478 U.S.

30
106 S.Ct. 2752
92 L.Ed.2d 25

Lacy H. THORNBURG, et al., Appellants

v.
Ralph GINGLES et al.
No. 83-1968.
Argued Dec. 4, 1985.
Decided June 30, 1986.

Syllabus
In 1982, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a legislative
redistricting plan for the State's Senate and House of Representatives.
Appellees, black citizens of North Carolina who are registered to vote,
brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging one single-member
district and six multimember districts on the ground, inter alia, that the
redistricting plan impaired black citizens' ability to elect representatives of
their choice in violation of 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. After
appellees brought suit, but before trial, 2 was amended, largely in
response to Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47,
to make clear that a violation of 2 could be proved by showing
discriminatory effect alone, rather than having to show a discriminatory
purpose, and to establish as the relevant legal standard the "results test."
Section 2(a), as amended, prohibits a State or political subdivision from
imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any
standards, practices, or procedures that result in the denial or abridgment
of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color. Section 2(b),
as amended, provides that 2(a) is violated where the "totality of
circumstances" reveals that "the political processes leading to nomination
or election . . . are not equally open to participation by members of a
[protected class] . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice," and that the extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office is one circumstance that may be
considered. The District Court applied the "totality of circumstances" test
set forth in 2(b) and held that the redistricting plan violated 2(a)

because it resulted in the dilution of black citizens' votes in all of the

>>disputed districts. Appellants, the Attorney General of North Carolina
and others, took a direct appeal to this Court with respect to five of the
multimember districts.
Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
590 F.Supp. 345, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V, concluding that: 1. Minority voters
who contend that the multimember form of districting violates 2 must
prove that the use of a multimember electoral structure operates to
minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred candidates.
While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be
relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember
districts, unless there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the
use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability of
minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. Stated succinctly, a
bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported
by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group. The
relevance of the existence of racial bloc voting to a vote dilution claim is
twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a
politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently
as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Thus, the
question whether a given district experiences legally significant racial bloc
voting requires discrete inquiries into minority and white voting practices.
A showing that a significant number of minority group members usually
vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political
cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim, and consequently
establishes minority bloc voting within the meaning of 2. And, in
general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength
of minority support plus white "crossover" votes rises to the level of
legally significant white bloc voting. Because loss of political power
through vote dilution is distinct from the mere inability to win a particular
election, a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a period of time
is more probative of a claim that a district experiences significant
polarization than are the results of a single election. In a district where
elections are shown usually to be polarized, the fact that racially polarized
voting is not present in one election or a few elections does not necessarily
negate the conclusion that the district experiences legally significant bloc
voting. Furthermore, the success of a minority candidate in a particular
election does not necessarily prove that the district did not experience

polarized voting in that election. Here, the District Court's approach,

which tested data derived from three election years in each district in
question, and which revealed that blacks strongly supported black
candidates, while, to the black candidates' usual detriment, whites rarely
did, satisfactorily addresses each facet of the proper standard for legally
significant racial bloc voting. Pp. 52-61.
2. The language of 2 and its legislative history plainly demonstrate that
proof that some minority candidates have been elected does not foreclose
a 2 claim. Thus, the District Court did not err, as a matter of law, in
refusing to treat the fact that some black candidates have succeeded as
dispositive of appellees' 2 claims. Where multimember districting
generally works to dilute the minority vote, it cannot be defended on the
ground that it sporadically and serendipitously benefits minority voters.
Pp. 74-76.
3. The clearly-erroneous test of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) is
the appropriate standard for appellate review of ultimate findings of vote
dilution. As both amended 2 and its legislative history make clear, in
evaluating a statutory claim of vote dilution through districting, the trial
court is to consider the "totality of the circumstances" and to determine,
based upon a practical evaluation of the past and present realities, whether
the political process is equally open to minority voters. In this case, the
District Court carefully considered the totality of the circumstances and
found that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy of official
discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and
health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice
acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme to impair the
ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of black
voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates
of their choice. Pp. 77-79.
Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice MARSHALL, Justice
BLACKMUN, and Justice STEVENS, concluded in Part III-C that for
purposes of 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it relates
to claims of vote dilutionthat is, when it is used to prove that the
minority group is politically cohesive and that white voters will usually be
able to defeat the minority's preferred candidatesrefers only to the
existence of a correlation between the race of voters and the selection of
certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent in order to
prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting, and defendants may not
rebut that case with evidence of causation or intent. Pp. 61-73.

Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice WHITE, concluded in Part IV-B,

that the District Court erred, as a matter of law, in ignoring the
significance of the sustained success black voters have experienced in
House District 23. The persistent proportional representation for black
residents in that district in the last six elections is inconsistent with
appellees' allegation that black voters' ability in that district to elect
representatives of their choice is not equal to that enjoyed by the white
majority. P. 77.
Justice O'CONNOR, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice POWELL,
and Justice REHNQUIST, concluded that:
1. Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is
admitted solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive
and to assess its prospects for electoral success, such a showing cannot be
rebutted by evidence that the divergent voting patterns may be explained
by causes other than race. However, evidence of the reasons for divergent
voting patterns can in some circumstances be relevant to the overall vote
dilution inquiry, and there is no rule against consideration of all evidence
concerning voting preferences other than statistical evidence of racial
voting patterns. Pp. 100-101.
2. Consistent and sustained success by candidates preferred by minority
voters is presumptively inconsistent with the existence of a 2 violation.
The District Court erred in assessing the extent of black electoral success
in House District 39 and Senate District 22, as well as in House District
23. Except in House District 23, despite these errors the District Court's
ultimate conclusion of vote dilution is not clearly erroneous. But in House
District 23 appellees failed to establish a violation of 2. Pp. 101-105.
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V,
in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined, an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to
Part IV-B, in which WHITE, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring
opinion, post, p. 82. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 83. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p. 106.
Lacy H. Thornburg, Raleigh, N.C., for appellants.

Sol. Gen. Charles Fried for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support
of the appellants, by special leave of Court.
Julius L. Chambers, Charlotte, N.C., for appellees.
Justice BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and
V, and an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which Justice
MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice STEVENS join, and an
opinion with respect to Part IV-B, in which Justice WHITE joins.

This case requires that we construe for the first time 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. 42 U.S.C. 1973. The specific
question to be decided is whether the three-judge District Court, convened in
the Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) and 42
U.S.C. 1973c, correctly held that the use in a legislative redistricting plan of
multimember districts in five North Carolina legislative districts violated 2 by
impairing the opportunity of black voters "to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." 2(b), 96 Stat. 134.

2* BACKGROUND
3

In April 1982, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a legislative

redistricting plan for the State's Senate and House of Representatives.
Appellees, black citizens of North Carolina who are registered to vote,
challenged seven districts, one single-member1 and six multimember2 districts,
alleging that the redistricting scheme impaired black citizens' ability to elect
representatives of their choice in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and of 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.3

After appellees brought suit, but before trial, Congress amended 2. The
amendment was largely a response to this Court's plurality opinion in Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), which had declared
that, in order to establish a violation either of 2 or of the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested electoral
mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a
discriminatory purpose. Congress substantially revised 2 to make clear that a
violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to
establish as the relevant legal standard the "results test," applied by this Court in
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), and by

other federal courts before Bolden, supra. S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong.2nd
Sess. 28 (1982), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 177, 205
(hereinafter S.Rep.).
5

Section 2, as amended, 96 Stat. 134, reads as follows:

"(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or

procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).

"(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of

circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."
Codified at 42 U.S.C. 1973.

The Senate Judiciary Committee majority Report accompanying the bill that
amended 2, elaborates on the circumstances that might be probative of a 2
violation, noting the following "typical factors":4

"1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;

10

"2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;

11

"3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions,
or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;

12

"4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority

12

"4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;

13

"5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process;

14

"6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle

racial appeals;

15

"7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction.

16

"Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of
plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:

17

"whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected

officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.

18

"whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is
tenuous." S.Rep., at 28-29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, pp. 206-207.

19

The District Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth in
2(b) to appellees' statutory claim, and, relying principally on the factors
outlined in the Senate Report, held that the redistricting scheme violated 2
because it resulted in the dilution of black citizens' votes in all seven disputed
districts. In light of this conclusion, the court did not reach appellees'
constitutional claims. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345 (EDNC 1984).

20

Preliminarily, the court found that black citizens constituted a distinct

population and registered-voter minority in each challenged district. The court
noted that at the time the multimember districts were created, there were
concentrations of black citizens within the boundaries of each that were
sufficiently large and contiguous to constitute effective voting majorities in
single-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the multimember
districts. With respect to the challenged single-member district, Senate District
No. 2, the court also found that there existed a concentration of black citizens
within its boundaries and within those of adjoining Senate District No. 6 that
was sufficient in numbers and in contiguity to constitute an effective voting

majority in a single-member district. The District Court then proceeded to find

that the following circumstances combined with the multimember districting
scheme to result in the dilution of black citizens' votes.
21

First, the court found that North Carolina had officially discriminated against
its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from
approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing at different times a poll tax, a
literacy test, a prohibition against bullet (single-shot) voting5 and designated
seat plans6 for multimember districts. The court observed that even after the
removal of direct barriers to black voter registration, such as the poll tax and
literacy test, black voter registration remained relatively depressed; in 1982
only 52.7% of age-qualified blacks statewide were registered to vote, whereas
66.7% of whites were registered. The District Court found these statewide
depressed levels of black voter registration to be present in all of the disputed
districts and to be traceable, at least in part, to the historical pattern of statewide
official discrimination.

22

Second, the court found that historic discrimination in education, housing,

employment, and health services had resulted in a lower socioeconomic status
for North Carolina blacks as a group than for whites. The court concluded that
this lower status both gives rise to special group interests and hinders blacks'
ability to participate effectively in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.

23

Third, the court considered other voting procedures that may operate to lessen
the opportunity of black voters to elect candidates of their choice. It noted that
North Carolina has a majority vote requirement for primary elections and,
while acknowledging that no black candidate for election to the State General
Assembly had failed to win solely because of this requirement, the court
concluded that it nonetheless presents a continuing practical impediment to the
opportunity of black voting minorities to elect candidates of their choice. The
court also remarked on the fact that North Carolina does not have a subdistrict
residency requirement for members of the General Assembly elected from
multimember districts, a requirement which the court found could offset to
some extent the disadvantages minority voters often experience in
multimember districts.

24

Fourth, the court found that white candidates in North Carolina have
encouraged voting along color lines by appealing to racial prejudice. It noted
that the record is replete with specific examples of racial appeals, ranging in
style from overt and blatant to subtle and furtive, and in date from the 1890's to
the 1984 campaign for a seat in the United States Senate. The court determined

that the use of racial appeals in political campaigns in North Carolina persists to
the present day and that its current effect is to lessen to some degree the
opportunity of black citizens to participate effectively in the political processes
and to elect candidates of their choice.
25

Fifth, the court examined the extent to which blacks have been elected to office
in North Carolina, both statewide and in the challenged districts. It found,
among other things, that prior to World War II, only one black had been elected
to public office in this century. While recognizing that "it has now become
possible for black citizens to be elected to office at all levels of state
government in North Carolina," 590 F.Supp., at 367, the court found that, in
comparison to white candidates running for the same office, black candidates
are at a disadvantage in terms of relative probability of success. It also found
that the overall rate of black electoral success has been minimal in relation to
the percentage of blacks in the total state population. For example, the court
noted, from 1971 to 1982 there were at any given time only two-to-four blacks
in the 120-member House of Representativesthat is, only 1.6% to 3.3% of
House members were black. From 1975 to 1983 there were at any one time
only one or two blacks in the 50-member State Senatethat is, only 2% to 4%
of State Senators were black. By contrast, at the time of the District Court's
opinion, blacks constituted about 22.4% of the total state population.

26

With respect to the success in this century of black candidates in the contested
districts, see also Appendix B to opinion, post, p. ---, the court found that only
one black had been elected to House District 36after this lawsuit began.
Similarly, only one black had served in the Senate from District 22, from 19751980. Before the 1982 election, a black was elected only twice to the House
from District 39 (part of Forsyth County); in the 1982 contest two blacks were
elected. Since 1973 a black citizen had been elected each 2-year term to the
House from District 23 (Durham County), but no black had been elected to the
Senate from Durham County. In House District 21 (Wake County), a black had
been elected twice to the House, and another black served two terms in the
State Senate. No black had ever been elected to the House or Senate from the
area covered by House District No. 8, and no black person had ever been
elected to the Senate from the area covered by Senate District No. 2.

27

The court did acknowledge the improved success of black candidates in the
1982 elections, in which 11 blacks were elected to the State House of
Representatives, including 5 blacks from the multimember districts at issue
here. However, the court pointed out that the 1982 election was conducted after
the commencement of this litigation. The court found the circumstances of the
1982 election sufficiently aberrational and the success by black candidates too

minimal and too recent in relation to the long history of complete denial of
elective opportunities to support the conclusion that black voters' opportunities
to elect representatives of their choice were not impaired.
28

Finally, the court considered the extent to which voting in the challenged
districts was racially polarized. Based on statistical evidence presented by
expert witnesses, supplemented to some degree by the testimony of lay
witnesses, the court found that all of the challenged districts exhibit severe and
persistent racially polarized voting.

29

Based on these findings, the court declared the contested portions of the 1982
redistricting plan violative of 2 and enjoined appellants from conducting
elections pursuant to those portions of the plan. Appellants, the Attorney
General of North Carolina and others, took a direct appeal to this Court,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253, with respect to five of the multimember districts
House Districts 21, 23, 36, and 39, and Senate District 22. Appellants argue,
first, that the District Court utilized a legally incorrect standard in determining
whether the contested districts exhibit racial bloc voting to an extent that is
cognizable under 2. Second, they contend that the court used an incorrect
definition of racially polarized voting and thus erroneously relied on statistical
evidence that was not probative of polarized voting. Third, they maintain that
the court assigned the wrong weight to evidence of some black candidates'
electoral success. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in concluding that
these multimember districts result in black citizens having less opportunity
than their white counterparts to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. We noted probable jurisdiction, 471 U.S. 1064,
105 S.Ct. 2137, 85 L.Ed.2d 495 (1985), and now affirm with respect to all of
the districts except House District 23. With regard to District 23, the judgment
of the District Court is reversed.

