Japan Must Fight Britain - Tota Ishimaru (1936)
Japan Must Fight Britain - Tota Ishimaru (1936)
Japan Must Fight Britain - Tota Ishimaru (1936)
By
-----Lt.-Comdr. ~A ISHIMAlUJ--------
-----------L-J.---N-.-.- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Translated by
Instructor-Capt. c. V. RAYMENT
C.B.E., R.N. (Retired)
----------LONDON-------------
J. $p'&1'ee,
.J:,"ssex.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
I have to acknowledge the help I have had from Mr.
Tateno Mamoru : v.rithout it, many passages would have
remained unintelligIble to me. If, in spite of his pains and
his patience, I have failed to do justice to the author, I
trust I may be forgiven.
I have also to thank the staffof the London Library for
their unfailing courtesy and their timely aid in unearthing
many references and quotations.
G. V. R.
October 1935.
NOTE
Grateful acknowledgments are hereby made to Messrs
Jonathan Cape, Ltd., for pennission to use extracts from
Andre Siegfried's England's Crisis and Nicholas Roosevelt's
America and England; to Messrs. .John Murray and the
Doubleday Doran Company for permission to use extracts
from Admiral Sims' Victory at Sea; to Messrs. George Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., for permission to use extracts from Warren
S. P. Thompson's Danger Spots in World Population; to
Messrs. Charles Scribner's Sons, for permission to use
extracts fronI Nicholas Roosevelt's The Restless Pacific;
to Messrs. Constable and Co., Ltd., for permission to use
extracts from Hector C. Bywater's Navies and Nations;
to The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M.P. ; to the Hearst
Press, to the Morning Post, and to The Times.
.... -
U1'A7r"t.T\""'"
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.r
./ . [
...........
v_v..... ...v,
~
in which she holds firmly what she has already and will
relinquish nothing.
The truth is that the relative positions of Japan and
England
today are
very closely similar
to ~.....
those of England
.3" r'1
,,,.,,.,
9'~
LY UC1Ult:: Ll1C
VY 41. .L l:lllnK tual: my
readers will be astonished to nnd how true this statement
<ULU.
.,
_.lo
..
. 'r'1
.,.,"
.,.,.. ..u'"'
......"''"' v...
.y
.,
v.
"
Q,uu.
to nip it in the bud, but it was not until the World War
that she attained her object. So true is this that one can see
at a,. glance what the future holds for. England
.- . in. relation
"V ., aparr,
..
(:l
... .
-in 'tAT~r
'tATl:Il:.
L'l.L......
.
v
un
--xrr U.lC WV.l.lu
vw
o
was it, then, that she was beaten in the end? In one word,
she was beaten from the start in diplomacy. The military
clique ignored the diplomatists and did what they liked with
German
foreign policy. If, in any country, the soldiers and
..
sauors controt tne conduct or roreizn affairs. that countrv
_L'
v........
will hp.
'.
- ....
'JU
u y
-in w::Ir
'no
'..
...
'"
aOUDt
.'-'
'J'''
it
tnat
~ng.lana
FOREWORD
1<'ORE\VORI.>
Xl
CONTENTS
PAGE
FOREWORD
IX
CHAPTER I
THE FRIEND OF YESTERDAY THE FOE OF TODAY
23
2.
Amoy-Russia
Alliance
26
Outer
44
CHAPTER II
BR.ITISH PRESSURE ON JAPAN
XlV
CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER III
WILL JAPAN AND ENGLAND COME TO BLOWS IN THE END?
I.
2.
,I
'f
I
84-
99
..
10
CHAPTER IV
THE KNELL OF THE BRITISH NAVY
I. Germany
2.
r 15
xv
CONTENTS
3. The Last ofthe Two-power Standard: Abortive FrancoItalian agreement-Agreement between England,
France, and Italy-End of the two-power standard..
PAGE
129
CHAPTER V
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
I.
2.
152
.. 154
CHAPTER VII
BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC
I.
()
160
xV!
Details of the Singapore Base: Designed on a large ~cale
-Position of the base-Lay-out-Military opinion
3.- Effect on Japan: Effect on national defence-Threat
to communications-Political effect-The truth from
an Englishman-Need for further discussions 4. British Bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans: Hongkong-Australia and New Zealand-Indian Ocean 5. England's Pacific Strategy: In an Anglo-Japanese war
-Defence of Australia and New Zealand-Dependencies and Mandated Territories-Command of the
sea in the Indian Ocean-Strategical key to the Pacific-
PAG!
2.
r68
170
t
76
177
CHAPTER VIII
JAPANESE AND BRITISH FIGHTING FORCES IN
1.
2.
1936
CHAPTER IX
181
CONTENTS
XVl1
PAGE
2.
2I3
CHAPTER XI
ATTAOK ON ENGLAND'S 'NEAK POINTS
I.
2.
CHAPTER XII
BRrTAIN NOT TO BE FEARED
I.
Japan's plans
- 245
5. Japan's War ofAttrition : Attack off Colombo-British
plans to force the straits lilson gets informationBritish attempts to confuse theJapanese Jaapaaa:lnweBssee-Hn90tli-------deceived-Preliminary skirmishing Fight in the
".
XVl11
CONTENTS
PI\QI:
CHAPTER XIII
WAKE UP, PEOPLE OF ENGLAND!
I.
Pacific
........
..
..
.. 275
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Frontispiece
Map -
FA<:lKG PAGF
H.M.S.
HoMoS.
H.M.S.
HoM.S.
H .Y:..
~f S
"Nelson"
"Royal Sovereign"
"Hood"
81
"Canberxa" "'"O'oIk"
I
96
H.M.S. "Furious"
112
H.M.S. "Active"
The World's Largest Submarine "XI" : Four Guns, 5.2
144
161
176
176
192
192
Map
-----Japanese
10,000
208
260
CHAPTER I
...
,.."
'.,
Simon.
he hostility has been boldly and frankly expressed by
Sir ohn Simon and b
London
of February
2, 1933, Sir John Simon,
. . telegram.
...
House
of Commons,
in very strong terms. He
said
that
he
*
...
,
1 opInIon,
Japanese action in Manchuria had not been in conformity
wi
e ovenant 0
e eague 0
anons, apan a,
beyond all uestion used armed force which the Covenant
or ade, He added that until an international decision was
reach d t
apan r
the Covenant.
..
25
...
u ,
...
WI
trigger .and thus betray the fact that it is not loaded. Japan
....
do any such
. thing without the co-operation of the. United States
att~tude
. ..
"
So the next
. question that arises is: What will the great
of the
...
t '
..
will receive
International co..operation
.
iance.
between Japan and China, she rejected their advances 'aridthereby successfully' earned the gratitude of Japan. Lord
im er ey,
mister or oreign
airs at t e time, 1
.. .
"
28
,
appreciate the ulterior motives of such far-seeing statesmen
as Nicholas II and Muravieff, and forgetting the earlier
exam le of Russia's treatment of Roumania she thou ht to
the effect of a trea . Count Inou e believed that
could not find a better man to carry out this important
, mission than the Marquis It6, who, fortunately, approved
of its.. object.. He .therefore
proposed to send. him to the
.
"
30
. ,
co
however, in 'possession
..of an. official. telegram
. from. his own
oreign
ce appoln
ment must ave nown
a
British were roceeding on the accepted lines, and for it to
en a e at the same time In separate nego ia ions wi
Russia, with a view to entenng Into an agreement WIt er,
.............,.". wron . Even if an a reement with Russia was
.
ro osed Alliance with Britain a an's
reputation would be adversely affected if she trimmed her
sails. in this.manner. It would be better first to conclude the
.
eo
of negotiating
very puzzled.
. . a treaty. Both of them were
.
,
that there was no change in the policy that his Government
had hitherto pursued in regard to the Anglo..Japanese
3I
.LA.L
. ," .
'"
..
an
oug
n e In on 0
e rare
failures of his life-failures as rare, one might say, as wrong
characters in Confucius or Mencius. His mistake was that,
failing to see through Russian duplicity, he wanted to come
to an understan .
.L'-Y,oJoJl
..
"
--:F
33
to
f'.
uaus, .u.,
pvu\.. y
-0'
11
L!,
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.~i
u;a.u vu
--_.
___ ..._1.""...
:;:--
. . . .,.
rnrai
...
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.J
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ri .. 7.'
'h... n
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f i ' , ' _.
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not till then, would it be incumbent on the other con:.r-..I'
....Jo ,
to
to t h p .
of thp.
fir~t
rhJ'"
., hu
;1'1
l~tA,
11
....UUV-
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ua.vt;; S
I,.V
c 1_
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I,.Ut;;i)~
a.uu,
nf
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d....
LJ.,lJ.;).
TT
.. ....., ............. ,
c1.
LJ,J,~.,
...
r..
_
vva.;, t')v
. For-ni-any-yea~.
befor~
. ~'this- Russia had been do ing all
35
n
a e on the one hand an alliance directe
against Russia and, on the other, treated the same country
as a friend and came to an amicable agreement with her.
The two actions were logically inconsistent.
It is in his ability calmly and unhesitatingly to do things
like this that John Bull is so great and shows that he is a
past-master in diplomacy.
There are two things that should not be overlooked in
have to learn
trimming, an
object in view.
s rue Ion 0 apanese expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia and her own forward
po cy t ere : a an s rotests at the annexation of
awan and over the immigration question: all these tended
to estrange the
. ..two peoples, and relations
. became so strained
,
Japanese Alliance, which was to them like 'a cist over the
eye', deepened and began to find expression in denunciations
_n.
.s was 0 y natura, or t e seeon
1.ance
being offensive and defensive, England would find herself
in the awkward redicament of h vi
side of a an in
began to get excited and to indulge in hysterics. It was
to absorb
claimed, for instance,..that. 'Japan designs .
.China
n ese cnmm
..
.
gain,
apan goes to war WIt
us, England will have to join her and is therefore e uall
our enemy.
enca s ou d start a s iritual c
ngan
England was seriously concerned at these denunciations.
.&..II.I.&.,F"...
....
contracting
. . . .party from making war
. on a third .country
.
The object of this clause was to free England from the
It
exclud~d
Alliance
would be lost.
Further, considered as a legal
..
C
.?
38
'III
..
tary and naval operations are being made: it only remains to
declare war. Were
.
a
unex ected r ..... .........
-_.__._-_
"..- -
seriously
from.
the value
.
. detract.
.
39
"
di~posal
ansm ; ng an c 1 r
and industrial activities in Manchuria interfered with her
own . in I 20, En land, on her own initiative, proposed a
four- ower loan to China teo ect 0 W ic was to c ec
Japanese financial activities in Eastern Asia; a ter t e
making of the Anglo-Russian Treaty in 1907, the Alliance,
~ directed against Russia, had lost its point and was con1
Alliance
.
41
the'
ote was
0 cance
England's treaty 0 igation to en military assistance to
a an. In articular uestions at issue between a an and
America could be referred to the League and settled
, by. it
S
tion
simply
. would be .
. . to conform .to the League's
. disposi-
had gone. In
the words
.
. of the Osaka Mainichi, 'the, . Anglo-
e tance s rang e .
Although the Alliance had become a ghost, the British
ovemment was still anxious. or one thing, re ations
between a an and America were becomin more and more
strained, and it seemed possible that war might break out
at any
the Alliance,
. time. It decided,. therefore, to cancel
.
fully concurred.
After considerable
.
. thought,
. it proposed.to
1,,'"
43
~t
Washington.
ovemmen 0 rna e
its opportunity to get rid of the Alliance. I will ive a
c aractenstic examp e 0
e sort of thing that was being
.
.
said from an article b Wickham t
the Review of Reviews, the sort of person who had been
advoc.ating from behind the scenes co-operation with
44
years
IS
nd if it b
at
is r
in the
. honesty
. . of man's intentions, England has indeed gone
And
n: after that
. wrongful
. . . strangling of the Alliance,
.
,
mobilized the
lie
100-10X.
movement, and the incident was closed for the time being.
But the anti-foreign boycott went on as before and, in
connexion WIt It attac s on m erialism and demands for
the
cancellation
of unfair treaties and for .
radical.
changes
..
..
. -
47
forwar~e two
- - - - 48
British distress.
The continued occurrence of anti-British outbreaks in
China caused England great distress.
--------t..Snu.u.nVlcel.r----\.the nineteenth century ~as rul.ed-th.....e
_
world, helped 'by great lumps of coal and iron', as the
French critic Michelet put it, and riding on the flood-tide
~
I~
I R: Iutron.
'
r' 'l..--.'L.- C'f---~o.&-fFree 'r
HLUe anu
U.LUustnaevo
vVlOtu
theGreat'v~v/--"arl'lr---her prosperity reacn.ea. its climax : it remains for herpain-.. --fully to stumble down the slope beyond; electricity and oil are
replacing coal as the motive power ofindustry ; international
l' ..
T" T
---------wtrl.-aade is changing its complexion; Free Tradeisbeing replaced.---------by-Protection and----hy---bloek systems of tariffs. p.~s the resul-Fct,---British trade, when compared with that before the War, shows
a remarkable decrease. John Bull's throne is, at last, in
----danger. On top of alItl::i.iShas come the Chinaman's antiBritish movement. For the English, indeed, 'bees have stung
a crying face' .
Just consider British trade with China. It has been harder
----hit-than ever befure. In 1925, the year of----the-May 30 affair,
British imports into China dropped to 338 million tael~s,------"'a---
fall of I I 3 million taels from the year before. At this rate
it will not be long before America or ~an captures the
ntIs commerclaosl1:l.on
...
_
British
ialpositi In Chi.n.. . a~.
