Property Cases 3
Property Cases 3
Property Cases 3
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FORENCIA BULING Vda
de TINAGAN, DEMOSTHENES TINAGAN, JESUS TINAGAN,
ZENAIDA T., JOSEP and JOSEPHINE TINAGAN, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners assail the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1994 which
affirmed the decision of the lower court ordering petitioners to
peacefully vacate and surrender the possession of the disputed
properties to the private respondents.
Culled from the record are the following antecedent facts of this
case to wit:
On April 1, 1950, Victoria Sonjaconda Tinagan purchased from
Mauro Tinagan two (2) parcels of land situated at Barangay
Bongbong, Valencia, Negros Oriental. 2 One parcel of land
contains an area of 5,704 square meters, more or less; 3 while
the other contains 10,860 square meters. 4 Thereafter, Victoria
and her son Agustin Tinagan, took possession of said parcels of
land.
Sometime in 1960, petitioners occupied portions thereof whereat
they built a copra dryer and put up a store wherein they engaged
in the business of buying and selling copra.
On June 23, 1975, Victoria died. On October 26, 1975, Agustin
died, survived by herein private respondents, namely his wife,
to
pay
the
following
12
The record further discloses that Victoria S. Tinagan and her son,
Agustin Tinagan, took possession of the said properties in 1950,
introduced improvements thereon, and for more than 40 years,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
occupation thereof in the concept of owners.
Petitioners' own evidence recognized the ownership of the land
in
favor
of
Victoria
Tinagan.
In
their
tax
28
declarations, petitioners stated that the house and copra dryer
are located on the land of Victoria S. Tinagan/Agustin Tinagan. By
acknowledging that the disputed portions belong to
Victoria/Agustin Tinagan in their tax declarations, petitioners'
claim as owners thereof must fail.
The assailed decision of the respondent court states that
"Appellants do not dispute that the two parcels of land subject
matter of the present complaint for recovery of possession
belonged to Victoria S. Tinagan, the grandmother of herein
plaintiffs-appellees; that Agustin Tinagan inherited the parcels of
land from his mother Victoria; and that plaintiffs-appellees, in
turn, inherited the same from Agustin." 29
Taking exception to the aforequoted finding, petitioners contend
that while the 2 parcels of land are owned by private
respondents, the portions wherein the copra dryers and store
stand were ceded to them by Victoria S. Tinagan in exchange for
an alleged indebtedness of Agustin Tinagan in the sum of
P7,602.04. 30
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias,
Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His
estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land
located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of
the instant controversy.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the
right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No.
5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the
co-ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent,
who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
xxx
xxx
Dominador
Sobrevias
Marciano Almario for respondents.
for
petitioners.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, on
appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Sulu in
Civil Cases Nos. 155 and 156 of said court, both instituted by
plaintiffs herein, Arada Lumungo (deceased), substituted by her
heirs, Juhuri Dawa, Kayajuja, Sadatul, Sarapatul, Jaramatul, Alma,
Kalukasa and Vicente, all surnamed Juhuri to recover the
possession of lot No. 871 of the Siasi Cadastre, in the first case,
and in the second, of lots Nos. 892, 893, 894 and 1121 of the
same cadastre. The defendants in case No. 155 are Asaad
Usman, Akmadul and Hada, whereas those in case No. 156 are
Asaad Usman, Fatima Angeles, Hadjaratul Julkanain, Inkiran and
Sitti Haridja, who were subsequently joined by Dominga Usman
and Jose Angeles, as defendants-intervenors.
him and his predecessors in interest on Lots 892, 893 and 894.
Should plaintiffs fail to do so within ninety (90) days from the
date this decision becomes final, the three lots shall be ordered
sold at public auction, the proceeds of which shall be applied to
the P4,500.00 herein adjudged to Jose Angeles, and the balance
to be delivered to the plaintiffs.
