Logical Samba 'Avec' Translations: Abstract
Logical Samba 'Avec' Translations: Abstract
Logical Samba 'Avec' Translations: Abstract
I. M. R. Pinheiro (Note 1)
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is providing a joyful logical account on the technicalities of
the translation work. We mix some superficial understanding of the Chinese language
with a deep understanding of the technical translation work (involving both Portugues
e and English languages) to support the applications of Logic to Language, that is: we
defend Semiotic studies by means of a new association, yet not tried. As a plus, we als
o make use of our previous work, on the `Sorites’ problem, to identify similarities bet
ween the `Sorites’ problem and issues related to the technique of translation, that is: w
e provide an alternative way, for linguistic experts, to understand the `Sorites’ proble
Keywords:
Pinheiro 1
1. Introduction
s;
After this introduction, we then try to apply those concepts to the theory (logic) which
We here copy our introduction to the problem as stated in (PINHEIRO, M.R. (2006)).
The name `Sorites' derives from the Greek word soros (meaning `heap'), and originall
No.
No...You must admit the presence of a heap sooner or later, so where do you draw th
e line?'
[HYDE, D. (1997)]
Pinheiro 2
The Sorites paradox is generally taken to mean all problems which are variations of th
e above `heap problem’. The `heap problem’ starts with a clear heap of sand and one t
akes one grain of sand at a time until there are no grains left. The problem is telling w
here one stops having a heap. The heart of the problem is determining where the line
(if there is any), which separates `heaps’ from `non-heaps’, is located. The puzzle has
been astonishing people for centuries because it is evident that there must be a line bet
ween `heaps’ and `non-heaps’: one has, at the beginning of the puzzle, a clear heap, a
nd, at the end, a clear non-heap. Admitting that there is no line to be drawn, that thing
s `are’ and `are not’, at the same time, as Paraconsistency wants to defend, would mea
n stating that it is the case that either what you see at the beginning is not what you se
e, once you clearly see a `heap’, or what you see at the end is not what you see, once i
be the case that there is a moment when the `heap’ stops being `a heap’. We must reas
sure the reader as to the view we hold: the Sorites was born in a classical logic contex
t, and, in it, it should be solved, even because what intrigues people is its similarity to
So far, we only repeated the words written in [PINHEIRO, M.R. (2006)], but we now
ask the reader to concentrate on these lines: `Admitting that there is no line to be draw
n; that things “are” and “are not”, at the same time, as Paraconsistency wants to defen
d, would mean stating that it is the case that either what you see, at the beginning, is n
ot what you see, once you clearly see “a heap”; or what you see, at the end, is not wha
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oblem
An easy way to create a Sorites is finding out the `right amount’ to be added to some s
pecificity of the attribute of the first element of the sequence (for instance: `brightnes
s’, in the case of colors) as well as the `right attribute’, which may actually be chosen
from several options (any color, any vaguely defined quality, etc.). But we also need t
o present the Sorites in a particular way, so that people are lead to believe that there is
no way to tell where the line is. This way of presenting things is as the increasing set
goes, precisely, that is, if one changes the set ordering, placing, for instance, the final
element from the class beside the first one, there is the danger that one identifies at lea
st one sharp cut-off in the sequence immediately, and the problem loses its value. Ther
b) The right amount (increment) to be added to each attribute, of each element, of the
sequence;
d) A clear opposition between the first and the last elements (say element a1 and
element aN), with the number of elements (n) allowed to be infinity (elements
of the sequence) regarding the attribute (either the attribute may be given to th
Pinheiro 4
We have decided to cut and paste (with very minor editing modifications) the explanat
`The term ``fuzzy logic" emerged in the development of the theory of fuzzy sets by ``
old people in X). Now if X is a set of propositions then its elements may be assigned t
heir degree of truth, which may be “absolutely true”, “absolutely false” or some inter
mediate truth degree: a proposition may be truer than another proposition. This is obvi
ous in the case of vague (imprecise) propositions like ``this person is old" (beautiful, r
ich, etc.). In the analogy to various definitions of operations on fuzzy sets (intersectio
n, union, complement...), one may ask how propositions can be combined by connecti
ves (conjunction, disjunction, negation…), and if the truth degree of a composed prop
osition is determined by the truth degrees of its components, i.e., if the connectives ha
ve their corresponding truth functions (like truth tables of classical logic). Saying `yes'
(which is the mainstream of fuzzy logic), one accepts the truth-functional approach; th
is makes fuzzy logic to something distinctly different from probability theory since th
zzy logic in the broad sense (older, better known, heavily applied but not asking deep
logical questions) serves mainly as apparatus for fuzzy control, analysis of vagueness
in natural language, and several other application domains (it is one of the techniques
eness (vagueness), which give quick, simple and sufficiently good solutions)".
