Digest
Digest
Digest
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
NAPOCOR vs. Hon. Ramon Codilla, Jr., Bangpai Shipping Company and Wallem Shipping
Incorporated
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Spouses Manuel and Victor Salimbangon v. Sps. Santos and Erlinda Tan
GR. No. 185240, January 21, 2010
Justice Melo
DOCTRINE:
The parol evidence rule precluded the parties from introducing testimony that tended to alter or
modify what the parties had agreed on above. But the exclusionary provision of the parol
evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
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Facts:
1. Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion,
Mandaue City. Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr.,
Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition,
adjudicating and dividing the land among themselves as follows:
a. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of
way 1.50 m. wide along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;
b.. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way
1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
c. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
d. . To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of
way 1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and
e. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50
m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision.1
2. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior
lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial
partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E
that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this
easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
3. Roughly, the lots including the easement of right of way would take the following
configurations,2 not drawn here to accurate size and proportion but illustrative of their relative
locations:
4. But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs
modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E,
and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively
along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.
4. Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the
result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street.
Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and
built two garages on it.
5. One garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley
or easement of right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this alley
cemented and gated.
6. Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots
B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the
easement area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built.
7. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with the City
Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue against the Salimbangons in Civil Case MAN-3223 for the
extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary
injunction.4 The Salimbangons filed their answer with counterclaims.
8. After hearing or on February 9, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, upholding the
Salimbangons easement of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the
Tans. The court pointed out that the easement in this case was established by agreement of the
parties for the benefit of Lots A, D, and E. Consequently, only by mutual agreement of the
parties could such easement be extinguished. The RTC declined, however, to award damages
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to the Salimbangons.
9. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 73468. On July 27, 2007
the CA5 reversed the RTC decision, extinguished the easement of right of way established on
the alley in Lot B of the Tans, and denied the Salimbangons claim for damages. The court ruled
that based on the testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of
the parties was to establish that easement of right of way for the benefit of the interior lots,
namely, Lots D and E.
10. Consequently, when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the
easement ceased to have any purpose and became extinct. The Salimbangons filed a motion
for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its resolution of October 14, 2008. This
prompted them to file the present petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule
Eduardo Cenizas testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in establishing the easement
of right of way as against what they stated in their written agreement; and
Held:
The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected Eduardo Cenizas testimony that
the heirs had intended to establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the
interior Lots D and E which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made
Lot A, now owned by the Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that easement. Thus:
2. To Eduardo Ceniza [now the Tans], Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of
way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
(Underscoring supplied)
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing
testimony that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above. But the
exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto; XXX XXX XXX.
Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when
they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply,
the easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. The complaint thus said:
Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were entitled to introduce evidence to
establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the
partition agreement literally provided. At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not
object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo Cenizas testimony even when this seemed at
variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition agreement among the heirs.
Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their right to now
question such testimony on appeal.
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PAROLE EVIDENCE
Facts:
1. Lot No. 9 is a 1,007 square meter parcel of land located at Kinasang-an, Pardo, Cebu
City. The lot originally belonged to Pastor Pacres (Pastor) who left it intestate to his heirs
Margarita, Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco, Mario (petitioners predecessor-in-interest) and
Vearanda (herein petitioner).
2. Petitioners admitted that at the time of Pastors death in 1962, his heirs were already
occupying definite portions of Lot No. 9. The front portion along the provincial highway
was occupied by the co-owned Pacres ancestral home, and beside it stood Rodrigos
hut (also fronting the provincial highway). Marios house stood at the back of the
ancestral house.
3. This is how the property stood in 1968, as confirmed by petitioner Valentinas testimony.
4. On the same year, the heirs leased the ground floor of the [ancestral home] together with
a lot area of 300 square meters including the area occupied by the house to respondent
Hilario Ramirez (Ramirez), who immediately took possession thereof.
5. Subsequently in 1974, four of the Pacres siblings (namely, Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia
and Margarita) sold their shares in the ancestral home and the lot on which it stood to
Ramirez. The deeds of sale described the subjects thereof as part and portion of the
300 square meters actually in possession and enjoyment by vendee and her spouse,
Hilario Ramirez, by virtue of a contract of lease in their favor
6. With the sale, respondent Ramirezs possession as lessee turned into a co-ownership
with petitioners Mario and Vearanda, who did not sell their shares in the house and lot.
