Vda. de Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 135216, 312 SCRA 772, 783 (1999)
Vda. de Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 135216, 312 SCRA 772, 783 (1999)
Vda. de Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 135216, 312 SCRA 772, 783 (1999)
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier
issued; and
d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo.
In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.1wphi1.nt
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No.
T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's
adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal
heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo
Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in
1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating
that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose
Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of
the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his
"thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa
and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975
attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
"thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the
loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he
allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration". And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who
allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he
was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
it was one "Benjamin Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the
Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered
in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally
adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the
Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in
judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding
judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.
xxx
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The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the
testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the
following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the
letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the
Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the
subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of
Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v.
Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary
evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact,
such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxx
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Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of
the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying
on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may
be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain
irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with
the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this
certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this
principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we
accepted testimonial evidence in its place.25
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in
the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and
Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years
before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the
first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate
the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this
case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge
Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court
also gave credence to the testimony of respondents handwriting expert, for "the assessment of
the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is
not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente,
who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and
found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which,
if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an
exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule
45.37
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned
Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were
presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on
respondents expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.38 Respondent
Pilapil justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He
contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and
cites the following portion as proof:39
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this
document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard
signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my
findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was]
in the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as
the capital letter "J".43
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been
sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by
Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui. 44
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that
he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open
court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya
insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions
and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore,
Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as
shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. 46 In
the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management 47 in Manila and the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that there was
no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. 49
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda.
de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID
and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Penned by Judge Angel S. Malaya. The case was heard by several judges;
namely, Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P. Barcinas,
Bonifacio C. Initia, and Augusto O. Cledera.
4
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 8, 1999, upon receipt
by the Court of respondent's Memorandum.
7
10
11
12
13
De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, 395, August 7, 1996, per Mendoza, J. See
Rule 130, 5, Rules of Court.
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15
16
17
18
De Vera v. Aguilar, supra, pp. 606-607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, 33 Phil.
87, 89-90, December 24, 1915. See also De Guzman v. CA, supra.
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 103, March 12, 1975, per Makalintal, CJ, citing
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56, March 3, 1922.
31
See Trinidad v. CA, supra; Balogbog v. CA, supra; People v. Borromeo, 133
SCRA 110, October 31, 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.
32
Sec. 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court. Cf. Sec. 5 (bb), Rule 131, 1964 Rules of
Court and Article 220 of the Civil Code.
33
34
36
Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997, per
Panganiban, J.
37
Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, January 25, 1996; Cayabyab v.
IAC, 232 SCRA 1, April 18, 1994.
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40
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45
46
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50