Both parties appealed from this decision to the Court of Appeals,
but, later, the defendants withdrew their appeal, which,
accordingly, was dismissed. Thus the only question left for
determination by the Court of Appeals was plaintiffs' appeal from
the trial court's decision, insofar as it sentenced them to pay
P4,500.00 to intervenor Jose Angeles. After appropriate
proceedings, the Court of Appeals reduced this amount to
P2,500.00 and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance
in all other respects, with costs against defendants-intervenors.
The case is now before us upon petition for review
on certiorari filed by the plaintiffs.
After a joint trial of the two (2) cases, the Court of First Instance
of Sulu rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
The pertinent facts are set forth in the decision of the trial court,
which were adopted in that of the Court of Appeals, from which
we quote:
Title of the five lots. Besides, since the Court had already
adjudged in the above-quoted order that Atty. Usman did not
have any claim of possession or ownership over the land, and
that he did not buy the land from Datu Idiris, Atty. Sobrevias
advised his clients that they may buy the lots. Accordingly, a
deed of sale, Exhibits "L" to "L-2", was executed. Upon
presentation of this deed of sale to the Register of Deeds,
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 8986, 8123, 8087 and 8122
were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-419, T-420, T-422, and T-421 were issued in the names of
the plaintifs. Plaintiffs took possession of the property, but they
were allegedly driven from the land. About three years ago, the
defendants left Lots Nos. 892, 893, 894 and 1121. Plaintiffs took
possession thereof. The defendants are still in possession of Lot
No. 871.[[1]]
Defendants maintained in the Court of Appeals that the sale
made by Datu Idiris Amilhussin to plaintiffs Arada Lumungo and
Juhuri Dawa, on September 30, 1952, is null and void because
the lots thus sold had previously been conveyed by Datu Idiris
and Datu Amirul Amilhussin to intervenor Dominga Usman, wife
of defendant Asaad Usman, and because the sale to said
plaintiffs was not approved by the provincial governor of Sulu, as
required by the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu. The
Court of Appeals overruled these objections upon the ground
that the sale to Dominga Usman "did not materialize" and was
"called off" by mutual agreement of the vendors and the vendee,
and that said lack of approval by the provincial governor is a
defense available to the contracting parties only, not to the
defendants herein who are not parties to said transaction. Then
the Court of Appeals went on to say:
Upon the other hand, it is to be noted that when intervenor
Dominga Usman who claimed to have purchased the lots in
planter or sower in bad faith may recover under Arts. 452 and
546, first paragraph, of the Civil Code.
Upon the other hand, the Court of Appeals found as a fact that
when Dominga Usman sold and transferred her rights in and to
the property in question to Jose Angeles "the latter made the
purchase with the knowledge that the property subject matter of
the sale was already in dispute by and between herein
defendants, one of whom is the husband of intervenor Dominga
Usman, on the one hand, and herein plaintiffs on the other."
Angeles was, therefore, aware of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title to
the property in question, which was an easy matter for him to
ascertain, said property being registered under the Torrens
System.[[3]]
Indeed, Jose Angeles is a nephew of defendant Asaad Usman,
and the controversy between the latter and Datu Idiris was a
matter of public knowledge, for Usman was a justice of the
peace, and Datu Idiris had filed charges against him, as such,
with the Department of Justice and the Office of the President, to
which Usman countered by causing the bail bond of Datu Idiris to
be cancelled and his corresponding reincarceration, as well as
the filing of complaints for murder against him. Besides, on
February 2, 1952, or several months prior to the sale to Angeles
on September 30, 1952, Datu Idiris had filed Civil Case No. 87 of
the Court of First Instance of Sulu against Asaad Usman to
recover the lots in question, and the latter stated in that case, on
September 26, 1952, or four (4) days before the aforementioned
sale, that he was not interested in either the possession or the
ownership of said lots and that he had not bought the same from
the former. It may not be amiss to note, also, that at the time of
the alleged sale in his favor, Jose Angeles was a law student;
that, in fact, on August 9, 1957, he entered his appearance as
REGALADO, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision 1 rendered by
respondent Court of Appeals on September 25, 1975 in CA-G.R.