7. On various dates in 1971, Rodrigo,[14] Francisco, and Simplicia sold their remaining
shares in Lot No. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygoa (Ygoa). In 1983, Margarita also sold
her share to Ygoa. The total area sold to Ygoa was 493 square meters.
8. In 1984, Ygoa filed a petition to survey and segregate[18] the portions she bought from
Lot No. 9. Mario objected on the ground that he wanted to exercise his right as co-owner
to redeem his siblings shares. Vendee Rodrigo also opposed on the ground that he
wanted to annul the sale for failure of consideration.
9. On the other hand, Margarita and the widow of Francisco both manifested their assent to
Ygoas petition. By virtue of such manifestation, the court issued a writ of possession
respecting Margaritas and Franciscos shares in favor of Ygoa. It is by authority of this
writ that Ygoa built her house on a portion of Lot No. 9.
10. Considering, however, the objections of the two other Pacres siblings, the trial court
subsequently dismissed the petition so that the two issues could be threshed out in the
proper proceeding. Mario filed the intended action while Rodrigo no longer pursued his
objection.
11. The complaint for legal redemption, filed by Mario and Vearanda, was dismissed on the
ground of improper exercise of the right. The decision was affirmed by the appellate
court and attained finality in the Supreme Court on December 28, 1992.
12. The CA held that the complaint was filed beyond the 30-day period provided in Article
1623 of the New Civil Code and failed to comply with the requirement of consignation. It
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was further held that Ygoa built her house on Lot No. 9 in good faith and it would be
unjust to require her to remove her house thereon.
13. On June 18, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), expropriated the front portion of Lot No. 9 for the
expansion of the Cebu south road. The petition for expropriation was filed in Branch 9 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City and docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-14150. As
occupant of the expropriated portion, Ygoa moved to withdraw her corresponding share
in the expropriation payment.
14. Petitioners opposed the said motion. The parties did not supply the Court with the
pleadings in the expropriation case; hence, we are unaware of the parties involved and
the issues presented therein. However, from all indications, the said motion of Ygoa
remains unresolved.
15. On July 20, 1993, the Pacres siblings (Margarita and Francisco were already deceased
at that time and were only represented by their heirs) executed a Confirmation of Oral
Partition/Settlement of Estate of Pastor Pacres.
16. On September 30, 1994, Mario, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, filed an ejectment
suit against Ramirez successor-in-interest Vicentuan. Mario claimed sole ownership of
the lot occupied by Ramirez/Vicentuan by virtue of the oral partition. He argued that
Ramirez/Vicentuan should pay rentals to him for occupying the front lot and should
transfer to the rear of Lot No. 9 where the lots of Ramirezs vendors are located.
17. The court dismissed Marios assertion that his siblings sold the rear lots to Ramirez. It
held that the deeds of sale in favor of Ramirez clearly described the object of the sale as
the ancestral house and lot.
18. Thus, Ramirez has a right to continue occupying the property he bought. The court
further held that since Mario did not sell his pro-indiviso shares in the house and lot, at
the very least, the parties are co-owners thereof. Co-owners are entitled to occupy the
co-owned property.
19. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. It held that petitioners failed to prove
partition of the lot in accordance with petitioners version. Instead, the trial court held that
the parties actual occupation of their portions in Lot No. 9, as evidenced by petitioner
Valentinas sketch, is the real agreement to which the parties are bound. Apparently
unsatisfied with the parties state of affairs, the trial court further ordered that a survey of
the lot according to the parties actual occupation thereof be conducted.
20. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Unsatisfied with the adverse
decision, petitioners appealed to the CA questioning the factual findings of the trial court
and its reliance on Exhibit 1. They maintained that Valentina was incompetent and barely
literate; hence, her sketch should not be given weight.
21. The appellate court sustained the ruling of the trial court insofar as it dismissed
petitioners complaint for lack of evidence. It held that the oral partition was not valid
because the heirs did not ratify it by taking possession of their shares in accordance with
their oral agreement.
22. Moreover, the CA ruled that Ygoas sole undertaking under the deeds of sale was the
payment of the purchase price. Since petitioners did not question the validity of the
deeds and did not assail its terms as failing to express the true intent of the parties, the
written document stands superior over the allegations of an oral agreement.
23. It, however, reversed the trial court on the latters order to survey the lot in accordance
with Valentinas sketch. The appellate court explained that while it was conclusive that
Ygoa and Ramirez bought portions of the property from some of the Pacres siblings,
the issue of the actual area and location of the portions sold to them remains
unresolved.