The next phase of the anti.. British movement was a
positive agitation to recover the lost Concessions-the
leases of Hongkong [sic] and Kowloon, as a matter of course,
---~a~nQ1:he Concession at Shanghai, the return of'whichwas- - - vociferousIyd.emandeCfd.uring the May 30 affair. These
special rights are the mainstay, the very heart, of England's
___________i.nfluence
...
in China, T.--O-lose these three Concessions, ap'Ga,.lrlrtl.---------~from any others, ""Guld amount to being driven out of
China. Under these circumstances, should England fail
to put a stop to the anti-British movement, she would not
--------=only1oseher status in tneFarEast, but a:J:SO;later on, h-er----dominion over India and her prestige in Persia and Afghanistan would be affected. In other words, England would
receive a fatal blow.. She had to alter her methods ofdealinz
I \.. rt'L'
-------\'Ne"l1Ho~rnln~a~.----------------------
49
.
....
b~y.,- - ,- - ----------..-cI9~2~..,;------,t~O..------4-t
0f t IIe 'UT
vvasl'
llngton Treaty
h e slgnatones
6
---------f"'O-'~ME-ac-'l-'l1ey, the Britisn:----eharge d'Affaires in Pekin, and by:,
_ _ _ _-----=tli---;:oe~e-Io-quent speech of CliainEetlain, the British Foreign;,
Minister, in January 1927. The main points of the new
proposals were :
(i) The Powers should respond to China's legitimate
aspirations and no longer maintain that her political
and financial prosperity is only possible with foreign
support.
autonomous rigl;tt to d.....o-lOSLVo-.-.- - - - - - - - - - - - (iii) China's legitimate demands for the revision of treaties
should be agreed to.
(iv) Extra-territorial rights, such as those attaching to
Church property, should be revised at once. Increases in customs duties should be accepted at
once and unconditionally.
(v) Steps should be taken, in due course, to return to
ChiIna certalnntlsease
. B" hJ
d~t~e,J.,rnAr.U.'ltoJ,ll1
. ......el,,;t;S,-.- - - - - - - -------~
This announcement marked an astounding change from
the high-handed policy England had pursued up to that
time and in her attitude to such questions as the supervision
of finance and of the railways, and also to that of granting
tariff autonomy, a matter in which she had opposed Japan
----------<-Ia---..-t_the Customs Congress.
It is an open question whether-England would-have given
way to this extent had the . L
. \lliance still been in furce.
--------I!I-Tno--------i--the first place she would have endeavoured, in co-
50
--------iojanlcH-d stationed-velunteers at t~ice offices, but viithl----l'-tth"We:li------bitter experience of the incident of May 30 in mind-,--they
-----------.av.. .o ided coming into conflict witlrthe mob, and:1eft..----.;-.it.----..:;to~---do as it pleased. Almost directly afterwards the British
residential quarter at Kiukiang went through a similar
experience. There, too, the mob captured the Concession,
and the British officials let it alone to do as it pleased.
In this way the administration of the Concessions passed
completely into the hands of Chinese officials.
----------.O~n-=e--a;;thing in particularslloul:aOe noted-.--r-It~m-i--=-ght natura:IIyD.ave been expecteCf1hat the other foreign Concessions
would have met with a fate similar to that of the British-.-.
_
---_But the Chinese were aiming at ~ y : they l~ef1lctt-------the other Concessions alone. The Chinese leaders kn-elo'H'WtJ'.. -- - - very well-that it would-be a great mistake to involve the
---------...cot:her-Powers, who, thougJ.rthey gave Englandtheirsym-..- - - - pathy, were taking no action, but standing aside and looking
on. At this time more than at any other, England had reason
to regret the abandoned Alliance.
that he would have to give way instead .of using ballcartridge, recognized the Wu-han National Government
an opene ne otiations. 0 save
er oss 0 ace e
oncessions to Hankow and Kiukiang were returned to the,
Chinese.
..
,
tears running down its cheeks! It is no exaggeration to say
that England lost her position in China because she had
a an one
e
ance.
52
From the first, one of the principal objects of the Communist International has been to deal British finance a
---------...n-tlO-IM"t~al_blow and so to remove the great obstacle to th~e---
accomplishment of the World Revolution it wants. To
----this end it stirred up the masses of China to deprive th-e---English of their valuable privileges and to drive them out.
I t hoped by this means to embarrass British rule in India
--------aa.....
nd to make Englan.dlose-her position in Afgb anistan and,---------Persia. In the incidents of May go, at Hankow, Canton, and
----Hongkong, it was the-Russian Communist International---and none other that controlled the Chinese Communist
----Party and wavedt1le1lag 'Away witn----Englana'.
n actl"V'ltles
---~~OSly,on.
Dut
In
more recent years nUSSlan
have been gradually estranging that country from her and
----drawing it nearer to Russia..
Then again, Persia, as a country rich in oil, has attracted
the attention of England, who made a treaty with it in 1919
and converted it into a protectorate. But since then Rlo-\Iu"""'sslH>i_a---'r'\
very poor as compared with that which she held while the
Anglo-]apanese Alliance was in force. It is small wonder,
then, that Englishmen, regretting past glories, have been ...
discussing its revival. The following is taken from a leading:
artie e In e ort
ina az~ etas, a ntis a er.
England, with her diplomatic vision obscured in the uncertain
atmosphere after the War, and under a deep sense of responsibility
to her
valuable Anglo-Japanese
. creditor America, sacrificed the.
.
,
Then there was Garvin, in a long article in the Observer,
saying that the Alliance ought to be renewed, and speaking
of it in almost affectionate terms. Presumably he expressed
the views f educat and well-informed eo Ie.
.
people. England had little thought for them when she so
unjustly strangled the Alliance: all she thought of was
casting up the account of profit and loss. We Japanese feel
that a casual renewal would touch our national eli . .
We have a tradition of kee in our hands clean and are
54
forget it.
Australia, committed to the principle of a 'White
Aust~alia',naturally dislikes a stream ofJapanese immi rants,
an IS rai 0 a anese ex ansion to e sout ward. n
roa
es, very similar considerations apply to New
Zealand.
Nowadays these Self-Governing Dominions have a
55
voice in foreign affairs, they are no longer slaves, they con..: ...:1...._
ILl.,
+'h~?"I
Ji'.?"In'l'::lnrl
-----,
.S
r\n
"'~?"I
lIT
C'L.--,lri
nnp k;nO'
'..J
i'hl;i
o~
that they might break away from her and join America.
T:"
~. U.1
,.
L,.
aI),
J.
L,.
U.1~.1~
1.
.11)
UU,",
,.1
,p.1
's:
,-
nn;nt
s;
-,
'::Inri thP
foe of today.
C11
1.
.11
'r
..... _ .. ..,--~y,
r'
.1
r.f
-1'::1'tT h".:lC!
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L1.
-.::n; --un;
..:I
CHAPTER II
BRITISH PRESSURE ON JAPAN
(I )
57
58
has obtained. This is nothing more nor less than the old diplomacy.
Such methods were frequently adopted in the nineteenth
century, excited DO comment and seemed to have been effective,
but they are directly contrary to the fundamental diplomatic
principles of the recently founded League of Nations and also
to the spirit of the No-War Pact.
Mr. Matsuoka, the a anese dele ate, referred to the conusion at reigns in hina and pointed to the fact that her
Government is one in name only. But this state of affairs is not
new, it obtained at the time of the Washin ton Conference, and
was t en Into consi eration y t e owers concerned. The
Nine Power Treaty was made to maintain the territorial inte ri
o a
na a was In t at con rtion an to prevent other
countries from taking advantage of its weakness.
Japan is censured because, disregarding this Treaty, she has
We.
do.
not doubt the
Mr. Matsuoka's statement that,"
.truth
.of.
'"
deny that she will establish good government and act generally
of Manchuria.
But the fact remains that in
in the interests
.
.
without appealing to the League. The League does not wish to
force on
. her its solution, which she has rejected, but .it is. the duty
has done, on her own independent solution.
(25/2/33) *
17, 1933,
. during the session that opened directly after
. Japan
.
found itself
u~able
to agree.' but
th~t
did
no~
alter in the
,
appropriate action much sooner than it had done in this
instance. I:f, instead, it wasted time in vacillation and
In ecision, t e war wo
ave run Its course e ore any
steps had been taken to prevent it. It was not impossible
that the situation in Manchuria mi ht evel into a war
between Japan and Russia. It was an insane idea to attempt
to carry out a policy which. had
. for its keynote the prevention
of the League of Nations had been flouted by Japan. If
England could not make up her mind to uphold the League
* English
6
ose CIrcumstances, s e a
etter WIt raw from it
herself. Inasmuch as Japan had heedlessly broken faith,
she ou ht most clear! to be .informed tha
be given any assistance whatever. The Government ought
not to wait and abstain from action until the committee
in t
,
priate part England had played in determining it.
He maintained that an embargo on arms could not be
.
. ou in ema lona co..operation,
and announced that, from that day until an international
decision was reached, the British Government would
au onze e Issue 0 icences for the export to either China
or Japan of any articles mentioned in the Arms Export
* English translator's note: The above reports of speeches are translations of the Japanese text. made after reference to Hansard.
organize ,an roug a ou a movemen or In eendence as a means of dealin with the situation
that had arisen after the incidents of Se tember 18.
To this end, they made use of the names and services
of certain Chinese, and at the same time availed
.
movement, which received support and encouragement from the Japanese General Staff,
was on success u on account 0 t e resence 0
Japanese troops. It could not, therefore, be regarded
as spontaneous
or genuinely
Manchurian.
.
.
.
63
,
of China and had been declared independent.
or e ension at existe pnor
e responsi i i
to September 18, I I, was shared b China and
apan. ut China was in no degree responsible for
the various inci
date. For these Japan alone was responsible.
,
pretation of the Treaties.
e con en Ion a
no rea
n regar 0
Government, The Times countered with 'The confusion in
hina as not started just now. It began before the Washington Conference a n '
.. .
Powers. The Nine Power Treaty was made to help countries
in the condition of China and to prevent their weakness
again,
The state of affairs in China today, when she is passing
through a period
to her impatient
. . .of transition, is.disappointing
.
.
~e
but little
its
. influence,
. they do not openly refuse to recognize
.
at present, it may
governments,
forces,
. be expected that the local
.
.
of the League of Nations. *
*'
urope
65
As soon
as our troops
.
.
.
len SIn an lapeared that British ri hts were endan ered, it was En land .
who .promptly c~anged her attitude and moved that a
by the League.
Preservation
China.
Today
. British
. trade, like that of Japan,
. has spread all
but.
also
Valley
. .
.into Kuang
. .Tung and
. North
. China.
. The
,
,maIn
purport of England's China policy. It is said that for the
same reason e ntis oreign
ce was muc concerned,
.
when the third revision of the Alliance wa under
tion, .
as to
England could connive .at Japanese
.how'
.far.
. .
,
oppose it.
68
estriction
..
Embargo on arms.
Originally, America had been the principal advocate
of prohibiting traffic in arms: England merely a servile
imitator. The facts were that on January 10, 1933, President
Hoover asked the Senate to empower him to prohibit
rtin munitions of war to
O::>O"V'I"\ .....
then
.
een reac e .
However, the British Government was disappointed
of its expectation
follow its lead. Not only
.
. .that others would
.
...
71
_y .
e enemy, wi
very gra e
estriction
One of the results was the denunciation of the IndoJapanese Trade Agreement of 1904. On April 10 a Note
.
greemen wou
e terminate on t e
owing coer 10 was an e to our m assa or In
London. This meant that in six months' time a an would
cease to e treated as a most..favoured nati
73
Its
A
UNIT 1000 YEN
..
90 , 063
288,119
I
):1
while her exports during the same period did not exceed
2,594,000,000 yen, less than half that amount. The excess
.
ov r our expor s was represcn ec y t ie uge
, sum of 3,346,000,000 yen. This shows that the profit derived
, from the Treaty was all made b En land. Last ear I 2
, owever, apanese exports to India exceeded her imports
, from that country) the difference being 75,626,000 yen.
, As soon as En land found thi
.
75
1932
1931
1930
..
3 2,957
x4,343
, 99
4,x06
3,4 3
3,3 22
2 0
21,5 25
5,59 2
3,91
2,239
x,392
1,7 2
1,1 I
ow WI t IS enunciation a ec apan .
ie,
America has held the first lace China the second, and India
the third in Japanese foreign trade. Since the affair WI
China, trade with her has declined and that with India has
.
1932 , .show that,
menca an
of our total .
exports, .
31 per cent went to
.
r
.,
35 per cent came om
enca an
pe
.
Our"trade with India both wa s reached the high figure of
I
total overseas trade.
76
..
This table shows that raw cotton occupies the first place
and pig-iron the second. In 193 I) the former accounted for
113,000,000 yen of a total of 133,160,000 yen, and in 193 2
for 91,700,000 yen out of 116,860,000. Of India's annual
output of 4,800,000 bales of cotton, 1,100,000 were ex..
_
_
77
Indian oppression.
-----------rThe powerful weapon of a preferential tariff was used
by Lancashire to suppress the import ofJapanese goods into
India for the reasons given above. What happened was that,
-------linl::l------Jlb\;;9.-..13""'O'o-,-aa.---;Bill to protect the Indian cotton industry di1'i-S-~-
criminated between British goods and those made in other
countries to the extent of iInposing a general-duty oho-p"'"'er---cent ad valorem on the latter and a preferential duty of
15 per cent only on the former. Later OD, the preferentiaI--duty was gradually raised to 25 per cent and the general
duty to 3It per cent in consequence. In August 1932, in
----------\:ooH-rder to stop a rush of Japanese goods consequent upon a
fall in the exchange value of the yen, the Government of
-----India raised-tlle general-duty to 50 per cent, with,-ro'lT1url-t--altering the preferentiatcluty. In April 1933 me----duties
were raised a fifth time, and a mortal blow was struck
at Japanese goods by subjecting them to a duty of 50 per
cent more than those from Britain. TheJollowing tab~le~_ _
shows the effect. (The unit is 1000 yen.)
