G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed

their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the
same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was
joined by other party-list organizations in a
Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMAKATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW,
Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
ALU
and
BIGAS.

Veterans Fed. Party v COMELEC

Facts: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list

representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123)
parties,
organizations
and
coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from
twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had
obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the
proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.

On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second

Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the
proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition
to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
number of congressional seats must be filled up by
eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In
allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percentvote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the
party-list system," which should supposedly determine
"how
the
52
seats
should
be
filled
up.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive

Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that
the literal application of the two percent vote
requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.

Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject

1

party-list election can be settled by addressing the

following
issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
In other words, should the twenty percent allocation
for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and
the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative,
how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?

representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these
statutory
provisions,
the
COMELEC
effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly
and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the
discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement
of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these
impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial
review.
The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce
and administer election-related laws, cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the
bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body,
it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an
amendment to the law find lobby for its approval and
enactment
by
the
legislature.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially

GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC
are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives
two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve
(12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement
as
to
costs.
SO
ORDERED.

In view of the party-list system elements per

COMELEC
First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be
represented in the House of Representatives." Second,
"the system should represent the broadest sectors of
the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage
[the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.)

Ratio: In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely

abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight
(38) herein respondent parties, organizations and
coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat,
because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
2

Considering these elements, but ignoring the two

percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it
concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos.
1 to 51 . . . should have at least one
representative."

"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves

are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of
suffrage, determine who and how many should
represent
them.
On the contention that a strict application of the
two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should
have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in the
wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election
process.

In view of to whom should the seats be given

In the suits, made respondents together with the
COMELEC were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as
likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the
proclamation of additional representatives from
each of their parties and organizations, all of
which had obtained at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status
Quo Order directing the COMELEC "to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date
and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998 Resolution
or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders
from
this
Court."

In

In

view
of
the
2%
threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented
in
Congress.

In

view
of
the
2.5%
vote
equivalent
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to
modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half
percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20

view
of
the
20%
being
mandatory
The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the
3

million who cast their votes in the last elections. Twoand-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes.
Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes
nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we
bring that down to two percent, we are talking about
400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three.
So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We
believe that there are many sectors who will be able to
get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the
operational
implication
of
our
proposal.

is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on

the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and enable
sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn
their
seats
among
the
fifty.
.
.
."

Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned

according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.

In view of the method of allocating additional

seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat
allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and
the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now
proceed to the method of determining how many
party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions
are
entitled
to.

In

In

view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit

An important consideration in adopting the partylist system is to promote and encourage a multiparty
system
of
representation.
Again,
we
quote
Commissioner
Monsod:

view
of
the
Niemeyer
Formula
Under this formula, the number of additional seats
to which a qualified party would be entitled is
determined by multiplying the remaining number of
seats to be allocated by the total number of votes
obtained by that party and dividing the product by the
total number of votes garnered by all the qualified
parties. The integer portion of the resulting product
will be the number of additional seats that the party
concerned
is
entitled
to.

"MR. MONSOD: but we also wanted to avoid the

problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple
votes. We are for opening up the system, and we
would like very much for the sectors to be there. That

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for

4

Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,

because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both
our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold
requirements two percent for us and five for them.

be able to compute that for the other parties. Since

the
distribution
is
based
on
proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to
the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which
the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the
most
number
of
votes.

One half of the German Parliament is filled up

by party-list members. More important, there are no
seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as
already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to
encourage the promotion of the multiparty system.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v.

Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot be
converted into a whole membership of one when it
would, in effect; deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
We said further that "no party can claim more than
what
it
is
entitled
to
.
.
."

In view of the legal and logical formula for the

Philippines
Step One. Rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the
parties participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed
one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered
in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

In view of the formula for determining additional

seats
for
the
first
party
The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall
be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party
were to receive twice the number of votes of the
second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's
number
of
seats
and
so
on.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because
the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of

Step Two. The next step is to determine the

number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to
5

available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18

or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the
number of seats to which all the parties are entitled
may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats
reserved
in
the
House
of
Representatives.

The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be

synthesized
as
follows:
1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will
just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties,
who are not ready and whose chances are very low,
from
participating
in
the
elections;

However, if the first party received a significantly

higher amount of votes say, twenty percent to
grant it the same number of seats as the second party
would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent
of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent.
The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first
party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six
percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the
first
party.

the

4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to

organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the
system;
5.To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the
same majesty as that of the elected representatives in
the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President
of
the
Philippines;

In view of the formula for additional seats of

other
qualified
parties
Step Three: The next step is to solve for the
number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.

In

view

of

the

2%

threshold

3.To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up

system;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually

proliferate political party groups and those who have
not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they
will be able to get to the Parliament through the
backdoor under the name of the party-list system; 16
and

rationale

party is entitled to have in the Bundestag, seats

should be multiplied by the number of votes obtained
by each party and then the product should be divided
by the sum total of the second votes obtained by all
the parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the
votes. First, each party receives one seat for each
whole number resulting from the calculation. The
remaining seats are then allocated in the descending
sequence of the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer
formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941, 11.

