SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150478. April 15, 2005]

HACIENDA
BINO/HORTENCIA
STARKE,
INC./HORTENCIA
L.
STARKE, petitioners, vs. CANDIDO
CUENCA,
FRANCISCO
ACULIT,
ANGELINA ALMONIA, DONALD ALPUERTO, NIDA BANGALISAN,
ROGELIO CHAVEZ, ELMO DULINGGIS, MERCEDES EMPERADO, TORIBIO
EMPERADO, JULIANA ENCARNADO, REYNALDO ENCARNADO, GENE
FERNANDO, JOVEN FERNANDO, HERNANI FERNANDO, TERESITA
FERNANDO, BONIFACIO GADON, JOSE GALLADA, RAMONITO KILAYKO,
ROLANDO KILAYKO, ALFREDO LASTIMOSO, ANTONIO LOMBO, ELIAS
LOMBO, EMMA LOMBO, LAURENCIA LOMBO, LUCIA LOMBO, JOEL
MALACAPAY, ADELA MOJELLO, ERNESTO MOJELLO, FRUCTOSO
MOJELLO, JESSICA MOJELLO, JOSE MOJELLO, MARITESS MOJELLO,
MERLITA MOJELLO, ROMEO MOJELLO, RONALDO MOJELLO,
VALERIANA MOJELLO, JAIME NEMENZO, RODOLFO NAPABLE,
SEGUNDIA OCDEN, JARDIOLINA PABALINAS, LAURO PABALINAS, NOLI
PABALINAS, RUBEN PABALINAS, ZALDY PABALINAS, ALFREDO
PANOLINO, JOAQUIN PEDUHAN, JOHN PEDUHAN, REYNALDO PEDUHAN,
ROGELIO PEDUHAN, JOSEPHINE PEDUHAN, ANTONIO PORRAS, JR.,
LORNA PORRAS, JIMMY REYES, ALICIA ROBERTO, MARCOS ROBERTO,
JR., MARIA SANGGA, RODRIGO SANGGA, ARGENE SERON, SAMUEL
SERON, SR., ANGELINO SENELONG, ARMANDO SENELONG, DIOLITO
SENELONG, REYNALDO SENELONG, VICENTE SENELONG, FEDERICO
STA. ANA, ROGELIO SUASIM, EDNA TADLAS, ARTURO TITONG, JR., JOSE
TITONG, JR., NANCY VINGNO, ALMA YANSON, JIMMY YANSON, MYRNA
VILLANUEVA BELENARIO, SALVADOR MALACAPAY, and RAMELO
TIONGCO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July
31, 2001, and the Resolution dated September 24, 2001 denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The assailed decision modified the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000099-98.
Hacienda Bino is a 236-hectare sugar plantation located at Barangay Orong, Kabankalan
City, Negros Occidental, and represented in this case by Hortencia L. Starke, owner and operator
of the said hacienda.

The 76 individual respondents were part of the workforce of Hacienda Bino consisting of
220 workers, performing various works, such as cultivation, planting of cane points, fertilization,
watering, weeding, harvesting, and loading of harvested sugarcanes to cargo trucks.[2]
On July 18, 1996, during the off-milling season, petitioner Starke issued an Order or Notice
which stated, thus:
To all Hacienda Employees:
Please bear in mind that all those who signed in favor of CARP are expressing their desire to get
out of employment on their own volition.
Wherefore, beginning today, July 18, only those who did not sign for CARP will be given
employment by Hda. Bino.
(Sgd.)
Hortencia Starke[3]
The respondents regarded such notice as a termination of their employment. As a
consequence, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, wage differentials, 13 thmonth pay,
holiday pay and premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave pay, and moral and exemplary
damages with the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on September 17,
1996.[4]
In their Joint Sworn Statement, the respondents as complainants alleged inter alia that they
are regular and permanent workers of the hacienda and that they were dismissed without just and
lawful cause. They further alleged that they were dismissed because they applied as beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) over the land owned by petitioner
Starke.[5]
For her part, petitioner Starke recounted that the companys Board of Directors petitioned the
Sangguniang Bayan of Kabankalan for authority to re-classify, from agricultural to industrial,
commercial and residential, the whole of Hacienda Bino, except the portion earmarked for the
CARP. She asserted that half of the workers supported the re-classification but the others, which
included the herein respondents, opted to become beneficiaries of the land under the CARP.
Petitioner Starke alleged that in July 1996, there was little work in the plantation as it was offseason; and so, on account of the seasonal nature of the work, she issued the order giving
preference to those who supported the re-classification. She pointed out that when the milling
season began in October 1996, the work was plentiful again and she issued notices to all
workers, including the respondents, informing them of the availability of work. However, the
respondents refused to report back to work. With respect to the respondents money claims,
petitioner Starke submitted payrolls evidencing payment thereof.
On October 6, 1997, Labor Arbiter Ray Allan T. Drilon rendered a Decision, [6] finding that
petitioner Starkes notice dated July 18, 1996 was tantamount to a termination of the respondents
services, and holding that the petitioner company was guilty of illegal dismissal. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the
complainants illegal and ordering respondent Hortencia L. Starke, Inc. represented by Hortencia
L. Starke, as President, to:
1. Reinstate the complainants to their former position without loss of seniority
rights immediately upon receipt of this decision;
2. PAY the backwages and wage differentials of the complainants, to wit:
in the total amount of Four Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Eight Hundred FiftyTwo and 72/100 (P495,852.72) Pesos; and
3. TO PAY the complainants attorney's fee in the amount of Forty-Nine Thousand
Five Hundred Eighty-Five and 27/100 (P49,585.27) Pesos.
Respondents are further directed to deposit to this Office the total judgment award of FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN AND
99/100 (P545,437.99) PESOS within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Both the petitioners and the respondents appealed the case to the NLRC. On July 24, 1998,
the NLRC affirmed with modification the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive part of
its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Respondent is further ordered to pay the complainants listed in the Holiday
Pay Payroll the amounts due them.
SO ORDERED.[8]
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied by the NLRC. [9] Dissatisfied,
the respondents appealed the case to the CA where the following issues were raised:
A. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND POWER BY VIOLATING THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS LAID
DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT AND THE APPLICABLE LAWS AS TO
THE STATUS OF THE SUGAR WORKERS.
B. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS BY
ADMITTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR ANSWER TO
PETITIONERS APPEAL MEMORANDUM DATED MARCH 26, 1998 FILED BY
COUNSEL FOR THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT
IT WAS FILED WAY BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

C. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN GIVING

CREDENCE TO THE SWEEPING ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANTS
AS TO THE AWARD OF BACKWAGES AND HOLIDAY PAY WITHOUT ANY
BASIS.[10]
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision,[11] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby MODIFIED by deleting the award for holiday pay and premium pay for holidays. The
rest of the Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The CA ruled that the concept of stare decisis is not relevant to the present case. It held that
the ruling in Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC[13] does not operate to abandon the settled doctrine that sugar
workers are considered regular and permanent farm workers of a sugar plantation owner,
considering that there are facts peculiar in that case which are not present in the case at bar. In
the Mercado case, the farm laborers worked only for a definite period for a farm owner since the
area of the land was comparatively small, after which they offer their services to other farm
owners. In this case, the area of the hacienda, which is 236 hectares, simply does not allow for
the respondents to work for a definite period only.
The CA also held that the petitioners reliance on Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. v.
NLRC[14] was misplaced, as it in fact, bolstered the respondents' posture that they are regular
employees. In that case, the Court held that a sugar worker may be considered as in regular
employment even during those years when he is merely a seasonal worker where the issues
concern the determination of an employer-employee relationship and security of tenure.
Further, the CA held that the respondents appeal to the NLRC was not perfected since they
failed to accompany their notice of appeal with a memorandum of appeal, or to timely file a
memorandum of appeal. Thus, as to them, the decision of the Labor Arbiter became final and
executory. The NLRC, therefore, gravely abused its discretion when it modified the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and awarded to the respondents holiday pay and premium for holiday pay.
Finally, the CA affirmed the award of backwages, finding no circumstance that would warrant a
reversal of the findings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on this point. [15]
On September 24, 2001, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners due to their failure to indicate the date of the receipt of the decision to determine the
timeliness of the motion.[16]
Hence, this petition for review.
The petitioners submit the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND POWER BY VIOLATING THE DOCTRINE
OF "STAREDECISIS" LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
APPLICABLE LAWS AS TO THE STATUS OF THE SUGAR WORKERS.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED IN DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR
FAILURE TO STATE THE DATE OF THE RECEIPT OF THE DECISION IN THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[17]
Petitioner Starke contends that the established doctrine that seasonal employees are regular
employees had been overturned and abandoned by Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC.[18] She stresses that in
that case, the Court held that petitioners therein who were sugar workers, are seasonal employees
and their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. Petitioner
Starke argues that the CA violated the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the said ruling.
She asserts that the respondents, who are also sugar workers, are seasonal employees; hence,
their employment can be terminated at the end of the season and such termination cannot be
considered an illegal dismissal. Petitioner Starke maintains that the determination of whether the
workers are regular or seasonal employees is not dependent on the number of hectares operated
upon by them, or the number of workers, or the capitalization involved, but rather, in the nature
of the work. She asserts that the respondents also made their services available to the
neighboring haciendas. To buttress her contention that the respondents are seasonal employees,
petitioner Starke cites Rep. Act 6982, An Act Strengthening the Social Amelioration Program in
the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and for other Purposes,
which recognizes the seasonal nature of the work in the sugar industry.[19]
Petitioner Starke also takes exception to the denial of her motion for reconsideration due to
failure to state the date of the receipt of the decision. She asserts that a denial of a motion for
reconsideration due to such cause is merely directory and not mandatory on the part of the CA.
Considering that the amount involved in this case and the fact that the motion was filed within
the reglementary period, the CA should have considered the motion for reconsideration despite
such procedural lapse.[20]
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners erroneously invoke the doctrine
of stare decisis since the factual backdrop of this case and the Mercadocase is not similar. The
respondents posit that the Mercado case ruled on the status of employment of farm laborers who
work only for a definite period of time for a farm owner, after which they offer their services to
other farm owners. Contrarily, the respondents contend that they do not work for a definite
period but throughout the whole year, and do not make their services available to other farm
owners. Moreover, the land involved in the Mercado case is comparatively smaller than the sugar
land involved in this case. The respondents insist that the vastness of the land involved in this
case requires the workers to work on a year-round basis, and not on an on-and-off basis like the
farm workers in the Mercado case.
Finally, the respondents maintain that the requirement that the date of receipt of the decision
should be indicated in the motion for reconsideration is mandatory and jurisdictional and, if not
complied with, the court must deny the motion outright.[21]
The petition is without merit.
On the substantial issue of whether the respondents are regular or seasonal employees, the
petitioners contend that the CA violated the doctrine of stare decisis by not applying the ruling in
the Mercado case that sugar workers are seasonal employees. We hold otherwise. Under the
doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain

