Gaston v. Ploeger, 10th Cir. (2008)
Gaston v. Ploeger, 10th Cir. (2008)
Gaston v. Ploeger, 10th Cir. (2008)
Clerk of Court
Defendants-AppelleesCross-Appellants.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
(continued...)
Jeffrey Ray Belden committed suicide on August 14, 2002, while he was
incarcerated as a pretrial detainee in Brown County, Kansas. Thereafter,
Mr. Beldens mother, plaintiff-appellant Marie Gaston, brought this lawsuit on his
behalf asserting: (1) 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that various Brown County officials
were deliberately indifferent to the risk that Mr. Belden would commit suicide;
and (2) state-law negligence claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment on
the 1983 claims based on qualified immunity and on the state-law claims based
on immunity. The district court granted the motion with respect to the 1983
claims against County Commissioners Warren Ploeger, Glen Leitch, and Steve
Roberts, but denied the motion with respect to the 1983 claims against Sheriff
Lamar Shoemaker, Sergeant Brett Hollister, and Officer Brandon Roberts. The
court also denied summary judgment as to all defendants on plaintiffs state-law
claims.
Sheriff Shoemaker and Sergeant Hollister then appealed the district courts
decision denying them qualified immunity with regard to plaintiffs 1983
(...continued)
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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response to a pretrial disposition of federal claims has been to dismiss the state
law claim or claims without prejudice).
III. Qualified Immunity and Deliberate Indifference Standard.
As noted above, Officer Roberts moved for summary judgment on
plaintiffs 1983 claim based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. When a
defendant in a 1983 case has asserted qualified immunity, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to establish that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and
(2) at the time of the incident, it was clearly established that the defendants
conduct amounted to a constitutional violation. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001); Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007)
(en banc). Here, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer
Roberts because it concluded that plaintiff had put forth insufficient evidence to
establish that Officer Roberts violated a constitutional right belonging to
Mr. Belden on the day he committed suicide. See Gaston, 2008 WL 169814,
at *14. As a result, the court did not need to address the second prong of the
qualified-immunity inquiry.
In the prior appeal to this court, we summarized the legal standards that
govern claims arising from prisoner suicides as follows:
Although neither prison officials nor municipalities can
absolutely guarantee the safety of their prisoners[,t]hey are, . . .
responsible for taking reasonable measures to [e]nsure the safety of
inmates. Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1999)
(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, a jailer violates the Eighth
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IV. Analysis.
As noted above, the district court initially concluded that neither Officer
Roberts nor Sergeant Hollister were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs
1983 claims. In its subsequent memorandum and order granting summary
judgment in favor of Officer Roberts, the district court explained its initial
reasoning as follows:
[T]his Court acknowledged that both Officer Roberts and Sergeant
Hollister denied knowledge of Beldens inclination toward suicide.
With that said, however, the Court found there was a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the risk of Belden committing suicide
was so substantial or pervasive that knowledge by Officer Roberts
and Sergeant Hollister could be inferred. More specifically, the
Court concluded that the . . . evidence was sufficient for a jury to
find that Belden was exhibiting strong signs of suicidal tendencies,
that these two jail officials had actual or inferred knowledge of,
or were wilfully blind to, the specific risk that Belden would commit
suicide, and that these jail officials then failed to take steps to
address that known and specific risk[.]
Gaston, 2008 WL 169814, at *11.
As also noted above, Sergeant Hollister, Officer Roberts immediate
supervisor, appealed the district courts decision that he was not entitled to
qualified immunity. On appeal, another panel of this court concluded that the
evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, failed to
establish that Sergeant Hollister was deliberately indifferent to the risk that
Mr. Belden would commit suicide. The panel therefore reversed the district
courts denial of qualified immunity for Sergeant Hollister and directed that
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they did not believe Mr. Belden was suicidal. Nevertheless, the
magistrate judge believed that a jury could find that:
[I]f the jailers had been properly monitoring the inmates, the
jailers would have heard Belden talk about suicide, would have
observed Belden give away his food, would have watched
Belden repeatedly rock back and forth on his bed, and would
have noticed Belden tying his shoelaces together to test the
ability of the shoelaces to hold his body weight.
This is hardly a proper inference to be drawn from the evidence
because it presumes that jailers have a constitutional duty to monitor
inmates constantly. However, jailers are neither obligated nor able to
watch every inmate at every minute of every day. The record is clear
that Sergeant Hollister and his colleagues were not aware of the
strange behavior described by Mr. Beldens cellmates. Under these
circumstances, we would not permit a jury to infer that their failure
to notice contributed to the higher degree of fault than negligence
required for deliberate indifference. Berry v. City of Muskogee,
900 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir. 1990).
With respect to the letter from Ms. Renz, Sergeant Hollister
testified that:
A. He received a letter through the mail. It had been logged
in by the jailers.
Q. That letter, did anyone at the jail look at that before they
gave it to him?
A. Apparently so because the other dayshift jailer had
mentioned it to me that . . . [Ms. Renz] wanted to know why he
wouldnt come to the window when she honked.
Q. Did you ever observe that letter?
A. I dont remember.
The letter is not in the record, and nothing in the record further
illuminates its contents. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge
seemingly presumed that it was a Dear John letter. This is pure
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Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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