Japanese cottons
British cottons
.
.
1932, June
J.wy
August
.
September
October ..
November
December
1 933, January ..
February
March
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
54,936
57,4 05
59,44 8
59,574
32 ,180
47,195
53,05 0
44,5 60
54,4~0
65,048
"'"
62,694
.....
09,99
6 7,657
02,057
56,242
5 I,b02
52,634
32,09tl
38,547
43, 08 7
;;,.
~.
78
,.
Britis cr
istress.
rdut aio,
e c ea ness 0 t ie a . anese 00 S was ue
____to"oL--'oOtkiacts that working hours in that country were 60 per
---~'W~re~ek as against 48 in England, and wages were 7s. 6d. a
---~'WrH'e"Pek as against 355. No European country COUkl---held----;iHoltss------own against that.
* English translatot's note: The report of Mr. Levy's speech has been
from the Morning Post is as it appeared in that paper.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----"B=RI=TI=S=H=----'"'P R=E=S=SU=R=E=---O""-N--------.JAPAN
79
their commercial policy. Notice to abrogate treaties and agreements is sharply resented in certain Japanese quarters, which
profess to see political hostility behind economic measures. It is,
therefore, wholesome for our Japanese friends to remember
that Japan also has been through a crisis, and took in that
'predicament much the same precautions as we are taking now.
The Great Earthquake, a decade a 0, reci itated a national
depression, to escape om w .ch Japan raised her tariffs to
somethin like double their hei ht, takin values into account.
There is no oubt that that revolution in policy dealt a heavy
blow to British trade; but Great Britain did not deny the right
ofJapan to take such steps as she thought wise for the good of her
people. So now, when Great Britain, bearing a heavier burden
80
The British, however, would not agree, and the Conference ended in a deadlock. Thereupon the Japanese
Government instructed Mr.. Kadono, its adviser at the
subsequent World Economic Conference, to lose no time
_ _ _""""in",---=-at=te=m=pting personal negotiations with British officials in
---London. The-British Government avoidecLthe issue and>---fop"-,,,u.-t- - - --~diftiGWties in the way. The Government of Ind~iah,-----t.\.toNo..-,- - - -----'I"m~aSl'lnMa:Hlg".edto a:void--replying to a request for direct negotiations for sonle time, and, on June 7, raised-the-duty on nonBritish cottons (principally Japanese), by Art 5, Section 3
of the Customs Bill. This meant that: '
(i) A duty of 61 annas the pound weight was imposed
on grey shirtings.
------t-'(i~i)----.T""""rhe duty on other cotton goods was raiseCfDy
amounts varying from 50 per cent to 75 p-""'er'-------=ce=n=t
_
---------JOla""c_co.n.-rding to k.ind~.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----~(izWr-i)l--1'hese increases did not apply to goods certified,---------to be of British manufacture.
This, clearly enough, was a final challenge to the
Japanese cotton industry.
,
enter into them. The question would have to be referred
to the Autumn Session, and what with this and that would
no
a a e.
. mean
a
. y pos pone .
ULLJ,LLa, n a s summer cap! a , was m e
But that was not all; England fell back on further
evasions. When Mr. Kadono called at the Board of Trade
r,
orace
to discuss the matter he was infonne
Wilson, the Secretary, that the British Government woul
prefer to have the conference held in England and not in
.
.
. before.
JAP
.
prohibitive tariffs on wool, wheat, and other Dominion produce,
the Age says that 'Australians have never surrendered to threats
In any par 0 err na iona 1e ,an a s, apan pure ases our
pr ucts, especia your woo, ecause It appens to suit er.
The cheapness ofJapanese goods is not due to superior technical
skill or industrial or anization, but to methods which Australia
will never ado t-mean wa es serf conditions Ion hours a
seven-day week, and child labour. There is an obligation to
resist this menace on eve Australian Government. *
the markets and had driven out British goods. J apan had
by two to one
in Egypt and by four to one
beaten
England
.
.
.
........,.."'''''.
r 1
e emen s, apanese co ons
and artificial silks had the upper hand, and it was only in
-----------------
--
_._-~_.--_.
83
CHAPTER III
_ _ _ _-----1WILL&-IoLL""'-JAPAN AND ENGLAND COME TO BLOWS IN THE END?
(I )
Irreconcilable DijJerences
she-hbQ,a~s- - - -
------Elokl"-rhepes to have. Therein lies a cause of~"''''y~talcl"rco-.- - - - - - - - - We Japanese are aware of our differences with America,
but very few of us realize how much more serious are our
relations with England and what an element of danger
they contain. Our interests, for instance, may clash p----.olic--ti__ca.-l~ly,------_
-----Wl----.tlithose of America, quite apart from the immigration
question, in connexion with her positive policy in Chi..n.-a,~
..
_
_____but nowhere dn1bey clash economica1J..-Japan and,",A~m~e;.L,ri"-c.Q.a~--
are, in fact, each-other's good customers, and trade in ChrninF-Haio-----in different commodities. By appreciating Japan's special
position in the Far East and by adjusting and restraining
her policy in China and Manchuria accordingly, America
can reduce all the talk. about war to vain and empty
babbling.
------B-ut~o~ur-p-o-si.-:-ti.--o-n---.i-n-r-eg-ar------.d-t-o.E.-n-g--la-n----;d~i.-s-an-o----;;th;--e-r-q-u-e-st1----;;-o-n---..
altogether. Serious and irreconcilable economic andpolitical~--differences are invohred. A revision of the .4.ngW-Japldo
an
esotee - - HG
_ _ _ _------"'T"--"'r~ade Agreement might tempoI:arily remove some of-thcPe---ecc;>nomic diffic~ties: ~ut .that would only postpone the
evil day : a collision IS inevitable, The Japanese and British
peoples should look this fact in the face. But what are the
reasons for it? Why must the two countries inevitably come
84
a
,
pee y
ere
e
attitude after the Russo-Japanese War. One reason for this
sudden change is to be found in her relations with America,
as explained in Chapter I, section 2. But the Japanese
people ought to realize that there was yet another. It was
that England was becoming afraid of the progress of the
country that had overthrown Russia, and altered her policy
to one calculated to check it. This will not be fully appre..
ciated without some account of her traditional policy.
England, by defeating her competitors on the sea one
after the other, gained the mastery of the world and brought
vast tracts of it under her sway. To retain these in peace
and safety it has been essential for her to prevent the rise
of more than one other Power at the same time. This
necessity has been the basis of her traditional policy on the
Continent of Europe, and was the reason why she endeavoured to nip in the bud Germany's challenge to her
supremacy. Her policy in Asia has been precisely the same,
and Japan .has the honour (?) of receiving her attentions
in this respect. England knew what she was doing when
she made the Anglo-]apanese Alliance. She had already
devised a means of keeping Japanese expansion within
definite limits. This is clear enough from the so-called
'Bertie Memorandum', which was published officially after
the Great War.
'Bertie' is Lord Bertie of Thame, who, at the time of the
making of the Alliance, was Assistant Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and who, as Sir Francis Bertie, was British
Ambassador in Paris during the Great War. The memorandum was dated March I I, I go I, three years before the
outbreak ofthe Russo-Japanese War. Russia, in combination
with France and Germany, had constrained Japan to withdraw from Port Arthur, which she had captured from China
some six years before, and had subsequently occupied that
place and the whole of the Liao-tung Peninsula herself:
86
87
trade in China
. has gradually
. . been
. overtopping
. . British,. and
on and..
the fierce
continues. Before
. fight for the mastery
..
. it,
respite.
As seen from the British side the advance of this army
IS 10 ictmg grave,
not ata, mjunes, or ntam epen s
for her national ros en on her trade and her Overseas
Dominions are among her best customers, as may be seen
from the following table.
BRITISH EXPORTS ACCORDING TO DESTINATION
Others
3.5
88
89
In the western Pacific area by far the most urgent needs are
those of the Japanese. Japan is decidedly overpopulated now as
compared vlith most other countries. It needs more territory
for agricultural expansion and it needs larger mineral resources
for the development of its industry. Japan's policies with regard
to China are today being determined by this really urgent
economic need. . . . Their policy towards China is being, and
will be, determined by their estimation of the best way to exploit
Manchuria as well as certain resources in other parts of China.
Since this is the customary method of procedure in international
relations today, it does not in any way reflect discredit upon
----Japan.
go
see things in this light, and seem quite likely to 0 ose the
expansion 0 t e apanese In every way possib e. They would
much like to see a close alliance of all Euro ean eo les who
have an Interest In e western aci c, for the purpose of maintaining the status quo. If such an alliance could be formed and
can be ormed, in the first place, or maintained long even if it
can once be formed. British, Australians, Dutch and Americans
-what have they in common that will hold them steadily vis-a-vis
Japan for the next half-century? . . . The only reasonable
answer to this uestion must be that the have not enou h in
common to hold together for any great length of time. * (Pp. 12312 .
of a .fair-minded
. and well-informed man.
impression that Manchuria and Mongolia are Japan's
But America is not alone in this opinion : it is held by
some peop e In ng an
erse, as a recen ar c e In e
Tiik a Asahi shows. Accordin to a tele ram from The
Times special correspondent at Brisbane, some remarks
b the De n fCanterbu at the Guildford Diocesan
Missionary
. Festival on July
. 5, 1933, created a sensation in
seeking an outlet for her popula~on and still more for her goods.
country,
a great
. so did Australia. I should
. . like to have
.seen.
Japan that part of Australia which we cannot colonize ourselves.
the whole
atmosphere
I believe
. that would change.
.
. of the East.
-Translator.]
ng i
ra
opposition on
that she is afraid.
y means
IS
,
became obsessed with . a .fear of her military
It
. .........strength.
.
~ ..........la
was
established and the immigration of Japanese labour strictly
pro . 1 e . t was en, too, at ustra a eci e to ave
a na of her own as a defence a ainst a an.
Later on, during the Great War, when Japan presented
the
Demands' to .China,
sent troops
into
. 'Twenty-one
,.
.
..
'territory
. . there, Europe and America began to study her
dangerous
. . militarist
ofa military clique.
apan was sti
emg con emned as militarist at the
openin of the Washin on Conference and Austr lia a
ew Zealand were so insistent in their denunciations that
the inten i
' .
.
ideas
of
. have
. .led to the .construction
.
. the Singapore Base,
ill
..
----;;Je94
JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRITAIN
Franco-Prussian War, the British" Empire held the sceptre
----ofilie worIa. On the economic side;-Britain was the workSh-op----of the world, the world's greatest exporter and greatest
trader: the leading banks and the greatest insurance
---vcowm
. . . .panies, too, were hers. That is what Sir MichaeLHick~s---
Beach said in March 1876. Up to that time British trade
---~an~d commerce had-been far, far greater than thl-f"lo~se~o~f~aHn~~f1-- - - other country. They had been built up with investments
- - -...a.....
nd undertakings in every part of dIe globe. AJ:t-th~is.--------:cis~---literally true.
On the politica~ritain administered far larger
territorial possessions than any other nation, in Europe,
in
Asia, Africa, Australia,
and in North and South America,
J::..
95
96
JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRIT.A}N
reception in Gexxuany, and anti-British s~timents became
-,
prevalent.
At the same time, in Germa~y itself manufacture was
makin ra id strides owin to th~ industry of.$e people
and the application of science un er surta e overnment
97
98
-----....to~check_Russia)s advance
327.
WILLJAP
conflict,
. and thatetherefore
. they
g ng apan.
0 er IS
a,
will eventually combine against
first theory hold
that.
important
.
.
100
frequently
th~
102
JAPAN
ea
e atntuce as
this apparent craven-heartedness ? Andre Siegfried says in
his book En land's Crisis :
Today, in a mere decade, without a war, without a struggle,
she
the same?
without seeming to care, this same England-is
.
..
- as renounce
er supre
,
.
request 0
e m e a s.
renunciation as a loss of prestige. The English would have you
and that it had to be
believe that it is simply
.
. common sense,
.
one.
ey e
u
ae
.
Needs must . . ., the English seem to say. The Americans
are not absolute strangers. We both have the same origin, the
same Cl iza on,
e sam
ma e em.
e ow-or
when they build a Fleet equal to ours they have no aggressive
or William .II it was
intentions. against us. With Napoleon
.
.
en ey
eren. n
will work together to police the seas and maintain the peace
of the world, and it will be an Anglo-Saxon peace. There is
sure y nei
..
.. . .
cousins. They rail against their accent, their manners, and their
lack ofculture; for the first time they s~ow an infer!ority c?~~lex
n
18 impracti ca
r canno e an e ec ve wor ng
agreement between th~ English-speaking nations. They have
mue
e same 0 ~ec ves,
grea
a ng na ons 0 are
vitally concerned to see peace maintained so that prosperity may
flourish. In matters political they are bound to co-operate by joining
orees In ringing pressure to ear against any nation w c
roattempts to embark on a dangerous naval or milit
It stan s to reason that once parity on a reduced basis
between the British and the American Navies is an accom lished
fact it will be to the interest of both nations to see that no other
Power builds a fleet to threaten either. t
If the United States better a reciated her stren
she
might more easily understand England's burdens. If England
more clearly reco~z~d the close kinship .betw~en the United
a form of partnership which could be based not on rivalry but
.
The
fact is.
that there is much in the psychology
.
