including the subject land, which is owned by his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. Eduardo sold this to Malabanan.
Also, a certificate issued by CENRO, DENR dated JUNE 1, 2001 was
presented verifying the said land as A and D. RTC ruled in favor of
Malabanan. Republic appealed, now represented by the OSG, CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/Ruling:
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND, IN ORDER
TO BE REGISTRABLE UNDER SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529,
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A&D AS OF JUNE 12, 1945.
The OSG contends that all lands certified as A&D after June 12, 1945
cannot be registered either under Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 sec. 48 (b) of
Public Land Act.
The SC said such interpretation renders the mentioned provision
virtually inoperative and even precludes the government form giving it
effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as A&D.
Such unreasonableness
is aggravated of the fact the before June 12, 1945, Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state. The SC cited the case of
Naguit. Such decision provides that the Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 only
requires the property sought to be registered as already A&D
at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State has not yet released the land as A&D at the time of the
application, it is presumed that the State is still reserving its right to
utilize the property. But in this case, the property was already classified
as A&D, this shows an intention of the State to abdicate its authority
over the land.
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GRANDE V. CA
5 SCRA 524
Facts:
Petitioners Grande are the owners of a parcel of land located in the
Municipality of Magsaysay, province of Isabela. They inherited the said
land from their mother who inherited the same from her parents. The
land is registered in the name of the parents of their mother. When it
was surveyed for purposes of registration in 1930, the northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, a gradual accretion on
the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the
Cagayan River. That by 1958, an alluvial deposit of 19, 964 square
meters, more or less, had been added to the registered area.
In 1958, Grandes filed an action to quiet title to said portion formed by
accretion. They alleged that they and their predecessor-in-interest were
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession of the said land until
the Calalungs entered upon the said land under claim of ownership in
1948. The Calalungs, on the other hand, asserts that they have been in
continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of the land since prior to
the year 1933 up to the present.
RTC ruled in favor of the Grandes and ordered Calalungs to vacate the
premises. The lower court said that the land in question being an
accretion to the mother or registered land, the same belongs to
Grandes. That the same cannot be acquired by prescription since it is
considered a registered property under Section 46, Act 496, hence, it
could not be acquired by prescription. CA overturned RTCs decision
saying that prescription has already set in favor of the Calalungs.
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FACTS:
In 1953, the Director of Lands granted Binan Development Co., Inc. its
Sales Application of the land located in Davao City with an area of
250 hectares. There were protesters but then their protest was
dismissed by the Director and ordered them to vacate the subject lot.
No appeal was made from the decision. Despite that, the squatters
defied the Director of Lands order to vacate. An ejectment suit was
brought which caused the delay of the issuance of the patent.
The Director of Lands recommended to the Secretary of Natural
Resources the approval of the Sales Patent saying that the Corporation
had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution, that the land in question was free from claims
and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was legal, and the
said issuance is an exception to the prohibition of ownership by private
corporation.
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ISSUE:
whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the
application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in
question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an
alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of
continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48,
subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
RULING:
The said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Binan Corp. because it has already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time of the 1973 Constitution
took effect. Such vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution.
A vested right is defined as when the right to enjoyment has become
the property of some person as a present interest, or, it is some right
or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is
no longer open to doubt or controversy. In this case, it is undisputed
that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy. Its
compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law had the
effect of segregating the said land from public domain. The petitioners
contention that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
property should fail, the SC said, they should have applied for patent
applications if it is true.
ZARA V. DOL
FACTS:
"application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of
107 hectares parcel of land pursuant to the provisions of Act 496.
They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their
grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a
Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in
1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land
Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the
benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48,
subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse
possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years
immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry
and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of
the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in
Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by
this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan
P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be
registered by the applicants was declared public land in said
decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S.
de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a
period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in
possession, and which possession, according to them, was OCENCO
that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to
appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect
and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the
same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case
No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in
CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-judicata" in
other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior
judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the
Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently
included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same
grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land
applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in
the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion
to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of
Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee.
HELD:
Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as
amended.
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been
extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative:
- for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or
- for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based
on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years.
It may be that although they were not actual parties in that
previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as
owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in
rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive
notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly
pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment
declared the land in question to be public land.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not
disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the
proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of
Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public.
The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is
not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part
of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's
possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees
have the necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their
favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land,
and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of
Lands.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is
remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with
costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES
(SECTION 48 (b) of CA 141)
Period of possession for Judicial Confirmation of imperfect
title:
Historical Background
LAW
DATE OF
RULE
EFFECTIVIT
Y
PLA- 926
Oct. 17,
OCENPO of agricultural lands for 10
1903
years before the effectivity of this Act
2nd PLA
Nov. 29,
OCENPO of agricultural lands
2874
1919
(excluding timber and mineral lands) of
the public domain, under bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since
JULY 26, 1894
RPLA 141
Dec. 1, 1936
Possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain since JULY 26, 1984
only limited to Filipinos
RA 1942
June 22,
Possession and occupation for atleast
1957
30 years immediately preceding the
filing of the application
PD 1073
January 25,
Land must be A&D (not anymore
1977
agricultural lands of the public
domain, it must be possessed and
occupied since June 12, 1945
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alienable. The prevailing rule for OCENPO is not anymore 30
years. It is now since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The amendment
was made to jive with Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
Did PD 1529 and PD 1073 (which removed the 30 yr
requirement for OCENPO) preclude application for registration
of alienable lands of public domain commenced only after June
12, 1945?
Facts:
Carino applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in
Benguet province. Carino alleges that:
a.
His predecessors has been in the possession of the land for more
than 50 years.
b.
He was inherited the land under the Igorot customs.
However, it was not shown that Carino has a document of title to prove
ownership such as royal grant. The dispute arose when the government
opposed the registration contending that the land in question belonged
to the State.
That the Spanish law provides that all lands belonged to the Spanish
Crown (Jura Regalia), and it could not have been acquired by Carino
since prescription does not lie against the crown.
CRUZ V. DENR
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the
constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997) together with its implementing rules and
regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous people.
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous people. For this reason, it prays that the
petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa countered the
constitutionality of IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground that
they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources. Also, that the law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands, it might
include private lands found within the said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian
Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to
dismiss the petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the
same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the
same. According to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be
dismissed. The constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
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3) It has OEJ over petition for cancellation of CADT and
CALT alleged to have been fraudulently acquired to
any person
4) Issuance of certification as a precondition to grant of
permit for disposition
5) Power to cite for contempt and issue restraining
orders
Ancestral Domains Office
Responsible for identification, delineation, and recognition of
ancestral lands/domains
EMANCIPATION
PATENT,
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Homesteads
Qualified Beneficiaries
Landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof,
landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of
priority
1) Agricultural lessees and share tenants;
2) Regular farmworkers;
3) Seasonal farmworkers;
4) Other farmworkers;
5) Actual tillers or occupants of public lands
6) Collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries
7) Others directly working on the land
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DARAB
After registration with ROD
Issuance,
correction
cancellation of CLOAs or EPs
or
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable
agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands. Lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of RA 6657 are outside its coverage Natalia vs. DAR
Lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the
definition of agricultural land. It declared as unconstitutional the
provision in RA 6657 insofar as it included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR
1)
2)
3)
4)
HELD:
Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural
uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other
than DAR. Thus, for instance, the conversion of portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision for residential use and developed such prior to the
passage of the law excluded the area for CARL coverage because it
ceased to be devoted to agricultural activity.
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