Issue:
Whether petitioners were able to prove the existence of the alleged oral agreements such as
the partition and the additional obligations of surveying and titling
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Ratio: No. The petitioners were not able to prove the existence of the alleged oral
agreements
Held:
In the first place, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable here). Thus, only a
party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under said
contract. Consequently, petitioners, not being parties to the contracts of sale between Ygoa
and the petitioners siblings, cannot sue for the enforcement of the supposed obligations
arising from said contracts. It is true that third parties may seek enforcement of a contract
under the second paragraph of Article 1311, which provides that if a contract should contain
some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment. This refers to
stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for the benefit of third parties.
However, the written contracts of sale in this case contain no such stipulation in favor of the
petitioners. While petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation, it cannot be proven
under the Parol Evidence Rule. Under this Rule, [w]hen the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. While the Rule admits of exception, no
such exception was pleaded, much less proved, by petitioners.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to the parties and their successors in interest.
Conversely, it has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol
Evidence Rule, a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour
autrui in a contract (such as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has
been held that a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract
becomes a party to that contract. This is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary of a
stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation. Moreover, to preclude the application of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown
that at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. A beneficiary of a stipulation
pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a
stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed
stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners claim cannot prosper, because they are barred from
proving them by oral evidence.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Leighton Contractors Philippines, Inc., v. CNP industries, Inc.
GR. No. 160972 March 9, 2010
Justice Corona
DOCTRINE:
The parol evidence rule, embodied in Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court29 holds
that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
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It, however, admits of exceptions such as when the parties subsequently modify the
terms of their original agreement.
Facts:
1. In 1997, Hardie Jardin, Inc. (HJI) awarded the contract for site preparation, building
foundation and structural steel works of its fibre cement plant project in Barangay
Tatalon in San Isidro, Cabuyao, Laguna to petitioner Leighton Contractors Philippines,
Inc.
2. On July 5, 1997, respondent CNP Industries, Inc. submitted to petitioner a proposal to
undertake, as subcontractor, the construction of the structural steelworks of HJIs fibre
cement plant project.
3. On July 15, 1997, petitioner accepted respondents proposal specifying that the project
cost was for the fixed lump sum price of P44,223,909. Respondent agreed and petitioner
instructed it to commence work.
4. Meanwhile, petitioner revised the fabrication drawings of several of the structures
columns necessitating adjustments in the designs of roof ridge ventilation and crane
beams.
5. Petitioner communicated the said revisions to respondent. Respondent estimated that
the said revisions required an additional 8,132 kgs. of steel costing P13,442,882.
However, it did not re-negotiate the fixed lump-sum price with petitioner.
6. On July 28, 1997, petitioner and respondent signed a sub-contract providing:
(B) Subcontract works.
To carry out complete structural steelworks outlined in the Sub-contract Lump Sum Price [of
P44,223,909] in accordance with the Main Drawing and Technical Specifications and in
accordance with the Main Contract, all of which are available on Site.
(c) Special Conditions of the Sub-Contract.
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2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 11(4) of the General Conditions of the Sub-contract,
this Sub-contract is on a Fixed Lump Sum basis and is not subject to re-measurement. It is
the responsibility of [respondent] to derive his own quantities for the purpose of the Lump Sum
Sub-contract price. No additional payments will be made to [respondent] for any errors in
quantities that may be revealed during the Sub-contract period. (emphasis supplied)
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7. The contract required respondent to finish the project within 20 weeks from the time
petitioner was allowed access to the site on June 20, 1997,17 that is, on or before
November 6, 1997.
8. Respondent informed petitioner that, due to the revisions in the designs of the roof ridge
ventilation and crane beams, it incurred "additional costs" amounting to P13,442,882.
9. respondent was unable to meet the project schedule, petitioner took over the project on
April 27, 1998. At the time of the takeover, respondent had already accomplished 86% of
the project for which petitioner paid P42,008,343.69.
10. Thereafter, respondent again asked petitioner to settle the "outstanding balance" of
P12,364,993.94, asserting that the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were
excluded from the project cost. Petitioner refused to pay as the July 28, 1997
subcontract clearly stated that the sub-contract price was a fixed lump sum.
11. The parties submitted the matter to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) for arbitration.
12. Respondent argued that the proposal it submitted (accepted by petitioner on July 15,
1997) excluded the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams
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13. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that the subcontract explicitly included the
aforementioned works in the scope of work. Furthermore, it was not liable for the
"additional costs" incurred by respondent as the subcontract clearly provided that the
project was for the fixed lump-sum price of P44,223,909. It likewise denied approving
respondents additional cost estimates as Bennett signed the August 12, 1997 progress
report only to acknowledge its receipt.