state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same.[22] Where the facts are essentially different, however, stare decisis does
not apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be entirely
inappropriate when a factual variance is introduced.[23]
The CA correctly found that the facts involved in this case are different from
the Mercado case; therefore, the ruling in that case cannot be applied to the case at bar, thus:
We do not find the concept of stare decisis relevant in the case at bench. For although in the
Mercado case, the Supreme Court held the petitioners who were sugar workers not to be regular
but seasonal workers, nevertheless, the same does not operate to abandon the settled doctrine of
the High Court that sugar workers are considered regular and permanent farm workers of a sugar
plantation owner, the reason being that there are facts present that are peculiar to the Mercado
case. The disparity in facts between the Mercado case and the instant case is best exemplified by
the fact that the former decision ruled on the status of employment of farm laborers, who, as
found by the labor arbiter, work only for a definite period for a farm worker, after which they
offer their services to other farm owners, considering the area in question being comparatively
small, comprising of seventeen and a half (17) hectares of land, such that the planting of rice and
sugar cane thereon could not possibly entail a whole year operation. The herein case presents a
different factual condition as the enormity of the size of the sugar hacienda of petitioner, with an
area of two hundred thirty-six (236) hectares, simply do not allow for private respondents to
render work only for a definite period.
Indeed, in a number of cases, the Court has recognized the peculiar facts attendant in
the Mercado case. In Abasolo v. NLRC,[24] and earlier, in Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing &
Redrying Corporation v. NLRC,[25] the Court made the following observations:
In Mercado, although respondent constantly availed herself of the petitioners services from year
to year, it was clear from the facts therein that they were not in her regular employ. Petitioners
therein performed different phases of agricultural work in a given year. However, during that
period, they were free to work for other farm owners, and in fact they did. In other words, they
worked for respondent, but were nevertheless free to contract their services with other farm
owners. The Court was thus emphatic when it ruled that petitioners were mere project
employees, who could be hired by other farm owners.[26]
Recently, the Court reiterated the same observations in Hacienda Fatima v. National
Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food and General Trade [27] and added that the petitioners in
the Mercado case were not hired regularly and repeatedly for the same phase/s of agricultural
work, but on and off for any single phase thereof.
In this case, there is no evidence on record that the same particulars are present. The
petitioners did not present any evidence that the respondents were required to perform certain
phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time. Although the petitioners assert that the
respondents made their services available to the neighboring haciendas, the records do not,
however, support such assertion.
The primary standard for determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or

business of the employer.[28] There is no doubt that the respondents were performing work
necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of an employer. Hence, they can properly
be classified as regular employees.
For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough
that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have been
employed only for the duration of one season.[29] While the records sufficiently show that the
respondents work in the hacienda was seasonal in nature, there was, however, no proof that they
were hired for the duration of one season only. In fact, the payrolls, [30] submitted in evidence by
the petitioners, show that they availed the services of the respondents since 1991. Absent any
proof to the contrary, the general rule of regular employment should, therefore, stand. It bears
stressing that the employer has the burden of proving the lawfulness of his employees dismissal.
[31]

On the procedural issue, petitioner Starke avers that the CA should not have denied outright
her motion for reconsideration, considering its timely filing and the huge amount involved. This
contention is already moot. Petitioner Starke has already aired in this petition the arguments in
her motion for reconsideration of the CA decision, which have been adequately addressed by this
Court. Assuming arguendo that the CA indeed failed to consider the motion for reconsideration,
petitioner Starke was not left without any other recourse.[32]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated July 31, 2001, and its Resolution dated September 24, 2001 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals), with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rebecca de GuiaSalvador, concurring.

[2]

Rollo, p. 102.

[3]

CA Rollo, p. 43.

[4]

Rollo, p. 103.

[5]

Id. at 36.

[6]

Id. at 35-51.

[7]

Id. at 49-51.

[8]

CA Rollo, p. 47.

[9]

Id. at 56-58.

[10]

Id. at 5.

[11]

Rollo, pp. 19-28.

[12]

Id. at 27-28.

[13]

G.R. No. 79869, 5 September 1991, 201 SCRA 332.

[14]

G.R. No. 84272, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 155.

[15]

Rollo, pp. 25-27.

[16]

Id. at 34.

[17]

Id. at 6.

[18]

Supra.

[19]

Rollo, pp. 87-96.

[20]

Id. at 14-16.

[21]

Rollo, pp. 105-108.

[22]

Villena v. Chavez, G.R. No. 148126, 10 November 2003, 415 SCRA 33.

[23]

Lee v. Insurance Company of North America, 70 Haw. 120, 763 P.2d 567 (1988).

[24]

G.R. No. 118475, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 293.

[25]

G.R. No. 127395, 10 December 1998, 300 SCRA 37.

[26]

Id. at 61.

[27]

G.R. No. 149440, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 518.

[28]

Tan v. Lagrama, G.R. No. 151228, 15 August 2002, 387 SCRA 393.

[29]

Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food and General Trade,

supra.

[30]

CA Rollo, pp. 58-60.

[31]

Tan v. Lagrama, supra.

[32]

See Vergara v. National Labor Relations Commission , G.R. No. 117196, 5 December 1997,
282 SCRA 486.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 73887 December 21, 1989
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORATO JUDICO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
G.A. Fortun and Associates for petitioner.
Corsino B. Soco for private respondent.