. . of both
America
... Instead of the words in italics, which are a translation of the Japanese,
Mr. Roosevelt say~, "have the opportunity of co-operating in the interest
104
..
expec e .
These are all possible steps for England to take to
oppress Japan. What line of action will Japan take to meet
them? Let us first discuss the American attitude to Manc
uo.
* The
108
.
.
.
NOTES:
109
they do
. not take long to build and she has a very high
I IO
---~e~srlo.ltrH51al..ldnH:!gcBecL--ButJapan
is not the only country of wh....o'olnlm..a.----England is apprehensive. If the Naval Conference broke
------IdOWR, beth France and--ltaly vlo~e to build as thl:Ee}V-'I'------pleased, and--England's traditional--pelicy of maintaining in
Europe a two-power standard would be upset, and she
---herselfwoutd seriouslybethreatened-.- - - - - - - - - - - For reasons such as these it is probable-tha:t-Eng
will continue to support America, and by fair means or foul
----s-cheme to oppress Japan: a matter that on no account we
sl:iOUIa overlOOk.
If the agreement to limit fortifications in the Pacific
oth~erF----
in the League.
In the second, they agree carefully to examine all
proposals to give effect to Articles 10, 16, and 19 of the
League of Nations Covenant. In other words, they heki-fO'HUHt=--------to Germany and---Italy a hope that the restrictions that h~a-~vep----
been placed upon them will be removed by a revision of the
Treaties.
------~ey agree to confer over any questions
left unsettled at the Conference on Reduction of Arm~a-m-e-n-:-t.---
This refers, principally, to the German demand for an
,.
I
112
r 14
--------'I'fiJO"ghHlt=----JEl"rl"nHJ"gland-.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----This being so, how will-the war be conducted-?-B....Iefln..o.....r e - - - - answering this question, let us consider briefly Englana's
---~n=-=ac=vc=-atpoIi.cyandtheBritishNavy.
CHAPTER IV
THE KNELL OF THE BRITISH NAVY
116
e total losses
. .
..
."
"
"Is there no solution for the problem ?" I asked.
"
"
118
e s eng 0
ens
avy, an
of the sea was actually at stake.
Nor did Admiral ]eIlicoe indulge in any false expectations
.
.
..
,
every
.
.
w
approaching would make easier the German operations, for
the submarines would soon have the long daylight of the British
,
,
would witness the great crisisof the War; the basis of the ruthless
campaign upon which the submarines had entered was that
the co d reach th
. .on
.
.
could learn there was a eneral belief in Bri .
that this plan would succeed. The losses were now approaching
a million tons a month it was thus a matter of ve SiTnT'\IA
arithmetic to determine the len th of time the Allies coul
stan such a strain. According to the authorities the limit of
endurance would be reached about November I, I917 ; in other
words, unless some method of successfully fighting submarines
co
e scovere a most rmme ate y, reat ritain would
ve 0 ay own er arms e ore a victorious ermany.
"What we are facing is the defeat of Great Britain," said
Ambassador
Walter
H. Page, after the situation had been
.
.
Battle of Jutland.
n
C'1"1'1'tt! A'W"
John
I 19
Beatty and the German scouting squadron under ViceAdmiral Hi er. The fi htin was fierce enou h to deserv
special
annals.
of .
the world.
But
. mention in the naval
..
.
Fleet,
.
.was slow to take advantage of this good. fight ofBeatty's
.
............,
..."
Great War the British were still deeply imbued with the
"
til
vessels.
As against this, England had left off building
battle..
.
.
.
s ps in 19 ,S e a s oppe
e cons rue on 0
ree 0
the six battle..cruisers laid down in 1915 and 1916, and had
only built a few light cruisers and smaller shi s. Althou h
of America. The relativ
itions
were entirely
altered.
England had either to abandon
.
.
years,. or to start
on a scale similar to that of
. building
.
enca s vast
naval programme, it is necessary to appreciate her attitude
to the British Navy, which I will endeavour to ex lain.
e
t consideration in framing the programme
was German. In 1 16 the
r
..
.
the second ear of the
naval Power, and it was feared that by the end of the
121
,
c yar s a
been working day and ~ght. Further, at that time the
e
ar was s 1 uncer am,
0
ermany
resu 0
succeed in crushing her European enemies, or in im osin
her own terms upon t em, it was highly probable that at
the first 0 ortuni she would turn on those countries
had been inimical to her;. America, to whom she
. had
. already
.
nnc',.,
pletely destroyed.
hig~y
im.portant factor
"
122
't'r'<IoI::o....,I'~Tl Government
concurred in
. .
t Wilson had in mind when he
supported the proposed naval ex~ansion..He w.as at. he.art a
man of peace and averse to actmg against hIS principles.
.,
.
.
lterior t th
the building of a large
Germany
. Navy against Japan
.or.
What, then, had he in mind? My own idea is .that he in-
programme
again, telling his people that if they would not
. ..
Navy Bill as a lever to get America into
.the
. League was
.
of construction.
strenuously
. Winston Churchill
. and others
.
on the sea, but it was quite clear that if America, with her
almost
in ship. . unlimited wealth, started a competition
.
Anglo-American discussions.
However somethin had to be done, and England
attempted to negotiate during the Peace Conference.
The negotiations were secret, but on January go, 1927, the
the whole sto b
publishing Secretary of the Navy Daniels' conversations.
eh~
.
naval strength as above requirements after the German
ro ramme of
,
her programme, England would find herself unable to
support the Le~gue of Nations. She could not allow any
r 0 er nava supremacy.
At this virtual ultimatum, Mr. Daniels abruptly terminated the interview and he has confessed that he spent a slee ...
the League
,
But he did not get on and failed in his object. For one thing,
the President was ill and unfit for serious conferences, and,
for another, he was just then putting it to the Senate that
America must either join the League or build the biggest
Navy in the world. The occasion was not opportune.*
* Frederick Moore:
126
ng an. U c 0pIIDon
the enormous expenditure that the programme entailed, and
Con ess discovered a similar tendency. The result was that
little progress was made with e new construction.
England twice took opportunity to assure the Amen......... r..I.'. . . . . . . . . .
i nded in e futur....
to be content with a one-power standard. The American
Navy Department also concede~ a point by abandoning .its
"
y 0 supremacy on e sea,
accepted equality with America. The dissatisfaction felt
in naval circles made itself heard from time to time. Admiral
emyss, irst or unng the War, for instance, remarked
that although it was questionable whether England, in
her resent financial .
. .
supremacy, the day would come when the old contention
that command
of the sea was essential
to the existence of
'II".
'II.
I-'v............
127
ng 0- mencan agreement.
England was startled. She abandoned the agreement
THE
K..~ELL
12
tained that she could not reduce this figure by a single ton
unless England and America guaranteed her safety. This
I
130
I3 I
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
I
.n
..
er sea co
u
.
Once they are cut, her people must either starve or
surrender. It was to cut them that Germany decided on
her illegal submarine campaign, in which she all but
succee e .
Four routes.
The routes followed by British merchant ships extend in
all to some 80 000 miles. There are four arteries which lead
to I NorthAmerica 2 SouthAmerica
Africa
The
Pacific. The last-named, after passing through the Mediterraneanand the SuezCanal
. into the Indian Ocean, divides into
I33
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
I",
_~.1.._
V.L
T!Io
A'
'
.L
'-1..1....,
.1+-r..
_"
+1-. ....
"r
'U~l
.......
.................
.1
........""
ro."
...,...
11~+;,,'h
+...~A".
..
'I"
II
.J.
. . . . . .
Source
~UURU.t;
19 13
1925
192 7
31.5
199
46.0
11.2
21.2
28.5
43. 2
ill
Asia
.
Oceania .
North America
South America
Europe .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.1)~4
16.8
279
87
84
103
18.6
79
19 13
Destination
...
~a.
'l\.T
,1"
...
.L "l UJ. '-lJ. ...
.
..
South America
Europe .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
_I:. _
.LV.V
-- ':>""
__ c:
.L
"" ,.v
237
12.8
192 5
192 7
-- -.')""5
-.
__ 0
,,""'.:>
.
_.... .I. . )......
....
""t.....
",~.V
....V.J
20.0
x95
139
139
134
Distribution
of naval strength.
:;.t
."
_,.
'J
..
'
VV.ua.1.
LU
.,
IT
111
n,..
_1.J
1:'
r ......
<.J
'I
w.w:ac :suc
..l:S,
_1.
GU \JQ.i::I
:.,
mOSl:
J.~
ssases
Gibraltar and
various
Statton
Home Fleet
.1VJ.eai'terranean
Fleet
......
ulufcul;ar ana
Malta
craft-carrier (I).
China Fleet
Hongkong
Cruiser SI..
.3.
(?\ .........
..
~hin
Bermuda
,...
(T),
Colombo
Sydney
New Zealand
Navy
Auckland
Canadian Navv
Destrovers
East Indies
Australian Navy
shin (I).
(4)
Parent shin
1'/
(2)
,1+
Sl
-0
.L
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
135
That was why England, after careful consideration, eventually decided to station her fleets with a view to the protection oftrade, rather
them in Home waters.
. than to concentrate
.
136
JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRIT..<\1N
previous section, but to appreciate how and where England
is vulnerable closer consideration is required.
The imp~rtance of the trade route through the Mediterranean to India, Australia, and China has already been P-=Ol=nted._ _
---OHi'Ql-lcltb-.To cut it east oIndia would cripple the British Emp"""'ir'-"'e'----':'-----_ _
.,.vere it cut west of Indi.a,-England would, in effect, b~e
_
strangled and die.
India is vitally important because, although her people
are very poor, they are also very numerous and they have
their native industries. They provide most valuable markets,
---for which-----htmdreds of British companies manufacture.
---The vast wealth---of-British business men is derived from th~eHm=t--o-,-----~an--d-the prosperity and, indeed,--the existence of thousand~s- - ---------co.....Jf;-British workmen depend on them. NaturaHy enought--,- - England has taken alarm at our peaceful penetration and
has done all she can to stop it.
The chain of naval bases that stretches from Gibraltar
in the west to Hongkong and Weihaiwei in the east bears
witness to theclose and continual attention paict-byi3ritish--statesmen and-----m.eir navalaclvisers to the control and
protection of the trade route to the Far East. But th-=-e----L.fi=rs:=ltc----condition of its safety is the command of the sea in the
Mediterranean. For were it lost British ships would have
to go all the way round by the Cape of Good Hope.
That is why England always attaches so much importance
to it. She lost it once, but the clear-sighted Nelson gave
his life to recover it at Trafalgar. Since then the Union
_ _ _Jack [rif] has held undisputed sway over the Mediterranean.
To complete our understanding of this question of Britain
and the Mediterranean, we must know something of the
attitude of other countries to it.
France.
----France and-Bngland, who-fought together against
Germany, have returned to their mutual antagonism now
that the War is over. There is no need to explain why the
loss of their common enemy has led to a serious conflict
of interests. The saying, 'Things that can be joined can be
parted', sufficiently expresses the position. The British,
---~en, ~a,re to take into consideration the possibility ofhostili...--- - ---+tiH"'es~"tV1Hth--Fr.lra:Hn"lfc~e~.
-------------------
MEDITERRANEAN
OR
PACIFIC?
137
.
centre to North Africa, the Near East, the Far East and elsewhere. The latter will have an added importance in the next
war as a source of man-power, in which France is deficient.
o ena e er rican roops 0 e c e up, ranee as
to ave cornman 0 t e sea ill a tnangu ar area WI vertex
at Marseilles, and with base stretching from Oran on the
western bounda of French Morocco to Tunis and Biserta
a Ion wa farther east. This im ortant trian Ie is dominated
b the British Fleet based on Gibraltar and Malta t
r
tect the British trade routes that pass through it. That the
strength of this Fleet h?,s to be sufficient to meet those of
y
French counter-moves.
France has been hard ut to it to meet this British threat
to er communications. The most desirable wa would be
to provide herselfwith a Capital Ship Navy, but the state ofher
finances does not permit ofit. She has, therefore, concentrated
on small fa~t, cruisers well-armed, sea-going torpedo boats,
African colonies. She is also building large cruisers and submarines for commerce-destroying operations outside the
..
upenor air
.
0 re a
e supenor
orce.
e prop ecy
can be made as to whether the development of the air arm
will cause any radical change in naval strate ,but it
w certain y ter nava 0 erations. For one thin it is
quite c ear at a country, in spite of an inferior navy, can,
with a superior air force, control a large area near her own
coasts and can protect her lines of communication within
th radi
.
.
.
..
138
,,*..
tons.
[Note.-The submarine tonnage allotted to each of
Japan, England, and America at the London Conference
80,000
Italy.
Relations between England and Italy are, to all appearances, friendly, but they are far from being so in connexion
wi
e e erranean.
e exis ence 0 a ntis nay
ase a
a a IS regar e as a reat.
eet statione
there could cut Italy's communications with her valuable
colony of Tripoli in Africa, And further, the Italian Nation..
alists stoutly maintain that the Maltese are Italian brace
an anguage an
at e island should be returned to them.
at
IS
ow matters stand in the Mediterranean
was en orsed in 1925 at the Williamstown International
Poll.tical Conferen.ce by Visconte Antonio Cippico, the
Italian representative and a member of the Fascist Senate
Hes~d:
.
o, 110.
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
and has seized Malta and Cyprus, not so much to satisfy the
needs of her people, but to fulfil her Imperialistic ambition.
"
."
No, they are the outcome of the necessity of ensuring the political
and economic life of our people, of guaranteeing to them liberty
of action and of providing suitable outlets for their rapidly
increasin numbers and for their manufactures. Possibl a
eaceful solution to this uestion may be found b a careful
stud ofit in the li ht of resent olitical circumstances.
"
.,.
Suez Canal.