14. CIAC ruled in favor of respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the cost of the additional steel used for the roof ridge ventilation and
crane beams was included in the fixed lump-sum price
Held:
2) No
Ratio:
6) The parol evidence rule, embodied in Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court29 holds
that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. It, however, admits of exceptions such as when the parties subsequently
modify the terms of their original agreement.
Respondent claims that the situation herein falls under said exception. Respondent
contends that when Bennett signed the August 12, 1997 progress report, petitioner
approved the additional cost estimates, in effect modifying the original agreement in the
subcontract.
In the case at bar, the court found that Bennett did not sign the subcontract for and in
behalf of respondent but only as a witness. Respondent was therefore aware of
Bennetts lack of authority.
Aside from respondents failure to present the documents required by Article 17241 of the
Civil Code, we find that the sub-contract was never modified. Petitioner therefore cannot
be liable for the additional costs incurred by respondent.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Estate of Margarita Cabancungan v. Marilou Laigo
GR. No. 175073 August 15, 2011
Justice Carpio
DOCTRINE:
Because an implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required
to be evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of
parole evidence to prove their existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish the
existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Facts:
1. Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered land in Paringao
and in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union.
1 (1) written authority from the developer or project owner ordering or allowing the written
changes in work and
(2) written agreement of parties with regard to the increase in price or cost due to the
change in work or design modification.
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2. Sometime in 1968, Margaritas son, Roberto Laigo, Jr. (Roberto), applied for a nonimmigrant visa to the United States, and to support his application, he allegedly asked
Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties in his name.
3. For said purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children, executed an Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property whereby the subject properties were transferred by donation to
Roberto.
4.
Not long after, Robertos visa was issued and he was able to travel to the U.S. as a
tourist and returned in due time. In 1979, he adopted respondents Pedro Laigo (Pedro)
and Marilou Laigo (Marilou), and then he married respondent Estella Balagot.
5. In July 1990, Roberto sold the 4,512 sq m property in Baccuit to the spouses Mario and
Julia Campos for P23,000.00.
6. Then in August 1992, he sold the 1,986 sq m and 3,454 sq m lots in Paringao,
respectively, to Marilou for P100,000.00 and to Pedro for P40,000.00.
7. Allegedly, these sales were not known to Margarita and her other children.
8. It was only in August 1995, at Robertos wake, that Margarita came to know of the sales
as told by Pedro himself.
9. In February 1996, Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted the instant
complaint for the annulment of said sales and for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject properties as well as for the cancellation of Ricardos tax
declarations.
10. Margarita admitted having accommodated Robertos request for the transfer of the
properties to his name, but pointed out that the arrangement was only for the specific
purpose of supporting his U.S. visa application. She emphasized that she never
intended to divest herself of ownership over the subject lands and, hence, Roberto had
no right to sell them to respondents and the Spouses Campos. She likewise alleged that
the sales, which were fictitious and simulated considering the gross inadequacy of the
stipulated price, were fraudulently entered into by Roberto. She imputed bad faith to
Pedro, Marilou and the Spouses Campos as buyers of the lots, as they supposedly knew
all along that Roberto was not the rightful owner of the properties.
11. The Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith, and had merely relied on Robertos representation that he had the right to sell
the property; and that, hence, they were not bound by whatever agreement entered by
Margarita with her son.
12. In much the same way, Marilou and Pedro, who likewise professed themselves to be
buyers in good faith and for value, believed that Margaritas cause of action had already
been barred by laches, and that even assuming the contrary, the cause of action was
nevertheless barred by prescription as the same had accrued way back in 1968 upon
the execution of the affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an implied trust had been
created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed only a period of ten (10)
years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to enforce an
implied trust thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.
Issue:
1. Whether or not that the complaint is barred by laches and prescription
2. Whether or not the rule on innocent purchaser for value applies in this case of sale of
unregistered land
3. Whether or not there is evidence to support the finding that there is an implied
trust created between Margarita and her son Roberto
Held:
1. No
2. No
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3. Yes
Ratio:
For issues 1 and 2 (case discusses at length the different types of trusts)
In the case at bar, lands involved are concededly unregistered lands; hence, there is
no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and
fraudulent sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by actual
notice from Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription
began to toll. The filing of the complaint in February 1996 is well within the
prescriptive period.