PARAS J.:
Before us is a Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC, for brevity) dated September 9, 1985 reversing the decision of Labor
Arbiter Vito J. Minoria, dated June 9, 1983, by 1) ordering petitioner insurance company, Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife, for brevity) to recognize private respondent
Honorato Judico, as its regular employee as defined under Art. 281 of the Labor Code and 2)
remanding the case to its origin for the determination of private respondent Judico's money
claims.
The records of the case show that Honorato Judico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
Grepalife, a duly organized insurance firm, before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No.
VII, Cebu City on August 27, 1982. Said complaint prayed for award of money claims consisting
of separation pay, unpaid salary and 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
Both parties appealed to the NLRC when a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the employer-employee relations did not exist
between the parties but ordered Grepalife to pay complainant the sum of Pl,000.00 by reason of
Christian Charity.
On appeal, said decision was reversed by the NLRC ruling that complainant is a regular
employee as defined under Art. 281 of the Labor Code and declaring the appeal of Grepalife

questioning the legality of the payment of Pl,000.00 to complainant moot and academic.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of revoking the supersedeas bond of said company it ruled that the
Labor Arbiter erred in awarding Pl,000.00 to complainant in the absence of any legal or factual
basis to support its payment.
Petitioner company moved to reconsider, which was denied, hence this petition for review
raising four legal issues to wit:
I. Whether the relationship between insurance agents and their principal, the
insurance company, is that of agent and principal to be governed by the Insurance
Code and the Civil Code provisions on agency, or one of employer-employee, to
be governed by the Labor Code.
II. Whether insurance agents are entitled to the employee benefits prescribed by
the Labor Code.
III. Whether the public respondent NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
controversy between insurance agent and the insurance company, arising from
their agency relations.
IV. Whether the public respondent acted correctly in setting aside the decision of
Labor Arbiter Vito J. Minoria and in ordering the case remanded to said Labor
Arbiter for further proceedings.(p. 159, Rollo)
The crux of these issues boil down to the question of whether or not employer-employee
relationship existed between petitioner and private respondent.
Petitioner admits that on June 9, 1976, private respondent Judico entered into an agreement of
agency with petitioner Grepalife to become a debit agent attached to the industrial life agency in
Cebu City. Petitioner defines a debit agent as "an insurance agent selling/servicing industrial life
plans and policy holders. Industrial life plans are those whose premiums are payable either daily,
weekly or monthly and which are collectible by the debit agents at the home or any place
designated by the policy holder" (p. 156, Rollo). Such admission is in line with the findings of
public respondent that as such debit agent, private respondent Judico had definite work
assignments including but not limited to collection of premiums from policy holders and selling
insurance to prospective clients. Public respondent NLRC also found out that complainant was
initially paid P 200. 00 as allowance for thirteen (13) weeks regardless of production and later a
certain percentage denominated as sales reserve of his total collections but not lesser than P
200.00. Sometime in September 1981, complainant was promoted to the position of Zone
Supervisor and was given additional (supervisor's) allowance fixed at P110.00 per week. During
the third week of November 1981, he was reverted to his former position as debit agent but, for

unknown reasons, not paid so-called weekly sales reserve of at least P 200.00. Finally on June
28, 1982, complainant was dismissed by way of termination of his agency contract.
Petitioner assails the findings of the NLRC that private respondent is an employee of the former.
Petitioner argues that Judico's compensation was not based on any fixed number of hours he was
required to devote to the service of petitioner company but rather it was the production or result
of his efforts or his work that was being compensated and that the so-called allowance for the
first thirteen weeks that Judico worked as debit agent, cannot be construed as salary but as a
subsidy or a way of assistance for transportation and meal expenses of a new debit agent during
the initial period of his training which was fixed for thirteen (13) weeks. Stated otherwise,
petitioner contends that Judico's compensation, in the form of commissions and bonuses, was
based on actual production, (insurance plans sold and premium collections).
Said contentions of petitioner are strongly rejected by private respondent. He maintains that he
received a definite amount as his Wage known as "sales reserve" the failure to maintain the same
would bring him back to a beginner's employment with a fixed weekly wage of P 200.00
regardless of production. He was assigned a definite place in the office to work on when he is not
in the field; and in addition to canvassing and making regular reports, he was burdened with the
job of collection and to make regular weekly report thereto for which an anemic performance
would mean dismissal. He earned out of his faithful and productive service, a promotion to Zone
Supervisor with additional supervisor's allowance, (a definite or fixed amount of P110.00) that he
was dismissed primarily because of anemic performance and not because of the termination of
the contract of agency substantiate the fact that he was indeed an employee of the petitioner and
not an insurance agent in the ordinary meaning of the term.
That private respondent Judico was an agent of the petitioner is unquestionable. But, as We have
held in Investment Planning Corp. vs. SSS, 21 SCRA 294, an insurance company may have two
classes of agents who sell its insurance policies: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours
and work under the control and supervision of the company; and (2) registered representatives
who work on commission basis. The agents who belong to the second category are not required
to report for work at anytime, they do not have to devote their time exclusively to or work solely
for the company since the time and the effort they spend in their work depend entirely upon their
own will and initiative; they are not required to account for their time nor submit a report of their
activities; they shoulder their own selling expenses as well as transportation; and they are paid
their commission based on a certain percentage of their sales. One salient point in the
determination of employer-employee relationship which cannot be easily ignored is the fact that
the compensation that these agents on commission received is not paid by the insurance company
but by the investor (or the person insured). After determining the commission earned by an agent
on his sales the agent directly deducts it from the amount he received from the investor or the
person insured and turns over to the insurance company the amount invested after such deduction
is made. The test therefore is whether the "employer" controls or has reserved the right to control

