In Re Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson, Debtor. Lisa Baldino v. Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson Bunce D. Atkinson, Trustee, 116 F.3d 87, 3rd Cir. (1997)

116 F.
3d 87
30 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 1284, Bankr. L. Rep. P 77,422
In re Robert Frank-Leonard WILSON, Debtor.

Lisa BALDINO; Appellant,
v.
Robert Frank-Leonard WILSON; Bunce D. Atkinson, Trustee.
No. 96-5433.
United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
June 16, 1997.
Lisa Baldino, Narragansett, RI, Appellant, Pro Se.

Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, NYGAARD and ALDISERT, Circuit
Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
This appeal by Lisa Baldino from the district court's affirmance of a bankruptcy
court order requires us to decide whether the bankruptcy court abused its
discretion in denying Baldino's motion for relief from the automatic stay in
proceedings against the Debtor, Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson. Baldino sought
relief from the stay in order to proceed with a pending appeal in a state court
action against Wilson. The bankruptcy court denied the request, reasoning that
the state court appeal should not proceed until the bankruptcy court determined
whether any judgment Baldino might receive would be dischargeable. The
district court agreed and affirmed. We find two distinct grounds for reversing
the district court: (1) the bankruptcy court relied on an erroneous legal premise
in exercising its discretion to deny relief from the stay and (2) the bankruptcy
court's order effectively prevents Baldino from challenging the state court
judgment in any forum. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand to the district
court for entry of an order directing the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic
stay for the limited purpose of allowing Baldino's appeal.
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(a). This court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. In bankruptcy cases, the district court sits
as an appellate court and, therefore, we exercise plenary review over the district
court judgment. Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851
F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir.1988). We review a decision to deny the automatic stay for
abuse of discretion. See Claughton v. Mixson, 33 F.3d 4, 5 (4th Cir.1994);
Holtkamp v. Littlefield (Matter of Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505, 507 (7th
Cir.1982).
On July 27, 1989, Wilson signed and swore to a criminal complaint charging
Baldino with criminal trespass and harassment. Wilson's complaint was
subsequently dismissed. Four years later, on July 20, 1993, Baldino filed a civil
complaint against Wilson in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Baldino asserted
a claim of malicious prosecution against Wilson based on the 1989 criminal
complaint.
On February 3, 1995 the state court granted Wilson's motion for summary
judgment. The court found that Baldino had not made out a prima facie case of
malicious prosecution because she failed to show that Wilson acted without
probable cause. Baldino appealed. The parties filed briefs on appeal and
argument was scheduled for February 6, 1996. On September 7, 1995, Wilson
filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby
automatically staying the appeal.
Baldino filed a pro se motion for relief from the automatic stay, seeking
permission to complete her appeal. The bankruptcy court denied Baldino's
request, reasoning:
6
Why
would I grant stay relief before the dischargeability of the debt has been
determined? ...You could be completely successful in the State Court and not be
successful on the nondischargeability determination.... [S]imply because you prevail
in the State Court does not necessarily mean that you will prevail in a nondischargeability action ... there's no need to determine the extent and validity of
claims unless there's going to be a distribution or unless the debt has been
determined to be dischargeable.
7
The district court adopted the reasoning of the bankruptcy court and affirmed
the order denying Baldino's request for relief from the stay.
I.
8
The bankruptcy court's reasoning rests on the premise that even if Baldino
prevailed in the state court malicious prosecution action, her judgment against
Wilson would not necessarily be nondischargeable in the bankruptcy
proceeding. This premise is incorrect as a matter of law. See Laganella v. Braen
(In re Braen), 900 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1990).
In Braen, as in the present case, the debtor was sued in New Jersey state court
for malicious prosecution. The state court action in Braen went to trial and a
jury entered a verdict against the debtor. The verdict included a finding that the
debtor "was activated by a malicious motive in prosecuting the criminal
complaint," a finding which is a necessary element for a claim of malicious
prosecution. Id. at 623. Before the successful plaintiff in the malicious
prosecution action could collect on the judgment, the debtor filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. The plaintiff asked the bankruptcy court to declare the
state court judgment nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), which
provides that a creditor can avoid the discharge of a debt incurred "for willful
and malicious injury by the debtor...." The bankruptcy court held that the debt
was nondischargeable. The court gave preclusive effect to the New Jersey
court's finding that the debtor acted maliciously. On appeal we stated: "The
bankruptcy court did not err in holding that issue preclusion barred[the debtor]
from relitigating whether [the plaintiff's] judgment was a debt incurred 'for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor.' " Id. at 630.
10
We see no reason why the reasoning of Braen should not apply to the present
case, even though Appellant Baldino was unsuccessful at trial in the state court.
To prevail in state court, of necessity, Baldino would have to prove that Wilson
acted maliciously. If she is ultimately successful and eventually obtains a
judgment, it would be nondischargeable under 523(a)(6) as a debt incurred by
the debtor's willful and malicious conduct. We therefore conclude that the
bankruptcy court abused its discretion by relying on an erroneous legal premise,
to wit, in declaring "[Baldino] could be completely successful in the State Court
and not be successful on the nondischargeability determination". See Stuebben
v. Gioioso (In re Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir.1992) (bankruptcy court
abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law).
II.
11
Moreover, an additional and independent reason supports our concern over the
bankruptcy court's refusal to lift the stay. The Bankruptcy Code provides that
the bankruptcy court shall grant relief from the automatic stay "for cause." 11
U.S.C. 362(d)(1). Section 362(d)(1) does not define "cause," leaving courts to
consider what constitutes cause based on the totality of the circumstances in
each particular case. Trident Assocs. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re
Trident Assocs.), 52 F.3d 127 (6th Cir.1995). We believe "cause" exists under
the circumstances of this case.
12
If the bankruptcy proceeding continues without modification of the stay, issue