3. Intention although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of
the transaction or from the facts and circumstances accompanying the transaction,
particularly the source of the consideration is always an element of a resulting trust
and may be inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties rather than from direct
expression of conduct. Certainly, intent as an indispensable element, is a matter that
necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even circumstantial, of
statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes. Because an
implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be
evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of
parole evidence to prove their existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish
the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest
on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals finding that there was no evidence on record
showing that an implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto, we find
that petitioner before the trial court, had actually adduced evidence to prove the
intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only the legal title to the properties in
question, with attendant expectation that Roberto would return the same to her on
accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction was entered into.
The evidence of course is not documentary, but rather testimonial.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Allied Banking v. Cheng Yong
G.R. No. 151040 October 6, 2005
Justice Garcia
Doctrine:
Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are conclusive upon the parties
and evidence which shall vary a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document is inadmissible. Simply put, when the parties have reduced their agreement
into writing, they are deemed to have intended such written agreement to be the sole
repository and memorial of everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and
contemporaneous agreements are deemed to be merged in the written document so that,
as between them and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive
evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or
modify the same is not admissible.
Facts:
1. Philippine Pacific Fishing Company, Inc. (Philippine Pacific), through its then ViceChairman of the Board and concurrent President Marilyn Javier, obtained from Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), a packing credit accommodation amounting to One
Million Seven Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P1,752,000.00). To secure the
obligation, Marilyn Javier and the spouses Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw (spouses Cheng,
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HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Leodegario Bayani vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 154947, August 11, 2004
Justice Callejo, Sr.
DOCTRINE:
Under section 36 of Rule 130, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay
if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that
of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed
to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.
While Evangelistas statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily
follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. In this regard, it has been held that
although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse
partys counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value, unless the proponent can
show that the evidence falls within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule
In this case, Evangelistas testimony may be considered as an independently relevant
statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish
the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the
truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant.
Facts:
The petitioner-accused Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. It is alleged that the check subject of the case was payable to Cash in the
amount of P10,000.00; and that said check was made to apply to the account of the accused,
Leodegario Bayani whose name appears therein in bold print at the upper portion of the check.
The check was presented to complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, for encashment by
Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the check was deposited with the bank, it was
returned to Evangelista for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, she sought payment of the value of
the check. On the part of the accused, he flatly denied having talked with or otherwise met
Evangelista regarding the latter's claim of payment of the value of the check.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, sentencing him to suffer one
(1) year imprisonment and a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and ordering him to pay the complainant damages and
other costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the trial courts decision; hence the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in refusing to acquit the petitioner-accused on the ground that the trial
court's finding of conviction is based on hearsay evidence.
Held:
No, the Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioners conviction by the RTC.
Ratio:
Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the
evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay.
The Court held that section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on
hearsay evidence, to wit:
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Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some
other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by
the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.
In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was approached by Alicia
Rubia who told her that she was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for cash,
as he needed money badly. Obviously, Evangelistas testimony is hearsay since she had no
personal knowledge of the fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check
exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when petitioner supposedly made this
request. What she testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own
perception but from Rubias.
However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Evangelistas testimony
even if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial
court shall not consider any evidence which has not been finally offered. Section 35 of the same
Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
Thus, it has been held that in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted. Since no objection to the admissibility of
Evangelistas testimony was timely made from the time her testimony was offered and up to
the time her direct examination was conducted then petitioner has effectively waived any
objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her testimony excluded
for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
While Evangelistas statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow
that the same should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. In this regard, it has been held that although hearsay evidence
may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse partys counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value, unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exception to the hearsay evidence rule.
In this case, Evangelistas testimony may be considered as an independently relevant
statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact
that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or the
falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant. When Evangelista said that
Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash,
Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the truth
or veracity of Rubias statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court
to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such independently
relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute
a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. Indeed,
independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelistas statement is relevant to the issues of
petitioners falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and consequently, his culpability
of the offense charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
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Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under
oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of
the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference,
and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness
stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the
truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not
apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule
applies.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to crossexamine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is
not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
Facts:
The petitioner-accused Patula was charged with estafa in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Dumaguete City. It is alleged that the accused was a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of
Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City; that she collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from
several customers of the company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of
the sales and deliver the collection to the company; that she failed to deliver the said collection
to the said company but instead willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said company in the amount of P131,286.97.