Another exert from the same source (ANDERSON ET AL. (1996)), same article, is:
Pinheiro 5
`Fuzzy logic, in the narrow sense, is symbolic logic with a comparative notion of truth
developed fully in the spirit of classical logic (syntax, semantics, axiomatization, trut
Fuzzy logic is a relatively young discipline, serving as a foundation for Fuzzy logic in
the broad sense, as well as subject of independent logical interest, since it turns out th
at strictly logical investigation of this kind of logical calculi can go very far'.
This definition looks very good, as introduction, and explains quite a lot about the logi
In the Sorites paradox, Fuzzy logic got translated into assigning random truth degrees
contained in the real interval [0,1], so that each step in the soritical sequence is further
or closer to the truth, depending on what degree the antecedent of each inferential step
acquired by this random assignment. With the progressive, and gradual, acquisition of
non-veracity by the antecedent, one finally gets a false implication, so that the last ste
searchers in Logic, and such a point is very clearly made by Hyde in, for instance, [H
nvert real values contained in [0,1] into either 0 or 1, that is, it changes `close to huma
n representation’(once we believe to have proved that human normal – not ill – repres
entation goes far beyond) into machine representation. Problem is that it is easy to pro
ve that such is never possible entirely (otherwise Turing contest would have made it
Pinheiro 6
The paraconsistent logical system is that which differs from the others for one specific
reason: it allows contradictions to not bring the law of explosion in an implication, tha
t is, uttering `p' and `not-p', at the same time, does not make the whole set of possible
is [TANAKA, K. (2003)].
belong to the beings, that is, to be ONTOLOGICAL, whilst `Da Costa’ defends it to n
As the most recent application of Paraconsistency (July, 2000), in the conference held
in Brazil, SP, with participation of both `Priest’ and `Da Costa’, someone has presente
ng information from the environment, when it had not been programmed for such, wo
uld still perform an action, that is, would still be able to act/move.
We here wish to explore this aspect of Paraconsistency: the ability of allowing decisio
ns when facing extremely conflicting information. The matter, however, is just allure
ment to explain how the technical process of translating takes place. Paraconsistency i
tive of the point of `Tanaka’ in the mentioned References Section, there is another mis
conception contained in `Priest's’ and other co-thinkers' works: when they claim the p
oint is about Logic and logical systems, we claim that the point is about whether incon
sistencies are really found in the World, or it is just our Parallax mistake, that is, the m
istake of not mentioning all the conditions involved in our observation, which makes
nsistencies, they simply `are'. What there is is an obvious difficulty with expressing th
ings to people via words, or any other means, which may be able to convey what we,
ourselves, are not able to think of, in precise terms. If our own judgment is a failure, i
n the sense that it usually does not involve, or mention, for instance, in the example `T
anaka’ mentions about `Priest’, about the moving objects and the law itself, the `refere
ntial'; how can our language ever express our thoughts with the precision that just was
As simple as the wind blows, there is obvious misconception, not in the Brazilian sch
ool, highly founded in scientific studies and `precisification' of definitions (for instanc
e, in Brazil, it is not accepted that a Mathematics lecturer ever thinks of brackets as irr
elevant, whilst in Australia it is OK: knowledge acquired via direct observation of syst
ems), but in the Australian `school'. School, here, replaces `Education' and `Philosoph
y' of a Country/people of that Country. In terms of that, what would make it better wo
n, for the Brazilian score, is the statistics on how many papers are published, in scienti
fic and relevant journals, produced by Brazilian specialists in both Mathematics and L
inguistics. We hold a belief that the Brazilian score is higher than the Australian score,
what makes it more believable that the Brazilian School of thought holds a far higher
chance of being better founded. Apart from that, we must also consider how holistic th
han the Australian approach, Brazilian courses encompassing at least four majors, and
Brazilian students are `obliged' to learn at least two other languages, different from th
eir native language, whilst studying at high school level, what, per se, means more Wo
rld communication/understanding/knowledge.