the "employee" not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and
methods by which the same is to be accomplished.
Applying the aforementioned test to the case at bar, We can readily see that the element of
control by the petitioner on Judico was very much present. The record shows that petitioner
Judico received a definite minimum amount per week as his wage known as "sales reserve"
wherein the failure to maintain the same would bring him back to a beginner's employment with
a fixed weekly wage of P 200.00 for thirteen weeks regardless of production. He was assigned a
definite place in the office to work on when he is not in the field; and in addition to his
canvassing work he was burdened with the job of collection. In both cases he was required to
make regular report to the company regarding these duties, and for which an anemic
performance would mean a dismissal. Conversely faithful and productive service earned him a
promotion to Zone Supervisor with additional supervisor's allowance, a definite amount of
P110.00 aside from the regular P 200.00 weekly "allowance". Furthermore, his contract of
services with petitioner is not for a piece of work nor for a definite period.
On the other hand, an ordinary commission insurance agent works at his own volition or at his
own leisure without fear of dismissal from the company and short of committing acts detrimental
to the business interest of the company or against the latter, whether he produces or not is of no
moment as his salary is based on his production, his anemic performance or even dead result
does not become a ground for dismissal. Whereas, in private respondent's case, the undisputed
facts show that he was controlled by petitioner insurance company not only as to the kind of
work; the amount of results, the kind of performance but also the power of dismissal.
Undoubtedly, private respondent, by nature of his position and work, had been a regular
employee of petitioner and is therefore entitled to the protection of the law and could not just be
terminated without valid and justifiable cause.
Premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106108 February 23, 1995

CABALAN PASTULAN NEGRITO LABOR ASSOCIATION (CAPANELA) and JOSE
ALVIZ, SR. petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FERNANDO
SANCHEZ, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
A man said to the Universe,
Behold, I am born!
However, replied the Universe,

The fact does not create in me

A sense of obligation.
To most, these familiar verses express the article of faith for self-reliance. To the racist in some
countries, however, they mean that the world does not owe the Negroid or other colored people
equal solicitude. The neo-colonial in the Philippines would hold the Negrito or a member of
indigenous cultural communities to the same social bondage. But our Constitution and our laws
were precisely formulated under a sense of obligation to the marginalized and the under
privileged. Under such mandates, this Court has always accorded them scrupulous and
compassionate attention. In now resolving their predicament in the case at bar, it call once again
on the old Castilian tenet: A l que la vida ha dado menos, dsele mas por la ley. 1
In this petition for certiorari, the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(hereafter, NLRC) dated February 28, 1992 2 which dismissed the appeal of herein petitioners
from the decision of the labor arbiter 3 for failure to file a supersedeas bond, as well as its April
30, 1992 4 denying their motion for reconsideration, are assailed for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion.
The antecedents of the present recourse, as culled from the records, are that herein private
respondent, Fernando Sanchez, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of back
wages and other benefits on January 3, 1991 with Regional Office No. III of the Department of
Labor and Employment in Olongapo City originally docketed therein as NLRC Case No. RAB
III 01-1931-91. The complaint, naming Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association
(CAPANELA, for brevity) and its president, Jose Alviz, Sr., as respondents, alleged that the
former was employed by CAPANELA as a foreman with a monthly salary of P3,245.70 from
March, 1977 until he was illegally dismissed on January 1, 1990. 5
Said complaint was later amended on February 22, 1991 to introduce the correction that private
respondent was illegally dismissed on March 27, 1990 (instead of January 1, 1990), and to
further pray for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages and
moral and exemplary damages. 6 As no amicable settlement was arrived at during the mandatory
pre-conference despite efforts exerted by the labor arbiter, the parties were required to
simultaneously submit their respective position papers and/or affidavits. 7 The case was
submitted for resolution on March 11, 1991 on the bases of said position papers and other
evidence, but the parties were further allowed to submit their respective memoranda, 8 after
which the case was deemed submitted for decision on May 29, 1991. 9
A decision was rendered on June 24, 1991 in favor of herein private respondent, declaring his
dismissal illegal, and ordering herein petitioners, jointly and severally

1. To pay the backwages of complainant from March 24, 1990 until June 24, 1991
and for 15 months at P3,245.70 a month equals P48,685.50;
2. To immediately reinstate complainant to his former or equivalent position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and for this purpose,
respondents are hereby ordered to submit proof of the physical or payroll
reinstatement of the complainant within five (5) working days from receipt
hereof, provided further that should reinstatement (be) not feasible due to any
supervening event, respondents are further ordered to pay the separation pay of
complainant equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, a fraction of
at least six (6) months service considered as in addition to his respondents are
further one (1) whole year, in addition to his backwages; . . . .
but dismissing the claim for moral and exemplary damages for want of substantial evidence. 10
The records further reveal that private respondent subsequently filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of 11 This was opposed by execution on July 15, 1991. 11 This was opposed by
CAPANELA 12 through its new counsel, Atty. Isagani M. Jungco, who at the same time filed a
memorandum of appeal 13 in its behalf, although admittedly without posting a supersedeas bond
because of want of funds of either CAPANELA or its president and co-petitioner Alviz, Sr.
Private respondent, in his answer to CAPANELA's memorandum of, appeal 14 and reply to
opposition to motion for execution, 15was unconvinced and adamantly insisted on the dismissal
of the appeal due to non-perfection thereof for failure to comply with the legal requirement of
posting a cash or surety bond as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal.
A partial writ of execution 16 was issued by Labor Arbiter Saludares on August 15, 1991 ordering
the physical or payroll reinstatement of private respondent. The sheriff's return of November 4,
1991, signed by Numeriano S. Reyes, Sheriff II of the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No.
III, stated that the writ expired without any indication of private respondent having been
reinstated. 17
As stated at the outset, the NLRC dismissed the appeal on February 28, 1992 for failure of
petitioners to post the supersedeas bond required by law, stating that "(r)espondents' contention
that it cannot post bond because it is insolvent deserve(s) scant consideration not being
accompanied by proof there(of)," and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The present controversy raises as principal issues for resolution by the Court whether or not (1)
the dismissal of private respondent was legal, and; (2) the appeal was perfected despite failure to
file a supersedeas bond.