T~e Suez C~nal is of m~re importance to England than
ST FIGHT BRITAIN
e anama ana 0
enca.
OU
It pass
into other hands, or should it be temporarily closed,
the backbone of England would be completely crushed,
and the Self-Govemin Dominions in the Pacific as well as
India would be im erilled. It must not be for otten tha
the anal is the weakest link in the Ion chain that c nn
England with India and is, therefore, essential to her.
Gibraltar, if by any chance captured by an enemy, could
in .all
. probability be recaptured, and, in fact, unless the
,
in the Mediterranean without it.
Cyprus may one day be given up by England of her
own accord.
an , WI
e e p 0 aircr ,prevent s ps from passing
through it. A ship unexpectedly sunk in it would block it.
As the defences of the Suez Canal zone are as different
from those of that of Panama as 'mud fr
cl
o eration would be c m r
That E
the
of a plan on a large scale to protect the Suez Canal. Before
the Great War the Turkish Empire constituted a rampart
for
of India
land and sea. For, though
. the defence .
.by.
. .
T"T,..... ',.
,,
over an rou es In 0
aerop ane ave ta en
They have a further value as channels through which
Russia can emerge into warm water. At the present time
the Russian Fleet has disappeared; it has died down like a
plant, but there may come a time when, like a plant, it
will shoot up again and with it the question of the straits.
Trotsky, when Army Commissary, asserted that the
straits and Constantinople provided one of the rare instances
in which Imperial Russia had pursued a reasonable policy.
He said that the world must be given to understand that
Red Russia regarded them as essential to her. He added a lot
more to the effect that even though France and England
went back on the secret agreement made with Russia
during the War, he firmly believed that sooner or later
the straits would be hers.
One day this declaration,
. which is almost one of war,
I 2
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
143
ases
What of the naval bases from which the Fleet that guards
the British Em ire and its trade routes all over the world
can 0 erate? In this cha ter onI those in Home watersthe Atlantic and the Mediterranean-will be mentioned:
those in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific will be left to the
Home waters.
There is what appears ..
to be an unnecessary
,.
. .number of,
144
145
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
Malta.
..
"
~rotection
of
th~
Suez
,
ous by day or night. To that extent its possession helps to
secure to England command of the Mediterranean and the
con 0 0
e sea-rou e om e es em 0 e a e
Ocean.
The place could be bombarded from Spain by in . ect
fire over the
And its strategical value to England
. mountains.
.
.
. .
Africa.
E
Mediterranean is threatened
. . in many
. places. Its shortness
--'-,..........
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC.
North America.
UX,
... ....CAo,.u....
o y irri e apan a n
. feeling. For that, as well as for reasons of economy, it turned
down that part of the proposal and compromised by
approving the construction of a base at Singapore capable
of taking the latest heavy ships, which could then be
des atched to the Far East should occasion arise.
The idea at the time was that althou h Sin a ore was
8000 miles from En land it would be ossible to send out
there a fast and owerful s uadron consistin of the hi hs eed battleshi s Nelson and Rodne who were then nearin
completion, and Hood, Repulse, and Renown. Further, it was
expected that future capital ships would be even faster
and would be capable of reaching the area under consideration in ten days. In fact, British naval opinion did not
consider it necessary to station a powerful Fleet in the
149
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
"
150
Anglo-American co-operation.
'
MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC?
15 I
II
..
ua f)1 memo.
What follows is an extract from an Admiralty memo..
randum circulated to all the re resentatives at the Im erial
o erence 0 I gog.
...
navies."
.
,
adopted. Twelve days later,
. 00
the
,
220d,
the Minister of
Halifax and
the
.
en as care y consi ere
mira
]ellicoe's suggestions. It is a time of great financial stringency.
.
. ..
onsi era on an
e
discussed at the Imperial Conference. Pending the result of this
discussion,
the Canadian
.
. . Government has. ,decided to .suspend
ne
cruiser and two destroyers offered by the Mother Country.
Th
. . .
.
organization of the Canadian Navy will be altered and, in order
to economize
. .
155
naval esta i
or abolished.
Canada, in fact, did away with the two old cruisers and
acce ted the one cruiser and two destroyers from the Mother
or y terwar s, owever, she
Country as su cient,
.......'..nosed to do awa with even these.
This policy of reduction was attacked by the Conservatives, whose leader,. Mr. Meighen, said
. that the
the Navy.
156
,..
,
.
The Henderson plan did not materialize. At the end of
.*
8,
,
cf?i~ers
mission.
ew ea an al!Y.
New Zealand is vulnerable in much the same way as
Australia. For this as well as for financial reasons she has
r I
a British Fleet based on Sin a ore
than to have her own Dominion Navy. This may sound
unfair,
. but
. the people of New Zealand argue that the
. ,
passe in 1923 provi e or ree crui ,
and a fuelling station at Auckland. Two of the cruisers and
the fuellin station have been com leted.
T
11
memorandum shows the im ortance
attached to the Singapore base by the New Zealand Government:
158
'T-J."
ne inman JVavy.
Before 1926 the so-called Indian Marine consisted
of a few armed merchantmen and patrol vessels. But on this
purely nominal Navy India sent
a 000 a ear .
...
a ltion to 100,000 for the base of the East Ind.ie~s--
, Squadron at Colombo, to which the Indians very naturally
T
'Sf
objected.
CHAPTER VII
BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC (B)
.
.
"''''
.
. ,.......er ana a nor e ns
ree
on: n a was un eel e. ow~ver, the Conservatives came back 'to power in 1 92 , and
a year war: was commence .
I
r6 I
.
of the Far East, and those of China
.B.a..' L
..
aintainin
be strengthened
and made more secure.
.
.
L
politicians had already made a lightning change to coo eration with America. It would not occur to one of our
naval officers that some of the British statesmen had foreseen
the possibility of a serious clash with Japan in the future.
They: ~re ~uch too honest not to be taken in by the cunning
"
that through the Suez Canal to the Far East is of the first
importance. It is protected as far as Suez by the Mediter)
FIGHT BRITAIN
16
,
base for the Americans and very convenient for suppressing
Japan.
The American, Nicholas Roosevelt, wrote in much the
same strain. He said :
168
England and Holland to see a powerful American Fleet b'COldas;n..e>u.d--.LJinLl----the Philippines. Were the United ~tat~ to ~thdraw f!om the
Philippines, the balance of power In this region-s-and In all of
Eastern Asia-would be so upset as to endanger the peace of the
world. England and Holland alike could only view the occupa-
WlJ:at1:la.sDeen said----above leaves no room for doub~t- - that the first of these is the principal object. We can but
admire the foresi ht of the British Government, especially
in view of the growing estrangement of e two countnes.
143-144.
169
it to take a battleship fitted with bulges, or a floating dock
BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC
out to be very different. An entirely new base is to be constructed some considerable distance away from Keppel
,
"
.
, ompara e wi
that of the Japanese naval dockyard at Kure.
ship.
mil~s
I1,OOO,000,
to the
but the
ary 0 zmon.
tary opmion was to e e ect t at as tease was
far nearer to a an than to an British base whence a Fleet
could be sent to relieve it, both it and the port of Singapore
1. 1.
,
of national defence?
_IIllO
'.
Supposing
the base at Singapore
to have been estab... ...
.
Political e ect.
The third point is that the esta s ment 0 t e mgapore
base will have a very considerable effect on our policy in
China.
BRITISH STRATE Y
attack [Japanese
translator's
ships it is not
, . ..
. remark: 'For modern
.
.
,
b~e
in
of such magnitude as
1921
~e
.
Fleet,
avowedly
.
. designed
~e
Pacific
h~ u~dergon~
a com-
b '
174
a great British Battle Fleet in those waters had passed, and with
it the need of an elaborate base at Singapore or elsewhere within
the Pacific zone. This expectation was not fulfilled. So far as
public knowledge goes, the original plan has been adhered to
in every respect. Apparently, therefore, the intention ofstationing
Fleet in the Pacific still ersists for ifit did not the
. . n of the new base would be su erfluous.
Yet the eril a ainst which this Battle Fleet is to shield the
Em ire is not readil discerned. The correspon ing Japanese
force now numbers only ten ships, a 0 weare semi-o so ete.
After the year 1934 e operation 0
e as ngton reaty
will automatically reduce it to nine ships, nor can that total be
exceeded while the Treaty remains valid. It is true that the
Japanese .Navy is strong in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines,
but battleships are not required to fight such craft, and Singapore
is, it would seem, to be primarily a battleship base. The Treaty
is to rem~n in forc~ until ~e en~ of 1936, and it will continue
o e v
,.
So far, however, there is no indication of such development.
III
,
suspicion that she harbours designs against the British Empire.
She has made no demonstration against British interests in Asia,
nor does the trend of her naval or military policy accord with the
theory that she meditates an invasion of British territory.
175
to bear at any point east of the Red Sea would hardly make for
the .
preservation
of peace.
Because Singapore
is a position of
.
..
.
..
,.
11II
ee or
1,SCUSSf,OTlS.
That the Singapore base is a menace to Japan is an
incontroverti e act, ten eyes e 0 It, ten an s point
to it'. t
Still thinking as they did when the dead Alliance was
80 per cent is of no use against England. And we must not
be misled into thinking that a ratio of equality, like that
which America has would be enou h. Dis assionate
strategical reasoning demands more. It is Japan's un-
Hector C. B
.8
-102.
Legge's translation.
176
JAPAN
177
Indian Ocean.
-------'T"'F'here is a chain of bases across the Inaian Ocean
linking the Mediterranean with the Pacific. Going from
west to east, we fincrAa.en at the entrance to the Rea Sea,
Karachi anC113OIii.bay on the west coast of India, with
Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon to the south of them.
Colombo is the base of the East Indies Squadron. In the
Bay of Bengal are Madras and Calcutta on the Indian
coast and Rangoon in Burma. None of these ports is strongly
defended, though there are guns at them alL
~----
- - -
In an Anglo-Japanese war.
As has already been mentioned, we accepted a ratio of
--~6J\.o1-per cent of naval strength in comparison with-thl.Vo:Kse;-oVolI.----England and of America because we overlooked the base at
---tdSUl
nH:!g'dapore. There, England-had us ! If our plenipotentiaries
had had more foresight, or if they had not been so
full of the glorious past of the Anglo-Japanese Alli~an'""cP4e-,--- - -1A
wHe>------qsh6tlld certainly-have stood out, like America, for
equality. With the present ratio, a war with England must
- - - b e expected to end in a victory for her. In other word-<'t-s,~w~e--
start at a disadvantage unless our naval strength is at least
--------'A
---~equatto-hers.
178
naa
I79
Fleet. Neither
J~pan
to
Singapore.
across
. it, except temporarily
. . with surface or submarine
destruction ofthe Fleet.
,
Europe, and there can be no doubt that the problem of
180
the
Ill:C"S
CHAPTER VIII
JAPANESE AND BlUTISH FIGHTING FORCES IN
1936
NaTJies
(I )
TABLE I
NAVAL STRENGTHS ACCORDING TO TIm
(UNIT 1000 TONS)
Capital
-.mip5-
..,.
..,
nhA
t"\
-~
Aircraft
-..:
loB .Ll
Br .o
(twelve)
England ..
pta-
Sub-
Destroy-
101:;;.c::.
..., ....
...1:;;2."7.
1435
150
5:1. 7
19 1 2
150
5 2 .7
lynn
......
A I:
,..
100.U
135.0
42 2.9
135.0
146.8
60
60
60
t:.....
&:.....
(:fifteen)
Jap/Amer.
435. 1
(iifteen)
OF LONDON
Total
"'.'"
(nhJ.e)
iUD.erica .
TREATY
(eighteen)
(fifteen)
'712.0c::.
,.
J.U~U3
1099.6
70 .I 7
100
65
,..,..
,.,.",..
t:..~
l;C.ul.
T__ I'C' __
.1"-j;'., .Ll.L.L5
u ....
....
,.,~
l-r
percent
~n
J~
I-
I
181
.....
182
(i) BATTLESHIPS:
Queen
Elizabeth class,
,.
lIve
.7
f"I
five
-,-~
1t.f
_ 7.
4-
knots
Guns, in.
TO~do
3,uOU
25. 0
15 \tl)
2-4
23. 0
........
.:>.'"
~~ \':JJ
)~~
2-4
3I.5
15 (6)
2-ro
C2 Tn
v
T J::
27,15 0
-,. ......... ,.
oo '.:J""'"'
.,.,
01
Speed,
31 ,0 0 0
..1
"'.l.u;;)>:>,
""......,.." ""6'.
.~
TOIlJlage
Tu es
.I. v
nn ",.."
.::J.::J'::;~""
(;;\
v -I.
RA'1""'T'T
.
.
'C'_n
32 ,0 0 0
AQ
",I;
"~
Tnn
"oJ
IA\
, "J
(iii). Am.CRAPT-C;~
,n1
~
.
.
.
.
Furious
Ar2US
Eagle
Hermes
c...;ourageous
Glorious
~--"-
\ IV) -.f\.:
.....
".
.LL~I"
.
.
.
\..iRUISERS :
,.
~LASS
-t . ,"
._..1~
.1
VJ.~i:l,
l.VVV
....1_ ,__.
...........,;:0,
"Cr
.
.
"Wloo
(v) 'B'
22,45 0
I4\4~0
22,600
10,850
22,5 0
22,50
31.0
20.2
24. 0
54
~.o
27
27
18
31.0
31.0
81
63
-.
f,;.Li:US::i, .L1VC
.
.
.
Guns
-.
90 0 0
990
n
31.5
t5 \ts)
~v/u
:; .L..5
,..