7. To ensure that only those with a more or less

substantial
following
can
be
represented.

The framers of the Constitution knew that the

sectoral groups suffer from major disadvantages in the
competitive election arena. They sought to remedy
this inequality through an outright constitutional gift of
reserve seats for the first three terms of the sectoral
representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have
to earn their seats through participation in the partylist
system.

In

view

of

the

3-seat

limit

Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed

for party-list representatives, which at present are 52.
The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district
representatives
to
20
percent
party-list
representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for partylist representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact
that the law limits parties, organizations, and
coalitions to three (3) seats each. To maintain this
ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list
system, after deducting the number of seats initially
distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to
them.

rationale

The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute

party-list representation to as many party groups as
possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party
will be allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving as
much as possible to the marginalized groups may be
defeated. The purpose is to allow as many as possible
of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to
representation to have a seat in Congress, and to have
enough seats left for those who are way below the list.

I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's

fixation with designating the highest ranking
participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as
admitted by the majority, assumes that the seats to be
allocated to the qualified parties depend on the seats
of
the
so-called
first
party.

The party-list system of proportional representation

is based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied in Art.
6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which
provides that, in determining the number of seats a
7

In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply

to the following prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for
every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking
party only and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2
percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the
first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which
case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes
of the first ranking party should get an extra seat..

that the votes cast for the said respondents not

be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's
nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan
Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some
of
herein
respondents.
On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the
respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all

2 percenters, which are not the first ranking party,
from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is
so because, with their votes being proportioned
against the votes of the first ranking party, there will
never be an instance where the additional seats of
these parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is
contrary to R.A. No. 7941, 11 which contemplates the
possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the
maximum number of seats allowed by law.
G.R. No. 147589

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the

COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed
COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a nonextendible period of five days from notice.

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

FACTS: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action

Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying that
"the names of [some of herein respondents] be
deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14,
2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative,

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed

before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR No.
147613,
also
challenging
COMELEC
Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the
two Petitions before it; directed respondents named
8

in the second Petition to file their respective

Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and
called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17,
2001. It added that the COMELEC may proceed with
the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the
party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of
any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.

participants in the light of the guidelines

enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last
party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin
its hearings for the parties and organizations that
appear to have garnered such number of votes as to
qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
COMELEC is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court
its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.

ISSUES: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the

Court directed the parties to address the following
issues:
1.
Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is
proper under the premises. More specifically, is there
no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary
course
of
law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate
in
the
party-list
elections.
3.
Whether or not the party-list system is
exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors
and
organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution
No.
3785."

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001,

directing the COMELEC "to refrain from proclaiming
any winner" during the last party-list election, shall
remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the
Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement
as
to
costs.
SO
ORDERED.

In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785

Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents
to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, such challenge may be brought before this
Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule

HELD:
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to
the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately
conduct
summary
evidentiary
hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
9

65.

"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where

public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with
public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of
the
House
of
Representatives.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was

promulgated by Respondent Commission en
banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was
possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section
1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental

constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its
duty
to
"formulate
guiding
and
controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had

filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. The COMELEC, however, did not act
on
that
Petition.

Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is

a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely
urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy
available."

In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner

Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time.
Subsequent events have proven the urgency of
petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has
not yet formally resolved the Petition before it.
But a resolution may just be a formality because the
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, has made its position on the matter
quite
clear.

In view of the participation of political parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is the most objectionable portion
of the questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major
political
parties."

In any event, this case presents an exception to the

rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It
has
been
held
that
certiorari
is
available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies,

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for

"a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party"
10

is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a

coalition of parties." More to the point, the law
defines "political party" as "an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public
office."

fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth,
veterans,
overseas
workers,
and
professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino
citizens
belonging
to
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

In
view
of
terms
marginalized
and
underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the partylist elections does not mean, however, that any
political party or any organization or group for that
matter may do so. The requisite character of
these parties or organizations must be consistent
with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941.

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to

the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized
or
underrepresented."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to

the number of people in a particular district, because
the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed
group.
Rather,
it
refers
to
the
representation
of
the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration
in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,

In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it

that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress
under
the
party-list
system,
Filipino-style.
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
11

sectors can be represented under the party-list

system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related.
Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.

them that the party-list system was enacted to give

them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and
in
the
larger
affairs
of
the
State.

In view of COMELECs grave abuse of discretion

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like
the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down
by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and
quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.

In

view
of
OSG
contention
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy,
the Office of the Solicitor General contends that any
party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it
admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park
or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list
elections.