Anent the first issue, before we delve into the matter of the alleged illegal dismissal of private
respondent Sanchez by petitioner CAPANELA, it is evidently necessary to ascertain the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between them.
Petitioners asseverate that CAPANELA is an association composed of Negritos who worked
inside the American naval base in Subic Bay (hereinafter referred to as the Base). They initially
received a daily wage of P100.00 and thus earned, on the average, less than P3,000.00 per
month. Said association organized the system of employment of members of this cultural
community who were accorded special treatment concededly because of the occupancy of their
ancestral lands as part of the operational area and military facility used by the Base authorities.
CAPANELA, through its officers, saw to it that its members reported for work, recorded their
attendance, and distributed the workers' salaries paid by the Base at the end of a specific pay
period, without gaining any amount from such undertakings petitioner Alviz, Sr., for his part and
as president of CAPANELA, was himself only an employee at the Base. In other words, neither
CAPANELA nor its president was the employer of private respondent Sanchez; rather, it was the
United States Government acting through the military base authorities. 18
Contrarily, private respondent maintains that there existed an employer-employee relationship, as
allegedly supported by the evidence on record, and that petitioners CAPANELA and Alviz, Sr.
exercised control as employer over the means and methods by which the work was
accomplished. He further argues that since the determination of the existence of an employeremployee relationship is a factual question, the findings of the labor officials thereon should be
considered conclusive and binding upon and respected by the appellate courts. 19
It is hence clearly apparent that the judgment of the labor arbiter, as affirmed by respondent
commission, declaring the dismissal of private respondent illegal and ordering the payment of
back wages to him together with his payroll or physical reinstatement, was premised on the
finding that there was an existing employer-employee relationship.
Indeed, findings of fact and conclusions of the labor arbiter, 20 as well as those of the
NLRC, 21 or,
for
that
matter,
any
other
adjudicative
body
which
22
can be considered as a trier of facts on specific matters within its field of expertise, should be
considered as binding and conclusive upon the appellate courts. This is in addition to the fact that
they were in a better position to assess and evaluate the credibility of the contending parties and
the validity of their respective evidence. 23 However, these doctrinal strictures hold true only
when such findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. 24
In the case at bar, we are hard put to find sufficient evidential support for public respondent's
conclusion on the putative existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioners
and private respondent. We are accordingly persuaded that there is ample justification to disturb

the findings of respondent NLRC and to hold that a reconsideration of its challenged resolutions
is in order.
A careful reevaluation of the documentary evidence of record belies the finding that
CAPANELA, through its president and co-petitioner, Jose Alviz, Sr., wielded control as an
employer over private respondent. It will be noted that in his affidavit dated March 4,
1991, 25 private respondent himself declared that through the intervention of CAPANELA, by
way of its June 13, 1389 letter 26 to Lt. Mark S. Kistner, he was cleared of the charge of larceny
of U.S. government property. Thereafter, in an indorsement dated July 11, 1989 from the
Director of Security, U.S. Navy Public Works Center, the recommendation for his reinstatement
and the release of his gate pass to the Base was addressed to the Director, Investigation Section,
U.S. Facility Security Department via the Director of the Contracts Administration Division. 27
This only goes to show that CAPANELA had in fact no control over the continued employment
of its members working in the U.S. naval base. For, after conducting its own investigation,
CAPANELA could only intervene in behalf of its members facing charges through a
recommendatory action request for favorable consideration. It could not, on its own authority,
exonerate such members from the charges, much less effect their reinstatement without the
approval of the Base authorities. Interestingly, in order to comply with the labor arbiter's decision
of June 24, 1991, CAPANELA even had to write to the Resident Officer-in-Charge of the
Facility Support Contracts at Subic Bay recommending the reinstatement of private respondent
to his former position. 28
Under their arrangement, CAPANELA, through its officers, could only impose disciplinary
sanctions upon its members for infractions of its own rules and regulations, to the extent of
ousting a member from the association when called for under the circumstances. Nonetheless,
such called termination of membership in the association, which could result in curtailment of
the privilege of working at the Base inasmuch as employment therein was conditioned upon
membership in CAPANELA, is not equivalent to the illegal dismissal from employment
contemplated in our labor laws. Petitioners, not being the employer, obviously could not arrogate
unto themselves an employer's prerogatives of hiring and firing workers.
As succinctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
True, there was a stipulation to the effect that Fernando Sanchez was employed by
petitioner CAPANELA, but the real employer was the United States government
and petitioner was just a "labor-only contractor." Annexes "G" and "H" of
CAPANELA's Memorandum on Appeal show that the award or contract of work
was between CAPANELA and the United States government through the U.S.
Navy. The same contract likewise clearly stipulated that CAPANELA was "to
provide labor and material to perform trash sorting services in the Base period

for all work specified in Section C." Annex "A" of complainant Fernando
Sanchez' Answer to petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal itself proves that the
negotiation was between CAPANELA and the U.S. Navy, with the former
supplying the labor and the U.S. government paying the wages. Since
CAPANELA merely provided the labor force, it cannot be deduced therefrom that
CAPANELA should also compensate the laborers; it is a case of non sequitur. In
other words, the actual mechanical act of making payments was done by
CAPANELA, but the monies therefor were provided and disbursements made by
the disbursing officer of the U.S. Naval Supply Depot, Subic Bay (see Annexes
"G" and "H").
Moreover, ingress and egress in the work premises were controlled not by
CAPANELA but by the U.S. Base authorities who could even reject entry of
CAPANELA members then duly employed as part of the project, and impose
disciplinary sanctions against them. Annex "1" of petitioners' Position Paper as
respondent in the NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01-193 1-91, which was the letter of
Lt. M.E. Kistner of the U.S. Navy, clearly proves this. 29 (Emphasis in the original
text.)
Prevailing case law enumerates the essential elements of an employer-employee relationship as:
(a)
the
selection
and
engagement
of
the
employee;
(b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with regard to
the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of control
being the most determinative factor. 30
The Solicitor General pertinently illustrates the glaring absence of these elements in the present
case:
. . . , as aforeshown, CAPANELA had no control of the premises as it was the
U.S. naval authorities who had the power to issue passes or deny their issuance. In
fact, CAPANELA did not have absolute control on the disciplinary measures to be
imposed on its members employed in the Base. Annex "1" of CAPANELA's
Position Paper submitted before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch
established the U.S. Navy's right to impose disciplinary measures for violations or
infractions of its rules and regulations as well as the right to recommend
suspensions or dismissals of the workers. Moreover, it was not shown that
CAPANELA had control of the means and methods or manner by which the
workers were to go about their work. These are indeed strong indicia of the U.S.
Navy's right of control over the workers as direct employer.