The RTC rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion.
Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge
against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence
presented against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense
not alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty, and that said judgment likewise blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules
on admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all
private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, petitioner has directly appealed to
the Court via petition for review on certiorari
Issue:
W/N Guivencans testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for
being hearsay
Held:
Yes, the Court held that Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected.
Ratio:
To establish estafa, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan,
and various documents consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of
her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each
customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and
(c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were
marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
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opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE AND REVERSES the decision convicting ANNA
LERIMA PATULA of estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her for the
recovery of any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
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1. Whether or not the CA erred in refusing the admissibility of the police report because
the same did not testify in court.
RATIO: Yes
HELD:
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police
investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in evidence, especially
since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation in
evidence. Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the
investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on record.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the
witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness
own perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely
learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the
witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v.
CA, Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which
are entries in official records. In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the requisites
for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records,
thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the
public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which
must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official
information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long
as the above requisites could be adequately proved. Here, there is no dispute that SPO1
Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of
his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge
of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking. Respondents failed to
make a timely objection to the police reports presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to
have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence.
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c. All private complainants filed complaints against Omictin with the NBI for Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa. Before Joffrey Dela Merced, the Supervising Agent of
the Bureaus Counter-Intelligence Division, Mago related that, the previous day,
he was able to contact Omictin, who required him to pay an additional PhP
60,000 for his deployment abroad. The designated place for the payment was
McDonalds EDSA. Thus, the NBI prepared an entrapment operation to arrest
Omictin and provided Mago with PhP 60,000 marked money. On March 9, 2004,
the entrapment operation was set in motion. After receiving the marked money,
Omictin was arrested by the accompanying NBI agents.
d. As a result, separate informations were filed before the Quezon City RTC
charging Omictin with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. The RTC
ruled a decision sentencing Omictin, hence, she appealed to the CA. At the CA,
she alleged that Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but
Elisa Dotenes, who issued a check in favor of Omictin in behalf of
Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not
presented by the prosecution, Guevarras testimony is unsubstantiated and
should be considered as hearsay.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimony of Ambrosio should be considered as self-serving
evidence.
2. Whether or not Guevarras testimony is hearsay.
HELD:
1. No
2. No
RATIO:
The testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as self-serving evidence. The phrase
self-serving evidence is a concept which has a well-defined judicial meaning. Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals clarified what self-serving evidence is and what it is not, thus:
The common objection known as self-serving is not correct because
almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is hearsay
(Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving
statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those
made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a
partys testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not
given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would
encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a partys testimony in
court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for
cross-examination.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent People v. Villarama, where the Court
ruled, x x x [A] self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his
favor. It does not include the testimony he gives as a witness in court. Assayed against the
foregoing standards, Ambrosios testimony is not self-serving and is admissible in evidence.
We can hypothetically assume, as a second consideration, that the testimonies of
Guevarra and Ambrosio are unsubstantiated and self-serving. Still, the unsubstantiated and
self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the day for Omictin, since she admitted,
during trial, the substance of their testimonies. Omictin testified thus before the RTC:
Q
A
So how much did each of the four complainants paid (sic) you for the
processing of their visa?
Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy [Mago], P40,000.00 each.
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P16,000.00
Through her testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by
Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000. Hence, the court
considered the evidence, upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, and denied Omictins
petition.
WEIGHT/SUFFICIENCY EVIDENCE
People of the Philippines vs. Paterno Lasanas
G.R. No. 183829, September 6, 2010
Justice Carpio-Morales
Doctrine: The weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the credibility, nature, and
quality of the testimony.
Facts:
Version of the Prosecution
On August 28, 1994, at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, while the then 14 year old AAA was fixing
clothes inside the room at the second floor of their house at Barangay Mirab, Upi, Maguindanao,
her then 39 year old uncle (first cousin of her mother-herein appellant) arrived and entered the
room, grabbed her by the shoulders and pulled her down. As AAA lay sprawled on the floor,
appellant removed her underwear, undressed himself, went on top of her and forced his penis
into her vagina amidst her loud cries for help.
AAAs pleas were heard by her then 17 year old brother BBB who went to the room, grabbed
and held appellant who, however, told him "Ipus ka lang hindi ka magsuguid sang guinikanan
mo."
AAA was physically examined by one Dr. Loribel Ann Sevilla (Dr. Sevilla) at the Cotabato
Regional Hospital. The examination yielded findings of fresh complete hymenal laceration at 3
oclock and 9 oclock positions.