0
';;j1':J v
;j:.t; .:.t;':J
830
32 . 25
8 (6)
.::J::;.......
n""nn
"",.. ""
_::;.'W'
&:.1.'
a
..,
412 0
418 0
A.9nn
... ..,
\~/
29.0
6 (5)
t5
.....
,,~(
,0
CLASS CRUISERS :
.L
_ ..
,..1~C!C! fiuiIl"
~
..,
(v) 'B'
CLASS
7\
'"
\,;J.(10)::I, i).IA
,O_~
.
.
*Dunedin class, two .
"'............,
A J
J"
J.
_1_~~
I 7560
...
.......
_.~
4850
...
.... ........
t::. I~\
0
33.
.... ......
-:'.".:;J
~ ~Z{
........
h fQ\
.-:1...,
"T~-.l-
5500
.?
g05
36.0
-.
1120
34.0
IAJln
..
1530
'lftn
....
36.5
.. .
1350
37.0
-? ?
,~
(vi) DESTROYERS:
7"1
...1........
...
- ---,
twenty-nine
,..1~C!C!
TT...
teen
TAr .77
1"1~qc:!
L1..
fnl1r_
T'"
~_.;.)
(6)
(5
12
?
6 (6)
(3)
47 (5)
;/'\'1'1"'_
#
rl~~~
--16
... '''t
29. 0
-0'
Torpedo
Tubes
Guns, in.
CRu"JSERS
\1'-L7'f~)
T'\
Speed,
knots
1936 183
47
11.7
~~~
l;
47
(5)
6
6
47
4.7
~~~
~4.'
6
6
"
teen
7
rl~H~c:!
(vii) SUBMARINES:
'L' class, six
K26
.
.
--
.
-'P' class, six
.
'R' class, six
.
Thames class, SlX Swordfish class, nine. _
..
~r:;.,\
I':l7l;
.\'VI: .VI:
?
?
?
?
1390
35.0
47 (4)
760
845
17 10
2425
13 83
1540
1570
175
4: (1)
235
4: (3)
10
t
?
22.0
15.0
4: (1)
15. 0
225
14.0
1~05
640
r
0
4: (1)
4: (1)
.
15.0
1570
.?
4-7.(1)
3 (1)
H.A_
15.0
2060
4.7 (1)
'f
..J
1..
_,_ .'i._
-,", l...~~.....
"'..~ ....................... ~ ........,.......... ~ ......-
h,,;l..J
c'
--
":
nin""
.i:I~.Lt;.;
~ l..._.y.....
+1.. ........ ;~ -'I --- .... ......."...... _. .... - -_.....
LI..L~
.,.
;n t'h....
....,.
V.I. "'''9VY
...-
#'7
.,
+~ 'hlp
-'
.,....
~.
JAPAJ.'T
184
1\11
.1'"l17.t1",L"
I!'oo:T
KK I A
TTT
~.
~"':-">
ots
32,720
29,33 0
29,990
23. 0
225
23. 0
14 (12)
275
14 l ts)
.
.
(ii) BATTLE-CRUISERS:
Kong'D cTass, three
20,330
(ill) AIRCRAFT-CARRIERS :
20,900
Akagz Class, two .
.
.
class, two
RUy)~
10,000
7000
. ..... u
.
ua5S",
i)J,A.
..
rfJ.bari
I. '!\
2/j5
23.
... 0
25. 0
..
..
..
C-..~_
...,~
? class, fourteen
Hatsuhara class, twelve
. . . . . . .1.:.C!C!
..
10,000
1U U
n. _
UOUV
5 100
----
"*:[', N O.
5 \12)
33. 0
8 (10)
jj.v
\UJ
1:0:;
1 __ \
'.1.;>1
--
,j,j'v
8-12
'11':""
33. 0
55 (7)
28 9 0
33. 0
5.5 (6)
.
I C1ass, SlX
C:::l rl~!:!q
... ....
T ...........
..,~ ?fF.\.,
R
?
?
nA
.J"'!'
140
1378
?
?
T"T~
lAn
1270
34. 0
,
47 4
1970
175
4.7 (2)
21.0
.d.. ...,
"-./
oJ
~:
A "1 (A\
."~
r~)
.
.
,..ro.
-.
...
~.I.~~
"oJ
.~
T No
..........-.
....
Iml)
.
\10)
-'
ij
1l~
T"\
\ v J.1.
I
I
",.
8
6
(tl)
It>
H.A.
TUbes
II
ti) BATrLESHIPS:
Guns, in.
Tonnage
..
,fic:::n
.....,.
140
1600
. . '?
iI\
6
8
onnage
(vii)
In.
1936 185
Tubes
SUBMARINES
(continued)
,.
goo
goo
?
?
?
?
which are commonly used for classification in the same way as we use the
letters of our alphabet.-Translator.
JAPA.~
MUS
,
account the fact that her boats individually are far better
than the British, she has a definite superiority.
'Ia
,
her strategy was successful. Nor need she be apprehensive
on account of the smaller cruisers and lighter craft, for
v 0
ra e
rmy
. .
,
Armoured Cars, 10 companies.
Anti-Aircraft Corps, 2 brigades.
exc u g n iai : 0
2 , 37.
Stationed in Jamaica, Aden, Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits
Settlements, Hongkong.
VERSEAS
zii
59,9 15
The units in India are changed from time to time at
the ex ense of the Government of India.
NDIA :
Territorial Army.
The Territorial Army .is divided into active and reserve.
.
ST FIGHT BRITAIN
voluntary.
e nomina s eng is , 15 cers an I 3,037
men. The numbers volunteering have decreased since the
Great War, and the War Office is much concerned about it.
The peace organization is into fourteen divisions and
one division of cavalry. These are called up for drills
and manceuvres from time to time.
Indian Army.
India, the treasure house of England, displayed great
loyalty to the Mother Country during the Great War. She
mobilized 1,500,000 men and sent 1,000,000 for service in
Europe and elsewhere. She expended 2,000,000,000 rupees
and pays interest on a war loan of 100,000,000. She was
of the greatest assistance to England. But the public promises
of independence and pledges given during the War have since
completely been forgotten or ignored. This has changed
the feelings of the people and has been the cause of the
unrest.
The Indian Army, maintained partly to enable England
to keep the people of India in subjection and partly to keep
out invaders, had a strength of 280,223 in 1929. The cost
of it is said to be 550,000,000 rupees. It is organized into
Regular Army (British), Native Indian Army, Volunteers
(British), Territorial Indian Army, and Air Force. Of these,
the first is composed of British troops sent out from England
and changed from time to time. I ts strength is about
60,000 men. The volunteers are British residents, a nucleus
only serving in peace time: the strength is 31,600 men.
The native regiments are enlisted from among the fighting races of India-Mahommedans, Sikhs, Rajputs, and
Nepalese. The last-named are a courageous race and make
e so ers.
e stren
IS a ou 172,000 men.
usua two 0
e ormer WI one 0
e atter, 0
and infan
The Native Territorials are voluntaril enlisted. In eace
time the form a nucleus of about 1 000 men and are
JAPANESE AND
commissions in the Indian Army given to theni:-The Government of Indiaidoes not agree, and has put all sorts of obstacles
in the way. .This
. question, combined .with the independence
us ra zan rmy.
Ali has already been explained, Australia is dependent on
sea-power for defence, but instead of providing it herself,
refers to rely on the British Navy. As, however, some time
come to er assistance,
must eIa se before at avy co
and as man outI .n arts of the count are at consi era e
distances from the naval bases some milita
rovision has
been thought necessary and an Army has been formed under
the Commonwealth Government. Since 192 I males have
to undergo compulsory training
. on reaching a certain age,
un er a separa e
ms ry.
co-opera es WI
e
and Army as requisite. There is a Minister for Air, and an
Air General Staff and Council.
The resent strength is a personnel of 35,000 and
1800 machines. The Force is in rocess 0 ex ansion an
should have a eater stren th at the end of I 6. It comprises the Regular Air Force and the Territorial Air Force.
The latter is regarded in peace time as a nucleus, a practice
similar to that which .obtains in the Army.
. ..
IS
,
to be reinforced at short notice from Iraq or Egypt. There are
CHAPTER IX
HOW WILL JAPA.~ AND ENGLA.~ FIGHT?
(I )
(A)
enemy, the
. diplomatic, the political, and the military are
It may use diplomacy to draw to its own side neutral
of its
countries and. to thwart the .corresponding attempts
.
Attitude 0 America.
If as su osed in Case I of Cha ter III section war
between Japan and England should result from a break-up
of the Pacific Conference to be held in 1935 or 1936, the
-.,...,.,.. . i al
ntries whos su ort each of the two belli er..
ents would endeavour to gain by diplomacy would be
America, Russia: and Holland. As the first two are Great
....." " -4''''~'
192
JAPAN MUST
FIG~T
BRITAIN
Three cases.
II:
America
fight her and then assume the mastery of.the world
..
194
to. .
accept.
an offer
.of Manchuria. On the other
. hand,
. pcon..
e;
England alone has interests there. It would, therefore, be
more to Russia's advantage to join in with Japan, and her
pro a y not esitate to do
eve .. ea e statesmen wo
so.
The ossibili of Russia remainin neutral must
be .considered.
What has she to gain by it?
. , .
.The
. answer
. . is
There is no need to explain what would happen to her if
she .adopted
attitude and abandoned the
. . such a negative
.
,
than once during the Manchurian affair for this very reason.
Canada, in the event ofwar between Japan and England,
. -,
......,............ preven
s an a
e same
e ac
ea
apanese air a ac on ana a.
The su port of Russia is, then, absolutel essential :
195
certain of our soldiers talk so much--6-f war with-her? N-o--country can fight the whole world. One would have thought
it obvious that Japan, driven as she is into hostilities with
those two champion wrestlers* England and America,
---,w'y"ffould not hesitate to grasp the-hand-of-her neighbour and--to get from her any and every assistance in cutting her way
out from a desperate position in which she is beset on all
sides.
It is, of course, essential to be on one's guard against
Communism. \Ve Japanese, however, need see nothing in it,
--~a~s'---'a"-principle,to fear. What we real1y1iave to guard----=a='-=g==ams-!-:::6
==t--is not Communism, to think of that obscures the issue, but
heedless provocation ofRussia. To kill the small insect and to
---leave theoig one alive is to commit tlie10IIy of UltimateI-y--destroying oneself:
Holland.
On account of the strategical. and economic imP....
0---crta..--n_ce - - ---o----#'f-her East Indian possessions, the attitude of Holland
woUIdliave a very considerable influence on the result of a
war between Japan and England.
Strung out in a chain, like twinkling stars, across the
South China Sea and the Pacific to the south of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies leap to the eye on opening
the map of the world. The approaches to Singapore from
the Indian Ocean are screened by Sumatra, Java, and the
Lesser Sunda Isles. The route north to Hongkong is flanked~_ _
by the Natuna Islands and Borneo. That to Australia passes
between Java and the Celebes.
The Netherlands East Indies stand to a naval base at
_ _ _~Sm
.....
..,.,gt'""apore much as our Pacific Islands stand to Mani},g.a._-_ _ _Their possession by eith.er-EnglandocJan would-determine
--~the fate of Singapore and-the command of the South q>Chwin..lCal.----Sea, the South Pacific, and, perhaps, the Indian Ocean.
It is no exaggeration to say that they constitute the. strat---eggt~'cal---key to Australia,-New Zealand, and----India, not to
C
'T't..
,In_ T'=lT\,
mentIon
olngapore.
oJ.U1r
1Illportance
In
an ..AUlg"'~.f"lAanes~~e~-war is not, however, solely strategical: it has its economic
side. The islands are noted for their production of sugar,
coffee, rubber, tobacco, tin, and oil, Of the last named in
* The professional wrestlers of Japan compete in two leagues of the
'f" -
. .
.
observe .
a neutrality
friendly
.
. . .to England, but strict
. and even
Japan.
must,.
if at war with England,
be .
prepared for
. We .
.
,
mance,
IS n s or our su mannes,
armed merchantmen, or aircraft to enable them to lie in
wai or a n s
ee a emptmg to get Into mgapore
from the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Sumatra, of
Sunda, of Lombok, or of Bali. The Dutch Government would
regar sue action as a breach of neutrality and a dispute
would ensue. Oil or rubber for exam Ie mi ht be
contraband of war and its su I
would give rise to a controversy in international law. A
n utrali
.
If Holland
adopt
a one-sided attitude of neutrality,
. were.to
.
.
.
HOV\T 'VILL
roOl . e s een
e n
In n a:
ey ave
aimed at keeping the natives in a state of dependence by
denying them education.
The policy of the Government General has been to amass
wealth for the Mother Country by forced labour and capitation taxes, and by similar means to squeeze the people.
On the social side, it has been held that to educate the natives
or to give em an instruction in olitical matters would
,
and are ready to seize every opportunity to obtain a greater
measure of self-government. Here again is a 'chestnut in
the fire' * of which Japan can avail herself:
Ig8
econ case.
We have considered above an An 10- a anese w
which might arise should the next
break
, Pacific
. . Conference
.
League of Nations.
We have also discussed the. diplomatic
.
attitude of the others.
In the second case, which will now be considered, it
IS suppose
at
oug a peace u so ution as been
found to the uestions of Manchuria and of the limitatio
armament, Japan's economic
. and demographic difficulties
The international
situation is continually changing,. and
.
,
Europe.
If she had sent out part of this second .Fleet in time,
. .
"
Three cases.