II
30

SECTION 2 AND VOTE DILUTION THROUGH USE OF MULTIMEMBER

DISTRICTS

31

An understanding both of 2 and of the way in which multimember districts

can operate to impair blacks' ability to elect representatives of their choice is
prerequisite to an evaluation of appellants' contentions. First, then, we review
amended 2 and its legislative history in some detail. Second, we explain the
theoretical basis for appellees' claim of vote dilution.

* SECTION 2 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

32

Subsection 2(a) prohibits all States and political subdivisions from imposing
any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards, practices,
or procedures which result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote of
any citizen who is a member of a protected class of racial and language
minorities. Subsection 2(b) establishes that 2 has been violated where the
"totality of the circumstances" reveal that "the political processes leading to
nomination or election . . . are not equally open to participation by members of
a [protected class] . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." While explaining that "[t]he extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered" in evaluating an
alleged violation, 2(b) cautions that "nothing in [ 2] establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population."

33

The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982 amendments elaborates on the
nature of 2 violations and on the proof required to establish these violations.7
First and foremost, the Report dispositively rejects the position of the plurality
in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), which
required proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was adopted
or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters.8 See, e.g.,
S.Rep., at 2, 15-16, 27. The intent test was repudiated for three principal
reasonsit is "unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on
the part of individual officials or entire communities," it places an "inordinately
difficult" burden of proof on plaintiffs, and it "asks the wrong question." Id., at
36, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 214. The "right" question, as the
Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether "as a result of the challenged practice
or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the
political processes and to elect candidates of their choice."9 Id., at 28, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 206. See also id., at 2, 27, 29, n. 118, 36.

34

In order to answer this question, a court must assess the impact of the contested
structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities "on the basis of
objective factors." Id., at 27, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 205.
The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a 2
claim: the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political
subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political
subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political
subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against

bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate
slating processes; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects
of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the
use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to
which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction. Id., at 28-29; see also supra, at ----. The Report notes also that
evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the
particularized needs of the members of the minority group and that the policy
underlying the State's or the political subdivision's use of the contested practice
or structure is tenuous may have probative value. Id., at 29. The Report
stresses, however, that this list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor
exclusive. While the enumerated factors will often be pertinent to certain types
of 2 violations, particularly to vote dilution claims, 10 other factors may also
be relevant and may be considered. Id., at 29-30. Furthermore, the Senate
Committee observed that "there is no requirement that any particular number of
factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other." Id., at
29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 207. Rather, the Committee
determined that "the question whether the political processes are 'equally open'
depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,' "
id., at 30, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 208 (footnote omitted), and
on a "functional" view of the political process. Id., at 30, n. 120, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 208.
35

Although the Senate Report espouses a flexible, fact-intensive test for 2

violations, it limits the circumstances under which 2 violations may be proved
in three ways. First, electoral devices, such as at-large elections, may not be
considered per se violative of 2. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the devices result in unequal access to the
electoral process. Id., at 16. Second, the conjunction of an allegedly dilutive
electoral mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone does not
establish a violation. Ibid. Third, the results test does not assume the existence
of racial bloc voting; plaintiffs must prove it. Id., at 33.

B
36

VOTE DILUTION THROUGH THE USE OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS

37

Appellees contend that the legislative decision to employ multimember, rather

than single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions dilutes their votes by
submerging them in a white majority,11 thus impairing their ability to elect
representatives of their choice.12

38

The essence of a 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure

interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives. This Court has long recognized that multimember districts and
at-large voting schemes may " 'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population.' "13 Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1294, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966)
(quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439, 85 S.Ct. 498, 501, 13 L.Ed.2d
401 (1965)). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617, 102 S.Ct. 3272,
3275, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 765, 93 S.Ct., at
2339; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1869, 29 L.Ed.2d
363 (1971). The theoretical basis for this type of impairment is that where
minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the
majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices
of minority voters.14 See, e.g., Grofman, Alternatives, in Representation and
Redistricting Issues 113-114. Multimember districts and at-large election
schemes, however, are not per se violative of minority voters' rights. S.Rep., at
16. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S., at 617, 102 S.Ct., at 3275; Regester,
supra, 412 U.S., at 765, 93 S.Ct., at 2339; Whitcomb, supra, 403 U.S., at 142,
91 S.Ct., at 1868. Minority voters who contend that the multimember form of
districting violates 2, must prove that the use of a multimember electoral
structure operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred
candidates. See, e.g., S.Rep., at 16.

39

While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant to a
claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts, unless
there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the use of multimember
districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect
representatives of their choice.15 Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority must
usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive,
geographically insular minority group. Bonapfel 355; Blacksher & Menefee 34;
Butler 903; Carpeneti 696-699; Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An
Overview (hereinafter Davidson), in Minority Vote Dilution 4; Grofman,
Alternatives 117. Cf. Bolden, 446 U.S., at 105, n. 3, 100 S.Ct., at 1520, n. 3
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("It is obvious that the greater the degree to
which the electoral minority is homogeneous and insular and the greater the
degree that bloc voting occurs along majority-minority lines, the greater will be
the extent to which the minority's voting power is diluted by multimember
districting"). These circumstances are necessary preconditions for multimember
districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives of
their choice for the following reasons. First, the minority group must be able to
demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to

constitute a majority in a single-member district.16 If it is not, as would be the

case in a substantially integrated district, the multi-member form of the district
cannot be responsible for minority voters' inability to elect its candidates.17 Cf.
Rogers, 458 U.S., at 616, 102 S.Ct., at 3275. See also, Blacksher & Menefee
51-56, 58; Bonapfel 355; Carpeneti 696; Davidson 4; Jewell 130. Second, the
minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the
minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of
a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests.
Blacksher & Menefee 51-55, 58-60, and n. 344; Carpeneti 696-697; Davidson
4. Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable itin the absence of special circumstances, such
as the minority candidate running unopposed, see, infra, at ---, and n. 26
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. See, e.g., Blacksher &
Menefee 51, 53, 56-57, 60. Cf. Rogers, supra, at 616-617, 102 S.Ct., at 32743275; Whitcomb, 403 U.S., at 158-159, 91 S.Ct., at 1877; McMillan v.
Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (CA5 1984). In establishing this
last circumstance, the minority group demonstrates that submergence in a white
multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen representatives.
40

Finally, we observe that the usual predictability of the majority's success

distinguishes structural dilution from the mere loss of an occasional election.
Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131-133, 139-140, 106 S.Ct. 2797, ----,
92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (opinion of WHITE, J.); Bolden, supra, 446 U.S., at 111,
n. 7, 100 S.Ct., at 1523, n. 7 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Whitcomb, supra,
403 U.S., at 153, 91 S.Ct., at 1874. See also Blacksher & Menefee 57, n. 333;
Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights
Act, 94 Yale L.J. 189, 200, n. 66 (1984) (hereinafter Note, Geometry and
Geography).

III
RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
41

Having stated the general legal principles relevant to claims that 2 has been
violated through the use of multimember districts, we turn to the arguments of
appellants and of the United States as amicus curiae addressing racially
polarized voting.18 First, we describe the District Court's treatment of racially
polarized voting. Next, we consider appellants' claim that the District Court
used an incorrect legal standard to determine whether racial bloc voting in the
contested districts was sufficiently severe to be cognizable as an element of a
2 claim. Finally, we consider appellants' contention that the trial court
employed an incorrect definition of racially polarized voting and thus

erroneously relied on statistical evidence that was not probative of racial bloc
voting.
42

THE DISTRICT COURT'S TREATMENT OF RACIALLY POLARIZED

VOTING

43

The investigation conducted by the District Court into the question of racial
bloc voting credited some testimony of lay witnesses, but relied principally on
statistical evidence presented by appellees' expert witnesses, in particular that
offered by Dr. Bernard Grofman. Dr. Grofman collected and evaluated data
from 53 General Assembly primary and general elections involving black
candidacies. These elections were held over a period of three different election
years in the six originally challenged multimember districts. 19 Dr. Grofman
subjected the data to two complementary methods of analysis extreme case
analysis and bivariate ecological regression analysis20in order to determine
whether blacks and whites in these districts differed in their voting behavior.
These analytic techniques yielded data concerning the voting patterns of the
two races, including estimates of the percentages of members of each race who
voted for black candidates.

44

The court's initial consideration of these data took the form of a three-part
inquiry: did the data reveal any correlation between the race of the voter and
the selection of certain candidates; was the revealed correlation statistically
significant; and was the difference in black and white voting patterns
"substantively significant"? The District Court found that blacks and whites
generally preferred different candidates and, on that basis, found voting in the
districts to be racially correlated.21 The court accepted Dr. Grofman's expert
opinion that the correlation between the race of the voter and the voter's choice
of certain candidates was statistically significant.22 Finally, adopting Dr.
Grofman's terminology, see Tr. 195, the court found that in all but 2 of the 53
elections23 the degree of racial bloc voting was "so marked as to be
substantively significant, in the sense that the results of the individual election
would have been different depending upon whether it had been held among
only the white voters or only the black voters." 590 F.Supp., at 368.

45

The court also reported its findings, both in tabulated numerical form and in
written form, that a high percentage of black voters regularly supported black
candidates and that most white voters were extremely reluctant to vote for
black candidates. The court then considered the relevance to the existence of
legally significant white bloc voting of the fact that black candidates have won
some elections. It determined that in most instances, special circumstances,
such as incumbency and lack of opposition, rather than a diminution in usually

severe white bloc voting, accounted for these candidates' success. The court
also suggested that black voters' reliance on bullet voting was a significant
factor in their successful efforts to elect candidates of their choice. Based on all
of the evidence before it, the trial court concluded that each of the districts
experienced racially polarized voting "in a persistent and severe degree." Id., at
367.
B
46

THE DEGREE OF BLOC VOTING THAT IS LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT

UNDER 2

* Appellants' Arguments
47
48

North Carolina and the United States argue that the test used by the District
Court to determine whether voting patterns in the disputed districts are racially
polarized to an extent cognizable under 2 will lead to results that are
inconsistent with congressional intent. North Carolina maintains that the court
considered legally significant racially polarized voting to occur whenever "less
than 50% of the white voters cast a ballot for the black candidate." Brief for
Appellants 36. Appellants also argue that racially polarized voting is legally
significant only when it always results in the defeat of black candidates. Id., at
39-40.

49

The United States, on the other hand, isolates a single line in the court's opinion
and identifies it as the court's complete test. According to the United States, the
District Court adopted a standard under which legally significant racial bloc
voting is deemed to exist whenever " 'the results of the individual election
would have been different depending upon whether it had been held among
only the white voters or only the black voters in the election.' " Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting 590 F.Supp., at 368). We read the District
Court opinion differently.

2
50

The Standard for Legally Significant Racial Bloc Voting

51

The Senate Report states that the "extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized," S.Rep., at 29, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 206, is relevant to a vote dilution claim.
Further, courts and commentators agree that racial bloc voting is a key element
of a vote dilution claim. See, e.g., Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d, at 1043;

United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (CA11),
appeal dism'd and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976, 105 S.Ct. 375, 83 L.Ed.2d 311
(1984); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
951, 100 S.Ct. 2916, 64 L.Ed.2d 807 (1980); Johnson v. Halifax County, 594
F.Supp. 161, 170 (EDNC 1984); Blacksher & Menefee; Engstrom & Wildgen,
465, 469; Parker 107; Note, Geometry and Geography 199. Because, as we
explain below, the extent of bloc voting necessary to demonstrate that a
minority's ability to elect its preferred representatives is impaired varies
according to several factual circumstances, the degree of bloc voting which
constitutes the threshold of legal significance will vary from district to district.
Nonetheless, it is possible to state some general principles and we proceed to do
so.
52

The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting is

twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically
cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidates. See supra, at ----. Thus,
the question whether a given district experiences legally significant racially
polarized voting requires discrete inquiries into minority and white voting
practices. A showing that a significant number of minority group members
usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political
cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim, Blacksher & Menefee 59-60,
and n. 344, and, consequently, establishes minority bloc voting within the
context of 2. And, in general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the
combined strength of minority support plus white "crossover" votes rises to the
level of legally significant white bloc voting. Id., at 60. The amount of white
bloc voting that can generally "minimize or cancel," S.Rep., at 28, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 205; Regester, 412 U.S., at 765, 93 S.Ct., at
2339, black voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice, however, will
vary from district to district according to a number of factors, including the
nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; the presence or absence of
other potentially dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements,
designated posts, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the percentage of
registered voters in the district who are members of the minority group; the size
of the district; and, in multimember districts, the number of seats open and the
number of candidates in the field.24 See, e.g., Butler 874-876; Davidson 5;
Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black Political Representation,
11 Urb.Aff.Q. 345 (1976); United States Commission on Civil Rights, The
Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals 38-41 (1981).

53

Because loss of political power through vote dilution is distinct from the mere
inability to win a particular election, Whitcomb, 403 U.S., at 153, 91 S.Ct., at

1874, a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a period of time is more
probative of a claim that a district experiences legally significant polarization
than are the results of a single election. 25 Blacksher & Menefee 61; Note,
Geometry and Geography 200, n. 66 ("Racial polarization should be seen as an
attribute not of a single election, but rather of a polity viewed over time. The
concern is necessarily temporal and the analysis historical because the evil to
be avoided is the subordination of minority groups in American politics, not the
defeat of individuals in particular electoral contests"). Also for this reason, in a
district where elections are shown usually to be polarized, the fact that racially
polarized voting is not present in one or a few individual elections does not
necessarily negate the conclusion that the district experiences legally significant
bloc voting. Furthermore, the success of a minority candidate in a particular
election does not necessarily prove that the district did not experience polarized
voting in that election; special circumstances, such as the absence of an
opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain minority
electoral success in a polarized contest.26
54

As must be apparent, the degree of racial bloc voting that is cognizable as an

element of a 2 vote dilution claim will vary according to a variety of factual
circumstances. Consequently, there is no simple doctrinal test for the existence
of legally significant racial bloc voting. However, the foregoing general
principles should provide courts with substantial guidance in determining
whether evidence that black and white voters generally prefer different
candidates rises to the level of legal significance under 2.