No. 32479-R, entitled "Rosendo del Rosario, et al., PlaintiffsAppellees, versus Mario Ronquillo, Defendant-Appellant,"
affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, and its
amendatory resolution 2 dated January 28, 1976 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court
dated September 25, 1975 is hereby amended in the
sense that the first part of the appealed decision is set
aside, except the last portion "declaring the plaintiffs to be
the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property," which we
affirm, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the Court of
Appeals:
It appears that plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a
registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 34,
Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manila
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of
the Registry of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit "A"). The other
plaintiffs Florencia and Amparo del Rosario were daughters
of said Rosendo del Rosario. Adjoining said lot is a dried-up
portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the
defendant since 1945 which is the subject matter of the
present action.
Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when T.C.T.
No. 34797 over Lot No. 34 was issued in the name of
Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in possession of
said lot including the adjoining dried-up portion of the old
Estero Calubcub having bought the same from Arsenio
Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, said titled lot was occupied by
Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of the
plaintiff on condition that the former will make
improvements on the adjoining dried-up portion of the
Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant
occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as
the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub which
abuts plaintiffs' titled lot. After a relocation survey of the
land in question sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that
defendant was occupying a portion of their land and thus
demanded defendant to vacate said land when the latter
refused to pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy.
However, despite said demand defendant refused to
vacate.
Defendant on the other hand claims that sometime before
1945 he was living with his sister who was then residing or
renting plaintiffs' titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on
the disputed dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub with
a small portion thereof on the titled lot of plaintiffs. Later
in 1961, said house was destroyed by a fire which
prompted him to rebuild the same. However, this time it
was built only on the called up portion of the old Estero
Calubcub without touching any part of plaintiffs titled land.
He further claims that said dried-up portion is a land of
public domain.3
Private respondents Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all
surnamed del Rosario (Del Rosarios), lodged a complaint with the
11
resolution dated January 10, 1990, 17 the Court ordered that DBP
be impleaded as a party respondent.
In a Comment 18 filed on May 9, 1990, DBP averred that
"[c]onsidering the fact that the petitioner in this case
claims/asserts no right over the property sold to Diaz/DBP by the
del Rosarios; and considering, on the contrary, that Diaz and DBP
claims/asserts (sic) no right (direct or indirect) over the property
being claimed by Ronquillo (the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub), it follows, therefore, that the petitioner Ronquillo has
no cause of action against Diaz or DBP. A fortiori from the
viewpoint of the classical definition of a cause of action, there is
no legal justification to implead DBP as one of the respondents in
this petition." DBP thereafter prayed that it be dropped in the
case as party respondent.
On
September
13,
1990,
respondent
DBP
filed
a
19
Manifestation/Compliance stating that DBP's interest over
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139215 issued in its name
(formerly Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of the Del
Rosarios and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135170 of Benjamin
Diaz) has been transferred to Spouses Victoriano and Pacita A.
Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated September 11, 1990.
Petitioner Ronquillo avers that respondent Court of Appeals
committed an error of law and gross abuse of discretion, acted
arbitrarily and denied petitioner due process of law (a) when it
declared private respondents Del Rosarios the rightful owners of
the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub by unduly relying upon
decisional law in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama, ante, which case
was decided entirely on a set of facts different from that
obtaining in this case; and (b) when it ignored the undisputed
facts in the present case and declared the dried-up portion of
Estero Calubcub as a private property.
The main issue posed for resolution in this petition is whether the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub being claimed by herein
petitioner was caused by a natural change in the course of the
waters; and, corollary thereto, is the issue of the applicability of
Article 370 of the old Civil Code.