In

view
of
the
Courts
assistance
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand
the case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of
the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to
lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in its
work.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar

disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.
The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for

In view of the 2 systems of representation

12

(Mendoza,
J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not
identical. Party list representation is a type of
proportional representation designed to give
those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the
House of Representatives in district elections a
chance to win if they have sufficient strength on
a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are
considered "marginalized and underrepresented.")
Under the party-list system, representatives are
elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the
number of votes received in contrast to the "winnertake-all" single-seat district in which, even if a
candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets
no
seat.

elections, for whom the party-list system was

intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the
districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to
enable them to be represented in the House. They may
include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged"
sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would
have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors"
one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three
terms if the two systems are
identical.
In sum, a problem was placed before the
Constitutional Commission that the existing "winnertake-all" one-seat district system of election leaves
blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of
underrepresentation two solutions were proposed:
sectoral representation and party-list system or
proportional
representation.
The
Constitutional
Commission
chose
the
party-list
system.

Thus, under the party-list system, a party or

candidate need not come in first in order to win
seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the
"winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for
a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote
for
the
winner
are
represented.

Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration

yields support for the view that the party-list system is
designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors.

What the advocates of sectoral representation

wanted
was
permanent
reserved
seats
for
"marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, 5(2), these
sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the
House of Representatives and only for three terms. On
the other hand, the "third or fourth placers" in district

For while the representation of "marginalized and

underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the
law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the
aim of proportional representation is to enable those
who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district
elections a chance of winning. These groups are not
13

necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in 5, i.e.,

labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped,
women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.

G.R. No. 203766

cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now

provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases.
The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC
must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the partylist system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.

April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its

President,
Mr.
Alan
Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

2. National parties or organizations and regional

parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.

FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were

disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but
primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections

provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari

against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be

marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that
14

their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest

and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are

disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since
theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing
(see parameter 3 above).

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or

organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized
and
underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

Allowing major political parties to participate,

albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies
to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined
political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of
the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the
party-list elections in order to develop a political
system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the
BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of
the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and
that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be
reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or

organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the partylist system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well15

defined political constituencies. It is also for national

or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. The common denominator
however is that all of them cannot, they do not have
the machinery unlike major political parties, to field
or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but
they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections.

BILL OF RIGHTS
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No.
190582April 8, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner is an organization composed of men

and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list
organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base. In
2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration
with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on
moral grounds.

If the party-list system is only reserved for

marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from
running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural
communities,
handicapped,
veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not
per se economically marginalized but are still qualified
as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
have well-defined political constituencies as they are
ideologically marginalized.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the

COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that the
party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests
are also the nations. Until the time comes when
Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to
the nation, its application for accreditation under the
party-list system will remain just that. That the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC

16

into society and these are not publicly accepted moral

norms. COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not
have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus
Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At

bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited

as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of

general application relating to elections be applied to
all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

Laws of general application should apply with equal

force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition and

set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also
directed the COMELEC to grant petitioners application
for party-list accreditation.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

FACTS:

The enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance
with
the
legal
requirements
for
accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under
any of the requisites under RA 7941.

1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case

filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for
the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of
several government corporations to the group of Lopa,
a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.

2.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen.
Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions,
an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and
testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that

no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
17

thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin

"Kokoy" Romualdez."

sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to

Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2.
The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to
be compelled to testify against one's self.

3.
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the
ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the
defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief
claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case
before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the
Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.

3.
The civil case was already filed in the
Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be
an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue
sought to be investigated has already been preempted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to
continue would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting
judgments
between
the
legislative
committee and a judicial tribunal.

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of

legislation

RULING: NO.

4.
Finally, a congressional committees right to
inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by
the Constitution on governmental action including the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these
rights is the right of an individual to against selfincrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to
respondents in administrative investigations but only if

1.
There appears to be no intended legislation
involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa
had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged

18

it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or

analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the
petitioners may not be compelled by respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence
before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and if pursued would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial departments of the
government as ordained by the Constitution.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff

bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House
shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

235 SCRA 630 (1994)

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
By: Dennis D. San Diego
G.R. No. 115455

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI,

Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.

FACTS RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded

Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.

HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the
revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient
that the House of Representatives initiated the
passage of the bill which may undergo extensive
changes in the Senate.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate

exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630
and it did not pass three readings on separate days on
the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and
26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the

President need not meet the requirement not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
Macalintal vs. COMELEC

19

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,

questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of
the said act on the following grounds, among others:

Philippines within the period required for nonabsentee voters. Further, as understood in
election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident
of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one
has the intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is considered a
resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be
exact). If the immigrant does not execute the
affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee
voter.

1. That the provision that a Filipino already

considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed
to participate in absentee voting provided he
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return
to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident
of the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates
for
president
and
vice-president,
is
unconstitutional
because
it
violates
the
Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.

2. The said provision should be harmonized. It

could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the
winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is
still lodged in Congress and was in no way
transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA
9189.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are

correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee
voters are required to physically reside in the

20