3
Standard Utilized by the District Court
55

The District Court clearly did not employ the simplistic standard identified by
North Carolinalegally significant bloc voting occurs whenever less than 50%
of the white voters cast a ballot for the black candidate. Brief for Appellants 36.
And, although the District Court did utilize the measure of " 'substantive
significance" that the United States ascribes to it" 'the results of the
individual election would have been different depending on whether it had been
held among only the white voters or only the black voters,' " Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting 590 F.Supp., at 368)the court did not
reach its ultimate conclusion that the degree of racial bloc voting present in
each district is legally significant through mechanical reliance on this
standard.27 While the court did not phrase the standard for legally significant
racial bloc voting exactly as we do, a fair reading of the court's opinion reveals
that the court's analysis conforms to our view of the proper legal standard.

56

The District Court's findings concerning black support for black candidates in
the five multimember districts at issue here clearly establish the political
cohesiveness of black voters. As is apparent from the District Court's tabulated
findings, reproduced in Appendix A to opinion, post, p. ---, black voters'
support for black candidates was overwhelming in almost every election. In all
but 5 of 16 primary elections, black support for black candidates ranged
between 71% and 92%; and in the general elections, black support for black
Democratic candidates ranged between 87% and 96%.

57

In sharp contrast to its findings of strong black support for black candidates, the
District Court found that a substantial majority of white voters would rarely, if
ever, vote for a black candidate. In the primary elections, white support for
black candidates ranged between 8% and 50%, and in the general elections it
ranged between 28% and 49%. See ibid. The court also determined that, on
average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the
primary elections. In the general elections, white voters almost always ranked
black candidates either last or next to last in the multicandidate field, except in
heavily Democratic areas where white voters consistently ranked black
candidates last among the Democrats, if not last or next to last among all
candidates. The court further observed that approximately two-thirds of white
voters did not vote for black candidates in general elections, even after the
candidate had won the Democratic primary and the choice was to vote for a
Republican or for no one.28

58

While the District Court did not state expressly that the percentage of whites
who refused to vote for black candidates in the contested districts would, in the
usual course of events, result in the defeat of the minority's candidates, that
conclusion is apparent both from the court's factual findings and from the rest
of its analysis. First, with the exception of House District 23, see infra, at ----,
the trial court's findings clearly show that black voters have enjoyed only
minimal and sporadic success in electing representatives of their choice. See
Appendix B to opinion, post, p. ---. Second, where black candidates won
elections, the court closely examined the circumstances of those elections
before concluding that the success of these blacks did not negate other
evidence, derived from all of the elections studied in each district, that legally
significant racially polarized voting exists in each district. For example, the
court took account of the benefits incumbency and running essentially
unopposed conferred on some of the successful black candidates,29 as well as of
the very different order of preference blacks and whites assigned black
candidates,30 in reaching its conclusion that legally significant racial
polarization exists in each district.

59

We conclude that the District Court's approach, which tested data derived from
three election years in each district, and which revealed that blacks strongly
supported black candidates, while, to the black candidates' usual detriment,
whites rarely did, satisfactorily addresses each facet of the proper legal
standard.

C
EVIDENCE OF RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING
* Appellants' Argument
60
61

North Carolina and the United States also contest the evidence upon which the
District Court relied in finding that voting patterns in the challenged districts
were racially polarized. They argue that the term "racially polarized voting"
must, as a matter of law, refer to voting patterns for which the principal cause
is race. They contend that the District Court utilized a legally incorrect
definition of racially polarized voting by relying on bivariate statistical analyses
which merely demonstrated a correlation between the race of the voter and the
level of voter support for certain candidates, but which did not prove that race
was the primary determinant of voters' choices. According to appellants and the
United States, only multiple regression analysis, which can take account of
other variables which might also explain voters' choices, such as "party
affiliation, age, religion, income[,] incumbency, education, campaign
expenditures," Brief for Appellants 42, "media use measured by cost, . . . name,
identification, or distance that a candidate lived from a particular precinct,"
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30, n. 57, can prove that race was the
primary determinant of voter behavior.31

62

Whether appellants and the United States believe that it is the voter's race or
the candidate's race that must be the primary determinant of the voter's choice
is unclear; indeed, their catalogs of relevant variables suggest both.32 Age,
religion, income, and education seem most relevant to the voter; incumbency,
campaign expenditures, name identification, and media use are pertinent to the
candidate; and party affiliation could refer both to the voter and the candidate.
In either case, we disagree: For purposes of 2, the legal concept of racially
polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent. It means simply that
the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or
candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority
language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates. Grofman, Migalski, &
Noviello 203. As we demonstrate infra, appellants' theory of racially polarized
voting would thwart the goals Congress sought to achieve when it amended 2

and would prevent courts from performing the "functional" analysis of the
political process, S.Rep., at 30, n. 119, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982,
p. 208, and the "searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,' "
id., at 30, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 208 (footnote omitted),
mandated by the Senate Report.
2
Causation Irrelevant to Section 2 Inquiry
63

The first reason we reject appellants' argument that racially polarized voting
refers to voting patterns that are in some way caused by race, rather than to
voting patterns that are merely correlated with the race of the voter, is that the
reasons black and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the central
inquiry of 2. By contrast, the correlation between race of voter and the
selection of certain candidates is crucial to that inquiry.

64

Both 2 itself and the Senate Report make clear that the critical question in a
2 claim is whether the use of a contested electoral practice or structure results
in members of a protected group having less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. See, e.g., S.Rep., at 2, 27, 28, 29, n. 118, 36. As we explained,
supra, at ----, multimember districts may impair the ability of blacks to elect
representatives of their choice where blacks vote sufficiently as a bloc as to be
able to elect their preferred candidates in a black majority, single-member
district and where a white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat
the candidates chosen by blacks. It is the difference between the choices made
by blacks and whitesnot the reasons for that differencethat results in
blacks having less opportunity than whites to elect their preferred
representatives. Consequently, we conclude that under the "results test" of 2,
only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates,
not the causes of the correlation, matters.

65

The irrelevance to a 2 inquiry of the reasons why black and white voters vote
differently supports, by itself, our rejection of appellants' theory of racially
polarized voting. However, their theory contains other equally serious flaws
that merit further attention. As we demonstrate below, the addition of irrelevant
variables distorts the equation and yields results that are indisputably incorrect
under 2 and the Senate Report.

66

Race of Voter as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior

67

Appellants and the United States contend that the legal concept of "racially
polarized voting" refers not to voting patterns that are merely correlated with
the voter's race, but to voting patterns that are determined primarily by the
voter's race, rather than by the voter's other socioeconomic characteristics.

68

The first problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that members of
geographically insular racial and ethnic groups frequently share socioeconomic
characteristics, such as income level, employment status, amount of education,
housing and other living conditions, religion, language, and so forth. See, e.g.,
Butler 902 (Minority group "members' shared concerns, including political
ones, are . . . a function of group status, and as such are largely involuntary. . . .
As a group blacks are concerned, for example, with police brutality,
substandard housing, unemployment, etc., because these problems fall
disproportionately upon the group"); S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in
America 151-152 (1972) ("Socioeconomic status . . . is closely related to race.
Blacks in American society are likely to be in lower-status jobs than whites, to
have less education, and to have lower incomes"). Where such characteristics
are shared, race or ethnic group not only denotes color or place of origin, it also
functions as a shorthand notation for common social and economic
characteristics. Appellants' definition of racially polarized voting is even more
pernicious where shared characteristics are causally related to race or ethnicity.
The opportunity to achieve high employment status and income, for example, is
often influenced by the presence or absence of racial or ethnic discrimination. A
definition of racially polarized voting which holds that black bloc voting does
not exist when black voters' choice of certain candidates is most strongly
influenced by the fact that the voters have low incomes and menial jobswhen
the reason most of those voters have menial jobs and low incomes is
attributable to past or present racial discriminationruns counter to the Senate
Report's instruction to conduct a searching and practical evaluation of past and
present reality, S.Rep., at 30, and interferes with the purpose of the Voting
Rights Act to eliminate the negative effects of past discrimination on the
electoral opportunities of minorities. Id., at 5, 40.

69

Furthermore, under appellants' theory of racially polarized voting, even

uncontrovertible evidence that candidates strongly preferred by black voters are
always defeated by a bloc voting white majority would be dismissed for failure
to prove racial polarization whenever the black and white populations could be
described in terms of other socioeconomic characteristics.

70

To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember district in which

70

To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember district in which

blacks and whites possess the same socioeconomic characteristics that the
record in this case attributes to blacks and whites in Halifax County, a part of
Senate District 2. The annual mean income for blacks in this district is $10,465,
and 47.8% of the black community lives in poverty. More than half 51.5%of
black adults over the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Just
over half of black citizens reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in rental units.
And, almost a third of all black households are without a car. In contrast, only
12.6% of the whites in the district live below the poverty line. Whites enjoy a
mean income of $19,042. White residents are better educated than blacks
only 25.6% of whites over the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or
less. Furthermore, only 26.2% of whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live
in households with no vehicle available. 1 App., Ex-44. As is the case in Senate
District 2, blacks in this hypothetical urban district have never been able to elect
a representative of their choice.

71

According to appellants' theory of racially polarized voting, proof that black

and white voters in this hypothetical district regularly choose different
candidates and that the blacks' preferred candidates regularly lose could be
rejected as not probative of racial bloc voting. The basis for the rejection would
be that blacks chose a certain candidate, not principally because of their race,
but principally because this candidate best represented the interests of residents
who, because of their low incomes, are particularly interested in governmentsubsidized health and welfare services; who are generally poorly educated, and
thus share an interest in job training programs; who are, to a greater extent than
the white community, concerned with rent control issues; and who favor major
public transportation expenditures. Similarly, whites would be found to have
voted for a different candidate, not principally because of their race, but
primarily because that candidate best represented the interests of residents who,
due to their education and income levels, and to their property and vehicle
ownership, favor gentrification, low residential property taxes, and extensive
expenditures for street and highway improvements.

72

Congress could not have intended that courts employ this definition of racial
bloc voting. First, this definition leads to results that are inconsistent with the
effects test adopted by Congress when it amended 2 and with the Senate
Report's admonition that courts take a "functional" view of the political
process, S.Rep. 30, n. 119, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 208, and
conduct a searching and practical evaluation of reality. Id., at 30. A test for
racially polarized voting that denies the fact that race and socioeconomic
characteristics are often closely correlated permits neither a practical evaluation
of reality nor a functional analysis of vote dilution. And, contrary to Congress'
intent in adopting the "results test," appellants' proposed definition could result

in the inability of minority voters to establish a critical element of a vote

dilution claim, even though both races engage in "monolithic" bloc voting, id.,
at 33, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 211, and generations of black
voters have been unable to elect a representative of their choice.
73

Second, appellants' interpretation of "racially polarized voting" creates an

irreconcilable tension between their proposed treatment of socioeconomic
characteristics in the bloc voting context and the Senate Report's statement that
"the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health" may be
relevant to a 2 claim. Id., at 29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p.
206. We can find no support in either logic or the legislative history for the
anomalous conclusion to which appellants' position leadsthat Congress
intended, on the one hand, that proof that a minority group is predominately
poor, uneducated, and unhealthy should be considered a factor tending to prove
a 2 violation; but that Congress intended, on the other hand, that proof that
the same socioeconomic characteristics greatly influence black voters' choice of
candidates should destroy these voters' ability to establish one of the most
important elements of a vote dilution claim.

4
74

Race of Candidate as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior

75

North Carolina's and the United States' suggestion that racially polarized voting
means that voters select or reject candidates principally on the basis of the
candidate's race is also misplaced.

76

First, both the language of 2 and a functional understanding of the

phenomenon of vote dilution mandate the conclusion that the race of the
candidate per se is irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis. Section 2(b) states
that a violation is established if it can be shown that members of a protected
minority group "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to .
. . elect representatives of their choice." (Emphasis added.) Because both
minority and majority voters often select members of their own race as their
preferred representatives, it will frequently be the case that a black candidate is
the choice of blacks, while a white candidate is the choice of whites. Cf. Letter
to the Editor from Chandler Davidson, 17 New Perspectives 38 (Fall 1985).
Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate that tendencyblacks preferred black
candidates, whites preferred white candidates. Thus, as a matter of
convenience, we and the District Court may refer to the preferred
representative of black voters as the "black candidate" and to the preferred

representative of white voters as the "white candidate." Nonetheless, the fact

that race of voter and race of candidate is often correlated is not directly
pertinent to a 2 inquiry. Under 2, it is the status of the candidate as the
chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the
candidate, that is important.
77

An understanding of how vote dilution through submergence in a white

majority works leads to the same conclusion. The essence of a submergence
claim is that minority group members prefer certain candidates whom they
could elect were it not for the interaction of the challenged electoral law or
structure with a white majority that votes as a significant bloc for different
candidates. Thus, as we explained in Part III, supra, the existence of racial bloc
voting is relevant to a vote dilution claim in two ways. Bloc voting by blacks
tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows
that blacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-member,
black majority district. Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that
blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of their choice. Clearly,
only the race of the voter, not the race of the candidate, is relevant to vote
dilution analysis. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60; Grofman, Should
Representatives be Typical?, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 98;
Note, Geometry and Geography 207.

78

Second, appellants' suggestion that racially polarized voting refers to voting

patterns where whites vote for white candidates because they prefer members
of their own race or are hostile to blacks, as opposed to voting patterns where
whites vote for white candidates because the white candidates spent more on
their campaigns, utilized more media coverage, and thus enjoyed greater name
recognition than the black candidates, fails for another, independent reason.
This argument, like the argument that the race of the voter must be the primary
determinant of the voter's ballot, is inconsistent with the purposes of 2 and
would render meaningless the Senate Report factor that addresses the impact of
low socioeconomic status on a minority group's level of political participation.

