Patrick Fisher
Patrick Fisher
Patrick Fisher
JUN 16 1998
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 97-1094
FREDERICK BRYE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant Frederick Brye entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty
to being a felon in possession of ammunition, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).
He was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment and three years supervised
release. He appeals his sentence, contending the government breached the plea
agreement and the district court erred in denying a downward departure for preindictment delay. We conclude the government did breach the plea agreement and
remand for resentencing. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction defendants claim
that the court erred in denying a downward departure.
I.
Defendant and his brother Bond Brye had a heated argument on June 14,
1993, concerning Bonds relationship with defendants girlfriend. Bond
purportedly struck and threatened to kill defendant. Defendant telephoned Fidel
Garner around 8:00 p.m. and asked him to bring his .45. He again called
Garner around 10:45 p.m. and told him he needed the gun because Bond had
kicked him, shot at him, threatened to kill him, and chased him with a gun. The
government had a Title III wiretap on Garners telephone line, which was
unknown to either Garner or defendant, and intercepted both of the conversations.
Based on this information, the police stopped defendants car and found a .45
pistol and two rounds of Winchester Silver Tip ammunition inside the car.
Sometime later in 1993, defendant was taken into state custody for
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violation of state law where he remained until early 1996. He was not charged in
federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm until February 14,
1996. Based on the long delay between the time the offense was committed and
the date of the indictment, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for
excessive pre-indictment delay. The court denied the motion because defendant
could not establish the government intentionally delayed seeking an indictment to
gain a tactical advantage. Immediately before trial began on October 7, 1996,
defendant entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to being a felon in
possession of ammunition.
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion for downward departure from
the recommended sentencing guidelines because (1) he committed the offense
while under coercion and duress,
prejudiced his defense, and (3) the totality of the circumstances justified a
downward departure. The court ultimately denied defendants request for
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downward departure.
II.
Defendant argues the government violated the plea agreement because the
prosecutor opposed downward departure during sentencing. Whether
government conduct has violated a plea agreement is a question of law which we
review de novo.
1990); see also United States v. Peglera , 33 F.3d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 1994)
(Because a government that lives up to its commitments is the essence of liberty
under law, the harm generated by allowing the government to forego its plea
bargain obligations is one which cannot be tolerated.). To determine whether a
breach has, in fact, occurred, we apply a two-step process: (1) we examine the
nature of the governments promise; and (2) we evaluate this promise in light of
the defendants reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the guilty
plea was entered.
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v. United States , 51 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1995) (Plea agreements are
contracts, which means that the first place to look in determining the extent of the
governments promises under the [] agreement is the language of the agreement
itself.). Accordingly, we determine the governments obligations by reviewing
the express language used in the agreement.
F.3d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1997) (We agree with the other circuits that have
considered this issue and have found that whether a plea agreement unequivocally
obligates the government to provide defendant with the opportunity to provide
substantial assistance turns on the specific language of the agreement.);
Rockwell , 124 F.3d at 1200; United States v. Vargas , 925 F.2d 1260, 1266-67
(10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Easterling , 921 F.2d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir.
1990). We will not allow the government to rely upon a rigidly literal
construction of the language of the agreement to escape its obligations under
the agreement.
F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir. 1989)). As with the interpretation of any contract, we
also apply the maxim that the agreement should be construed against its drafter.
Hawley , 93 F.3d at 690.
It is not entirely clear who drafted the plea agreement here, but at one
point in the sentencing hearing the prosecutor seemed to imply he had authored it.
(continued...)
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With these general principles in mind, we turn to the language in the plea
agreement here. The agreement obligated the government to:
A. Dismiss, at sentencing, the [i]ndictment . . .;
B. File no further charges against [defendant] based upon what
[was known at that time] of his criminal misconduct . . .;
C. Stipulate, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(c), to a sentence
of no more than sixty (60) months;
D. Agree that defense counsel may argue for an extraordinary
departure under Section 5K2.0 et seq ., and the government will defer
to the Courts determination of this point.
E. Consider providing defendant an opportunity to debrief
regarding his knowledge of drug trafficking activities, . . . and agree
to file at sentencing a motion under Section 5K1.1 of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, recommending a downward departure from
defendants resulting guideline range, if, in the governments sole
and good faith discretion, defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation of others.