Respondent court, in affirming the findings of the trial court that
there was a natural change in the course of Estero Calubcub
declared that:
The defendant claims that Article 370 of the old Civil Code
is not applicable to the instant case because said Estero
Calubcub did not actually change its course but simply
dried up, hence, the land in dispute is a land of public
domain and subject to the disposition of the Director of
Land(s). The contention of defendant is without merit. As
mentioned earlier, said estero as shown by the relocation
plan (Exhibit "D") did not disappear but merely changed
its course by a more southeasternly (sic) direction. As
such, "the abandoned river bed belongs to the plaintiffsappellees and said land is private and not public in nature.
Hence, further, it is not subject to a Homestead
Application by the appellant." (Fabian vs. Paculan CA-G.R.
Nos. 21062-63-64-R, Jan. 25 1962). Even assuming for the
sake of argument that said estero did not change its
course but merely dried up or disappeared, said dried-up
estero would still belong to the riparian owner as held by
this Court in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama (CA-G.R. No.
8389, Jan. 8, 1943; 2 O.G. 307). 20
Elementary is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the
review of errors of law, and that said appellate court's finding of
names of the spouses under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T21940 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo.
The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that
the piece of real property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay
Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square
meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No.
7511 and Lot No. 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that
the area of 11,819 square meters of what was Lot No. 7340 has
been in the possession of the defendants; that the area of
14,036 square meters, which was formerly the river bed of the
Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the
possession of the defendants; and that the plaintiffs have never
been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.
After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which
included damages was admitted.
The plaintiffs raised the following issues to be resolved:
1. Whether the change in the course of
the Suague River was sudden as
claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as
contended by the defendants;
2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual,
whether or not the plaintiffs are still
entitled to Lot "B' appearing in Exhibit
damages
and
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO LOT B APPEARING IN
EXHIBIT "4" AND TO ONE-HALF () OF LOT A IN THE
SAID EXHIBIT "4."
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS (p. 42, Rollo).
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the court a quo. Plaintiffs (the petitioners herein) now come to Us
claiming that the Court of Appeals palpably erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court on the ground that the change in the
course of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Appeals held:
This appeal is not impressed with merit.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.
the most part of the year such that when this happens, Lot 821
becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the dried up
bed owned by respondent Manalo. Both courts below in effect
rejected the assertion of petitioners that the depression on the
earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during
part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan
River.
It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are
entitled to great respect, and that they carry even more weight
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 9 This is in recognition of
the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able
to observe first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while
testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of
Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. 10 But whether a
conclusion drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a
question of law cognizable by this Court. 11
In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below
apparently collides with their findings that periodically at the
onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through
the eastern bed of the Cagayan River. The trial court held:
The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the
nature and character of alluvion (Accretion), for it appears
that during the dry season, the body of water separating
the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821, Pls-964) and
the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased
from Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes
a marshy land and is only six (6) inches deep and twelve
(12) meters in width at its widest in the northern tip (Exhs.
"W", "W-l", "W-2", "W-3" and "W-4"), It has been held by
our Supreme Court that "the owner of the riparian land
which receives the gradual deposits of alluvion, does not
result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers (or the sea coast). 22 The Court notes that the
parcels of land bought by respondent Manalo border on the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by
this eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be
deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed
accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to
Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in
the Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land to
respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of the
Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings
to the effect that the land purchased by respondent Manalo
received alluvium from the action of the aver in a slow and
gradual manner. On the contrary, the decision of the lower court
made mention of several floods that caused the land to reappear
making it susceptible to cultivation. A sudden and forceful action
like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated
under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to
the riparian owner.
Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91
hectares. Lot 821 is the northern portion of the strip of land
having a total area of 22.72 hectares. We find it difficult to
suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow
accretion to another lot of almost equal size. The total
landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares
(8.65 hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from
Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964, respectively), in fact even
smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion. The
cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91
ROSENDO
BALUCANAG, Petitioner,
ALBERTO
J.
FRANCISCO
STOHNER, Respondents.
vs. HON.