Third, there is evidence to prove that payment of wages was merely done through
CAPANELA, but the source of payment was actually the U.S. government paying
workers according to the volume of work accomplished on rates agreed upon
between CAPANELA and the U.S. government. . . . 31
It would, therefore, be inutile to discuss the matter of the legality or illegality of the dismissal of
private respondent. Considering that petitioners cannot legally be considered as the employer of
herein private respondent, it follows that it cannot be made liable as such nor be required to bear
the responsibility for the legal consequences of the charge of illegal dismissal.
Granting arguendo that private respondent was illegally dismissed, the action should properly be
directed against the U.S. government which, through the Base authorities, was the true employer
in this case.
Neither can petitioners be deemed to have been engaged in permissible job contracting under the
law, for failure to satisfy the following prescribed conditions:
1. The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract
work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own
manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or
principal in all matters connected with performance of the work except as to the
results thereof; and
2. The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary
in the conduct of his business. 32
In the present case, the setup was such that CAPANELA was merely tasked with organizing the
Negritos to facilitate the orderly administration of work made available to them at the base
facilities, that is, sorting scraps for recycling. CAPANELA recorded the attendance of its
members and submitted the same to the Base authorities for the determination of wages due them
and the preparation of the payroll. Payment of wages was coursed through CAPANELA but the
funds therefor came from the coffers of the Base. Once inside the Base, control over the means
and methods of work was exercised by the Base authorities. Accordingly, CAPANELA
functioned as just an administrator of its Negrito members employed at the Base.
From the legal standpoint, CAPANELA's activities may at most be considered akin to that of
labor-only contracting, albeit of a special or peculiar type, wherein CAPANELA, operating like a
contractor, merely acted as an agent or intermediary of the employer. 33
The Solicitor General ramifies this aspect:

. . . , petitioner CAPANELA could not be classified as an "independent

contractor" because it was not shown that it has substantial capital or investments
to qualify as such under the law. On the other hand, it was apparent that the
premises, tools, equipment, and other paraphernalia used by the workers were all
supplied by the U.S. government through the U.S. Navy. What CAPANELA
supplied was only the local labor force, complainant Fernando Sanchez among
them. It is therefore clear that CAPANELA had no capital outlay involved in the
business or in the maintenance thereof. 34
While it is not denied that an association or a labor organization or union can at times be an
employer insofar as people hired by it to dispose of its business are concerned, 35 the situation in
this case is altogether different. A proper and necessary distinction should be made between the
employees of CAPANELA who actually attended to its myriad functions as an association and its
members who were employed in the jobsite inside the Base vis-a-vis CAPANELA's relative
position as the employer of the former and a mere administrator with respect to the latter.
On the matter of the perfection of an appeal from the decision of the NLRC, petitioners plead for
a more considerate and humane application of the law as would allow their appeal to prosper
despite non-posting of a supersedeas bond on account of their insolvency. To dismiss the appeal
for failure to post said bond, petitioners aver, is tantamount to denial of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of access to courts by reason of poverty. 36 Private respondent, on the other
hand, argues that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in compliance with
all requirements of the law therefor is jurisdictional. That petitioners do not have the funds for
the premiums for posting a supersedeas bond or for a cash deposit, disdainfully says private
respondent, "is not in the least our problem." 37
We have no quarrel with the provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code which, in part and
among others, requires that in case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from. Perfection of an appeal within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional 38 and non-compliance with such legal requirements is
fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. 39
However, in a number of recent cases, 40 the Court has eased the requirement of posting a bond,
as a condition for perfection of appeals in labor cases, when to do so would bring about the
immediate and appropriate resolution of controversies on the merits without over-indulgence in
technicalities, 41 ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the Labor Code to
ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law
and procedure, all in the interest of due process. 42 Punctilious adherence to stringent technical
rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man, 43 and should not defeat the complete