Record I, Doc. 18, at 1-2. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a one-count
information which charged him with being a felon in possession of ammunition,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).
Defendant argues the government violated part D of the agreement. The
parties disagree on the meaning of the word defer and what departure
determination the government agreed to defer to the court. The government
argues this provision referred only to defendants request for downward departure
based on coercion or duress, while defendant argues the government agreed to
(...continued)
See Record VII at 6-7 (We drafted an information . . . . I told her we put it in
the plea agreement that she could do that. . . . I indicated in the plea agreement.)
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defer on all possible bases for downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K2.
The word defer means to refer or submit for determination or decision
or to submit or yield through authority, respect, force, awe, [or] propriety.
Websters Third New International Dictionary 591 (1993). The government adopts
this definition and claims it agreed to submit the question of whether defendant
was eligible for downward departure to the court for determination. Although
this argument seems to comport with the dictionary definition of defer, it is
nonsensical when viewed in the context of sentencing proceedings. The
sentencing court already possessed the authority to determine whether defendant
was eligible for downward departure. Therefore, interpreting the plea agreement
as the government urges renders part D superfluous, which is obviously not in
accord with general principles of contract law.
New
Valley Corp. v. United States , 119 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (An
interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all of [the contracts] parts is
preferred to one which leaves a portion of the [contract] inoperative, void,
meaningless, or superfluous.);
1006 n.5 (10th Cir.) (We will not construe a statute in a way that renders words
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___
Id. at 50.
137 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 1998) (The government cannot be penalized for
correctly stating the legal issue to be addressed by th[e] court.);
United States v.
Jimenez , 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th Cir. 1991) (government obligated to inform
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however, 5K2.0 does not set forth a specific basis for departing from the
guidelines. Rather, 5K2.0 is a policy statement that generally outlines
considerations the sentencer should contemplate when determining whether to
grant a defendant a downward departure under any of the specific rationales listed
in other sections of the subchapter that follow 5K2.0.
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et.
See United
States v. Williams, 102 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1996) (We review the language
of the plea agreement objectively and hold the government to the literal terms of
the plea agreement.).
Such an interpretation appears to comport with the parties reasonable
understanding of the agreement at the time the guilty plea was entered. At the
change of plea hearing, the government stated it understood the plea agreement as
obligating it to:
[allow] defense counsel [to] argue for an extraordinary departure
downward under Section 5K2.0. The burden being on the defense
counsel, of course, to convince the Court that [it] would apply, and
the government will simply defer to the Courts determination of this
point.
Record V at 9. This was also defendants understanding of the agreement.
Id. at
10. Therefore, based on the plain language of the agreement and the parties
apparent understanding of the agreement at the change of plea hearing, the
government agreed not to oppose defendants argument that he was entitled to a
downward departure under
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of latitude for the district court on remand is preferable in light of the district
courts position with respect to the case.). When the governments breach is
particularly egregious or intentional, we will allow defendant to withdraw the
guilty plea. See id. ; see , e.g. , United States v. Cooper , 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th
Cir. 1995). Since it does not appear the governments breach was egregious or
intentional, but rather, was based on misinterpretation of the plea agreement, we
remand only for resentencing by a different judge.
III.
Defendant also argues the district court applied the wrong legal test in
deciding whether to depart based on three years of pre-indictment delay. Br. at
8. [A] discretionary decision not to depart downward is not reviewable unless
the record shows that the district court erroneously believed that the Guidelines
did not permit a departure.
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clearly believed it could not grant departure for pre-indictment delay unless
defendant proved the government intentionally delayed to gain a tactical
advantage and that he suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.
When seeking dismissal of an indictment based on pre-indictment delay, a
defendant must establish the government intentionally delayed for tactical reasons
and that the delay caused him actual prejudice.
F.3d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir. 1998). However, a few appellate courts have
suggested a less stringent standard may apply at sentencing when a defendant is
seeking a downward departure based on pre-indictment delay.
States v. Saldana , 109 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1997) (It seems to us possible that
someone with time and ingenuity could construct a case where a careless or even
an innocent delay produced sentencing consequences so unusual and unfair that a
departure [without a showing of government intent] would be permissible.);
United States v. Martinez , 77 F.3d 332 (9th Cir. 1996) . This court has not
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