JUDGE
and
RICHARD
ESCOLIN, J.:
This petition for review of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 67503 calls for a
determination of the respective rights of the lessor and the
lessee over the improvements introduced by the latter in the
leased premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Cecilia dela Cruz Charvet was the owner of a 177.50 square
meter lot located in Zamora Street, Pandacan, Manila, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25664. On August 31, 1952,
Mrs. Charvet leased said lot to respondent Richard Stohner for a
period of five [5] years at the monthly rental of 2140.00, payable
in advance within the first ten [10] days of each month. The
lease contract 1 provided, among others, that:
IV. The lessee may erect such buildings upon and make such
improvements to the leased land as he shag see fit. All such
buildings and improvements shall remain the property of the
lessee and he may remove them at any nine, it being agreed,
however, that should he not remove the said buildings and
improvements within a period of two months after the expiration
of this Agreement, the Lessor may remove the said buildings and
improvements or cause them to be removed at the expense of
the Lessee.
by
the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the
lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal
thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause
any more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary. ...
This article gives the lessor the option to appropriate the useful
improvements by paying one-half of their value, 6 And the lessee
cannot compel the lessor to appropriate the improvements and
make reimbursement, for the lessee's right under the law is to
remove the improvements even if the leased premises may
suffer damage thereby. But he shall not cause any more damage
upon
the
property
than
is
necessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual
law
library
One last point. It appears that while the lease contract entered
into by Stohner and Mrs. Charvet had expired on August 31,
1957, he nevertheless continued in possession of the premises
with the acquiescence of Mrs. Charvet and later, of Balucanag.
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion was thus created
between the parties, the period of which is established by Article
1687 of the Civil Code thus:
Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is
annual; from month to month, if it is monthly: from week to
week, if the rent is weekly: and from day to day, if the rent is to
be paid daily. ...
Under the above article, the duration of the new lease must be
deemed from month to month, the agreed rental in the instant
case being payable on a monthly basis. The lessor may thus
terminate the lease after each month with due notice upon the
Fisher,
for
appellant.
WILLARD, J.:
The plaintiff brought this action for the recovery of a tract of land
in the pueblo of Oas, claiming that it was a part of the public
square of said town. The defendant in his answer alleged that he
was the owner of the property. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and the defendant has brought the case here by
bill of exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
As we look at the case, the only question involved is one of fact.
Was the property in question a part of the public square of the
town of Oas? The testimony upon this point in favor of the
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review emanating from Civil
Case No. Q-93-15266 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 78, entitled "Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (hereafter MWSS) vs. Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club
Inc. (hereafter, CHGCCI), STC (hereafter, SILHOUETTE), Ayala
Corporation, Ayala Land, Inc.(hereafter AYALA) Pablo Roman, Jr.,
purchase,
the
total
price
for
the
subject
property
isP50,925,200, P25 Million of which was to be paid upon
President Marcos' approval of the contract and the balance to be
paid within one (1) year from the transfer of the title to
respondent SILHOUETTE as vendee with interest at 12% per
annum. The balance was also secured by an irrevocable letter of
credit. A Supplemental Agreement was forged between
petitioner MWSS and respondent SILHOUETTE on August 11,
1983 to accurately identify the subject property.
Subsequently, respondent SILHOUETTE, under a deed of sale
dated July 26, 1984, sold to respondent AYALA about sixty-seven
(67) hectares of the subject property at P110.00 per square
meter. Of the total price of around P74 Million, P25 Million was to
be paid by respondent AYALA directly to petitioner MWSS for
respondent SILHOUETTE's account andP2 Million directly to
respondent SILHOUETTE. P11,600,000 was to be paid upon the
issuance of title in favor of respondent AYALA, and the remaining
balance to be payable within one (1) year with 12% per annum
interest.
Respondent AYALA developed the land it purchased into a prime
residential area now known as the Ayala Heights Subdivision.
Almost a decade later, petitioner MWSS on March 26, 1993 filed
an action against all herein named respondents before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking for the declaration of
nullity of the MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement and all
subsequent conveyances involving the subject property, and for
the recovery thereof with damages.