I will imagine three possibilities and discuss how each
e ect e con uet 0
e war.
wo
First case. e
suppose t t most 0 t e ntis
eet
has been sent out to the Far East from Euro e and based on
Sin a ore: that it has left that lace in com an for Hon ..
kong, and that war breaks out just before its arrival
there. '
nder these conditions the shi s of the China S uadron
......<1-;",.1.... to ioin the Fleet from Euro e and
England would start the war in superior force. The safety
of Singapore and Hongkong would be assured, and .the
'What of Japan? She would have had no opportunity
to destroy
. any part
.. of the British Fleet on its way out, or to
201
,
there the Japanese
. . Fleet could. attack when.and
. where it
HOW
another
. . was the
- aggressor. Against such, America would
..
rI
I:&r' ~ r I
204
---for Limiting Arms, wished to insert, as a safeguard-..-,- - --~aL-----bclause defining the aggressor. On May 24-----Mh----D~a'tv-lli~s,~after discussing the matter with President Roosevelt and taking the opinion of other countries, introduced amended
proposals. They included the following agreement to
confer:
.
S~
.
- - - ahs ansen,
WI t h
a VIew
to restoIlng
peace.llUUIU
uu-"'-s- - prove impossible, it ~ etwo is responsible.
---------JThe aggressor having thus been determined, restrictive
action Wilfbe taken accordingly.
----~In view oIlier painfiil-e-x-p-e'----ril-e-n-c-e-o-v-er------O-tlieManchurian
affair, Japan Will proEaOIy attach reservations to President
Roosevelt's 'Aggressor proposal' and to MacDonald's
'Consultative Clauses'. This, though an entirely proper procedure, would hardly be dignified or straightforward.
It would be far better for Japan to frame a definition of the
aggressor and to draft consultative clauses in such a way
that she can agree to them. This would, however, be very
---------'ditfiGult so long as she-has not the right to parity of naval---
.'
Pre-war: preparations.
206
Three cases.
The British problem is to assemble a superior Fleet at
Singapore. .On that,' the whole conduct of subsequent
207
..
tt
208
209
through which of
2II
- - - J , : : M...
212
and in clearing out our light forces lurking among the Dutch
Islands. They might eventually slip through the Straits of
Bunda or Bali and rendezvous with the Battle Fleet from
urope somew ere 0 e nor -wes 0 uma ra.
e
r case presents many opportumnes or m ependent action and calls for audacity. Apart from hampering
our attacks on Hon kon and Sin a ore and makin airraids on Formosa the Pescadores and K -shu the s uadron
could raid our communications in the East China Sea, appear
off the Pacific coasts of Japan and send up aircraft to drop
Continual
bombs on Tokyo, Nagoya,
. or Osaka.
.
.
, raids, a
21
..
z a
ecisrve ac on at
sea. The destruction of the British China Squadron is an
example of (i). The use of the convenient geographical
configuration of the islands that mask Singapore to establish
a .ne 0 e ence and to await t e enem s onset is an exam Ie
of ii. A Ii htnin descent on Hon kon and Sin a or
blocking the Suez Canal, threatening the enemy's communications in the Indian Ocean are examples of (iii)
and (iv).
21
..
In
for .
commencing
. . this connexion, the time we select.
e
arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore, our chances of
destroying the squadron.would be considerably diminished.
,
e, an we S 0
have to adapt
Further, the time for
. our. plans
. . accordingly.
a ec our pans or cap unng
enemy bases and for reducing the enemy's strength by
attrition. I will try to forecast these plans in each of my
e cases.
ase z.
Here, the fact that a superior Fleet had already reached
Singapore would complicate the problem of attackin
ong ong.
at p ace IS t ee ays rom ingapore and
seventeen hours-i-allowing Army trans orts a seed of
12
ots- om ormosa, and to attack it 'would a ear
very rasn. ut if the British Fleet is to bring our Fleet to
action, it will have to 0 erate from a base not so far awa
as Singapore: it will have, in fact, to use Hongkong as an
advanced base. The ca ture of that lace is therefore of
the first im ortance and would have to be undertaken even
at heavy cost. We should have to be very quick and to use
..
a ve lar e force and to save time the whol ex
would have completely to be prepared beforehand.
With h Briti
.
chance of reducing the difference in strength between our
,
~,',...... hT
21
own
a Japanese expeditionary
force .
from
Formosa, a difference
.
..
..
to British
operations.
at..
..
. Were it invested, the danger
. . of ee
,
ere IS none
that is secure nearer than Australia.
Therefore it would be
.
o our a van age 0 a ac 1, W a ever e risk. u er,
if we took it we should strike England in one of her weakest
spots, her so-called treasure house ofIndia, where the natives
w 0 are urmng with righteous indignation at being kept
in dependence, would rise in swarms.
The fact that the British Fleet from Eur
westward, as it is in this case, improves our prospects of
reducing its strength
. . by attrition. Our .submarines would be
HOW WILL
JAP~~
21 9
_1'1:
,\;
'.1......
~1 - .
VIJV
.1 .1
C"".
.r.
VV U ..LL U;) VV
' .............._
.1..1 1.
"
-,
~{
"1.
c.
, ,"
-,
U\;
J:"T.
. s:
u.1.C; t:
1.
..1.'
VoL
vu.".LLI.
T ._
.I.~
. s:
n.....'
_
,u
peOple, tnougn conSClOUS mat tney nave ner gooaww,
do not realize how valuable it might be to them in connexion
.
wun operations agamst Smgapore ana In the ooutn t-unna
Seas in the commg war WIth ~ngland.
We must bear in mind that our relations with her have
their strategical as well as their commercial side.
or
,~'...
-.L'..
...
218
and Singapore
probably,
would have fallen.
.
.
.
,
,wou
ave
e
chance of success until she had built many more ships and
consi era y increase
er nava strengt In companson
with that of Japan. In other words, both sides would have
to prepare or a ong-drawn-out war.
she take
. sides,
. or even be benevolently neutral to one
. side,
.
21 9
C1
~ "".......
"\A/e
.....
...t _ .
" ...... ~
Ll~
~'V
a...I.
.,
v'll llll
--
........' "
.i.
rJ~
......
T"
..
rl
~1
CHAPTER XI
ATTACK ON ENGLAND'S WEAK POINTS
A double object.
To fan the agitation for independence and to raise the
standard of revolt in Egypt would serve two objects.
In the first place, the Suez Canal may well be called the
key to British communications with the Indian Ocean, the
Far East, and Australasia. Were it blocked, British naval
operations
. farther
. east would very seriously
. be hampered
22 I
A British trick.
But the best way of all of definitely blocking the Canal
would be to stir up an insurrection in Egypt. During the
Great War the Turks advanced to the Canal and made
determined efforts to cut it, but they had omitted to win over
the Egyptians. The English, however, were wiser, and, by
declaring Turkish suzerainty at an end and by saying that
Egypt would be taken under British protection and granted
independence, were able successfully to protect the Canal.
The Egyptians, trusting to these promises, made many
sacrifices during the War. Some volunteered for service on
the Palestine, Syrian, and Mesopotamian fronts, others
served behind the line. After the War they expected to be
granted the independence they so earnesly desired. They
had been deluded, and have our sincere sympathy.
. Two days after the Armistice, Zaghul Pasha, the leader
- - -....of1:heEgyptian NationatisrParty, canea at tD.eResid'-=en=-c=y=-,----~
and, on the strength of the promises given during the War,
---demanCIeCI1J.1eiibolition ofthe protectorate and a recognition
of complete independence. The Sirdar, Sir Reginald
---=CWi=-=l:--n-g-at~e,received him with courtesy, but gave hi~ anevasive
222
Egyptian demands.
I have discussed the Egyptian nationalist movement
at some length in my earlier book, Japan Fights the World,
and have explained how it arose because the independence
granted was nominal only.
Egyptian demands may be classified under the following
three heads :
223
anse,
-----Egypt-has representative government and~4am~e;,un",t- - ----of two Houses. But the viishes of the people as expressed-bev-y--the-Diet are not carried out. England-does not allovl th~emHtc---
---+-,to..-be reflected in the actions of the Government.
The party of the Vlafii-,-for instance, 1ed--by Zaglml--Pasha, has an absolute majority in the Diet, but England
takes no notice of it and turns out any Cabinet formed by it.
In June 1930 the election law was revised and the will
of the people was made still more ineffective. Sixty members
ofthe Upper House are in the appointment of the King, who
can summon or close the Diet as he pleases. As this King is
----n-othirig more than a British puppet, the meaning of--m.e-ele=-c"---torallaw is obvious enough.
s.
----1'he-present standing Army has a strength-of 12,500, ap_art"'--"'----
224
,
number.
a
pre
I 100.
"With an unlooked-for
,
in all others.
1 th
r ve sue ssful in this it is int nd d
to hand other departments over to them.
The
Simon
Committee was set up to study
.
.
. the results
vative opposition
no Indian was appointed
on it. As the
..
.
Montague manifesto, the Indians were very dissatisfied, and
.
In .view of the alarming
. state of affairs, Lord Irwin,
226
opened
November
1932, and the draft ofa revised Indian
. in.
.
Confederate
.
. or
other Assembly
allowed to interfere
. are
.not.
ere IS a presen In
1,
are s c
under British rule, a number of Native States governed by
their own Princes. The relations of these States with others
are dealt with by the Viceroy, in the name of the KingEm eror, ut ot erwise eac
nnce IS an m e en ent
soverei . The Nationalist Part a eed to a onfederation
as a necessary step towards the consolidation of the whole
country into a United India. But the British saw in it a
means. of .getting the Native Princes to surrender their
the ruling Native Princes, by a majority of their representatives in the Upper House, agreed to join it. While on the
one hand a bribe.was
. offered to the
.Native
. Princes, on .the
228
18 who assassinated a
229
230
man, there is no room for doubt that the Indians, who have
all along looked up to her, would raise the stand.a.rcL---Of
_
revolt against the British.
_____But, as Gandhi remark.ed,-thelndians are an emascul-ated~-
people, forcibly deprived of weapons. There are at present
60,000 men of----the-Reg~ritishArmy and 172,000 native
troops in India. What the attitude of the latter would be in
.L
.~.
.2 I
c
The Russian attitude to India being as described, she
would hardly hesitate to make an Anglo-] apanese war the
".
"
"
235
B..
..
23 6
ng an n u
.
.
.e s rugg e e een USSla an
ng an IS no can ne
to that in India, Afghanistan, and Persia; the two countries
are at variance in many other directions. In brief Russia is
bent on destruction in British reserves, for the easiest and
most effective wa of ettin what she wants is b attackin
En land.
Before the Great War German thou ht to can er the
world by the sword, but the sword of Red Russia is, in some
senses, far sharper. The German relied on a weapon pure
and si!D-PI~: the Russian relies on doctrines of self-
237
CHAPTER XII
BRrrAIN NOT TO BE FEARED
as.
239
tactic
240
Attack on Australia.
J~pan
;~I-l-~\--c~~<~?'-~~o
f
>
Girt
1."1'''''':(,_
-_~ ~
"'"
~<~".;-~
-t,
.... : . _
. . -.. -:,,:-
_c.
_
"'"-~
4
-
-;~
~-
1c:
I
J. ~;:
~.J
-t :
!'co
~".
...#/
a.'!..
<
~...
,;
-
;f
'1- "';'-l-'
~-~..
--
~ "..
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?/
"
.....
",'
i.
-'
2 I
,
started bombing, several British 'planes leave the ground.
An air battle ensues. More British 'planes get up and more
are sent from the Japanese aircraft-carrier. Some of the
nus
anes try to ro om s on e cruisers,
e are
attacked b a anese' lanes and b hi h-an le fire and
meet with no success.
,
After about forty minutes the Japanese 'planes draw off
the westward. The cruisers follow them. The British
en sips.
.'
,..,
2 2
,
required adequa!ely to defend both the east and the west
, ... """"".......
ccupation
orneo
e
1
e oe 0 plaisant to Japan. For the adjoining Dutch Borneo could be
overawed and its native population incited to rise against
its tyrannical masters, with reverberations throughout the
o er IS an s.
On the strate .cal side several ur oses would be served.
The excellent harbours of Brunei and Sarawak would be
available for use as bases for Japan's war of attrition in the
Greater and Lesser Sunda Isles, and for the Fleet covering
her expedition .to Singapore.
The problems
obtaining
.
. .of.
. oil
2~
Note on Borneo.
For purposes of government, British Borneo is divided
--------cliH-lnHcottol-l-----hthree parts Nm'th-Bomeo, Brunei, and Sarawak---'Ihc("';e--territory is mountainous, the arable areas being in the southl---- - ---~wtH-e:.e'st'l"-'l-1'in'\-'the-basinsof the Rajang and Sara;"y\pak-R+i'\RvpeRr~s-.
-----North Borneo became a British protectorate in 1888 by
agreement with the Sultan, and since then has been admin---c!-:;;isc:=te=r=ectby a British resident. It is fertile and produces timb"'-er=-,--rice, -ruBber, cocoa, and coffee. Our firms of Kuhara and
Mitsui have estates there, and several rubber plantations
are owned by Japanese. The principal commercial ports are
_
Sandakan and J-=es=s-=el=-=-to=c:n=-:.'-----Brunei is between North Borneo and Sarawak. It has
been British since r888, the Sultan here, too, having been
won over. Brunei, the chief town, is on an arm of a bay
---tlo-the same name and-has a large wireless station. ~irillne--------------jc~ipal products are oil----and----mb-b~er~.------------Sarawak is the most westerly of the three divisions and,
like the other two, was made a British protectorate in
1888. The name of the present Sultan is C. V. Brooke. The
-------i-=-'nD:abitants are principatly savage Malays and-----nyak-=-s.--11ieChief products are oil, coal, and rice. The capital~
is also the chief port, is known as Kuching and also as
Sarawak.
The Japanese occu..by Borneo.