Therefore, considering the way Brazilians are raised, as well as their schools, and thei
Pinheiro 8
r scientific production, we tend to think that, for probability reasons, they would be th
For obvious simple logical reasons, the Parallax mistake is there to tell us that Paraco
nsistency cannot be ontological, given its easily defeatable argumentation, such as the
Just for the sake of illustration, in 2006, year of this article, `Da Costa' accumulated 1
35 research articles published in scientific journals, along with several other interests
such as successful supervision of PhD students [DA COSTA, N. (2006)]. `Dr. Priest’,
at the same year, with a much more reduced scope of work, accumulated 114 [PRIES
T, G. (2006)]. The difference, in the figure of the papers, might not be that relevant, b
ut it is still greater to the Brazilian top theorist in the subject. Also, if put together with
n more in favor of the Brazilian theorist, what confirms our written argumentation on
y.
This is one more argumentative line (technical), to the side of our previous assertions,
about someone who knows nothing about Logic, but wants to `bet their assets' on one
Well, all of this must have to do with translation, at some stage. Let's see...
nique of Translation
r language, for a couple of words in a origin-language, one may think that certain lexi
con word `may be' and `may not be' what is there, stated in the dictionary. However, f
Pinheiro 9
act is that the words are always referring to something very precise in the head of thos
s. Basically, if we ever had instruments which were as accurate as the mind of the spe
aker/writer/etc, we could tell precisely the image they see (or reference) whilst speaki
n each translated text (of any nature, even technical). That does not mean `it is a transl
ation' and `it is not'. It is, obviously, a translation. How perfect that translation is, is an
other matter. The ontology of the word, however, is precise, in both languages, when t
he user of those words is considered (mental images). Easy to see how Logic could ne
ver apply to words of language in general, as non-classicists would like them to. Pure
Language is where logic systems cannot really go, just like God. God can only be acc
/realm of spiritual gifts: The same way goes language. Language is created by all of u
s, all the time; it is something `renewable', `dynamic'. However, the own lexicon is al
ways stuck in time, always behind, given that, when the words are there included, the
y have been in common use for long. Once the lexicon is the only accessible scientific
part of language, and even being so, still differs depending on who writes them, Logic
cannot, ever, deal with language. Basically, apart from everything which may be done
with language, people can still employ words vaguely (in new contexts), and are usual
ly understood, to make things worse. With a huge push, non-classicists (and Paraconsi
stency, as well as Fuzzy logic are non-classical logic systems) could think of employi
e, given legal words and scientific words are usually contained in glossaries used all o
ver the World, always referring to the same universal mental picture. Therefore, if Par
duced technical part of Language which is already unique, and taken as standard, all o
Translators and theorists in the subject must know, however, that several non-classicis
ts have been creating systems for their own entertainment, with absolutely no practica
l use.
