Double Jeopardy Complete Cases FTW
Double Jeopardy Complete Cases FTW
Double Jeopardy Complete Cases FTW
double jeopardy despite the fact that dismissal was secured upon
motion of the accused.
Also, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense as said
dismissal is not without the express consent of the defendant, has
no application to a case where the dismissal, as here, is
predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial.
In Diaz, Abao, Tacnengand Robles which are cited above, like
in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants,
were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on
the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the
Government to prosecute. Therefore, even if such dismissals were
induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel
were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acquittal.
a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal was not
without the express consent of the defendant. This ruling,
however, has no application to the instant case, since the
dismissal in those cases was not predicated, as in the case at bar,
on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial, but on different
grounds. In the Salico case, the dismissal was based on the
ground that the evidence for the prosecution did not show that
the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court which, on appeal, we found that it was, so the case was
remanded for further proceedings; and in the Romero case the
dismissal was due to the non-production of other important
witnesses by the prosecution on a date fixed by the court and
under the understanding that no further postponement at the
instance of the government would be entertained. In both cases,
the right of a defendant to a speedy trial was never put in issue.
(emphasis supplied)
Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous
contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and
such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not
on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the
Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this
case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the
merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the
dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to
prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel
requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be
sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his
counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the
case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of
our jurisprudence.
Paulin v Gimenez
Facts:
The petition before us arose from an incident when the jeep
ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme
Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein
petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering
the former with dust. Furthermore, it was alleged that spouses
Paulin pointed their guns at private respondent Mabuyo. A file of
complaints was filed against petitioners for grave threats and
private respondent for grave threats and oral defamation. The
cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, MTC of Talisay,
Cebu , acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho,
dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204. Not satisfied with the
resolution of respondent Judge Coliflores, petitioners filed on July
31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with
relief for preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary
restraining order" with the RTC, which was thereafter docketed as
Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207.
Issue:
WON the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No.
5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration
or reversal of such dismissal as the same would violate
petitioners' right against double jeopardy.
Decision:
No. The municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on
double jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal for the
reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it
merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to
complete the presentation of its evidence. It follows then that the
decision of respondent regional trial court sustaining that of the
court of origin cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Demurrer to evidence due to its insufficiency presupposes that the prosecution had already rested its case (Sec.
15, Rule 119, 1985, Rules on Criminal Procedure). Hence, the
motion is premature if interposed at a time when the prosecution
is still in the process of presenting its evidence (Aquino v. Sison,
179 SCRA 648 [1989]), as what happened in this case.
For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the following requisites must have been obtained in the
original prosecution;
a) a valid complaint or information;
b) a competent court;
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent
an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2) the
dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect,
the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of the case
once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself, to wit:
1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial
which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
Rules of Court[20] which provides that [a]ny party may appeal from
a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed
thereby in double jeopardy.
Lejano vs. People
Facts:
The case revolves around what everybody refers to as the
Vizconde Massacre. On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and acquitted the Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, et. al of the charges (rape with homicide) against
them on the ground of lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Lauro Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims asked the
court to reconsider its decision claiming that it denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the
facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a
tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner
that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave
abuse of in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses.
Issue:
Whether the Hubert Webb et al. is covered by the protection of
the right against double jeopardy?
Ruling:
Yes, they are covered. The Supreme court ruled that a
judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places
the accused under double jeopardy which is prohibited under
Section 21, Article IIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Reason behind the law:
There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal
cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If
there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the
same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and
Issue:
WON the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as
the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case
No. RTJ-87-81
Decision:
Esmena v Pogoy
Facts:
Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their coaccused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira
were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for
having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan to
withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to
give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a
game of cards. Esmea and Alba were not duly notified of that
hearing, hence, they were not able to appear. When the case was
called, Father Tibudan was not able to appear because he was
sick. Respondent Judge dismiss the case pursuant to the
invocation of right to speedy trial by the accused. Twenty-seven
days later, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He
attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting
to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16,
1979.
Issue:
WON the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally
dismissed (after the accused had been arraigned) because of
complainant's failure to appear at the trial, would place the
accused in double jeopardy, considering their constitutional right
to have a speedy trial.
Decision:
Yes. SC hold that the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the
provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional
dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if
2)Whether or not the right to a speedy trial can justify the dismissal of the case
without prejudice to the right against double jeopardy?
Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that the facts of the case do not indicate that
the prosecution of the private respondents have been unjustly delayed by the
prosecution hence the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a
fair opportunity to prosecute the case.
Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy. The
three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in
the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been
entered, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. 15
2. It is true that in an, unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of
cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear
right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to
the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to
speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Melo v People
Facts:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide wherein he stabbed the victim with a kitchen knife
several times. On December 29, 1949, the accused pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. On the same day, Benjamin Obillo
died from his wounds. On January 4, 1950, an amended
information was filed charging the accused with consummated
homicide.
Issue:
WON the accused would be placed in a double jeopardy pursuant
to the amended information
Decision:
No. The rule of identity does not apply, however when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy. "where after the first
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and
distinct offense", the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.
Rule of identity: who has been charged with an offense cannot be
again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter
be lesser or greater than the former.