Civil Procedure 32 - Uy v. Chua GR No. 183965 18 Sept 2009 SC Full Text
Civil Procedure 32 - Uy v. Chua GR No. 183965 18 Sept 2009 SC Full Text
Civil Procedure 32 - Uy v. Chua GR No. 183965 18 Sept 2009 SC Full Text
768
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009 ]
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE NGO CHUA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
24, which granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting
in the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition [1] for
the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an
illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children,
namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the
latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioner's
birth certificate be filled out with the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as
father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of
Irene's father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene's mother. Respondent
financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly
given petitioner allowances before she got married. He also provided her with
employment. When petitioner was still in high school, respondent required her to
work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to
work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondent's efforts. Petitioner and
Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as
respondent's illegitimate children. During petitioner's wedding, respondent sent his
brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was the latter who acted
as father of the bride. Respondent's relatives even attended the baptism of
petitioner's daughter.[2]
In his Answer[3] to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that
he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.[4]
Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that respondent was the only
father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished her college
education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also
presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence [5] on the
ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res judicata in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
Page 1 of 11
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October
2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually
entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which
was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision[6] dated 21 February 2000. The full
contents of said Decision reads:
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18,
2000, praying that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and
conditions of which follows:
"1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is
no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand
and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or
acknowledgement is concurred with petitioner's brother Allan, who although not a
party to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by the
declaration herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brother's (Allan)
civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent]
JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her
brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have
received in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more
claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies or business
enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and
Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA
may have interest or participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand
with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent
dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a
judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim."
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the
same. Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise
agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings
embodied in the agreement.[7]
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTCPage 2 of 11
Page 3 of 11
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be
subject to compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for
the same relief against the same defendant.[9]
proper, given that petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or
resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of
facts; a question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the
controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to
the undisputed facts.[15]
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into
between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision
dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata
in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest
of the State that there should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.[16]
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. [17]
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch
9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both
actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against
respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action between the two cases. However, the question arises as to whether the other
elements of res judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[18] In Estate of the late
Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[19] the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has
Page 5 of 11
Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No.
3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a person's civil status, which
cannot be the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the
status and filiation of a child.[22] Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. [23]
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights
and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement
cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full)
of their respective prestations.[24]
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement,
in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already
made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the
jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority
to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that was contrary to law and
public policy, even if said contract was executed and submitted for approval by both
parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the
approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a
tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The
following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta[25] is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such,
jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the
question is not whether a competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable
before it, but whether the court itself is competent under any circumstances to
adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of
the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can
never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign
state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its agent to
pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source
of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and
any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can
be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.[26]
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res
judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent's
Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; and,
Page 7 of 11
consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without
jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the
merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement
between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy,
the admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioner's
admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the
lack of filiation.[27]
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTCBranch 24 for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB,
more particularly, for respondent's presentation of evidence.
Although respondent's pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more
appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which
is reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the presentation
of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer,
therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar
to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.[28]
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence
should be granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such
inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant
recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A
demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact
favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the
material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation
necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima
facie insufficient for a recovery.[29]
Page 8 of 11
[1]
[2]
Id. at 1-6.
[3]
Id. at 19-32.
[4]
Id. at 19.
[5]
Rollo, p. 53.
Page 9 of 11
Copy of the Petition and the RTC decision in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB not
attached to the records of the petition before this Court.
[6]
[7]
[8]
Id. at 237.
[9]
Id. at 304.
[10]
Id. at 304-305.
[11]
Id. at 305.
[12]
Id. at 308.
[13]
Id. at 315.
[14]
Rollo, p. 7.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA
251, 257.
[15]
[16]
Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, 26 October 2007,
537 SCRA 513, 537.
[17]
[18]
[19]
Supra note 17, citing Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239 (2004).
[20]
Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, 17 May 2005, 458 SCRA 714, 735.
[21]
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 438,
447-448, citing Baluyut v. Baluyut, G.R. No. 33659, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 506,
511.
[22]
[23]
See Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 366 Phil. 863, 871
(1999).
[24]
[25]
[26]
Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo, G.R. No. 155785, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 85,
Page 10 of 11
97.
[27]
[28]
Condes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161304, 27 July 2007, 528 SCRA 339, 352.
[29]
Id. at 352-353.
Page 11 of 11