79

Congress intended that the Voting Rights Act eradicate inequalities in political
opportunities that exist due to the vestigial effects of past purposeful
discrimination. S.Rep., at 5, 40; H.R.Rep. No. 97-227, p. 31 (1981). Both this
Court and other federal courts have recognized that political participation by
minorities tends to be depressed where minority group members suffer effects
of prior discrimination such as inferior education, poor employment
opportunities, and low incomes. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 768769, 93 S.Ct., at 2340-2341; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County,
Miss., 554 F.2d 139, 145-146 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98

S.Ct. 512, 54 L.Ed.2d 454 (1977). See also S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in
America 152 (1972). The Senate Report acknowledges this tendency and
instructs that "the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process,"
S.Rep., at 29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 206 (footnote omitted),
is a factor which may be probative of unequal opportunity to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives. Courts and commentators have
recognized further that candidates generally must spend more money in order to
win election in a multimember district than in a single-member district. See,
e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704, 720-721 (WD Tex.1972), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. White v. Regester, supra. Berry & Dye 88; Davidson
& Fraga, Nonpartisan Slating Groups in an At-Large Setting, in Minority Vote
Dilution 122-123; Derfner 554, n. 126; Jewell 131; Karnig, Black
Representation on City Councils, 12 Urb.Aff.Q. 223, 230 (1976). If, because of
inferior education and poor employment opportunities, blacks earn less than
whites, they will not be able to provide the candidates of their choice with the
same level of financial support that whites can provide theirs. Thus, electoral
losses by candidates preferred by the black community may well be attributable
in part to the fact that their white opponents outspent them. But, the fact is that,
in this instance, the economic effects of prior discrimination have combined
with the multimember electoral structure to afford blacks less opportunity than
whites to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. It would be both anomalous and inconsistent with congressional intent
to hold that, on the one hand, the effects of past discrimination which hinder
blacks' ability to participate in the political process tend to prove a 2 violation,
while holding on the other hand that, where these same effects of past
discrimination deter whites from voting for blacks, blacks cannot make out a
crucial element of a vote dilution claim. Accord, Escambia County, 748 F.2d,
at 1043 (" '[T]he failure of the blacks to solicit white votes may be caused by
the effects of past discrimination' ") (quoting United States v. Dallas County
Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1536 (CA11 1984)); United States v. Marengo County
Comm'n, 731 F.2d, at 1567.
5
80

Racial Animosity as Primary Determinant of Voter Behavior

81

Finally, we reject the suggestion that racially polarized voting refers only to
white bloc voting which is caused by white voters' racial hostility toward black
candidates.33 To accept this theory would frustrate the goals Congress sought to
achieve by repudiating the intent test of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100

S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), and would prevent minority voters who have
clearly been denied an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice from
establishing a critical element of a vote dilution claim.
82

In amending 2, Congress rejected the requirement announced by this Court in

Bolden, supra, that 2 plaintiffs must prove the discriminatory intent of state or
local governments in adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral
mechanism.34 Appellants' suggestion that the discriminatory intent of individual
white voters must be proved in order to make out a 2 claim must fail for the
very reasons Congress rejected the intent test with respect to governmental
bodies. See Engstrom, The Reincarnation of the Intent Standard: Federal
Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28 How. L.J. 495 (1985).

83

The Senate Report states that one reason the Senate Committee abandoned the
intent test was that "the Committee . . . heard persuasive testimony that the
intent test is unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the
part of individual officials or entire communities." S.Rep., at 36, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 214. The Committee found the testimony of Dr.
Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, particularly persuasive. He testified:

84

" '[Under an intent test] [l]itigators representing excluded minorities will have
to explore the motivations of individual council members, mayors, and other
citizens. The question would be whether their decisions were motivated by
invidious racial considerations. Such inquiries can only be divisive, threatening
to destroy any existing racial progress in a community. It is the intent test, not
the results test, that would make it necessary to brand individuals as racist in
order to obtain judicial relief.' " Ibid. (footnote omitted).

85

The grave threat to racial progress and harmony which Congress perceived
from requiring proof that racism caused the adoption or maintenance of a
challenged electoral mechanism is present to a much greater degree in the
proposed requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that racial animosity
determined white voting patterns. Under the old intent test, plaintiffs might
succeed by proving only that a limited number of elected officials were racist;
under the new intent test plaintiffs would be required to prove that most of the
white community is racist in order to obtain judicial relief. It is difficult to
imagine a more racially divisive requirement.

86

A second reason Congress rejected the old intent test was that in most cases it
placed an "inordinately difficult burden" on 2 plaintiffs. Ibid. The new intent

test would be equally, if not more, burdensome. In order to prove that a specific
factor racial hostilitydetermined white voters' ballots, it would be necessary
to demonstrate that other potentially relevant causal factors, such as
socioeconomic characteristics and candidate expenditures, do not correlate
better than racial animosity with white voting behavior. As one commentator
has explained: "Many of the[se] independent variables . . . would be all but
impossible for a social scientist to operationalize as interval-level independent
variables for use in a multiple regression equation, whether on a step-wise basis
or not. To conduct such an extensive statistical analysis as this implies,
moreover, can become prohibitively expensive.
87

"Compared to this sort of effort, proving discriminatory intent in the adoption

of an at-large election system is both simple and inexpensive." McCrary,
Discriminatory Intent: The Continuing Relevance of "Purpose" Evidence in
Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 How. L.J. 463, 492 (1985) (footnote omitted).

88

The final and most dispositive reason the Senate Report repudiated the old
intent test was that it "asks the wrong question." S.Rep., at 36, U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News 1982, p. 214. Amended 2 asks instead "whether minorities
have equal access to the process of electing their representatives." Ibid.

89

Focusing on the discriminatory intent of the voters, rather than the behavior of
the voters, also asks the wrong question. All that matters under 2 and under a
functional theory of vote dilution is voter behavior, not its explanations.
Moreover, as we have explained in detail, supra, requiring proof that racial
considerations actually caused voter behavior will resultcontrary to
congressional intentin situations where a black minority that functionally has
been totally excluded from the political process will be unable to establish a 2
violation. The Senate Report's remark concerning the old intent test thus is
pertinent to the new test: The requirement that a "court . . . make a separate . . .
finding of intent, after accepting the proof of the factors involved in the White
[v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314] analysis . . . [would]
seriously clou[d] the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances of racial
discrimination in American elections." Id., at 37, U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1982, p. 215. We therefore decline to adopt such a requirement.

6
Summary
90

In sum, we would hold that the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it
relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a correlation

between the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs
need not prove causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial
bloc voting and defendants may not rebut that case with evidence of causation
or intent.
IV
91

THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SOME BLACK CANDIDATES'

SUCCESS

A.
92

North Carolina and the United States maintain that the District Court failed to
accord the proper weight to the success of some black candidates in the
challenged districts. Black residents of these districts, they point out, achieved
improved representation in the 1982 General Assembly election.35 They also
note that blacks in House District 23 have enjoyed proportional representation
consistently since 1973 and that blacks in the other districts have occasionally
enjoyed nearly proportional representation.36 This electoral success
demonstrates conclusively, appellants and the United States argue, that blacks
in those districts do not have "less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice." 42 U.S.C. 1973(b). Essentially, appellants and the United States
contend that if a racial minority gains proportional or nearly proportional
representation in a single election, that fact alone precludes, as a matter of law,
finding a 2 violation.

93

Section 2(b) provides that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may be considered."
42 U.S.C. 1973(b). The Senate Committee Report also identifies the extent to
which minority candidates have succeeded as a pertinent factor. S.Rep., at 29.
However, the Senate Report expressly states that "the election of a few
minority candidates does not 'necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of
the black vote,' " noting that if it did, "the possibility exists that the majority
citizens might evade [ 2] by manipulating the election of a 'safe' minority
candidate." Id., at 29, n. 115, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 207,
quoting Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (CA5 1973) (en banc),
aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96
S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976) (per curiam ). The Senate Committee
decided, instead, to " 'require an independent consideration of the record.' "
S.Rep., at 29, n. 115, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 207. The
Senate Report also emphasizes that the question whether "the political

processes are 'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of

the 'past and present reality.' " Id., at 30, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982,
p. 208 (footnote omitted). Thus, the language of 2 and its legislative history
plainly demonstrate that proof that some minority candidates have been elected
does not foreclose a 2 claim.
94

Moreover, in conducting its "independent consideration of the record" and its

"searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,' " the District
Court could appropriately take account of the circumstances surrounding recent
black electoral success in deciding its significance to appellees' claim. In
particular, as the Senate Report makes clear, id., at 29, n. 115, the court could
properly notice the fact that black electoral success increased markedly in the
1982 electionan election that occurred after the instant lawsuit had been filed
and could properly consider to what extent "the pendency of this very litigation
[might have] worked a one-time advantage for black candidates in the form of
unusual organized political support by white leaders concerned to forestall
single-member districting."37 590 F.Supp., at 367, n. 27.

95

Nothing in the statute or its legislative history prohibited the court from
viewing with some caution black candidates' success in the 1982 election, and
from deciding on the basis of all the relevant circumstances to accord greater
weight to blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent
elections. Consequently, we hold that the District Court did not err, as a matter
of law, in refusing to treat the fact that some black candidates have succeeded
as dispositive of appellees' 2 claim. Where multimember districting generally
works to dilute the minority vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that it
sporadically and serendipitously benefits minority voters.

B
96

The District Court did err, however, in ignoring the significance of the
sustained success black voters have experienced in House District 23. In that
district, the last six elections have resulted in proportional representation for
black residents. This persistent proportional representation is inconsistent with
appellees' allegation that the ability of black voters in District 23 to elect
representatives of their choice is not equal to that enjoyed by the white
majority.

97

In some situations, it may be possible for 2 plaintiffs to demonstrate that such

sustained success does not accurately reflect the minority group's ability to elect
its preferred representatives,38 but appellees have not done so here. Appellees
presented evidence relating to black electoral success in the last three elections;

they failed utterly, though, to offer any explanation for the success of black
candidates in the previous three elections. Consequently, we believe that the
District Court erred, as a matter of law, in ignoring the sustained success black
voters have enjoyed in House District 23, and would reverse with respect to that
District.
V
ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF VOTE DILUTION
98

Finally, appellants and the United States dispute the District Court's ultimate
conclusion that the multimember districting scheme at issue in this case
deprived black voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.

A.
99

As an initial matter, both North Carolina and the United States contend that the
District Court's ultimate conclusion that the challenged multimember districts
operate to dilute black citizens' votes is a mixed question of law and fact subject
to de novo review on appeal. In support of their proposed standard of review,
they rely primarily on Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), a case in which we reconfirmed
that, as a matter of constitutional law, there must be independent appellate
review of evidence of "actual malice" in defamation cases. Appellants and the
United States argue that because a finding of vote dilution under amended 2
requires the application of a rule of law to a particular set of facts it constitutes
a legal, rather than factual, determination. Reply Brief for Appellants 7; Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19. Neither appellants nor the United
States cite our several precedents in which we have treated the ultimate finding
of vote dilution as a question of fact subject to the clearly-erroneous standard of
Rule 52(a). See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S., at 622-627, 102 S.Ct., at 32783281; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1564,
64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 765-770, 93 S.Ct., at
2339-2341. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504,
1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

100 In Regester, supra, we noted that the District Court had based its conclusion
that minority voters in two multimember districts in Texas had less opportunity
to participate in the political process than majority voters on the totality of the
circumstances and stated that

101 "we are not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as they do a blend
of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the . . .
multimember district in the light of past and present reality, political and
otherwise." Id., 412 U.S., at 769-770, 93 S.Ct., at 2341.
102 Quoting this passage from Regester with approval, we expressly held in Rogers
v. Lodge, supra, that the question whether an at-large election system was
maintained for discriminatory purposes and subsidiary issues, which include
whether that system had the effect of diluting the minority vote, were questions
of fact, reviewable under Rule 52(a)'s clearly-erroneous standard. 458 U.S., at
622-623, 102 S.Ct., at 3278-3279. Similarly, in City of Rome v. United States,
we declared that the question whether certain electoral structures had a
"discriminatory effect," in the sense of diluting the minority vote, was a
question of fact subject to clearly-erroneous review. 446 U.S., at 183, 100 S.Ct.,
at 1565.
103 We reaffirm our view that the clearly-erroneous test of Rule 52(a) is the
appropriate standard for appellate review of a finding of vote dilution. As both
amended 2 and its legislative history make clear, in evaluating a statutory
claim of vote dilution through districting, the trial court is to consider the
"totality of the circumstances" and to determine, based "upon a searching
practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality,' " S.Rep., at 30, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 208 (footnote omitted), whether the political
process is equally open to minority voters. " 'This determination is peculiarly
dependent upon the facts of each case,' " Rogers, supra, 458 U.S., at 621, 102
S.Ct., at 3277, quoting Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 224 (CA5 1978), and
requires "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact" of the contested
electoral mechanisms. 458 U.S., at 622, 102 S.Ct., at 3278. The fact that
amended 2 and its legislative history provide legal standards which a court
must apply to the facts in order to determine whether 2 has been violated does
not alter the standard of review. As we explained in Bose, Rule 52(a) "does not
inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that
may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is
predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law." 466 U.S., at
501, 104 S.Ct., at 1960, citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287,
102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855, n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, n. 15, 72
L.Ed.2d 606 (1982). Thus, the application of the clearly-erroneous standard to
ultimate findings of vote dilution preserves the benefit of the trial court's
particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering
the rule of law.