With this, those willing to pursue applications in Language, of such systems, are goin
Logical systems are about reasoning and inferences, that is, what may be deduced fro
With this, new computer programs for translators may be built based on the applicatio
In general, in the case of Paraconsistency, giving up, hopefully with generalized agree
ment, on the ontological possibility, a loose translated word `may', and `may not', corr
espond to the original, in the original language, in terms of mental images, for instanc
e. Perhaps, however, two words together are definitely going to correspond, given it is
technical lingo. With paraconsistent systems, we are then allowed to make provisions
for such reasoning, and, mixing more than one logical system, we finally reach the top
On the other hand, there might be a degree of closeness to the mental picture which m
ay be found by the time the translation is being made. If that degree is entered by the t
ranslator in the computer system (reliability he/she gives to their work), there might b
e more accuracy, which may even be mathematically measured, in the final document,
b) Section 3: Sorites and Chinese language with Fuzzy logic and Paraconsistency;
c) Section 4: Conclusion;
d) Section 5: References.
The translation works, in general, are split into technical and non-technical works, des
pite of what `Wikipedia' states in [Wikipedia authors (2006)]. Inside of the non-techni
cal works, there are the literary translations and flicks, for instance. Interpretation, that
is, that sort of translation involving only verbal work, is considered something apart: a
nother area. These classifications are easily found in any major association of professi
onals in these fields (see for instance `Sintra' in [Sintra website authors (2006)]).
Technical translations are those which usually bring fewer options to the pair (source;
target), of language words. The source-language is that from which one wishes to tran
slate texts/words, and the target-language is that into which one wishes to translate tex
ts/words.
Every computer program, which makes translations in place of human beings, must m
ake use of a `translation function' which chooses `a best match', for a certain word, in
One can easily see how Fuzzy logic adapts well here, in terms of performing the matc
hes .
It is obviously the case that the mental picture, seen by the speaker of some language,
may only be translated into the same picture into another language by a top profession
al, if all the following things take place, at the same time:
Pinheiro 12
l) The audience, as well as the professional of either translation or interpretation,
does not hold any traumas associated to the mention of the words or context, o
r even possible memories which may create interference (noise zero from envi
ronment, as we could put it) – notice here that even if we take the professional
of display used, there is still a problem with the reception by the audience of w
hatever the professional is stating: notice well the full human complexity invol
ved, and, so far, we are still disregarding factors such as attention, care, conce
ntration, etc.;
c.;
n) The cultural understanding of the professional is broad (both sides, both cultur
es: audience - each member of the audience must be taken care of, as well as s
peaker/writer).;
o) The audience is interested not only in the speaker/writer as a holistic being (ne
p) The vehicle of delivery of the translated message is 100% well in health (migh
All that stated, one can see that if the same picture is ever grasped by the majority of t
Paraconsistency
We consider the amateur knowledge of ours, acquired from true Chinese people, and s
omeone else's research [XIAOQING, Z.K. (1995)], plus the Chinese dictionary [MA
NSEI, MARTIN H. (2003)], as a basis for our writings. Apparently, each word in Chi
nese (Mandarin, the main stream of Chinese) allows people to use it in at least 4 differ
ent ways via intonation (that is, the spelling goes the same way, but there is a different
intonation, or oral accent, given to the word, by the time someone utters it, which may
change its meaning completely). Going straight into the Chinese dictionary, one under
stands that the meaning is known via recursion to the next word from the text/speech.
However, the word with same spelling, and different meanings, is still there: interestin
g enough. With that as basis, we notice some differ in the sound because there is a pho
netic alphabet that comes with it, or different drawings in the same sort of symbology
(they also hold different written alphabets apparently [MD. MARUF HASAN AND Y
UJI MATSUMOTO (2000)]). Once our knowledge is superficial, and there is not muc
h romanized about the Chinese language, we try to use this piece of knowledge, along
There is apparently a confusion, once the Chinese (Mandarin) alphabet allows more s
ounds (phonetically richer) than the roman characters, when going from Chinese to an
occidental language, or vice-versa. It is easy to see how the same romanized word wo
uld be corresponding to a few variations in the Mandarin dialect by the `forceful matc
h' process, that is: in not existing enough sound expressions in our alphabet, they use t
Pinheiro 14
he closest sound, what leads to a single word in the occidental language encompassing
more than one meaning (same referent in the occidental language, meaning a range of
references, in Chinese, rather than one word, as many theorists of language would put
it). Thus, it is true that just via very brief research into the Chinese written words, we f
ind easily some words with up to 3 different meanings for the same drawing/romanize
d particle/word.