245
(4) Escape
of Mackeen's Squadron
246
---dangerous but enviahle-position as Commander-in-Chief;.------------'C~hina. We ",Jill imagine that a state of strained----reld.atl+ioHinFHS~---------.eXl~siH"tss-bet\"leenJapan and----England, and-that on .August 2 5
---the Admiral-,----who is at Hengkong, receives the foll~o"*wwrin~g----------1telegraphic instructions from the Adrniral-i"lt}'I1'-~~:- - - - - - - - M
247
,
First Lord.
the Japanese
,
sent to .
the Batan
.Straits, 3 battle-cruisers,
.2
light cruisers,
* Nagoya is ai: the head of a bay; Enshii Nada is the open sea oute 1 . - rans or.
249
of Attrition
----.a.;lS~SI~g
~ r e uaVIB, and-the tired----4c~r"Pe""t.\iN~S--heave a sigh of relief
250
harbour.
no risks
25 1
hand, by
en,
Preliminar kirmishin.
On the I th British aircraft are se narc
Sumatra, Java, and the Lesser Sundas to search the
a anese aircraft 0 u to meet them and hea f
ensues. When the British a roach the a anese
them and drive them off to the southward.
Shortly afterwards the British destroyers accomp
the cruisers a ear off the several straits to which the
een sent and start to search them. The cruisers serr
Straits of Malacca do not venture too far in, as it is to
At the Straits of Sunda, first of all the destroyers try tl
roug ; t ey are met your on as an c ose y er
. e covenng cruisers on 0 81 es come up, an a
action begins.
-------'";;i~54
.1-.~
1.':_
1-..
1-. -
n . t..
'0_.&....1
255
"
25 7
* The r~ferenc~ is to a de1'D;on Asura, of Indian and Buddhist mythology, who IS continually fightIng the others. He is depicted as having
three heads. Translator.
258
10,000
have
down.
259
rush
hoping.
to reduce its numerical superior. up to attack it,. .
.
ermine 0
push their attack home
regardless of loss and of the attempts
.
e enemy cruisers an
0 1 as 0
nve em O. orne
destroyers even ram their op onents and sacrifice them-
the others opportunity to. close the British Battle Fleet from
"
260
.
'
_ _ _ _ _~.----"~s time the Battle Fleets have gra~'Vee~nu.----- - - -.-dclHpproaching one another. Admiral Suenaga,' cbs'erving thffi"e---distress of the British and the disorder into which the1'lzave
been thrown by the gallant attack of his destroyer flotillas,
------a:ea:aes to aDanaon his originaTplan to Ieaathem north-w-a-rd-.--"'sc-"- - and to engage them then and there..
He has Iearned from his aircraft that the enemy's capital;
ships have been reduced to seven in number. He proposes,
after getting within range, to deliver another d~es="t='ro~y~e~r---
------a--O-tt;--a~ck and to take advantage of the ensuing disorder to
close and fight to a finish.
------~Fli_,jiw._rye~isi!_'o\ol1pt.l'e-n.AVed at about 30,000 metres. The range clHosMe~s~,- - - -----~a'F1-.nd each---Fleet starts manceuvring to cross the---l"' of thr#J>oe---'other. Fire is concentrated on the flagships, Mutsu and
Nelson, Hyuga and Royal Sovereign. Turrets are knocked out,
great holes blown in the ships' sides, upper-works andsuper_
--------is:H..tr.L-1,u''"'c..-\.tl\.Lurl.-'.e~s~shot away, fires ~. out and are with-difficulcl.1t)IIextinguished. The other ships also are damaged. The
'battering effect of the projectiles sh~ws the power of modern
science: it is enough to cow even the most naroened---fighters.
'
Each side continues to manoeuvre to get into a position
from which it can concentrate its fire on the other. The
range is ~ontinuaHy opening and-closing. Neither Fleet
attempts to proceed in any definite direction. Presentl-y,---just when Nelson is leading the British Fleet in to close the
_ _ _ _ _--'rlJOjal.Lln~g.ve,~Rear..AdmiraUwa.naga sees his opportunity. Ht;;-e--J.;is::.-.luDI-------------lChlOHmHmlklaOcH'nd of the fourth-division of----Gestroyers and----has-bfPJeeF"'lft'l-----w tl"t'inl"liglY---'is~o.nm'He-distance ahead of the--japanese Battle-Fieet.
-----------'f1IwP::lal
He has lost half his ships on the previous day, but none the
less gallantly dashes in to attack at close quarters.. He comes
under heavy fire from the covering Britis~l.I,o;;sJ--_
destroyers push on determined not to draw off until the last
torpedo has been fired and then, when nothing else remains,
-----------....to-du-what they can to ram their enemies. In spite of'-=-se~v~ec=cre=----losses, they achieve the signal success of torpedoing Resolu-tion, who is seen to draw out of line.
I t is about 170 and will soon be dark. The loss of
--------jR~e~slHol'!H.uF.lo.tzOmn~,
~added to the-losses in cruisers and-destroyers ,th-a+-t- - - he-has sustained-the-previous day, decides Admirar-wilson
to break off the action -and to make for Singapore, which
T ----
TYPE
a far greater
26~
CHAPTER XIII
WAKE UP, PEOPLE OF ENGLAND!
DURING
..
Out-of-date industry.
One must not,
overlook
. however,
.
. . the fact that.one of the
Per cent
5
..
..
3,50,000,000
267
dollars
agna arta.
t t e m erial onference in I 26 there was a further
change. The Self-governing Dominions were regarded as the
equals of England, and as independent except in so far as
all alike owned allegiance to one King. Their status was
raised and their limits of competence
.
. widened. England
268
still call her-is apt to play the role of a reticent old partner who
is on the defensive) while the Dominions talk big) insinuate, and
dogmatize in a fashion that they themselves would never tolerate
for a moment.*
'
----------------,--- ,--_._-""---
2 0
..
,
n s
Empire Economic Block. Up to that time England's
policy had been that of Free Trade, and she had had no
exclusive markets of her own, like America and German
W 0
a a 0 te
rotection. s, owever, er industries
were declining and the markets were being invaded by
others, she decided to try the economic block system to
provide. herself with closed markets. .
She.
invited
. .the co..
and in this
2 I
(2) A Matter
pr?sp~rity,
and hOl?es to
bezed that it is
. a common practice in Japan for the. old men
. to retire, not
.-
27 2
273
'"
Powers, and that her action was taken with the same
object.
She argued, further, that the Far Eastern question
could not be solved by legal arguments and by insisting on
the close observance of a set of rules. If peace was to be
maintained, the main purport of the Treaty must be kept in
sight and not lost behind a mass of arguments about procedure.
----2---#-74
275
,
Countries when they go to war all too frequently think
solely of victories, of winning battles; they do not stop to
effects
consider what they have to. gain by them or what
.the
,
o
e w r ay~.
a
w y
wars are reeor e In S ory.
276
If England wins.
chain of islands
. between it and Japan, of the Ogasawara
. san s
,
north of the equator. She might take these herself or share
t em, or err man a e, WI
enca, 0 eep apan s ut
in she mi ht make some of these islands as near! as
possible impregnable. As a further step, she might possess
of the oil-fields in th
.
she might take over the part of.guardian
. of China.
Japan hand and foot and to check her expansion and pro..
278
.would
.
,
,e
to repeat the Allies' mistake. I am sure England has had
enough of that !
China
. would be more
ignore her offer and seize the opportunity to take for themselves the independence they so greatly desire. If England
were defeated, India would break away from her, nothing
is more certain. En land would th
.
house.
WA
ng an ,ma e wqy
the beautiful
word Peace as a cover for the unreasonable
..
.
ace zn e act c.
Japan, England, and America are the three great Pacific
owers : armony an co-operation etween em
brin eace. If the Pacific should rove to be the scene of
another world war, it will be because the influence and
280
development, finalJ.y--abandon all ideas of racial discrimination and hatred, remove all tariff walls and restrictions on
migration, encourage the settlement of differences by an
----efficient system of arbitration. Then limitation of armament
will present no difficulties, mutual confidence will increase,
and the Pacific Ocean will not belie its name.
But unless America and England, and especially the
latter, who is the more likely to come into collision with
Japan, make way, all this is but so much froth.
England holds the key to the peace ofthe Pacific. Whether
that ocean belies its name, whether it becomes the scene of
another world war, depends on the attitude of the British
people.
Wake up, people of Britain! The times have changed!
You cannot go on as you have done in the past !
THE END
-------INI>E~X~--------
INDEX
Dean of Canterbury on
J.apanese expansion in, 91: deci-
90-92;
Afgha~staD;' 35;
Africa, Ca
Aggressor,
loss of Bri~sh
202
a;
BALDWIN, MR.
S.,
101
Balfour, Lord, I I 8
Bali, Straits of, 201
Banda Sea, 218
Banka Is., 210, 216, 249
Batan Straits of, 2
Beacon sfield, Lord, 34
to Britain, 2 I I ;
machinery, 266
Amery, Mr., on Singapore base, 165
Amoy, concession at, 51
Arms, export prohibition order,
24; export of, to Japan, 60;
embargo on, 69, 70
Army,
31; memorandum
28,
INDF.X
EAST AFRICA,
u ies,
Alteration in custom
,
British Empire Conference,
I921,
4X
Cecil Lord 6 r 2
Chamberlain. Mr. 61
am er am, JI ., 49. 51, 53
Chang Hsiao-ling, 65. 67
Chatfield, Admiral, 126
China, British methods in, 48, 49 ;
British policy in, 57; decrease of
British supremacy in, 65; territorial integrity of, 66; Japan's
aims in, II3; use of by British,
206; British squadron in, 245,
~47) British tra?e in, 278
ear.
Con ess of Eastern races 2 2
President. 127, 128
n us ,
nego a OIlS
between England and ] apan,
80. 8x; boycott of British
goods, 8x
Customs Congress, Chinese, 49
Czecho-Slovakia opposes
arms
embargo, 70
Coolidg~
future needs
on
INDEX
French Indo-China, 33
GANDHI, 225. 230
Garvin, 53
IMPERIALCONFERENC~,152,160
Inouy~Count,28, 32
Ira ,
140
situation
.II7; o~
.. h
athie of 1 6
Hongkong, anti-British movement
in, 46-48; ~mportan~e in war,
.n""
~ov
LABOUR PARTY,
tude of ~Q
anti-Japanese atti-
165
~:nll r.'h;n~
"'-T'
'2"-
..
...
,.,R
...."'. .J.'
Nagoya, 248
Nakamura, Lieut., 273
Nankin Government, 65, 1I3
Nathan, Mr., 70
--
....
IJ.r: t:!IJ.n
I.
....
'
""
. _, .. '"
...-,
. '
!:S.........
.I.cLUU, ....'
11....
I4~7 .s,
r:.
.:7'
",ni-1_ T<:ln",n_
ese. 6.;:
oJ
-.r:
.....
.......;;}! ......'"
T .1n"C7n ~-
I"t' ..
.- nn
of
".4'
--
..
-4, .....
0,
~YJ.J..,
",of
;:ZV, ::J':I
'f~,
J.,:).5
Michelet, 48
Militarism, Japanese, 92, 93
Mongolia, Govt. recognized by Russia, 52; otherwise mentioned, ~6
.I."~
"~A
- . '"
..
...........
_.
Ti'\C!'
.,,'"
Iln1'... h
of
.~.
....- ,
;"
TO'"
-~
..
.-.
oJ
+;'hl~
, (l.UU ......_<:I.1Jo.:,
':I. '
ol."IQ,V
..
....
Obsswsr, 53
ogasawara
-rs., 277
- ~- .- _", -v
lViI., .49
Osaka M ainichi, 42
Ottawa Conference, British Empire
Economic Block, 270; otherwise
mentioned '72
et seq.
ac c
,
troubles at the next, 104, 105
Pacific Is., Japan's mandate in,
nO-1I2
Page, r.
er, 1I
Palestine, 140
Peace, the way to, 275
Peace Conference, 9, 0, 277
Persia, loss of Britis prestige in,
48, 52; oilfields in, 225; England
and Russian interests in, 235
Pescadores, 213, 277
Philippine Is., 36, 43, 1I6, 277
Port Arthu.r, 34, 276
Protection replacing Free Trade, 48
RAILWAYS, South Manchurian, competition with,
7;
e gMukden, seizure of by Japan, 67
Red Sea, 216, 249
V It
Mr.
Nicholas
on
Singapore base, 167; otherwise
mentioned, 103
Roosevelt, President, non-intern
Statesman, 229
Steed, Mr. Wickham, 43
Stimson, Mr., on Manchukuo, ,56.
Japan, 67
Submarine, tonnage allotted at
London Conference, 138; bases.
Suez Canal, importance of to
England, 140; blocking of by
Japan, 214, ~I7, 220; details of,
"
- -
Treaties,
Anglo-Japanese, history of! 26
et seq.; first, rati1icatio~
INDEX
See America
UNITED STATES.
0"' ",....
222
TT"t
ment,'<denunciation of, 72 et
seq.; effect on Japan, 75;
effect on British Colonies.
~2 ; OtI!-erwlse mennonec, 01
J.Vuou, .l.?4. .L V'::I.
Miscellaneous, Jap. violation
~l r; . . .
, -,
'r.'
..
."..
.......
~.
....
rr
T"iPze Alliance.
Treitsche, 95
Trotsky, 141
Tsmg-Tao, 38
_ riots, 45
.,.,..,
35,38, 39
discussed, 27 6
'-' J.~
War plans, British, 205 et seq.;
Japanese, 213 ct seq.
Waslungton Conterence, 23, 42
,-
C&
scq.,
T rv...~
.....
T~~
T",(;
naval
Shanghai
Yangtze Valley, 66
Yellow Sea, 26
.....
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