B
104 The District Court in this case carefully considered the totality of the
circumstances and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the
legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing,
employment, and health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to
racial prejudice acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme to
impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of
black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates
of their choice. It found that the success a few black candidates have enjoyed in
these districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard to the 1982 elections,
perhaps too aberrational, to disprove its conclusion. Excepting House District
23, with respect to which the District Court committed legal error, see supra, at
----, we affirm the District Court's judgment. We cannot say that the District
Court, composed of local judges who are well acquainted with the political
realities of the State, clearly erred in concluding that use of a multimember
electoral structure has caused black voters in the districts other than House
District 23 to have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of
their choice.
The judgment of the District Court is
105 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF BRENNAN, J.
106 Percentages of Votes Cast by Black and White Voters for
107 Black Candidates in the Five Contested Districts
Senate District 22
Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 (Alexander) 47 87 41 94
1980 (Alexander) 23 78 n/a n/a
1982 (Polk) 32 83 33 94
House District 21

Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 (Blue) 21 76 n/a n/a
1980 (Blue) 31 81 44 90
1982 (Blue) 39 82 45 91
House District 23
Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 Senate
Barns (Repub.) n/a n/a 17 5
1978 House
Clement 10 89 n/a n/a
Spaulding 16 92 37 89
1980 House
Spaulding n/a n/a 49 90
1982 House
Clement 26 32 n/a n/a
Spaulding 37 90 43 89
House District 36
Primary General
White Black White Black
1980 (Maxwell) 22 71 28 92
1982 (Berry) 50 79 42 92

1982 (Richardson) 39 71 29 88
House District 39
Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 House
Kennedy, H. 28 76 32 93
Norman 8 29 n/a n/a
Ross 17 53 n/a n/a
Sumter (Repub.) n/a n/a 33 25
Primary General
White Black White Black
1980 House
Kennedy, A. 40 86 32 96
Norman 18 36 n/a n/a
1980 Senate
Small 12 61 n/a n/a
1982 House
Hauser 25 80 42 87
Kennedy, A. 36 87 46 94
590 F. Supp., at 369-371.
108
APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BRENNAN, J.
109 Black Candidates Elected From 7 Originally Contested Districts
District Prior to

(No. Seats) 1972 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982

110
House 8 (4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
House 21 (6) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
House 23 (3) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
House 36 (8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
House 39 (5) 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Senate 2 (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senate 22 (4) 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
See Brief for Appellees, table printed between pages 8 and 9; App. 93-94.
111
112 Justice WHITE, concurring.
113 I join Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V of the Court's opinion and agree with
Justice BRENNAN's opinion as to Part IV-B. I disagree with Part III-C of
Justice BRENNAN's opinion.
114 Justice BRENNAN states in Part III-C that the crucial factor in identifying
polarized voting is the race of the voter and that the race of the candidate is
irrelevant. Under this test, there is polarized voting if the majority of white
voters vote for different candidates than the majority of the blacks, regardless
of the race of the candidates. I do not agree. Suppose an eight-member
multimember district that is 60% white and 40% black, the blacks being
geographically located so that two safe black single-member districts could be
drawn. Suppose further that there are six white and two black Democrats
running against six white and two black Republicans. Under Justice
BRENNAN's test, there would be polarized voting and a likely 2 violation if
all the Republicans, including the two blacks, are elected, and 80% of the
blacks in the predominantly black areas vote Democratic. I take it that there
would also be a violation in a single-member district that is 60% black, but
enough of the blacks vote with the whites to elect a black candidate who is not
the choice of the majority of black voters. This is interest-group politics rather
than a rule hedging against racial discrimination. I doubt that this is what
Congress had in mind in amending 2 as it did, and it seems quite at odds with
the discussion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-160, 91 S.Ct. 1858,
1872-1878, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971). Furthermore, on the facts of this case, there

is no need to draw the voter/candidate distinction. The District Court did not
and reached the correct result except, in my view, with respect to District 23.
115 Justice O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice POWELL,
and Justice REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.
116 In this case, we are called upon to construe 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended 2 is intended to codify the
"results" test employed in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29
L.Ed.2d 363 (1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37
L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test propounded in the plurality
opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47
(1980). S.Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 27-28 (1982) (hereinafter S.Rep.). Whereas
Bolden required members of a racial minority who alleged impairment of their
voting strength to prove that the challenged electoral system was created or
maintained with a discriminatory purpose and led to discriminatory results,
under the results test, "plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results
without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose." S.Rep., at 28, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 206. At the same time, however, 2
unequivocally disclaims the creation of a right to proportional representation.
This disclaimer was essential to the compromise that resulted in passage of the
amendment. See id., at 193-194 (additional views of Sen. Dole).
117 In construing this compromise legislation, we must make every effort to be
faithful to the balance Congress struck. This is not an easy task. We know that
Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under 2, but we
also know that Congress did not intend to create a right to proportional
representation for minority voters. There is an inherent tension between what
Congress wished to do and what it wished to avoid, because any theory of vote
dilution must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting
strength that makes some reference to the proportion between the minority
group and the electorate at large. In addition, several important aspects of the
"results" test had received little attention in this Court's cases or in the decisions
of the Courts of Appeals employing that test on which Congress also relied. See
id., at 32. Specifically, the legal meaning to be given to the concepts of "racial
bloc voting" and "minority voting strength" had been left largely unaddressed
by the courts when 2 was amended.
118 The Court attempts to resolve all these difficulties today. First, the Court
supplies definitions of racial bloc voting and minority voting strength that will
apparently be applicable in all cases and that will dictate the structure of vote
dilution litigation. Second, the Court adopts a test, based on the level of

minority electoral success, for determining when an electoral scheme has

sufficiently diminished minority voting strength to constitute vote dilution.
Third, although the Court does not acknowledge it expressly, the combination
of the Court's definition of minority voting strength and its test for vote dilution
results in the creation of a right to a form of proportional representation in favor
of all geographically and politically cohesive minority groups that are large
enough to constitute majorities if concentrated within one or more singlemember districts. In so doing, the Court has disregarded the balance struck by
Congress in amending 2 and has failed to apply the results test as described
by this Court in Whitcomb and White.
119 * In order to explain my disagreement with the Court's interpretation of 2, it is
useful to illustrate the impact that alternative districting plans or types of
districts typically have on the likelihood that a minority group will be able to
elect candidates it prefers, and then to set out the critical elements of a vote
dilution claim as they emerge in the Court's opinion.
120 Consider a town of 1,000 voters that is governed by a council of four
representatives, in which 30% of the voters are black, and in which the black
voters are concentrated in one section of the city and tend to vote as a bloc. It
would be possible to draw four single-member districts, in one of which blacks
would constitute an overwhelming majority. The black voters in this district
would be assured of electing a representative of their choice, while any
remaining black voters in the other districts would be submerged in large white
majorities. This option would give the minority group roughly proportional
representation.
121 Alternatively, it would usually be possible to draw four single-member districts
in two of which black voters constituted much narrower majorities of about
60%. The black voters in these districts would often be able to elect the
representative of their choice in each of these two districts, but if even 20% of
the black voters supported the candidate favored by the white minority in those
districts the candidates preferred by the majority of black voters might lose.
This option would, depending on the circumstances of a particular election,
sometimes give the minority group more than proportional representation, but
would increase the risk that the group would not achieve even roughly
proportional representation.
122 It would also usually be possible to draw four single-member districts in each
of which black voters constituted a minority. In the extreme case, black voters
would constitute 30% of the voters in each district. Unless approximately 30%
of the white voters in this extreme case backed the minority candidate, black

voters in such a district would be unable to elect the candidate of their choice in
an election between only two candidates even if they unanimously supported
him. This option would make it difficult for black voters to elect candidates of
their choice even with significant white support, and all but impossible without
such support.
123 Finally, it would be possible to elect all four representatives in a single at-large
election in which each voter could vote for four candidates. Under this scheme,
white voters could elect all the representatives even if black voters turned out in
large numbers and voted for one and only one candidate. To illustrate, if only
four white candidates ran, and each received approximately equal support from
white voters, each would receive about 700 votes, whereas black voters could
cast no more than 300 votes for any one candidate. If, on the other hand, eight
white candidates ran, and white votes were distributed less evenly, so that the
five least favored white candidates received fewer than 300 votes while three
others received 400 or more, it would be feasible for blacks to elect one
representative with 300 votes even without substantial white support. If even
25% of the white voters backed a particular minority candidate, and black
voters voted only for that candidate, the candidate would receive a total of 475
votes, which would ensure victory unless white voters also concentrated their
votes on four of the eight remaining candidates, so that each received the
support of almost 70% of white voters. As these variations show, the at-large or
multimember district has an inherent tendency to submerge the votes of the
minority. The minority group's prospects for electoral success under such a
district heavily depend on a variety of factors such as voter turnout, how many
candidates run, how evenly white support is spread, how much white support is
given to a candidate or candidates preferred by the minority group, and the
extent to which minority voters engage in "bullet voting" (which occurs when
voters refrain from casting all their votes to avoid the risk that by voting for
their lower ranked choices they may give those candidates enough votes to
defeat their higher ranked choices, see ante, at 38-39, n. 5).
124 There is no difference in principle between the varying effects of the
alternatives outlined above and the varying effects of alternative single-district
plans and multimember districts. The type of districting selected and the way in
which district lines are drawn can have a powerful effect on the likelihood that
members of a geographically and politically cohesive minority group will be
able to elect candidates of their choice.
125 Although 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution," I agree with the Court
that proof of vote dilution can establish a violation of 2 as amended. The
phrase "vote dilution," in the legal sense, simply refers to the impermissible

discriminatory effect that a multimember or other districting plan has when it

operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups." White,
412 U.S., at 765, 93 S.Ct., at 2339. See also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439, 85 S.Ct. 498, 501, 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965). This definition, however,
conceals some very formidable difficulties. Is the "voting strength" of a racial
group to be assessed solely with reference to its prospects for electoral success,
or should courts look at other avenues of political influence open to the racial
group? Insofar as minority voting strength is assessed with reference to
electoral success, how should undiluted minority voting strength be measured?
How much of an impairment of minority voting strength is necessary to prove a
violation of 2? What constitutes racial bloc voting and how is it proved?
What weight is to be given to evidence of actual electoral success by minority
candidates in the face of evidence of racial bloc voting?
126 The Court resolves the first question summarily: minority voting strength is to
be assessed solely in terms of the minority group's ability to elect candidates it
prefers. Ante, at ---- - ----. Under this approach, the essence of a vote dilution
claim is that the State has created single-member or multimember districts that
unacceptably impair the minority group's ability to elect the candidates its
members prefer.
127 In order to evaluate a claim that a particular multimember district or singlemember district has diluted the minority group's voting strength to a degree that
violates 2, however, it is also necessary to construct a measure of "undiluted"
minority voting strength. "[T]he phrase [vote dilution] itself suggests a norm
with respect to which the fact of dilution may be ascertained." Mississippi
Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002, 1012, 105 S.Ct.
416, 422, 83 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary
affirmance). Put simply, in order to decide whether an electoral system has
made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court
must have an idea in mind of how hard it "should" be for minority voters to
elect their preferred candidates under an acceptable system.
128 Several possible measures of "undiluted" minority voting strength suggest
themselves. First, a court could simply use proportionality as its guide: if the
minority group constituted 30% of the voters in a given area, the court would
regard the minority group as having the potential to elect 30% of the
representatives in that area. Second, a court could posit some alternative
districting plan as a "normal" or "fair" electoral scheme and attempt to calculate
how many candidates preferred by the minority group would probably be
elected under that scheme. There are, as we have seen, a variety of ways in
which even single-member districts could be drawn, and each will present the

minority group with its own array of electoral risks and benefits; the court
might, therefore, consider a range of acceptable plans in attempting to estimate
"undiluted" minority voting strength by this method. Third, the court could
attempt to arrive at a plan that would maximize feasible minority electoral
success, and use this degree of predicted success as its measure of "undiluted"
minority voting strength. If a court were to employ this third alternative, it
would often face hard choices about what would truly "maximize" minority
electoral success. An example is the scenario described above, in which a
minority group could be concentrated in one completely safe district or divided
among two districts in each of which its members would constitute a somewhat
precarious majority.
129 The Court today has adopted a variant of the third approach, to wit, undiluted
minority voting strength means the maximum feasible minority voting strength.
In explaining the elements of a vote dilution claim, the Court first states that
"the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."
Ante, at 50. If not, apparently the minority group has no cognizable claim that
its ability to elect the representatives of its choice has been impaired.1 Second,
"the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive," that is,
that a significant proportion of the minority group supports the same
candidates. Ante, at ----. Third, the Court requires the minority group to
"demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
in the absence of special circumstances . . .usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate." Ibid. If these three requirements are met, "the minority
group demonstrates that submergence in a white multimember district impedes
its ability to elect its chosen representatives." Ibid. That is to say, the minority
group has proved vote dilution in violation of 2.
130 The Court's definition of the elements of a vote dilution claim is simple and
invariable: a court should calculate minority voting strength by assuming that
the minority group is concentrated in a single-member district in which it
constitutes a voting majority. Where the minority group is not large enough,
geographically concentrated enough, or politically cohesive enough for this to
be possible, the minority group's claim fails. Where the minority group meets
these requirements, the representatives that it could elect in the hypothetical
district or districts in which it constitutes a majority will serve as the measure of
its undiluted voting strength. Whatever plan the State actually adopts must be
assessed in terms of the effect it has on this undiluted voting strength. If this is
indeed the single, universal standard for evaluating undiluted minority voting
strength for vote dilution purposes, the standard is applicable whether what is
challenged is a multimember district or a particular single-member districting

