Counsel For Appellant
Counsel For Appellant
Counsel For Appellant
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 2255(d), and we have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. We
review the validity of a collateral-attack waiver de novo.
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001).
We exercise plenary review over a district courts legal
conclusions in ruling on a habeas corpus petition and apply a
clearly erroneous standard in reviewing its factual findings.
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.
2002).
III.
The threshold issue in this appeal is whether the
District Court erred in enforcing the collateral-attack waiver
in Fazios plea agreement. A criminal defendant may
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995).
Further, a defendant may waive the statutory right to appeal if
he does so with knowledge of the nature and consequences of
the waiver. Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561. Thus, we will enforce
appellate or collateral-attack waivers when they are entered
into knowingly and voluntarily and their enforcement does
not work a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Erwin,
765 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2014); Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561
([W]aivers of appeals, if entered into knowingly and
voluntarily, are valid.). Fazio argues that the collateralattack waiver in his plea agreement was not made knowingly
and voluntarily and that enforcement of the collateral-attack
waiver would constitute a miscarriage of justice.1
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A.
We consider first whether Fazio entered into the plea
agreement knowingly and voluntarily. His plea agreement
clearly includes a broad appellate waiver that applies to both
direct appeal and collateral-attack rights. Counsel explained
the waiver to Fazio and he signed the agreement,
acknowledging that he understood its terms. Further, the
District Court asked Fazio at the plea colloquy whether he
had been coerced into entering the plea agreement and
discussed its terms with him. The District Court ultimately
found that Fazio was competent to plead guilty and did so
knowing the consequences of his plea. We conclude that it
did not err in finding that Fazio entered into the plea
agreement knowingly and voluntarily.
B.
As Fazios plea agreement was knowing and
voluntary, the appellate waiver must therefore be enforced
unless we identify the unusual circumstance of an error
amounting to a miscarriage of justice in his sentence. Erwin,
765 F.3d at 226 (quotation marks omitted).
This
determination depends on factors such as
the clarity of the error, its gravity, its character
(e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a
sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum),
the impact of the error on the defendant, the
impact of correcting the error on the
government, and the extent to which the
defendant acquiesced in the result.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Fazio argues that enforcement of the waiver would
work a miscarriage of justice because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. In United States v. Mabry, we noted
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561).
therefore reject Fazios arguments.
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We
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In Padilla, defense counsel failed to advise his noncitizen client of the immigration consequences of pleading
guilty. Counsel specifically told the defendant that he did
not have to worry about immigration status since he had been
in the country so long. 559 U.S. at 359 (quotation marks
omitted). The Supreme Court noted that there are numerous
situations in which the deportation consequences of a
particular plea are unclear or uncertain and that, in such
situations, a criminal defense attorney need do no more than
advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. Id. at
369. However, when the deportation consequence is truly
clear, as it was in Padillas case because he had committed a
removable offense, the duty to give correct advice is equally
clear. Id. Padilla was entitled to be advised . . . that his
conviction for drug distribution made him subject to
automatic deportation, id. at 360, and his defense counsels
failure to meet this requirement was constitutionally deficient
representation under the first prong of Strickland. Id.
Following Padilla, we decided, in United States v.
Orocio, that counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing
to advise a non-citizen defendant that his guilty plea carried a
risk of deportation. 645 F.3d 630, 64243 (3d Cir. 2011),
abrogated on other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 1103 (2013). Like the attorney in Padilla, defense
counsel in Orocio completely failed to advise his client of the
near-certain removal consequence of pleading guilty to a
controlled substance offense. Id. at 642. And like the
attorney in Padilla, defense counsel affirmatively misled his
client, telling him that he did not have to worry about
immigration status. Id. at 641 (quotation marks omitted).
We held that the failure of defense counsel to warn a
defendant that a plea would make the defendant eligible for
removal is a constitutional defect in representation that
satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test. Id. at 641.
Unlike defense counsel in Padilla and Orocio, Fazios
plea counsel did inform him that there could be immigration
consequences, App. 105, to pleading guilty. He conducted a
careful and thorough review of the plea agreement with
Fazio, including a review of the provision explaining the
possible immigration consequences of Fazios plea. Yet plea
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counsel did not inform Fazio that the plea made him subject
to automatic deportation, as is required under Padilla in cases
like Fazios where the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea are clear.2 While Fazios plea counsel stated that it
would be more likely than not that Fazio could remain in the
United States, it is clear that Fazio was subject to automatic
removal as a result of his plea.
However, we need not reach the issue of whether
Fazios plea counsels advice constituted deficient
performance under Strickland. Any error in that advice was
remedied by the District Courts in-depth colloquy and the
language of the plea agreement itself, and so Fazio was not
prejudiced.3
In United States v. Shedrick, the defendants plea
agreement stated that his maximum potential sentence was
ten years of imprisonment and that his actual sentence would
be left to the discretion of the court after both he and the
Government had an opportunity to argue the applicability of
any other provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, including . .
. adjustments and departures. 493 F.3d 292, 295 (3d Cir.
2007). At the plea colloquy, the district court repeated that
2
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