and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. 44 Moreover, it is the duty of
labor officials to consider their decisions and inquire into the correctness of execution, as
supervening events may affect such execution. 45
The Solicitor General realistically assesses the situation, thus:
. . . As aforestated, above the technical consideration on whether failure to post a
supersedeas bond was fatal to petitioners' appeal is the importance of first
resolving whether there was indeed an employer-employee relationship in this
case so as not to render the execution of the NLRC's resolution unenforceable or
impossible to implement. . . . Besides, it is of public notice that the U.S. Navy had
withdrawn from the Subic Base in view of the termination of the Bases Treaty.
Even if CAPANELA were ordered to reinstate complainant Fernando Sanchez,
this is obviously an impossible thing to perform as there is no longer any work to
be done inside the Base. Nor is petitioner CAPANELA in a position to pay
Sanchez's back wages considering that it was the U.S. Navy that paid his
wages. . . . 46
In light of the circumstances in this case, the Solicitor General further suggests two ways of
writing finis to this dispute, i.e., to reconsider public respondent's resolution of February 28,
1992 and April 30, 1992 and reinstate petitioner's appeal to give the latter a chance to prove
CAPANELA's insolvency or poverty, or to reverse the decision of the labor arbiter on the ground
that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner CAPANELA and private
respondent Sanchez. Harmonizing our evaluation of the facts of this case with the greater
interests of social justice, and considering that the parties involved are those upon whose socioeconomic status we prefaced this opinion, we opt for the latter.
While this Court, when it finds that a lower court or quasi-judicial body is in error, may simply
and conveniently nullify the challenged decision, resolution or order and remand the case thereto
for further appropriate action, it is well within the conscientious exercise of its broad review
powers to refrain from doing so and instead choose to render judgment on the merits when all
material facts have been duly laid before it as would buttress its ultimate conclusion, in the
public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, such as where the ends of justice
would not be subserved by the remand of the case. 47
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the resolutions of February 28, 1992 and
April 30, 1992 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission are accordingly
ANNULLED, and the adjudgment of Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Saludares in NLRC Case No.
RAB III 01-1931-91 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 The contemporary version, of varying attributions, is that "he who is less favored in
life must be more favored in law."
2 Annex A, Petition; Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier, ponente, with
Commissioners Irineo B. Bernardo and Rogelio I. Rayala, concurring; Rollo, 11-13.
3 NLRC Case No. RAB III-01-1931-91; Original Record, 66-72.
4 Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 14-15.
5 Original Record, 1.
6 Ibid., 23.
7 Ibid., 42.
8 Ibid., 44.
9 Ibid., 56.
10 Ibid., 72; per Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Saludares.
11 Ibid., 130.
12 Ibid., 148.
13 Ibid., 228.
14 Ibid., 158.
15 Ibid., 217.
16 Ibid., 222.
17 Ibid., 490.
18 Rollo, 4-5.
19 Ibid., 29-30.

20 Lopez Sugar Corp. vs. Federation of Free Workers, et al., G.R. Nos. 75700-01,
August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 179; Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
106374, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 463.
21 Cando vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 91344, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 666;
Five J Taxi vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100138, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 225.
22 Baby Bus, Inc. vs. Minister of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 54223, February 26, 1988,
158 SCRA 220; Needle Queen Corp. vs. Nicolas, etc., G.R. Nos. 60741-43,
December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 568; San Miguel Corporation vs. Javate, et al., G.R.
No. 54244, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 469.
23 Mary Johnston Hospital, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 73839, August 30, 1988,
165 SCRA 110; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
80600, 183 SCRA 451.
24 Cartagenas, et al. vs. Romago Electric Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 82973,
September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 637; Asian Construction and Development
Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 85866, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 784; Tiu vs.
NLRC, et al., G.R. 83433, November 12, 1992, 215 SCRA 541.
25 Original Record, 31-32.
26 Ibid., 33.
27 Ibid., 34.
28 Ibid., 119.
29 Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment of the Solicitor General, 7-8; Rollo,
74-75.
30 Hydro Resources Contractors Corp. vs. Pagalilauan, et al., G.R. No. 62909, April
18, 1989, 172 SCRA 399; Singer Sewing Machine Corp. vs. Drilon, et al., G.R. No.
91307, January 24, 1991, 193 SCRA 270; Villuga, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
75038, August 23, 1993, 225 SCRA 537.
31 Rollo, 76-77.
32 Sec. 8, Rule VIII, Book III, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code;
Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corp. vs. Hon. Clave, etc., et al., G.R. No
50915, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 127.Cf. Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association
vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 50915, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 127. See PhonePoulenc Agrochemicals Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 102633-35,
January 19, 1993, 217 SCRA 249; Development Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC,
et al., G.R. Nos. 100376-77, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 251.

33 Sec. 9, ibid., id.; Industrial Timber Corp., et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No . 83616,
January 20, 1989, 202 SCRA 465; Baguio, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 7900408, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 465;cf. Neri, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.,C.P. Nos. 9700809, July 23, 1993, 224 SCRA 717. See also Arts. 106 and 107, Labor Code.
34 Rollo, 76.
35 Bautista vs. Inciong, etc., et al., G.R. No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665.
36 Rollo, 6-7.
37 Ibid., 28-29.
38 Periquet vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 91298, June 22, 1990, 186 SCRA 724; Alto
Sales Corp. vs. Intermediate Appellate.Court, et al., G.R. No. 72763, May 29, 1991,
197 SCRA 618.
39 Chong Guan Trading vs. NLRC, et al., G.R.. No. 81471, April 28, 1989, 172 SCRA
831; Andaya, ct al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 73726-28, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA
253.
40 Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 93690, October 10, 1991, 202 SCRA
597; Blancaflor, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 101013, February 2, 1993, 218
SCRA 366; Union of Filipino Workers vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 98111, April 7, 1993,
221 SCRA 267.
41 YBL (Your Bus Lines), et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 93381, September 28,
1990, 190 SCRA 160; Rada vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 96078, January 9, 1992, 205
SCRA 69; Star Angel Handicraft vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 108914, September 20,
1994.
42 Art. 221, Labor Code.
43 Vda. de Inguillo vs. Employees Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No.
51543, June 6, 1989, 174 SCRA 19.
44 Rapid Manpower Consultants, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 88683, October 18,
1990, 190 SCRA 747; Ranara vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100969, August 14, 1992,
212 SCRA 631; De Ysasi III vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 104599, March 11, 1994, 231
SCRA 173.
45 Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 88864, January 17, 1990, 181 SCRA
130.
46 Rollo, 78-79.

47 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R.
No. 73027, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 653; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
et al. vs. Court of appeals, et al., G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300.