We then joyfully play with that little finding and the Sorites paradox, along with its fu
From [XIAOQING, Z.K. (1995)], we get the romanized Chinese word `jiao', for insta
nce. In the source, it is mentioned that there are four different sounds for it, the sounds
It is not very easy to imagine a set S, for the scope of sound variations, the same way
However, suppose:
for instance, as our sound variation, where x would mean `short sound', which, multip
lied by a special real number n, would give us a long one, and α would mean `falling
pitch', which may be made `rising' if multiplied by another special real number m, pas
sing by `constant’, on the way, the same way that, in the other case, it may pass via se
veral intermediaries (what would be expected, given occidental people would probabl
y hold more variations in sound emissions than the oriental people, used to their own s
Pinheiro 15
ounds, who gave origin to their systems). We all know that alphabets were designed af
ter the sounds, what means that each culture has created them based on their own abili
The beautiful thing, with this comparison, is that we know the division exists, but it is
completely `blurred', so that it falls perfectly well into the objections to the fuzzy acco
unt on the `Sorites’ paradox, until someone is obviously able to `precisify' that, if poss
ible at all (different people might emit similar sounds and still be understood as saying
On the other hand, `jiao' is told to have 3 different intonations, in the mentioned resear
ch work (dictionary), and they would be those listed as first, third, or fourth place, abo
ve, disclosing three different English meanings: `to teach’, `0.1 yuan’, and `to shout’.
One can easily ask then: when does `to teach' stop and `0.1 yuan' starts (by considerin
g all intermediary sounds not yet mentioned from our sound set)?
It is beautiful to see, once more, how the `Sorites' is definitely as good as Gödel’s the
orem, or as the Turing machine contests, in the sense of perceiving how meaningful to
our understanding of the World, and things which belong to it, the problem is. It is bas
ically a statement, per se, that whatever is a human expression cannot, ever, be fully tr
anslated into machine lingo, unless the human into consideration had been, by means
Once more, we understand that communication, and expression, are definitely not, an
d will never be, fully programmable, unless we do something criminal to destroy the
Notice the striking difference between the first intonation, in terms of meaning (`to tea
ch'), and the last one (`to shout'). It is not the same as `heap' and `non-heap', straight a
way, but, by means of an equivalence function between objects and human actions, it
ends up being the same, once `to teach' naturally conflicts with `to shout', in every pos
Pinheiro 16
sible pedagogical theory (once more, notice how broad the choice of contexts become
when we depart from what was already proven, by us, to lie far beyond Mathematics,
or Logic, but still supposed to be of concrete nature, to get to everything which is poss
ible in language).
The same may be said to occur in Portuguese, a very `musical' language, as most of th
e Latin languages are. If any expression is picked, at random, say: `bonito, hein?', it m
ay hold several different meanings. The just mentioned expression bears at least 3 diff
erent intonations of speech: interrogation (?), exclamation (!), assertion (.). How to tel
l one from another could easily be expressed the same way we did before with the Chi
nese word. However, If we start with full stop, the meaning is basically that somethin
g was really good, and, if we end with the question mark, there is a conflicting meanin
To make it all worse, however, a person may use an intonation but mean precisely the
opposite. Suffices changing what comes before and after, and it all becomes the oppos
ite. Language truly encompasses several things, still less complex than the ontology of
One may easily see how translating these words and expressions, in the so called liter
nd, of course, not less importantly, Arts: Bad enough for the readers of translations, an
d pleasant enough for translators (to be really entertained with their professions).
