United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.: No. 597, Docket 95-7278
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.: No. 597, Docket 95-7278
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.: No. 597, Docket 95-7278
3d 574
19 Employee Benefits Cas. 2916
ORDER
1
This appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Griesa, Chief Judge ), came on to be heard on
the record from said district court.
Kay and Junior had been married for almost 30 years prior to his death. During
that time, she raised five of Junior's children--three of her own and two of
Annie Marie's, and cared for him and covered expenses during his illness,
which lasted from 1979 until his death in 1991. Although Kay was allegedly
aware of Junior's earlier marriage, there is evidence that she believed that her
marriage was necessarily legal because it had been performed by a New York
judge. And there is no indication that Annie Marie was in any way involved
with Junior, or with her children by Junior, at least since July 6, 1962, the date
of Junior's marriage to Kay.
Marie, and further ordering Kay to return those benefit payments she had
already received. Kay appealed to this Court, arguing that the existence of a
previous, undissolved marriage between Junior and Annie Marie should not
eliminate Kay's right to some portion of Junior's death benefits since Kay
married Junior in a formal ceremony, believing in good faith that her marriage
was legal, and her marriage continued until Junior's death.
8
It is clear that under New York law Kay's marriage to Junior is not legally valid
if Annie Marie's marriage was never dissolved. The question that we certify
here is whether a second spouse whose marriage is void due to the existence of
a prior, undissolved marriage, is nonetheless entitled to some portion of her or
his spouse's death benefits when the second marriage was the result of a formal
ceremony, undertaken in good faith, and the second marriage continued until
the spouse's death.
The Court of Appeals of New York has never addressed this question. In fact,
even those Appellate Division cases that handle somewhat analogous questions
have not squarely considered whether the invalidity of the second marriage
necessarily eliminates a second spouse's claims to all benefits. Several appellate
division cases have considered the appropriate standard a court should employ
when confronted with the claim that a second marriage is invalid because of the
existence of a valid first marriage, and have concluded that the second marriage
carries a presumption of validity. See, e.g., Seidel v. Crown Indus., 132 A.D.2d
729, 517 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dep't 1987); In re Estate of Bihanskyj, 55 A.D.2d
836, 390 N.Y.S.2d 322 (4th Dep't 1976). Where the decision that a second
marriage was invalid would create a substantial injustice, New York courts
have been particularly loath to do so. See Dolan v. Celebrezze, 381 F.2d 231,
236-38 (2d Cir.1967) (Friendly, J.) (canvassing New York cases and noting that
the presumption favoring the validity of the second marriage varies its force
with the attendant facts and circumstances).
10
Thus, while New York decisions evince a reluctance to find a second marriage
void where such a finding will result in an apparent injustice, New York law
has not established whether the injustice that is created by holding the second
marriage void may also be ameliorated by the application of a rule that would,
under appropriate circumstances, recognize an entitlement to some benefits on
the part of the second spouse, even where the second marriage is found to be
invalid.
11
legally married in the good faith belief that he was married to that person is a
putative spouse" and that "rights acquired by a putative spouse do not
supersede the rights of the legal spouse ... but the court shall apportion
property, maintenance, and support rights among the claimants as appropriate
in the circumstances and in the interests of justice." Unif. Marriage & Divorce
Act 209 (1973).3
12
Similarly, this Court, when presented with somewhat analogous circumstances- involving, however, the interpretation of federal laws--has found that a second
spouse whose marriage was undertaken in good faith retains a right to some
benefits, even in the face of a competing claim by the first--and, under
applicable state law, explicitly the legal--spouse. See Capitano v. Secretary of
Health & Human Serv., 732 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir.1984); Kirkland v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 706 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.1983); Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F.2d
487 (2d Cir.1976).
13
the amount that would have been payable to a single claimant. See Capitano,
732 F.2d at 1069-70 (affirming the interpretation, as set forth originally in
Rosenberg, 538 F.2d at 487).
14
15
What these cases and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act make clear is that
some jurisdictions do not make the invalidity of a second marriage
determinative of the appropriate division of benefits between two surviving
putative spouses. New York has not addressed this question. Given the concern
evinced by the New York courts about the injustice that can be created by
holding a second marriage to be void, we are uncertain as to whether the Court
of Appeals, a) would follow a rule analogous to that provided in the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, or to that articulated in this Court's interpretation of
federal benefits laws, or b) would, instead, give full benefits to the "legal"
widow, however tenuous her ultimate relationship to the deceased. In the
absence of any controlling precedent, we are reluctant to decide the question.
We do recognize, however, that the unsettled question here presented may not
arise with sufficient frequency to justify the acceptance of this certification. In
that event, we will of course resolve the issue ourselves.
16
17
Because benefit disputes are now generally controlled by ERISA, and hence
almost always are tried in the federal courts, see 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1)
(providing for nearly exclusive federal jurisdiction over ERISA disputes), the
New York Court of Appeals is unlikely to be able to consider the question
presented by this case on review of a New York court decision. Thus, not only
will this question not be presented to the Court of Appeals except through
certification, but since federal courts will most often be the courts called upon
in such cases, these courts will continue to apply an uncertain New York law,
The foregoing question is hereby certified to the Court of Appeals for the State
of New York as ordered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
See Colo.Rev.Stat. 14-2-111 (1995); Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 750, p 5/305 (SmithHurd 1995); Minn.Stat. 518.055 (1994); Mont.Code Ann. 40-1-404 (1994)
We are not suggesting, of course, that the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
applies in New York. The Act does indicate, however: a) that a determination
of the invalidity of a marriage does not automatically settle the question--as to
which New York courts have not spoken--of the allocation of benefits; and b)
that at least some jurisdictions, and the drafters of the uniform act, do not
consider an apportionment under such circumstances to be administratively
infeasible