scheme.
131 The Court's statement of the elements of a vote dilution claim also supplies an
answer to another question posed above: how much of an impairment of
undiluted minority voting strength is necessary to prove vote dilution. The
Court requires the minority group that satisfies the threshold requirements of
size and cohesiveness to prove that it will usually be unable to elect as many
representatives of its choice under the challenged districting scheme as its
undiluted voting strength would permit. This requirement, then, constitutes the
true test of vote dilution. Again, no reason appears why this test would not be
applicable to a vote dilution claim challenging single-member as well as
multimember districts.
132 This measure of vote dilution, taken in conjunction with the Court's standard
for measuring undiluted minority voting strength, creates what amounts to a
right to usual, roughly proportional representation on the part of sizable,
compact, cohesive minority groups. If, under a particular multimember or
single-member district plan, qualified minority groups usually cannot elect the
representatives they would be likely to elect under the most favorable singlemember districting plan, then 2 is violated. Unless minority success under the
challenged electoral system regularly approximates this rough version of
proportional representation, that system dilutes minority voting strength and
violates 2.
133 To appreciate the implications of this approach, it is useful to return to the
illustration of a town with four council representatives given above. Under the
Court's approach, if the black voters who constitute 30% of the town's voting
population do not usually succeed in electing one representative of their choice,
then regardless of whether the town employs at-large elections or is divided
into four single-member districts, its electoral system violates 2. Moreover, if
the town had a black voting population of 40%, on the Court's reasoning the
black minority, so long as it was geographically and politically cohesive, would
be entitled usually to elect two of the four representatives, since it would
normally be possible to create two districts in which black voters constituted
safe majorities of approximately 80%.
134 To be sure, the Court also requires that plaintiffs prove that racial bloc voting
by the white majority interacts with the challenged districting plan so as usually
to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. In fact, however, this requirement
adds little that is not already contained in the Court's requirements that the
minority group be politically cohesive and that its preferred candidates usually
lose. As the Court acknowledges, under its approach, "in general, a white bloc

vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus
white 'crossover' votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc
voting." Ante, at 56. But this is to define legally significant bloc voting by the
racial majority in terms of the extent of the racial minority's electoral success. If
the minority can prove that it could constitute a majority in a single-member
district, that it supported certain candidates, and that those candidates have not
usually been elected, then a finding that there is "legally significant white bloc
voting" will necessarily follow. Otherwise, by definition, those candidates
would usually have won rather than lost.
135 As shaped by the Court today, then, the basic contours of a vote dilution claim
require no reference to most of the "Zimmer factors" that were developed by the
Fifth Circuit to implement White results test and which were highlighted in
the Senate Report. S.Rep., at 28-29; see Zimmer v. Mc Keithen, 485 F.2d 1297
(CA5 1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976) (per curiam). If
a minority group is politically and geographically cohesive and large enough to
constitute a voting majority in one or more single-member districts, then unless
white voters usually support the minority's preferred candidates in sufficient
numbers to enable the minority group to elect as many of those candidates as it
could elect in such hypothetical districts, it will routinely follow that a vote
dilution claim can be made out, and the multimember district will be
invalidated. There is simply no need for plaintiffs to establish "the history of
voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision," ante, at ----,
or "the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting
practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination
against the minority group," ante, at --- or "the exclusion of members of the
minority group from candidate slating processes," ante, at --- or "the extent to
which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas
such as education, employment, and health," ibid., or "the use of overt or subtle
racial appeals in political campaigns," ibid., or that "elected officials are
unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group."
Ibid.. Of course, these other factors may be supportive of such a claim, because
they may strengthen a court's confidence that minority voters will be unable to
overcome the relative disadvantage at which they are placed by a particular
districting plan, or suggest a more general lack of opportunity to participate in
the political process. But the fact remains that electoral success has now
emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and
that the elements of a vote dilution claim create an entitlement to roughly
proportional representation within the framework of single-member districts.
II

136 In my view, the Court's test for measuring minority voting strength and its test
for vote dilution, operating in tandem, come closer to an absolute requirement
of proportional representation than Congress intended when it codified the
results test in 2. It is not necessary or appropriate to decide in this case
whether 2 requires a uniform measure of undiluted minority voting strength
in every case, nor have appellants challenged the standard employed by the
District Court for assessing undiluted minority voting strength.
137 In this case, the District Court seems to have taken an approach quite similar to
the Court's in making its preliminary assessment of undiluted minority voting
strength:
138 "At the time of the creation of these multi-member districts, there were
concentrations of black citizens within the boundaries of each that were
sufficient in numbers and contiguity to constitute effective voting majorities in
single-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the multimember districts, which single-member districts would satisfy all constitutional
requirements of population and geographical configuration." Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 358-359 (EDNC1984).
139 The Court goes well beyond simply sustaining the District Court's decision to
employ this measure of undiluted minority voting strength as a reasonable one
that is consistent with 2. In my view, we should refrain from deciding in this
case whether a court must invariably posit as its measure of "undiluted"
minority voting strength single-member districts in which minority group
members constitute a majority. There is substantial doubt that Congress
intended "undiluted minority voting strength" to mean "maximum feasible
minority voting strength." Even if that is the appropriate definition in some
circumstances, there is no indication that Congress intended to mandate a
single, universally applicable standard for measuring undiluted minority voting
strength, regardless of local conditions and regardless of the extent of past
discrimination against minority voters in a particular State or political
subdivision. Since appellants have not raised the issue, I would assume that
what the District Court did here was permissible under 2, and leave open the
broader question whether 2 requires this approach.
140 What appellants do contest is the propriety of the District Court's standard for
vote dilution. Appellants claim that the District Court held that "[a]lthough
blacks had achieved considerable success in winning state legislative seats in
the challenged districts, their failure to consistently attain the number of seats
that numbers alone would presumptively give them (i.e., in proportion to their

presence in the population)," standing alone, constituted a violation of 2.

Brief for Appellants 20 (emphasis in original). This holding, appellants argue,
clearly contravenes 2's proviso that "nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population." 42 U.S.C. 1973.
141 I believe appellants' characterization of the District Court's holding is incorrect.
In my view, the District Court concluded that there was a severe diminution in
the prospects for black electoral success in each of the challenged districts, as
compared to single-member districts in which blacks could constitute a
majority, and that this severe diminution was in large part attributable to the
interaction of the multimember form of the district with persistent racial bloc
voting on the part of the white majorities in those districts. See 590 F.Supp., at
372.2 The District Court attached great weight to this circumstance as one part
of its ultimate finding that "the creation of each of the multi-member districts
challenged in this action results in the black registered voters of that district
being submerged as a voting minority in the district and thereby having less
opportunity than do other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Id., at 374. But the
District Court's extensive opinion clearly relies as well on a variety of the other
Zimmer factors, as the Court's thorough summary of the District Court's
findings indicates. See ante, at ---- - ----.
142 If the District Court had held that the challenged multi-member districts
violated 2 solely because blacks had not consistently attained seats in
proportion to their presence in the population, its holding would clearly have
been inconsistent with 2's disclaimer of a right to proportional representation.
Surely Congress did not intend to say, on the one hand, that members of a
protected class have no right to proportional representation, and on the other,
that any consistent failure to achieve proportional representation, without more,
violates 2. A requirement that minority representation usually be proportional
to the minority group's proportion in the population is not quite the same as a
right to strict proportional representation, but it comes so close to such a right as
to be inconsistent with 2's disclaimer and with the results test that is codified
in 2. In the words of Senator Dole, the architect of the compromise that
resulted in passage of the amendments to 2:
143 "The language of the subsection explicitly rejects, as did White and its progeny,
the notion that members of a protected class have a right to be elected in
numbers equal to their proportion of the population. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected under the challenged practice or
structure is just one factor, among the totality of circumstances to be

considered, and is not dispositive." S.Rep., at 194, U.S.Code Cong. &

Admin.News 1982, p. 364 (additional views of Sen. Dole).
144 On the same reasoning, I would reject the Court's test for vote dilution. The
Court measures undiluted minority voting strength by reference to the
possibility of creating single-member districts in which the minority group
would constitute a majority, rather than by looking to raw proportionality alone.
The Court's standard for vote dilution, when combined with its test for
undiluted minority voting strength, makes actionable every deviation from
usual, rough proportionality in representation for any cohesive minority group
as to which this degree of proportionality is feasible within the framework of
single-member districts. Requiring that every minority group that could
possibly constitute a majority in a single-member district be assigned to such a
district would approach a requirement of proportional representation as nearly
as is possible within the framework of single-member districts. Since the
Court's analysis entitles every such minority group usually to elect as many
representatives under a multimember district as it could elect under the most
favorable single-member district scheme, it follows that the Court is requiring a
form of proportional representation. This approach is inconsistent with the
results test and with 2's disclaimer of a right to proportional representation.
145 In enacting 2, Congress codified the "results" test this Court had employed, as
an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in White and Whitcomb. The
factors developed by the Fifth Circuit and relied on by the Senate Report
simply fill in the contours of the "results" test as described in those decisions,
and do not purport to redefine or alter the ultimate showing of discriminatory
effect required by Whitcomb and White. In my view, therefore, it is to
Whitcomb and White that we should look in the first instance in determining
how great an impairment of minority voting strength is required to establish
vote dilution in violation of 2.
146 The "results" test as reflected in Whitcomb and White requires an inquiry into
the extent of the minority group's opportunities to participate in the political
processes. See White, 412 U.S., at 766, 93 S.Ct., at 2339-40. While electoral
success is a central part of the vote dilution inquiry, White held that to prove
vote dilution, "it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated
against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential," id., at
765-766, 93 S.Ct., at 2339-40, and Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition that
"any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls if it
is numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a majority
living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single member district."
403 U.S., at 156, 91 S.Ct., at 1875. To the contrary, the results test as described

in White requires plaintiffs to establish "that the political processes leading to

nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in
questionthat its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice." 412 U.S., at 766, 93 S.Ct., at 2339-40. By showing both "a history of
disproportionate results" and "strong indicia of lack of political power and the
denial of fair representation," the plaintiffs in White met this standard, which, as
emphasized just today, requires "a substantially greater showing of adverse
effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of
unconstitutional vote dilution." Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 169-170, 106
S.Ct. 2797, ----, ----, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (plurality opinion).
When Congress amended 2 it intended to adopt this "results" test, while
147 abandoning the additional showing of discriminatory intent required by Bolden.
The vote dilution analysis adopted by the Court today clearly bears little
resemblance to the "results" test that emerged in Whitcomb and White. The
Court's test for vote dilution, combined with its standard for evaluating "voting
potential," White, supra, 412 U.S., at 766, 93 S.Ct., at 2339-2340, means that
any racial minority with distinctive interests must usually "be represented in
legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and
represents a minority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute" a
voting majority in "a single member district." Whitcomb, 403 U.S., at 156, 91
S.Ct., at 1875. Nothing in Whitcomb, White, or the language and legislative
history of 2 supports the Court's creation of this right to usual, roughly
proportional representation on the part of every geographically compact,
politically cohesive minority group that is large enough to form a majority in
one or more single-member districts.
148 I would adhere to the approach outlined in Whitcomb and White and followed,
with some elaboration, in Zimmer and other cases in the Courts of Appeals
prior to Bolden. Under that approach, a court should consider all relevant
factors bearing on whether the minority group has "less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. 1973 (emphasis added). The court
should not focus solely on the minority group's ability to elect representatives
of its choice. Whatever measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court
employs in connection with evaluating the presence or absence of minority
electoral success, it should also bear in mind that "the power to influence the
political process is not limited to winning elections." Davis v. Bandemer, supra,
478 U.S., at 132, 106 S.Ct., at ----. Of course, the relative lack of minority
electoral success under a challenged plan, when compared with the success that
would be predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting strength the

court is employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution.

Moreover, the minority group may in fact lack access to or influence upon
representatives it did not support as candidates. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, supra,
at 169-170, 106 S.Ct., at ---- (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Nonetheless, a reviewing court should be required to find more than
simply that the minority group does not usually attain an undiluted measure of
electoral success. The court must find that even substantial minority success
will be highly infrequent under the challenged plan before it may conclude, on
this basis alone, that the plan operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of [the] racial grou[p]." White, supra, 412 U.S., at 765, 93 S.Ct., at
2339.
III
149 Only three Justices of the Court join Part III-C of Justice BRENNAN's opinion,
which addresses the validity of the statistical evidence on which the District
Court relied in finding racially polarized voting in each of the challenged
districts. Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is
admitted solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and
to assess its prospects for electoral success, I agree that defendants cannot rebut
this showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may
be explained in part by causes other than race, such as an underlying divergence
in the interests of minority and white voters. I do not agree, however, that such
evidence can never affect the overall vote dilution inquiry. Evidence that a
candidate preferred by the minority group in a particular election was rejected
by white voters for reasons other than those which made that candidate the
preferred choice of the minority group would seem clearly relevant in
answering the question whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently
defeat minority candidates. Such evidence would suggest that another
candidate, equally preferred by the minority group, might be able to attract
greater white support in future elections.
150 I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the reasons why white
voters rejected minority candidates would be probative of the likelihood that
candidates elected without decisive minority support would be willing to take
the minority's interests into account. In a community that is polarized along
racial lines, racial hostility may bar these and other indirect avenues of political
influence to a much greater extent than in a community where racial animosity
is absent although the interests of racial groups diverge. Indeed, the Senate
Report clearly stated that one factor that could have probative value in 2 cases
was "whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group."