preclusion will prevent Baldino from challenging the effect of the state court
judgment in the bankruptcy court. It is settled law that issue preclusion applies
to bankruptcy proceedings. Graham v. Internal Revenue Service (In re
Graham), 973 F.2d 1089 (3d Cir.1992). As our discussion of Braen makes
clear, issue preclusion applies even where the previous adjudication occurred in
state court. Braen, 900 F.2d at 624-630; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Brown (In
re Brown), 951 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.1991). If Baldino raises her claim for
malicious prosecution in bankruptcy court, the state court's determination that
Baldino did not show lack of probable cause will preclude her from relitigating
this issue. Although Baldino's appeal is pending in state court, the state trial
court's resolution of this issue is "final" for preclusion purposes. See Gregory
Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 207 N.J.Super. 607, 504 A.2d 828, 836
(1985) (New Jersey law recognizes a judgment as "final" for preclusion
purposes even though it is pending on appeal); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-16, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (federal courts afford state
court judgments the same preclusive effect that would exist in the rendering
state).
13
The bankruptcy court is also prohibited from reviewing the state court's
judgment by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits lower federal courts
from sitting as effective courts of appeal for state court judgments. See, e.g.,
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311-12,
75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44
S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923)); Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d
1488, 1496 (5th Cir.1993) ("The Bankruptcy Code was not intended to give
litigants a second chance to challenge a state court judgment nor did it intend
for the Bankruptcy Court to serve as an appellate court [for state court
proceedings]") (quoting In re G & R Mfg. Co., 91 B.R. 991, 994
(Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988)).
14
As demonstrated, Baldino cannot relitigate the adverse trial court judgment in

bankruptcy court. If she is denied relief from the automatic stay, she will have
no opportunity to challenge the adverse judgment before the bankruptcy
proceedings are complete. If Baldino is not afforded an opportunity to pursue
her appeal in state court, she will have no forum to litigate her cause.
Accordingly, we believe it is necessary to lift the stay to permit prosecution of
her appeal to the state appellate courts.
15
Our approach is consistent with that taken by other courts. See, e.g., Metz v.
Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank (In re Metz), 165 B.R. 769, 771
(Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1994) (evaluating the totality of the circumstances and
granting stay relief to allow appeal of state court judgment); Matter of Highway
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union 107, 98 B.R. 698, 705 (E.D.Pa.1989)
(affirming bankruptcy court's grant of stay relief on the grounds that state court
appeal was debtor's "only vehicle to attack the adverse judgment"), rev'd on
other grounds, In re Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107, 888 F.2d
293 (3d Cir.1989).
16
Moreover, our decision is supported by the legislative history of 362(d)(1),

which states in pertinent part:
17 will often be more appropriate to permit proceedings to continue in their place of

[I]t
origin, when no great prejudice to the bankruptcy estate would result, inorder to
leave the parties to their chosen forum and to relieve the bankruptcy court from
many duties that may be handled elsewhere.
18
S.Rep. No. 95-989 at 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5787, 5836.

We perceive no great prejudice to the bankruptcy estate in granting relief from
the stay. Such relief will expedite the resolution of Baldino's claim by
eliminating it if Wilson prevails on appeal, or by rendering it final and
nondischargeable if Baldino ultimately prevails. Moreover, Baldino's claim can
be resolved more quickly in state court on appeal than in the bankruptcy
proceedings, as the parties have already filed briefs on appeal.
19
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude
that no further discussion is necessary.
20
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be reversed and remanded
for entry of an order directing the bankruptcy court to grant Baldino's request
for relief from the stay for the limited purpose of allowing her appeal to
proceed in the New Jersey courts.

In Re Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson, Debtor. Lisa Baldino v. Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson Bunce D. Atkinson, Trustee, 116 F.3d 87, 3rd Cir. (1997)

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In Re Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson, Debtor. Lisa Baldino v. Robert Frank-Leonard Wilson Bunce D. Atkinson, Trustee, 116 F.3d 87, 3rd Cir. (1997)

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116 F.

In re Robert Frank-Leonard WILSON, Debtor.

United States Court of Appeals,

Lisa Baldino, Narragansett, RI, Appellant, Pro Se.

If the bankruptcy proceeding continues without modification of the stay, issue

As demonstrated, Baldino cannot relitigate the adverse trial court judgment in

Moreover, our decision is supported by the legislative history of 362(d)(1),

17 will often be more appropriate to permit proceedings to continue in their place of

S.Rep. No. 95-989 at 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5787, 5836.

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