Version of the Defense
Denying the accusation, appellant proffered alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he
was at his house, which is about 100 meters away from AAAs, preparing dinner which he and
his family partook at 5:00 p.m. His wife Editha Lasanas corroborated his claim as did his first
cousin Heidi Libresa.
Appellant ventured that the accusation was propelled by a petty quarrel that he had with AAAs
mother early that month arising from his refusal to haul corn for her, during which quarrel AAAs
mother "st[umbled] down and collapsed."
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape.
C.A.: Affirmed
Appellant brands AAAs version as not only implausible but contrary to human experience. He
cites AAAs claim that her brother heard her cries for help and went to her rescue while she was
being raped, yet the prosecution never called him to testify.
Appellant goes on to argue that the medical certificate showing hymenal lacerations in AAA
cannot strengthen her claim as Dr. Sevilla who examined her was not presented in court.
Issues:
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1. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimony of
the private complainant?
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt despite the patent weakness of the prosecutions evidence.
Held: No to both.
Ratio: The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as
witnesses. It need not present each and every witness as long as it meets the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
That AAAs brother was not presented does not thus infirm the case for the prosecution for,
among other things, his testimony would have been merely corroborative.
It need not be underlined that the weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the
credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony. That explains why an accused in rape cases may
be convicted solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the victim where such
testimony is clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things, as in AAAs testimony.
Respecting appellants argument that the medical certificate cannot be used to corroborate
AAAs testimony in light of Dr. Sevillas failure to take the witness stand, suffice it to state that
she was no longer available at the time of the trial. The hospitals head of its Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department, Dr. Helen Peralta Yambao, however, identified the signature of Dr.
Sevilla on the certificate.
At all events, a medical examination is not indispensable to successful prosecution of rape.
AAAs testimony on direct examination, standing alone, proves appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Notably, appellant did not cross examine her, sufficient time and opportunity
afforded him notwithstanding, which thus prompted the trial court to declare him to have waived
his right to cross-examine.
As for appellants alibi, it crumbles. On direct examination, he claimed to have been, at about
4:00 p.m. of August 28, 1994, the time AAA claimed to have been raped, in his house preparing
dinner which he and his family partook at 5:00 p.m. following which he slept at 6:00 p.m. On
cross examination, however, he declared that he did not sleep at 6:00 p.m. because the
policemen arrived and went with them.
That appellants alibi fails to persuade especially gains light from the fact that it was not
physically impossible for him to have been at the house of AAA. Recall that his house is only
about 100 meters away from AAAs.
As for appellants insinuation that the charge against him was trumped-up as it could have been
the result of a grudge that AAAs mother harbored against him, it too does not persuade. It is
unnatural for a mother to use her daughter as an instrument of malice or revenge, especially if,
as it did here, subjects a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.
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Contrary to Malates contentions, this Court finds no cogent reason to doubt the veracity of
BBBs testimony.
In cases involving the prosecution for forcible rape, the courts have consistently held that, as a
general rule, corroboration of the victims testimony is not a necessary condition to a conviction
for rape where the victims testimony is credible, or clear and convincing or sufficient to prove
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The weight and sufficiency of evidence
are determined by the credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony.
x x x Her positive identification of the accused as the very same man who had sexual
intercourse with her and with whom she was alone for about three (3) hours in that place
which was not pitch-dark as not to see totally his face, cannot taint her word with
unavoidable inaccuracy on the identity of accused as her real tormentor in those
agonizing hours. She was so certain of him as that man from the time she pointed him to the
police to the time she was asked to identify him at his trial. Strangers to each other, BBB would
not announce to all that herein accused Jessie was her rapist, if she was not sure. His wound
on his left middle finger, the scar it left he even showed while he was on the witness stand, is a
tell-tale sign that it was really he who BBB said was the man with the knife who cut himself
when she struggled to get away from his clutches as he threatened her with that knife. In fact, it
was because of that knife that she fearfully surrendered her body to him and did in submission
what he wanted her to do during all that time she was helplessly alone with him.
Evidently, the trial court had ascertained the truthfulness and credibility of BBBs testimony and
ruled that it was sufficient to convict Malate.
Additionally, Malate was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of BBB. The fact that he
testified not knowing the complainant and that he first met her when he was brought to the
police station the day after the incident argues against the idea of BBB harboring ill will against
him.