S.Rep., at 29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 207. The overall vote
dilution inquiry neither requires nor permits an arbitrary rule against
consideration of all evidence concerning voting preferences other than
statistical evidence of racial voting patterns. Such a rule would give no effect
whatever to the Senate Report's repeated emphasis on "intensive racial
politics," on "racial political considerations," and on whether "racial politics . . .
dominate the electoral process" as one aspect of the "racial bloc voting" that
Congress deemed relevant to showing a 2 violation. Id., at 33-34. Similarly, I
agree with Justice WHITE that Justice BRENNAN's conclusion that the race of
the candidate is always irrelevant in identifying racially polarized voting
conflicts with Whitcomb and is not necessary to the disposition of this case.
Ante, at 83 (concurring).
In this case, as the Court grudgingly acknowledges, the District Court clearly
151 erred in aggregating data from all of the challenged districts, and then relying
on the fact that on average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black
candidate in the primary elections selected for study. Ante, at 59-60, n. 28.
Although Senate District 22 encompasses House District 36, with that
exception the districts at issue in this case are distributed throughout the State
of North Carolina. White calls for "an intensely local appraisal of the design
and impact of the . . . multimember district," 412 U.S., at 769-770, 93 S.Ct., at
2341, and racial voting statistics from one district are ordinarily irrelevant in
assessing the totality of the circumstances in another district. In view of the
specific evidence from each district that the District Court also considered,
however, I cannot say that its conclusion that there was severe racial bloc
voting was clearly erroneous with regard to any of the challenged districts.
Except in House District 23, where racial bloc voting did not prevent sustained
and virtually proportional minority electoral success, I would accordingly leave
undisturbed the District Court's decision to give great weight to racial bloc
voting in each of the challenged districts.
IV
152 Having made usual, roughly proportional success the sole focus of its vote
dilution analysis, the Court goes on to hold that proof that an occasional
minority candidate has been elected does not foreclose a 2 claim. But Justice
BRENNAN, joined by Justice WHITE, concludes that "persistent proportional
representation" will foreclose a 2 claim unless the plaintiffs prove that this
"sustained success does not accurately reflect the minority group's ability to
elect its preferred representatives." Ante, at 77. I agree with Justice BRENNAN
that consistent and sustained success by candidates preferred by minority voters
is presumptively inconsistent with the existence of a 2 violation. Moreover, I

agree that this case presents no occasion for determining what would constitute
proof that such success did not accurately reflect the minority group's actual
voting strength in a challenged district or districts.
153 In my view, the District Court erred in assessing the extent of black electoral
success in House District 39 and Senate District 22, as well as in House District
23, where the Court acknowledges error. As the evidence summarized by the
Court in table form shows, ante, at 82, Appendix B, the degree of black
electoral success differed widely in the seven originally contested districts. In
House District 8 and Senate District 2, neither of which is contested in this
Court, no black candidate had ever been elected to the offices in question. In
House District 21 and House District 36, the only instances of black electoral
success came in the two most recent elections, one of which took place during
the pendency of this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and Senate
District 22, black successes, although intermittent, dated back to 1974, and a
black candidate had been elected in each of these districts in three of the last
five elections. Finally, in House District 23 a black candidate had been elected
in each of the last six elections.
154 The District Court, drawing no distinctions among these districts for purposes
of its findings, concluded that "[t]he overall results achieved to date at all levels
of elective office are minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total
population." 590 F.Supp., at 367. The District Court clearly erred to the extent
that it considered electoral success in the aggregate, rather than in each of the
challenged districts, since, as the Court states, "[t]he inquiry into the existence
of vote dilution . . . is district-specific." Ante, at 59, n. 28. The Court asserts
that the District Court was free to regard the results of the 1982 elections with
suspicion and to decide "on the basis of all the relevant circumstances to accord
greater weight to blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several
recent elections," ante, at 76, but the Court does not explain how this technique
would apply in Senate District 22, where a black candidate was elected in three
consecutive elections from 1974 to 1978, but no black candidate was elected in
1982, or in House District 39, where black candidates were elected in 1974 and
1976 as well as in 1982. Contrary to what the District Court thought, see 590
F.Supp., at 367, these pre-1982 successes, which were proportional or nearly
proportional to black population in these three multimember districts, certainly
lend some support for a finding that black voters in these districts enjoy an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
155 Despite this error, I agree with the Court's conclusion that, except in House
District 23, minority electoral success was not sufficiently frequent to compel a

finding of equal opportunity to participate and elect. The District Court found
that "in each of the challenged districts racial polarization in voting presently
exists to a substantial or severe degree, and . . . in each district it presently
operates to minimize the voting strength of black voters." Id., at 372. I cannot
say that this finding was clearly erroneous with respect to House District 39 or
Senate District 22, particularly when taken together with the District Court's
findings concerning the other Zimmer factors, and hence that court's ultimate
conclusion of vote dilution in these districts is adequately supported.
156 This finding, however, is clearly erroneous with respect to House District 23.
Blacks constitute 36.3% of the population in that district and 28.6% of the
registered voters. In each of the six elections since 1970 one of the three
representatives from this district has been a black. There is no finding, or any
reason even to suspect, that the successful black candidates in District 23 did
not in fact represent the interests of black voters, and the District Court did not
find that black success in previous elections was aberrant.
157 Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote dilution claim on the
basis of isolated black successes, 485 F.2d, at 1307; see S.Rep., at 29, n. 115,
cannot be pressed this far. Indeed, the 23 Court of Appeals decisions on which
the Senate Report relied, and which are the best evidence of the scope of this
caveat, contain no example of minority electoral success that even remotely
approximates the consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e.g.,
Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (CA5 1973) (no black candidates elected);
Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (CA5 1975) (one black candidate elected),
vacated on other grounds, 425 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1721, 48 L.Ed.2d 191 (1976).
158 I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional minority electoral
success should always, as a matter of law, bar finding a 2 violation. But, as a
general rule, such success is entitled to great weight in evaluating whether a
challenged electoral mechanism has, on the totality of the circumstances,
operated to deny black voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. With respect to House
District 23, the District Court's failure to accord black electoral success such
weight was clearly erroneous, and the District Court identified no reason for not
giving this degree of success preclusive effect. Accordingly, I agree with
Justice BRENNAN that appellees failed to establish a violation of 2 in
District 23.
V
159 When members of a racial minority challenge a multimember district on the

grounds that it dilutes their voting strength, I agree with the Court that they
must show that they possess such strength and that the multimember district
impairs it. A court must therefore appraise the minority group's undiluted
voting strength in order to assess the effects of the multimember district. I
would reserve the question of the proper method or methods for making this
assessment. But once such an assessment is made, in my view the evaluation of
an alleged impairment of voting strength requires consideration of the minority
group's access to the political processes generally, not solely consideration of
the chances that its preferred candidates will actually be elected. Proof that
white voters withhold their support from minority-preferred candidates to an
extent that consistently ensures their defeat is entitled to significant weight in
plaintiffs' favor. However, if plaintiffs direct their proof solely towards the
minority group's prospects for electoral success, they must show that substantial
minority success will be highly infrequent under the challenged plan in order to
establish that the plan operates to "cancel out or minimize" their voting
strength. White, 412 U.S., at 765, 93 S.Ct., at 2339.
160 Compromise is essential to much if not most major federal legislation, and
confidence that the federal courts will enforce such compromises is
indispensable to their creation. I believe that the Court today strikes a different
balance than Congress intended to when it codified the results test and
disclaimed any right to proportional representation under 2. For that reason, I
join the Court's judgment but not its opinion.
161 Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice MARSHALL and Justice BLACKMUN
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
162 In my opinion, the findings of the District Court, which the Court fairly
summarizes, ante, at 37-41; 52-54, and n. 23; 59-61, and nn. 28 and 29,
adequately support the District Court's judgment concerning House District 23
as well as the balance of that judgment.
163 I, of course, agree that the election of one black candidate in each election since
1972 provides significant support for the State's position. The notion that this
evidence creates some sort of a conclusive, legal presumption, ante, at 75-76 is
not, however, supported by the language of the statute or by its legislative
history.1 I therefore cannot agree with the Court's view that the District Court
committed error by failing to apply a rule of law that emerges today without
statutory support. The evidence of candidate success in District 23 is merely
one part of an extremely large record which the District Court carefully
considered before making its ultimate findings of fact, all of which should be
upheld under a normal application of the "clearly erroneous" standard that the

Court traditionally applies.2

164 The Court identifies the reason why the success of one black candidate in the
elections in 1978, 1980, and 1982 is not inconsistent with the District Court's
ultimate finding concerning House District 23.3 The fact that one black
candidate was also elected in the 1972, 1974, and 1976 elections, ante, at 82,
Appendix B, is not sufficient, in my opinion, to overcome the additional
findings that apply to House District 23, as well as to other districts in the State
for each of those years. The Court accurately summarizes those findings:
165 "The District Court in this case carefully considered the totality of the
circumstances and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the
legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing,
employment, and health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to
racial prejudice acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme to
impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of
black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates
of their choice. It found that the success a few black candidates have enjoyed in
these districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard to the 1982 elections,
perhaps too aberrational, to disprove its conclusion." Ante, at 80.
166 To paraphrase the Court's conclusion about the other districts, ibid., I cannot
say that the District Court, composed of local judges who are well acquainted
with the political realities of the State, clearly erred in concluding that use of a
multimember electoral structure has caused black voters in House District 23 to
have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of their choice.4
Accordingly, I concur in the Court's opinion except Part IV-B and except
insofar as it explains why it reverses the judgment respecting House District 23.

Appellees challenged Senate District No. 2, which consisted of the whole of

Northampton, Hertford, Gates, Bertie, and Chowan Counties, and parts of
Washington, Martin, Halifax, and Edgecombe Counties.

Appellees challenged the following multimember districts: Senate No. 22

(Mecklenburg and Cabarrus Countiesfour members), House No. 36
(Mecklenburg Countyeight members), House No. 39 (part of Forsyth County
five members), House No. 23 (Durham County three members), House No.
21 (Wake Countysix members), and House No. 8 (Wilson, Nash, and
Edgecombe Countiesfour members).

Appellants initiated this action in September 1981, challenging the North

Carolina General Assembly's July 1981 redistricting. The history of this action
is recounted in greater detail in the District Court's opinion in this case, Gingles
v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 350-358 (EDNC 1984). It suffices here to note
that the General Assembly revised the 1981 plan in April 1982 and that the
plan at issue in this case is the 1982 plan.
4

These factors were derived from the analytical framework of White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), as refined and developed
by the lower courts, in particular by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297 (1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School
Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976) (per
curiam ). S.Rep., at 28, n. 113.

Bullet (single-shot) voting has been described as follows:

" 'Consider [a] town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an at-large election to
choose four council members. Each voter is able to cast four votes. Suppose
there are eight white candidates, with the votes of the whites split among them
approximately equally, and one black candidate, with all the blacks voting for
him and no one else. The result is that each white candidate receives about 300
votes and the black candidate receives 400 votes. The black has probably won a
seat. This technique is called single-shot voting. Single-shot voting enables a
minority group to win some at-large seats if it concentrates its vote behind a
limited number of candidates and if the vote of the majority is divided among a
number of candidates.' " City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184, n.
19, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1565, n. 19, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980), quoting United States
Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, pp. 206207 (1975).

Designated (or numbered) seat schemes require a candidate for election in

multimember districts to run for specific seats, and can, under certain
circumstances, frustrate bullet voting. See, e.g., City of Rome, supra, at 185, n.
21, 100 S.Ct., at 1566, n. 21.

The United States urges this Court to give little weight to the Senate Report,
arguing that it represents a compromise among conflicting "factions," and thus
is somehow less authoritative than most Committee Reports. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 8, n. 12, 24, n. 49. We are not persuaded that the
legislative history of amended 2 contains anything to lead us to conclude that
this Senate Report should be accorded little weight. We have repeatedly
recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent lies in the
Committee Reports on the bill. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,
76, and n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 479, 483, and n. 3, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984); Zuber v.

Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186, 90 S.Ct. 314, 324, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969).
8

The Senate Report states that amended 2 was designed to restore the "results
test"the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to our
decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47
(1980). S.Rep., at 15-16. The Report notes that in pre-Bolden cases such as
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), and
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA5 1973), plaintiffs could prevail by
showing that, under the totality of the circumstances, a challenged election law
or procedure had the effect of denying a protected minority an equal chance to
participate in the electoral process. Under the "results test," plaintiffs are not
required to demonstrate that the challenged electoral law or structure was
designed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. S.Rep., at 16, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 193.

The Senate Committee found that "voting practices and procedures that have
discriminatory results perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination."
Id., at 40, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 218 (footnote omitted). As
the Senate Report notes, the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was " 'not only
to correct an active history of discrimination, the denying to Negroes of the
right to register and vote, but also to deal with the accumulation of
discrimination.' " Id., 5, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 182 (quoting
111 Cong.Rec. 8295 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).

10

Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just vote dilution.
S.Rep., at 30.

11

Dilution of racial minority group voting strength may be caused by the

dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority
of voters or from the concentration of blacks into districts where they constitute
an excessive majority. Engstrom & Wildgen, Pruning Thorns from the Thicket:
An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering, 2 Legis.Stud.Q.
465, 465-466 (1977) (hereinafter Engstrom & Wildgen). See also Derfner,
Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 Vand.L.Rev. 523, 553 (1973)
(hereinafter Derfner); F. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative
Reapportionment (hereinafter Parker), in Minority Vote Dilution 86-100
(Davidson ed., 1984) (hereinafter Minority Vote Dilution).

12

The claim we address in this opinion is one in which the plaintiffs alleged and
attempted to prove that their ability to elect the representatives of their choice
was impaired by the selection of a multimember electoral structure. We have no
occasion to consider whether 2 permits, and if it does, what standards should
pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and

compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the

use of a multimember district impairs its ability to influence elections.
We note also that we have no occasion to consider whether the standards we
apply to respondents' claim that multimember districts operate to dilute the vote
of geographically cohesive minority groups, that are large enough to constitute
majorities in single-member districts and that are contained within the
boundaries of the challenged multimember districts, are fully pertinent to other
sorts of vote dilution claims, such as a claim alleging that the splitting of a large
and geographically cohesive minority between two or more multimember or
single-member districts resulted in the dilution of the minority vote.
13

Commentators are in widespread agreement with this conclusion. See, e.g.,

Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7
Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 85 (1979) (hereinafter Berry & Dye); Blacksher & Menefee,
From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 34 Hastings L.J. 1 (1982)
(hereinafter Blacksher & Menefee); Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large
Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 Ga.L.Rev. 353 (1976) (hereinafter
Bonapfel); Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Election
Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 La.L.Rev. 851
(1982) (hereinafter Butler); Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment:
Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 666 (1972)
(hereinafter Carpeneti); Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority
Group Representation, in Minority Vote Dilution 65; Derfner; B. Grofman,
Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Districts: Legal and Empirical Issues
(hereinafter Grofman, Alternatives), in Representation and Redistricting Issues
107 (B. Grofman, R. Lijphart, H. McKay, & H. Scarrow eds., 1982)
(hereinafter Representation and Redistricting Issues); Hartman, Racial Vote
Dilution and Separation of Powers, 50 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 689 (1982); Jewell,
The Consequences of Single- and Multimember Districting, in Representation
and Redistricting Issues 129 (1982) (hereinafter Jewell); Jones, The Impact of
Local Election Systems on Political Representation, 11 Urb.Aff.Q. 345 (1976);
Karnig, Black Resources and City Council Representation, 41 J.Pol. 134
(1979); Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils, 12 Urb.Aff.Q. 223
(1976); Parker 87-88.