Basically, that may also happen with different cultures and same language: For instanc
e, Australian English and British English, with a Brazilian cultural understanding (bas
ed on American culture).
parently' very simple example: university courses, from Brazil, being translated into E
nglish. For a native from Australia, or Brazil, who is not ever worried about this sort o
Pinheiro 17
f issue: big deal, a course and its name is just `a course and its name'. But for those wh
o study the extenuating techniques of translation, and have been working with that am
azing set of tasks, it might be a real puzzle, where they may make use of their intuitio
n, better than anything else, and actually bring lifetime damage to a client, without ev
We pick, for instance, an example from our own experience. Once it is part of the etho
s of translation, we will never mention names. However, we know a person who had a
matics, and four majors in a course in Brazil. Following the tradition of technical wor
k, where amateurs reach the top cruelty of using computer programs, the words `Licen
ciatura em Matemática' got literally translated into `Teaching Certificate'. Once the do
cument was going to be used in Australia (and context is obviously part of this Art), a
Bachelor of Science, with a Pg Dip in Ed., plus Honors in Math, and four majors, bec
a single year.
Basically, the professional (client of the translator) was relying on that translated versi
on of their document, and was then, therefore, severely diminished in their qualificati
ons, what, more than obviously, produces a devaluation in their market-value, somethi
Suppose we now create a set of all the possible market-values involving a person who
holds a Bachelor of Science, with Honors in Math, and a person who does not hold th
em. We now have a `Sorites', in terms of translation, because Brazil simply never calle
d its courses `Honors', which would basically mean someone was `invited' to do resea
rch works. In Brazil, up to now, everybody in the course must do the same, and resear
ch is just one subject, or several, amongst others. Not only that, but the so-called thesi
s, of a Honors course in Australia, is made by Brazilians since High School (not origin
Pinheiro 18
al works, however, at high-school level, most of the time).
It is very easy to see that, if there is cultural understanding missing, that is, if a superfi
cial learner of the `Art of Translation' (let's say someone who did not graduate in Engl
ish, is of native Portuguese background, and just sat for `Naati' tests, or even a very qu
alified Brazilian translator, who knows nothing about Australian culture) is given the a
Interesting enough, we could have a `Sorites' sequence even about how good a transla
tor is, in those regards: we would start with `no understanding of cultural issues at all'
and finish with `understands all about both cultures' (clearly conflicting), once more i
We believe one may easily see how we could write forever on the special application
4. Conclusion
In this article, we have provided further tools, as well as insights, on how to deal with
the technique of translations and how `mechanizable' human productions might be. W
e believe to have added an association between translation techniques and the Sorites
paradox, as well as translation techniques and Fuzzy logic, which was never made bef
ore, to the scope of knowledge of readers from Language, Logic, and Computer Scien
ce. We have also worked towards settling the matter: `human language will never be f
ully computable'. Along with this, we try to contribute for the Art of evaluation of tran
slation professionals, and that of career design, with a few explicit insights based on a
Pinheiro 19
5. References
ANDERSON, C.A.; TERENCE, B.; TAMAR, G.; others (Note 3) (1996). Standford
ISSN 10955054.
CASTI, JOHN (1999). Cinco Regras de Ouro. Editora Gradiva. ISBN 9726626919.
Http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.jsp?id=K4787165A0.
10955054.
Linguistics and Chinese Language Processing Vol. 5, No. 2, August 2000, pp. 59-86.
www.geocities.com/mrpprofessional.
Http:www.standrews.ac.uk/academic/philosophy/gp-papers.html.
ZADEH, LOFTI (1994). Preface in R.J. Marks II (ed.). Fuzzy logic technology and
Pinheiro 22
Notes:
E-mail: mrpprofessional@yahoo.com
Note 2: We regard the opposite direction, in which the Sorites could go, as being logi
cally redundant.
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