Respondent AYALA filed its answer pleading the affirmative
defenses
of
(1)
prescription,
(2)
laches,
(3)
waiver/estoppel/ratification, (4) no cause of action, (5) non-
II
In failing to consider that the complaint recited six
alternative causes of action, such that the insufficiency of
one cause - assuming there is such insufficiency - does not
render insufficient the other causes and the complaint itself.
The contrary ruling in this regard by respondent CA is
founded entirely on speculation and conjecture and is
constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.
III.
In G.R. No. 128520, petitioner MWSS avers that:
I
The court of origin erred in belatedly granting respondent's
motions to dismiss which are but a rehash, a disqualification,
of their earlier motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative
defense / motion to dismiss. These previous motions were
denied by the lower court, which denial the respondents
raised to the Court of Appeals by way of perfection
for certiorari, which petitions in turn were dismissed for lack
of merit by the latter court. The correctness and validity of
the lower court's previous orders denying movant's motion
for preliminary hearing of affirmative defense/motion to
dismiss has accordingly been settled already with finality
and cannot be disturbed or challenged anew at this instance
of defendant's new but similarly anchored motions to
dismiss, without committing procedural heresy causative of
miscarriage of justice.
IV.
The lower court erred in holding, per the questioned orders,
that plaintiff's cause of action is for annulment of contract
which has already prescribed in the face of the clear and
unequivocal recitation of six causes of action in the
complaint, none of which is for annulment. This conclusion of
public respondent is manifestly mistaken and legally absurd.
V.
II
titles TCT Nos. 213872 and 307655, having been duly issued in
its name. However, as a result of fraudulent and illegal acts of
herein defendants, as described in the paragraphs hereinafter
following, the original of said title/s were cancelled and in lieu
thereof new titles were issued to corporate defendant/s covering
subject 127.9271 hectares. xxx."
Paragraph 34 alleges:
We disagree.
Paragraph 53 states:
" 53. Defendants Pablo Roman, Jr., Josefino Cenizal, and Jose
Roxas as well as defendant corporations (CHGCCI, STC and
Ayala) who acted through the former and their other principal
officers, knowingly inducedand caused then President Marcos
and the former officers of plaintiff MWSS to enter into the
aforesaid undated 'Agreement' which are manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government and which gave the same
defendants unwarranted benefits, i.e., the ownership and
dominion of the afore-described property of plaintiff."
"12. xxx.
The plaintiff has been in continuous, peaceful and public
possession and ownership of the afore-described properties, the
title (TCT No. [36069] 199170) thereto, including its derivative
Paragraph 54 avers:
"54. Defendants Jesus Hipolito and Alfredo Junio, then public
officers, together with the other public officers who are now
deceased (Ferdinand Marcos, Oscar liustre, and Sivestre Payoyo)
knowingly allowed themselves to be persuaded, induced and
influenced to approve and/or enter into the aforementioned
'Agreements' which are grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the MWSS/government and which bestowed upon the other
defendants the unwarranted benefit/ownership of subject
property."
The three elements of a contract - consent, the object, and the
cause of obligation11 are all present. It cannot be otherwise
argued that the contract had for its object the sale of the
property and the cause or consideration thereof was the price to
be paid (on the part of respondents CHGCCI/SILHOUETTE) and
the land to be sold (on the part of petitioner MWSS). Likewise,
petitioner MWSS' consent to the May 11, 1983 and August 11,
1983 Agreements is patent on the face of these documents and
on its own resolution No. 36-83.
As noted by both lower courts, petitioner MWSS admits that it
consented to the sale of the property, with the qualification that
such consent was allegedly unduly influenced by the President
Marcos. Taking such allegation to be hypothetically true, such
would have resulted in only voidable contracts because all three
elements of a contract, still obtained nonetheless. The alleged
vitiation of MWSS' consent did not make the sale null and
void ab initio. Thus, "a contract where consent is given through
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud,
is voidable."2 Contracts "where consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud" are voidable or
annullable.3These are not void as -
RE: Laches
RE: Ratification