14

Not only does "[v]oting along racial lines" deprive minority voters of their
preferred representative in these circumstances, it also "allows those elected to
ignore [minority] interests without fear of political consequences," Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S., at 623, 102 S.Ct., at 3279, leaving the minority effectively
unrepresented. See, e.g., Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical of Their
Constituents?, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 97; Parker 108.

15

Under a "functional" view of the political process mandated by 2, S.Rep., at

30, n. 120, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 208, the most important
Senate Report factors bearing on 2 challenges to multimember districts are
the "extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction" and the "extent to which voting in the elections of the state
or political subdivision is
racially polarized." Id., 28-29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 206. If
present, the other factors, such as the lingering effects of past discrimination,
the use of appeals to racial bias in election campaigns, and the use of electoral
devices which enhance the dilutive effects of multimember districts when
substantial white bloc voting existsfor example antibullet voting laws and
majority vote requirements, are supportive of, but not essential to, a minority
voter's claim.
In recognizing that some Senate Report factors are more important to
multimember district vote dilution claims than others, the Court effectuates the
intent of Congress. It is obvious that unless minority group members
experience substantial difficulty electing representatives of their choice, they
cannot prove that a challenged electoral mechanism impairs their ability "to
elect." 2(b). And, where the contested electoral structure is a multimember
district, commentators and courts agree that in the absence of significant white
bloc voting it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters to elect their
chosen representatives is inferior to that of white voters. See, e.g., McMillan v.
Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (CA5 1984); United States v.
Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (CA11), appeal dism'd and
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976, 105 S.Ct. 375, 83 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984); Nevett v.
Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct.
2916, 64 L.Ed.2d 807 (1980); Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F.Supp. 161, 170
(EDNC 1984); Blacksher & Menefee; Engstrom & Wildgen 469; Parker 107.
Consequently, if difficulty in electing and white bloc voting are not proved,
minority voters have not established that the multimember structure interferes
with their ability to elect their preferred candidates. Minority voters may be
able to prove that they still suffer social and economic effects of past
discrimination, that appeals to racial bias are employed in election campaigns,
and that a majority vote is required to win a seat, but they have not
demonstrated a substantial inability to elect caused by the use of a multimember
district. By recognizing the primacy of the history and extent of minority
electoral success and of racial bloc voting, the Court simply requires that 2
plaintiffs prove their claim before they may be awarded relief.

16

In this case appellees allege that within each contested multimember district
there exists a minority group that is sufficiently large and compact to constitute

a single-member district. In a different kind of case, for example a gerrymander

case, plaintiffs might allege that the minority group that is sufficiently large and
compact to constitute a single-member district has been split between two or
more multimember or single-member districts, with the effect of diluting the
potential strength of the minority vote.
17

The reason that a minority group making such a challenge must show, as a
threshold matter, that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district is this: Unless minority voters
possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged
structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or
practice. The single-member district is generally the appropriate standard
against which to measure minority group potential to elect because it is the
smallest political unit from which representatives are elected. Thus, if the
minority group is spread evenly throughout a multimember district, or if,
although geographically compact, the minority group is so small in relation to
the surrounding white population that it could not constitute a majority in a
single-member district, these minority voters cannot maintain that they would
have been able to elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the
multimember electoral structure. As two commentators have explained:
"To demonstrate [that minority voters are injured by at-large elections], the
minority voters must be sufficiently concentrated and politically cohesive that a
putative districting plan would result in districts in which members of a racial
minority would constitute a majority of the voters, whose clear electoral
choices are in fact defeated by at-large voting. If minority voters' residences are
substantially integrated throughout the jurisdiction, the at-large district cannot
be blamed for the defeat of minority-supported candidates. . . . [This standard]
thus would only protect racial minority votes from diminution proximately
caused by the districting plan; it would not assure racial minorities
proportional representation." Blacksher & Menefee 55-56 (footnotes omitted;
emphasis added).

18

The terms "racially polarized voting" and "racial bloc voting" are used
interchangeably throughout this opinion.

19

The 1982 reapportionment plan left essentially undisturbed the 1971 plan for
five of the original six contested multimember districts. House District 39 alone
was slightly modified. Brief for Appellees 8.

20

The District Court found both methods standard in the literature for the analysis
of racially polarized voting. 590 F.Supp., at 367-368, n. 28, n. 32. See also
Engstrom & McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation:

Political Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 Urb.Law. 369 (Summer 1985);

Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello, The "Totality of Circumstances Test" in
Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science
Perspective, 7 Law & Policy 199 (Apr.1985) (hereinafter Grofman, Migalski,
& Noviello).
21

The court used the term "racial polarization" to describe this correlation. It
adopted Dr. Grofman's definition"racial polarization" exists where there is "a
consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the
voter votes," Tr. 160, or to put it differently, where "black voters and white
voters vote differently." Id., at 203. We, too, adopt this definition of "racial
bloc" or "racially polarized" voting. See, infra, at ----.

22

The court found that the data reflected positive relationships and that the
correlations did not happen by chance. 590 F.Supp., at 368, and n. 30. See also
D. Barnes & J. Conley, Statistical Evidence in Litigation 32-34 (1986); Fisher,
Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 702, 716-720
(1980); Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello 206.

23

The two exceptions were the 1982 State House elections in Districts 21 and 23.
590 F.Supp., at 368, n. 31.

24

This list of factors is illustrative, not comprehensive.

25

The number of elections that must be studied in order to determine whether

voting is polarized will vary according to pertinent circumstances. One
important circumstance is the number of elections in which the minority group
has sponsored candidates. Where a minority group has never been able to
sponsor a candidate, courts must rely on other factors that tend to prove
unequal access to the electoral process. Similarly, where a minority group has
begun to sponsor candidates just recently, the fact that statistics from only one
or a few elections are available for examination does not foreclose a vote
dilution claim.

26

This list of special circumstances is illustrative, not exclusive.

27

The trial court did not actually employ the term "legally significant." At times it
seems to have used "substantive significance" as Dr. Grofman did, to describe
polarization severe enough to result in the selection of different candidates in
racially separate electorates. At other times, however, the court used the term
"substantively significant" to refer to its ultimate determination that racially
polarized voting in these districts is sufficiently severe to be relevant to a 2
claim.

28

In stating that 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidates in
the primary election and that two-thirds of white voters did not vote for black
candidates in general elections, the District Court aggregated data from all six
challenged multimember districts, apparently for ease of reporting. The inquiry
into the existence of vote dilution caused by submergence in a multimember
district is district specific. When considering several separate vote dilution
claims in a single case, courts must not rely on data aggregated from all the
challenged districts in concluding that racially polarized voting exists in each
district. In the instant case, however, it is clear from the trial court's tabulated
findings and from the exhibits that were before it, 1 App., Exs. 2-10, that the
court relied on data that were specific to each individual district in concluding
that each district experienced legally significant racially polarized voting.

29

For example, the court found that incumbency aided a successful black
candidate in the 1978 primary in Senate District 22. The court also noted that in
House District 23, a black candidate who gained election in 1978, 1980, and
1982, ran uncontested in the 1978 general election and in both the primary and
general elections in 1980. In 1982 there was no Republican opposition, a fact
the trial court interpreted to mean that the general election was for all practical
purposes unopposed. Moreover, in the 1982 primary, there were only two white
candidates for three seats, so that one black candidate had to succeed. Even
under this condition, the court remarked, 63% of white voters still refused to
vote for the black incumbentwho was the choice of 90% of the blacks. In
House District 21, where a black won election to the six-member delegation in
1980 and 1982, the court found that in the relevant primaries approximately
60% to 70% of white voters did not vote for the black candidate, whereas
approximately 80% of blacks did. The court additionally observed that although
winning the Democratic primary in this district is historically tantamount to
election, 55% of whites declined to vote for the Democratic black candidate in
the general election.

30

The court noted that in the 1982 primary held in House District 36, out of a
field of eight, the successful black candidate was ranked first by black voters,
but seventh by whites. Similarly, the court found that the two blacks who won
seats in the five-member delegation from House District 39 were ranked first
and second by black voters, but seventh and eighth by white voters.

31

Appellants argue that plaintiffs must establish that race was the primary
determinant of voter behavior as part of their prima facie showing of polarized
voting; the United States suggests that plaintiffs make out a prima facie case
merely by showing a correlation between race and the selection of certain
candidates, but that defendants should be able to rebut by showing that factors
other than race were the principal causes of voters' choices. We reject both

arguments.
32

The Fifth Circuit cases on which North Carolina and the United States rely for
their position are equally ambiguous. See Lee County Branch of NAACP v.
Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1482 (1984); Jones v. Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 234
(1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

33

It is true, as we have recognized previously, that racial hostility may often fuel
racial bloc voting. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166,
97 S.Ct. 996, 1010, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S., at 623,
102 S.Ct., at 3278. But, as we explain in this decision, the actual motivation of
the voter has no relevance to a vote dilution claim. This is not to suggest that
racial bloc voting is race neutral; because voter behavior correlates with race,
obviously it is not. It should be remembered, though, as one commentator has
observed, that "[t]he absence of racial animus is but one element of race
neutrality." Note, Geometry and Geography 208.

34

The Senate Report rejected the argument that the words "on account of race,"
contained in 2(a), create any requirement of purposeful discrimination. "[I]t is
patently [clear] that Congress has used the words 'on account of race or color'
in the Act to mean 'with respect to' race or color, and not to connote any
required purpose of racial discrimination." S.Rep., at 27-28, n. 109, U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 205.

35

The relevant results of the 1982 General Assembly election are as follows.
House District 21, in which blacks make up 21.8% of the population, elected
one black to the six-person House delegation. House District 23, in which
blacks constitute 36.3% of the population, elected one black to the three-person
House delegation. In House District 36, where blacks constitute 26.5% of the
population, one black was elected to the eight-member delegation. In House
District 39, where 25.1% of the population is black, two blacks were elected to
the five-member delegation. In Senate District 22, where blacks constitute
24.3% of the population, no black was elected to the Senate in 1982.

36

The United States points out that, under a substantially identical predecessor to
the challenged plan, see n. 15, supra, House District 21 elected a black to its
six-member delegation in 1980, House District 39 elected a black to its fivemember delegation in 1974 and 1976, and Senate District 22 had a black
Senator between 1975 and 1980.

37

See also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d, at 1307 ("[W]e cannot endorse the
view that the success of black candidates at the polls necessarily forecloses the
possibility of dilution of the black vote. Such success might, on occasion, be
attributable to the work of politicians, who, apprehending that the support of a

black candidate would be politically expedient, campaign to insure his election.

Or such success might be attributable to political support motivated by different
considerationsnamely that election of a black candidate will thwart
successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution grounds. In either
situation, a candidate could be elected despite the relative political
backwardness of black residents in the electoral district").
38

We have no occasion in this case to decide what types of special circumstances

could satisfactorily demonstrate that sustained success does not accurately
reflect the minority's ability to elect its preferred representatives.

I express no view as to whether the ability of a minority group to constitute a

majority in a single-member district should constitute a threshold requirement
for a claim that the use of multimember districts impairs the ability of minority
voters to participate in the political processes and to elect representatives of
their choice. Because the plaintiffs in this case would meet that requirement, if
indeed it exists, I need not decide whether it is imposed by 2. I note, however,
the artificiality of the Court's distinction between claims that a minority group's
"ability to elect the representatives of [its] choice" has been impaired and
claims that "its ability to influence elections" has been impaired. Ante, at 46-47,
n. 12. It is true that a minority group that could constitute a majority in a singlemember district ordinarily has the potential ability to elect representatives
without white support, and that a minority that could not constitute such a
majority ordinarily does not. But the Court recognizes that when the candidates
preferred by a minority group are elected in a multimember district, the
minority group has elected those candidates, even if white support was
indispensable to these victories. On the same reasoning, if a minority group that
is not large enough to constitute a voting majority in a single-member district
can show that white support would probably be forthcoming in some such
district to an extent that would enable the election of the candidates its
members prefer, that minority group would appear to have demonstrated that, at
least under this measure of its voting strength, it would be able to elect some
candidates of its choice.

At times, the District Court seems to have looked to simple proportionality

rather than to hypothetical single-member districts in which black voters would
constitute a majority. See, e.g., 590 F.Supp., at 367. Nowhere in its opinion,
however, did the District Court state that 2 requires that minority groups
consistently attain the level of electoral success that would correspond with
their proportion of the total or voting population.

See ante, at 75 ("Section 2(b) provides that '[t]he extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may

be considered.' 42 U.S.C. 1973(b). . . . However, the Senate Report expressly

states that 'the election of a few minority candidates does not "necessarily
foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black vote," ' noting that if it did, 'the
possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade [ 2] by manipulating
the election of a "safe" minority candidate.' . . . The Senate Committee decided,
instead, to ' "require an independent consideration of the record" ' ") (internal
citations omitted).
2

See ante, at 79 ("[T]he application of the clearly-erroneous standard to ultimate

findings of vote dilution preserves the benefit of the trial court's particular
familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering the rule of
law").

See ante, at 52-54, and n. 23, 60, n. 29, 75-76.

Even under the Court's analysis, the decision simply to reversewithout a

remandis mystifying. It is also extremely unfair. First, the Court does not
give appellees an opportunity to address the new legal standard that the Court
finds decisive. Second, the Court does not even bother to explain the contours
of that standard, and why it was not satisfied in this case. Cf. ante, at 77, n. 38
("We have no occasion in this case to decide what types of special
circumstances could satisfactorily demonstrate that sustained success does not
accurately reflect the minority's ability to elect its preferred representatives").
Finally, though couched as a conclusion about a "matter of law," ante, at 77, the
Court's abrupt entry of judgment for appellants on District 23 reflects an
unwillingness to give the District Court the respect it is due, particularly when,
as in this case, the District Court has a demonstrated knowledge and expertise
of the entire context that Congress directed it to consider.